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ABSTRACT 
The study investigates the extent and determinants of greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures 
by FTSE350 United Kingdom (UK) listed companies from both theory and practitioners’ 
views. In accomplishing the aim, the study has the following objectives: (1) to analyse the 
extent of voluntary disclosure of GHG information in annual and sustainability reports of 
FTSE350 companies over a four year period i.e. 2008-2011; (2) to establish whether 
voluntary GHG disclosures are influenced by corporate governance characteristics (board 
size,  non-executive directors, environmental committee, audit committee, ownership 
concentration and director ownership) and firm characteristics (company size, profitability, 
gearing, liquidity and industry); and (3) To investigate whether practitioners consider the 
determinants (as in objective two above) motivates the extent of voluntary GHG disclosures.  
 To accomplish the objectives, the study uses a mixed-method approach on data 
derived from a sample of 215 FTSE 350 companies listed on London Stock Exchange. 
Firstly, an econometric model was developed based on a set of explanatory factors i.e. the 
governance and company characteristics and a dependent variable of disclosure index drawn 
from a multiple GHG voluntary reporting frameworks. Panel regression was then employed 
to examine the relationship between the explanatory factors and the actual disclosures. 
Secondly, through survey questionnaire, company executives were asked to rate their 
perception of the extent to which a list of determinants derived from largely secondary data 
literature influenced voluntary GHG disclosure.      
 The results indicate an increasing trend in GHG disclosures from 2008 to 2011 
perhaps suggesting positive impact of the government initiatives on GHG disclosures in the 
UK. Overall there is more disclosure of qualitative information in particular information on 
company action on GHG and climate change rather than actual emission disclosures. 
Companies have also not been proactive in disclosing quantified estimates of all forms of 
risks emanating from climate change. Results of the econometric model show that there is no 
support for the influence of traditional board characteristics such as Non-executive Directors, 
board size, and audit committee whereas both forms of ownership had a significant negative 
influence. The presence of an environmental committee was only significant in enhancing 
qualitative information and not quantitative information. In addition, as in other voluntary 
disclosures, size plays a vital role in determining the extent of the disclosures and that highly 
geared companies disclose less GHG information than less geared firms. Liquidity and 
profitability have no significant influence.         
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 The survey results suggest that according to the practitioners, board environmental 
committee and firm size are the only determining factors to have received wide support by 
the respondents while all other factors were firmly rejected. The findings that other 
determinants do not influence disclosure of GHG from a practitioner point of view suggests 
the need for an in-depth investigation into the determinants of voluntary disclosures beyond 
the evidence as derived from secondary data based studies.      
 The study contributes knowledge to the voluntary disclosure studies in a number of 
ways. First, through mixed data approach, it has brought additional insights into the 
determinants of GHG disclosures. For example, through the primary survey data approach, 
evidence is documented that confirm and also contradict the secondary data approach 
findings in respect of both some governance and company variables. This suggests the need 
for more research using the mixed-method approach in an attempt to reveal why the results 
contradict. Secondly the results enrich voluntary disclosure literature by bringing disclosure 
determinants evidence through longitudinal data. Insights obtained from both the data 
triangulation and longitudinal study setting will help inform existing debate on policy options 
with regard to GHG emission disclosure. Finally the study contributes to the GHG disclosure 
literature by developing a comprehensive GHG voluntary disclosure index drawn from a 
various reporting guidelines. Such a comprehensive index will help ensure that adequacy of 
company GHG disclosures is assessed based on robust instrument. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction and Overview of Research 
1.0 Introduction 
This research investigates the extent and determinants of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions 
voluntary reporting in annual and sustainability reports of FTSE350 companies in United 
Kingdom for the period 2008 to 2011. Decades of scientific research and related criticism has 
seen climate change, global warming and GHG emissions becoming key phrases that both 
politicians and business captains find hard to ignore or indeed ignore at their own peril (Stern, 
2007; Porter and Reinhardt, 2007; Kolk and Pinkse, 2004). In political circles, scepticism has 
now given way to sensible debates as to what needs to be done to decisively deal with or 
reverse the trend of global warming (Wegener et al., 2013). In this respect, regional bodies 
such as the EU and countries including United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia and 
recently USA have been developing strategies as part of their response to global warming 
(Warren, 2007; Stern, 2007; Wegener et al., 2013). In the same vein, pressure has been and is 
being exerted on businesses to demonstrate their green credentials (Hoffman, 2005; Lash and 
Wellington, 2007; Lee et al., 2013).      
 Particularly, in response to this emerging threat, the UK government introduced a set 
of initiatives known as the Climate Change Programme (Wordsworth and Grubb, 2001). In 
part, these initiatives led to the enactment of the Climate Change Act (CCA) 2008. Among 
other things, the CCA recognises that measuring and reporting GHGs is critical to the fight 
against global emissions, with section 83 requiring the government to issue guidance on this. 
Therefore, the government through Department of Energy, Food and Rural Agriculture 
(DEFRA) issued guidance on GHG emissions measurement and reporting in 2009. DEFRA 
(2009), which is voluntary, aims at supporting UK firms in reducing their contribution to 
climate change. Modelled on the GHG Protocol (2004), the guidance outlines the 
measurement and reporting criteria for GHGs (DEFRA, 2009), and is aligned with other 
voluntary GHG-reporting frameworks, such as International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) 14064-1, a specific standard that details accounting and reporting for GHGs. 
 Under this guidance i.e. DEFRA (2009), firms calculate emissions from activities they 
control (both direct and indirect carbon footprints), then categorise them into three ‘scopes’ 
(with measurement determined by multiplying activity data by emission factors provided by 
the authorities), and finally disclose total emissions (expressed in CO2e tonnes) and the 
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measurement criteria/standard used. The organisation then carries out a strategic analysis of 
its carbon emissions, and discloses actions taken to reduce them and corporate-governance 
processes introduced to manage them, including the opportunities available (e.g. emissions 
trading schemes). Finally, the guidelines call for disclosure of carbon-related risks – both 
physical (e.g. the impact of climate change on company operations) and regulatory (e.g. the 
potential effect of carbon regulation on company operations).   
 Therefore  although other GHG reporting guidance (e.g. GHG Protocol, 2004; Global 
Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure; Carbon Disclosure Project; Carbon Disclosure 
Standard Board; Global Reporting Initiative; ISO 14064-1) already existed, the publication of 
the government-backed 2009 guidance brought momentum and policy clarity to UK 
companies. However, it should be highlighted that reporting is just one of the many policy 
instruments relied upon by the UK government in its bid to meet both international and own 
commitments to attain a carbon constrained future. Through the CCA the UK has legally 
binding target of achieving at least an 80% cut in GHG emissions by 2050 and a reduction of 
at least 34% by 2020 against a 1990 baseline.    
 Nonetheless, despite realisation that the battle against climate change cannot be won 
without genuine and decisive action and accountability by companies who are considered to 
be the main culprits (Solomon and Lewis, 2002), the policy move by most governments and 
the UK in particular, can at best be described as ‘cautious’ preferring firms to do things 
voluntarily than issuing mandatory regulations. Thus since launching its climate change 
program at the beginning of the 21
st
 Century, the UK has shied away from issuing outright 
regulation mandating GHG emission reporting until recently through the Companies Act 
2006 (Strategic and Directors’ Reports) Regulations 2013 when such has been made 
mandatory for FTSE350 companies with effect from September 2013. In the circumstances 
and in the broader context of environmental management, firms have been implementing 
their environmental and climate change strategies and have been communicating the same 
through various mediums like annual reports, sustainability reports and websites. However 
considering the voluntary nature of prevailing regimes coupled with the uncertainty 
surrounding the cost and benefits of engaging in such voluntary initiatives, questions still 
remain as to the extent and what within a firm determines the extent of these voluntary GHG 
disclosures and indeed, what role do existing decision making structures such as board 
mechanisms play in the disclosure decisions (Galbreath, 2010; Peters and Romi, 2012; 
Rodrigue et al., 2013).          
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 There is now a general interest among academic researchers to investigate the 
determinants of voluntary climate change and GHG emissions disclosures and literature in 
this area is steadily growing.  The majority of the studies have examined specific firm 
characteristics (i.e. size, industry, profitability and leverage) and other general contextual 
factors like country of origin, or firms belonging to a country which is a signatory of Kyoto 
Protocol (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al 2009; Stanny and Ely, 2008; 
Stanny 2011; Berthelot and Robert, 2011). Few studies notably Prado-Lorenzo and Sanchez 
(2010), Galbreath (2010) and Peters and Romi (2012) have extended their investigation to 
review the role of governance factors like board size, board committees, non-executive 
directors and ownership structure.      
 Nonetheless, in either setting, the results are often conflicting. For instance, while the 
majority of GHG disclosure studies (Rankin et al., 2011; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; and 
Freedman and Jaggi, 2005) concluded that gearing had an insignificant role in GHG 
voluntary disclosures, Luo and Tang (2011) found that gearing was significantly influenced 
firms to be transparent in carbon disclosure. Similarly, Freedman and Jaggi (2005); Prado-
Lorenzo et al. (2009); Rankin et al. (2011); Cotter and Najar (2011) have found profitability 
to be insignificantly related to GHG disclosures whereas Berthelot and Robert (2012) found it 
to be positively related to GHG disclosures. On governance variables, there is a general 
absence of evidence testing the impact of other known governance characteristics like board 
size, non-executive directors and ownership characteristics.  Of the few undertaken, conflict 
of results is evident.  Berthelot and Robert (2012), Peters and Romi (2011) found evidence 
that presence of an environmental committee positively influences GHG disclosures while 
Rankin et al (2011) did not find any significant relationship.    
  Whilst there may be many reasons for the contradiction in results, the 
variations in sample, research design and proxies used to represent different theoretical 
viewpoints investigated in the studies have been suggested as possible causes in quantitative 
studies on determinants of disclosure (Wallace et al., 1995).   The mixed results have led to 
calls for the use of other research approaches like qualitative approach or use of primary data 
in addition to the predominantly quantitative approach in form of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression to improve our understanding of the determinants of extent of disclosure. 
For example, Beattie and Smith (2012) noted that primary research based disclosure studies 
are rare and yet such research approach can bring enormous benefits to the understanding of 
the motives for disclosure. In particular primary data based studies suggest investigating the 
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determinants of voluntary disclosure using the quantitative approach is inadequate because 
there are other internal contextual factors that may affect disclosure (Adams 2002; Gray et 
al., 2001). Consequently, there have been calls for academic research to begin investigating 
the influence of the specific governance structures on voluntary disclosure using the 
qualitative approach and or employ primary data (Adams 2002; Michelon and Parbonetti, 
2012). 
 
1.1 Research Questions 
In achieving the aim  of the research, three research questions will be answered namely; To 
what extent did FTSE350 companies disclose GHG information between 2008 and 2011?; Is 
the extent of voluntary GHG disclosures influenced by corporate governance characteristics 
(board size, non-executive directors, managerial ownership, and ownership concentration) 
and firm characteristics (company size, profitability, and leverage) and which of the 
determinants of voluntary disclosures as derived from secondary data evidence, in the 
opinion of the Finance Directors, determines the extent of voluntary GHG disclosures? 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
Therefore in an attempt to answer the set research questions and the calls for more studies on 
GHG voluntary disclosures, this research is to investigate the extent and determinants for 
voluntary GHG disclosures by companies operating in the UK from both a theoretical 
(secondary) and practical (primary) viewpoint. The target sample is FTSE350 companies 
over a four year period i.e. 2008-2011 and the focus will be on the following objectives: 
I) To analyse the extent of voluntary disclosure of GHG information in annual 
reports, sustainability reports and websites of FTSE350 companies over a four 
year period i.e. 2008-2011;  
II) To establish whether voluntary GHG disclosures are influenced by corporate 
governance characteristics (board size, non-executive directors, managerial 
ownership, ownership concentration) and company characteristics (company size, 
profitability, and leverage); and  
III) To investigate whether practitioners consider the determinants (as in objective two 
above) motivates the extent of voluntary GHG disclosures.  
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Thus, though there is burgeoning research focussing on climate change and GHG 
emissions reporting, there is still a sense that other aspects like determinants and motivation 
for engaging in these actions remains unexplored (Okereke, 2007; Milne and Grubnic 2011). 
Besides, though it might appear a natural thing to simply extend the motivation and 
determinants as understood from environmental disclosures to GHG emissions disclosures as 
is the case in most studies conducted to date, climate change and GHG emissions needs to be 
handled differently. Thus the importance of establishing the extent and determinants for GHG 
or climate change disclosures is reinforced by the nature of climate change itself. Though 
businesses may strategise to deal with Climate change in the broader context of 
environmental issues, yet climate change is different in that, ‘its impact is global, the problem 
is long-term, and the harm is essentially irreversible’ (Lash and Wellington, 2007, p.3). In 
addition, as noted by O’Dwyer et al. (2005) firms are between a rock and a hard place in as 
far as GHG emissions disclosures are concerned since active environmental and other NGOs 
having mobilised institutional investors to force firms to disclose, they can use the very same 
disclosed information to pressure a firm to change its practices. However neglecting the issue 
is not an option either since that may expose them to potential reputational risk and legal 
liability (Kolk et al., 2008). Thirdly, as discussed above, the contradiction in results reported 
so far means there is still much to be understood in the GHG voluntary disclosures. 
1.3 Importance of UK Context in the Study 
By studying the extent and determinants of GHG voluntary in UK based companies in the 
period between 2008 and 2011 when the government had stepped up its policy instruments 
and rhetoric towards climate change, the study also addresses a long standing issue as to the 
efficacy of voluntary guidance as opposed to mandatory guidance. By investigating extent of 
disclosure over a four year period including one i.e. 2009 when DEFRA guidance was issued, 
the study partly assesses whether firms have responded positively to the 2009 guidance by 
disclosing significantly more GHGs information, and if so whether voluntary (as opposed to 
mandatory) reporting regimes can adequately enable policy makers to influence a desired 
outcome. Proponents of regulation argue that without this, organisations lack incentives to 
voluntarily disclose adequate information; opponents, meanwhile, assert that it is only 
through market forces that optimal disclosure levels are achieved (Gore, 2004). The 
regulatory regime governing information disclosure in the UK has followed the tradition of 
the English law that only principles are laid down and the rest is supplemented by managerial 
discretion (Arnold and Matthews, 2002). However, the 2009 guidance is an exception, giving 
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a detailed account (and even illustrations) of how companies should measure and disclose 
GHGs. The research will also assess whether this achieved the desired outcome. 
1.4 Research Method 
To accomplish the objectives, the study uses a mixed-method approach on data derived from 
a sample of FTSE 350 companies listed on London Stock Exchange. Firstly, an econometric 
model was developed based on a set of explanatory factors i.e. the governance and company 
characteristics listed and a dependent variable of disclosure index drawn from a multiple 
GHG voluntary reporting frameworks. Panel regression is then employed to examine the 
relationship between the explanatory factors and the actual disclosures. Secondly, through a 
survey questionnaire, Company executives are asked to rate their perception of the extent to 
which a list of explanatory factors derived from largely secondary data literature influences 
their level of disclosure. The FTSE 350 was chosen because it is broad enough to cover a 
wide range of industries and it comprises big companies that may set the pace on GHG 
reporting. Brammer and Pavellin (2006) suggest that the use of large companies in a diverse 
range of industries permits a comprehensive review of disclosure and reasonable 
generalisability of results. The period 2008 to 2011 was chosen because it covers two years 
before and after the publication of DEFRA’s 2009 guidance. The total number of firms in the 
sample after excluding financial firms and other companies with no information was 215. 
Financial firms were excluded on the basis that they are subjected to various prudential 
regulations which may materially affect the nature of their capital governance structures and 
that could affect the outcome of this study.       
 For the survey, questionnaires were sent to finance directors of the 215 companies and 
after follow-ups only 69 responded of which 62 were usable. The analysis was in large part 
based on descriptive statistics. In addition, apart from ranking based on mean, based on prior 
literature (Graham et al., 2005; Nauman and Giel, 1995), a modified top two box and bottom 
two box scores were used to explore the pattern of the responses. Using this approach, the 
original five point scale in the surveys was collapsed to increase the clarity of the data for 
reporting purposes.  Scales were collapsed into “bottom two box” and “top two box” scores.  
Bottom two box scores represented the percentage of respondents who selected responses that 
were considered negative i.e. disagree or strongly disagree, taken from the bottom portion of 
the five point scale.  The top two scores represent the percentage of respondents who selected 
responses that were considered positive i.e. agree or strongly agree. The middle column 
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which referred to neutrality formed its own group. Thereafter the summarized results were 
subjected to a t-test between the mean score of each item and its neutral score. 
 
1.5 Summary of Results 
The results indicate an increasing trend in GHG disclosures from 2008 to 2011 but a 
particularly significant increase is evident between 2009 and 2010. The results also suggest 
that governance mechanisms (director ownership and ownership concentration) and company 
specific control variables (size, gearing and industry) have a significant effect on GHGs 
disclosure. However, there is no support for the effect of other corporate governance 
mechanism (board size, audit committee, environmental committee and non-executive 
directors) and company specific control variables (profitability and liquidity).  
 To the contrary, results using the primary data indicate that with the exception of 
environmental committee, none of the corporate governance variables is a significant 
determinant of GHGs disclosure. In fact, company specific variable (size) is the only 
significant determinant of GHGs disclosure that is confirmed by both secondary and primary 
data approaches. However when the survey responses are compared to the regression 
outcome of the respondents firms for 2011,  the two research methods are consistent in that 
they both suggest that corporate governance characteristics (board size and proportion of non-
executive directors) do not determine the extent of GHG disclosures. On the other hand, the 
two research approaches yielded different results for the other two corporate governance 
variables (ownership concentration and directors’ share ownership). While a negative and 
significant influence of both ownership structures through secondary data is found, a strong 
rejection is recorded by the survey respondents.      
 The results have implications on both disclosure literature in general and GHG 
voluntary disclosure in particular. The contradiction of results from both secondary and 
primary data approach suggest the need to extend the understanding of disclosure 
determinants through various means other than just through secondary data. The fact that 
GHG disclosure extent could not be explained through traditional board structures may 
suggest that the sample has homogenous board structures and hence there is need to extend 
investigation into the role of governance beyond those structures stipulated as minimum 
requirements in governance code. In this respect studies may focus on particular 
characteristics of environmental committees or specific departments/personnel responsibility 
for environment and climate change.         
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1.6 Contribution of Research 
The study contributes knowledge to the voluntary disclosure studies in a number of ways. 
First, through mixed data method approach, it has brought additional insights into the 
determinants of GHG disclosures. For example, through the primary data approach, evidence 
is documented that confirm and also contradict the quantitative secondary data approach 
findings in respect of both some governance and company variables. This suggests the need 
for more research using the mixed-method approach in an attempt to reveal why the results 
contradict. In recent times, studies have tended to narrow their focus to GHGs disclosures and 
hence literature in this respect is growing (See Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Freedman and 
Jaggi 2005; Rankin et al., 2011; Stanny, 2011). But just like prior studies focussing on social 
and environmental studies, these studies have heavily relied on testing secondary data against 
a disclosure index with the aim of analysing determinants of these disclosures. None have 
attempted to investigate whether the determinants as derived by secondary data are indeed 
perceived as such in practice.         
 One advantage of primary data is that it is able to obtain specific responses to a 
specific question unlike in secondary data where a proxy for say size might represent a 
number of things ranging from political costs, firm risk to environment influence (Graham et 
al., 2005). It is intimated that appreciation of a firm's determinants of disclosures through 
both secondary data and a survey is helpful in setting up any policy on GHG disclosures. 
Thus, evidence abound that the understanding of firm specific determinants is of paramount 
importance in helping identify and highlight challenges or obstacles to the success of future 
regulatory efforts (Peters and Romi, 2010). Tauringana (1997) also pointed out that one 
importance of disclosure is that they help recommend or influence policy. But policy 
adoption itself is as a result of the application of a choice among several alternatives and 
often a highly subjective judgemental process which in the opinion of Graham et al. (2005) 
can only have a sound grounding if supported by empirical evidence emanating from primary 
data. In the circumstances, one contribution of this research is that its results will help shape 
policy on GHG disclosures at a time when the government is stepping up efforts to ensure 
more GHG disclosures by companies (Defra, 2010).     
 Methodologically, related to the use of primary data, the other contribution of the 
study comes in its longitudinal setting. The relevance of longitudinal studies is well 
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documented in literature. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) noted that a longitudinal study helps 
to highlight an evolving pattern of disclosure over time and the results of Rajab (2009) on 
risk disclosures in the UK, though done based on random years chosen over time supports 
this view. Other social and environmental disclosure studies have also displayed an 
increasing pattern in response to a number of factors specifically regulation and public 
pressure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).       
 Thirdly, the fact that the results failed to establish a statistical relationship between 
most governance characteristics and GHG disclosures could be food for thought for 
authorities responsible for governance as to whether there is need to re-look at how 
governance can become more encompassing to serve the needs of wider stakeholders. 
Arguably, the results contribute to growing debate/calls about a rethink relating to what 
constitutes the ‘best practice’ in terms of board structure when it comes environmental and 
GHGs issues (Walls et al., 2013). Wang and Hussainney (2013) argue that it is still debatable 
as to whether certain governance characteristics as advocated by UK corporate governance 
guidance are effective in improving narrative reporting in general. Mallin et al. (2013) argues 
that there is no straightforward path between corporate governance to social and 
environmental disclosures hence called for innovative techniques of proving the link.
 Finally, the study also contributes to the understanding of the extent of GHG 
voluntary disclosure practices by UK firms in the context of the requirements from a number 
of GHG disclosure guidance. Although there is burgeoning research on GHG disclosures 
(e.g., Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Peters and Romi, 2010; Rankin et al., 2011; Stanny, 2011), 
most of it is based on only one GHG disclosure guidance (i.e. GRI, 2002). Rankin et al. 
(2011) criticised the use of one environmental disclosure guidance such as GRI to measure 
GHG disclosure arguing that it is too limited for quantifying GHG disclosures. Day and 
Woodward (2009) also made a similar observation regarding GRI (2002) calling it ‘a generic’ 
document that does not address a specific sector. It is therefore intimated that by measuring 
GHG voluntary disclosures based on a number GHG disclosure guidance is more appropriate 
in that it will show the extent to which UK firms disclose internationally recommended GHG 
information on a voluntary basis. 
 
1.7 Limitation of Study 
The study’s main limitation lies in the sample size and response rate of the survey 
questionnaire. The exclusion of financial companies coupled with exclusive focus on UK 
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only meant the ability of generalising the results is limited. The sufficient but low response 
rate also meant that the study was limited on the extent to which triangulation could have 
been performed.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis comprises nine chapters which are organised as follows. The present chapter 
(chapter one) gives an overview of the research while chapter two presents the different 
theoretical frameworks within which voluntary disclosures have been investigated. Thus the 
main principles of the theories and their suitability to the current study are discussed in this 
chapter. Theories discussed include agency, stakeholder, legitimacy, signalling and 
institutional theory. Through the theories, the chapter attempted to highlight whether both 
information asymmetry and social political pressure can explain the voluntary nature of GHG 
disclosures.          
 Chapter three discusses existing literature on the determinants of voluntary disclosure 
in particular environmental and GHG emissions. In this chapter a list of determinants i.e. 
governance and firm characteristics as drawn from previous studies is presented and their 
applicability to current study analysed. The chapter also notes areas where the literature has 
been limited and merits further research like the present one. What is apparent in this chapter 
is the lack of empirical studies investigating the GHG emission voluntary phenomenon in the 
UK. In the same vein it is noted that since the GHG disclosure are still emerging, little 
attention has been given to disclosures in annual reports, sustainability reports and websites 
instead the majority has concentrated on CDP reports. In particular the chapter has also 
documented absence of studies testing primary data in relation to GHG voluntary disclosures.
 Chapter four was dedicated to discussing the nature and importance of GHGs. It 
tracked down the science behind GHGs, their social and economic consequences on 
humanity and efforts taken both local and international to decisively deal with the emission 
problem. In discussing the science behind global warming, due recognition was made to the 
criticism levelled against the threat of global warming. By highlighting specific features of 
GHGs and international efforts to reduce them, the chapter intended locate the role of 
reporting or disclosures in light of nature of the GHGs. The last part of the chapter is 
dedicated to discussing UK efforts in dealing with climate change and strategies put in place 
to reduce emissions.          
 In chapter five a discussion of the various reporting frameworks for GHG emissions is 
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presented. Being a voluntary disclosure study, concentration is only on those frameworks that 
are not mandatory. The differences and similarities of these frameworks are analysed and this 
leads to the construction of the disclosure index used in the current study.  
 Chapter six details the methodology used in this study. To begin with the research 
philosophy underpinning the study is identified and briefly discussed and then the population, 
sample and data description is given. After the data description, different aspects of the 
research index methodology are explained. The justification for the disclosure index drawn is 
also described. Various statistical tests undertaken to ensure data normality have also been 
explained.  Thereafter the nature of the primary data and questionnaire used to collect the 
same is explained. A description of ethical issues surrounding the survey and the pilot study 
conducted wind up the chapter.       
 Chapter seven discusses the main hypotheses to be tested in the study. The hypotheses 
are discussed and drawn based on the literature covered in chapter two and the theoretical 
framework presented in chapter three. In total, a list of eleven hypotheses based on board 
size, non-executive directors, audit committee, environmental committee, ownership 
concentration, director ownership, company size, gearing, profitability, liquidity and industry 
has been presented. The model and definition of the variables are also explained in this 
chapter.          
 Chapter eight discusses the results of the both the econometric model and the survey 
questionnaire. Descriptive statistics aimed at exploring the parameters of the data set have 
been presented and this leads to a detailed discussion of the main regression results as well as 
other alternative models. Thus as part of robustness, other alternative models were explored 
and these include decomposition of the dependent variable into qualitative and quantitative 
disclosures and another model containing a transformed industry dummy variable. After 
discussing the secondary data results, the chapter goes on to present results from the survey 
questionnaire. Based on the respondent sample, a regression model is run and the comparison 
of the results is carried out at the end of the chapter.     
 Chapter nine summarises the whole thesis with particular focus on methodology and 
results. It then discusses contribution; implications and limitations of the research and 
finishes by suggesting avenues which future research might concentrate upon.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Framework behind Disclosures 
 
2.0 Introduction 
Evidence from prior studies suggest that firms disclose environmental and GHG information 
due to a number of incentives (Gray et al., 1995a). Indeed, a number of theoretical 
frameworks have been used to understand the phenomenon of disclosure incentives and 
explain the managerial motivations to disclose beyond what is required by say legislation. 
There is however an admission that no single theory satisfactorily explains the motivations or 
determinants as such some researchers have had to rely on a number of theories to explain the 
phenomenon while others have had to choose a theory based on their hypothesis (Freedman 
and Stagliano, 1992; Linsley and Shrives, 2000; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Both Adrem 
(1999) and Cormier et al. (2005) point out that disclosures are a complex phenomenon that 
cannot be explained by one single theory. Nonetheless, though the theoretical frameworks 
used differ, the outcome regarding the disclosure motivations have consistently pointed to 
similar conclusions hence arguably underlying the fact that theories do not tell a researcher 
what to do rather they highlight what is possible to do and not. In the circumstances, this 
thesis will adopt a number of theories in attempting to explain the determinants of voluntary 
GHG disclosures. Despite this, however, emphasis will be placed on those theories which are 
deemed relevant in explaining GHG disclosures since though theories are complementary; 
they are not equal in their interpretation capabilities of a particular phenomenon (Van der 
Laan, 2009).           
 Regardless of the subject of the disclosure study, empirical research results largely 
explain that the desire to overcome information asymmetry problem, signal quality and 
knowhow, meet stakeholder expectations and gain society acceptance are among the 
significant forces behind disclosure decisions. A well informed market is believed to benefit a 
firm through lowering cost of capital and debt while good cooperation with stakeholders and 
society is deemed critical in securing going concern prospects of a firm.    
 In this thesis which focuses on the extent and determinants of GHG disclosures in the 
UK, a number of theories for instance legitimacy, stakeholder, agency, signalling, and 
proprietary cost will be used to understand what motivates firms to disclose GHG 
information in a predominantly voluntary environment.  Environmental and GHG disclosure 
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can be construed as part of dialogue between a firm and its stakeholders and as a way of 
gaining society approval (Gray et al., 1995a). This is arguably important in the present era 
when climate change has become both socially and politically sensitive. Such disclosures can 
also help overcome the information asymmetry problem currently synonymous with 
environmental and GHG issues. Thus there is evidence of information gap between firms and 
their stakeholders notably investors who are increasingly demanding more information on 
climate change and GHG emissions. Understanding how firms are minimising the 
information asymmetry problem to benefit their companies through accurate valuation of 
their companies will also help illuminate the tension brought by proprietary costs of 
disclosure that can potentially shape the disclosure decision. Since companies do not exist in 
a vacuum, the influence of its operating environment on its disclosure decisions can also be 
paramount as such this can be analysed by institutional theory.    
 The rest of the chapter is dedicated to a detailed discussion of the theoretical 
frameworks for disclosure. Theories covered are legitimacy, stakeholder, institutional, 
agency, stewardship, signalling, and proprietary cost. Within the discussion of the theories 
justification is made as to why some theories are particularly useful in the study of voluntary 
disclosures of GHG information taking into account their usage in prior studies and the 
particular features of the subject matter i.e. GHGs. At the end, a summary of the chapter is 
presented.            
2.1 Legitimacy Theory 
Despite being widely used by social researchers in explaining disclosures, legitimacy theory 
is a seldom known phenomenon prone to many varied interpretations. This concurs with the 
observations of Hybels (1995) who observed that many use legitimacy theory but few define 
it. But according to Suchman (1995 p 574) 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.           
 Earlier, Lindblom (1994) defined legitimacy as a condition conferred upon a firm 
when its value system is congruent to that of the society. The fundamental element in both 
definitions is that legitimacy only exists when a firm’s actions are deemed acceptable in the 
society in which it is part of. Therefore, legitimacy theory emphasizes the importance of 
societal acceptance in ensuring a company’s existence and survival (Ghazali, 2007). The 
author argues that an underlying assumption of legitimacy theory is the belief that a 
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company’s actions can intentionally or unintentionally have an impact on the surrounding 
environment in which it operates, and in case a company’s activities are perceived to have 
detrimental or negative effects on the environment, the society may adversely react by 
boycotting the company’s product or pressuring for government intervention. In this case, 
firms legitimatise their activities through various means, including communication with 
relevant stakeholders (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).      
 Patten (1992) suggested that legitimacy theory largely relates to the concept of ‘social 
contract’ between a firm and the society. The existence of an organisation is threatened if it is 
regarded as violating the implied social contract. This is usually believed to take place 
whenever the society members are not satisfied with the behaviour of the concerned company 
(Milne and Patten, 2002). Failure to comply with society expectations leads to revocation of 
the contract (Deegan and Rankin, 1996).      
 Suchman (1995) explained that legitimacy exists in different layers one of which is 
the macro theory of legitimisation where institutional legitimacy theory falls. The 
institutional legitimacy theory focusses on how businesses/organisational structures gain 
society acceptance which then makes their operations/actions be deemed natural and relevant. 
Below the institutional level is the organisational legitimacy which explains the mechanism 
within which an organisation seeks approval or avoids sanctions from different groups in a 
society. Such approval or sanction avoidance is considered necessary to ensure continued 
existence (Kaplan and Luland, 1991). Within the organisational legitimacy, a firm 
relationship with its society is seen from a resource dependency framework. In this context, 
Tilling and Tilt (2010) states that legitimacy just like money is viewed as a resource which 
the organisation strives to have in abundant supply often through competition. Inadequacy of 
legitimacy, just like any other resource might lead to catastrophic consequences i.e. demise of 
an organisation. While other resources are firmly under the control of the firm, legitimacy is 
largely controlled by a firm’s collective stakeholders. This then means that in search of 
legitimacy, an organisation should identify how each stakeholder influences the flow of 
resources crucial to the organisations’ establishment, growth, and survival. Critical 
stakeholders identified in literature are media, public, financial community and the state. 
Disclosure literature has recognised that one of the reasons companies try to manage their 
legitimacy is because it ‘helps to ensure the continued inflow of capital, labour and customers 
necessary for viability’ (Neu et al., 1998, p. 265).     
 Since legitimacy is a significant determinant of a firm’s going concern, it is deemed 
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as more of a process rather than an end in itself as such a firm goes through various stages of 
gaining legitimacy. The first stage is that of establishing legitimacy and this is gained through 
competency, customer service, adequate financial resources (see Tilling and Tilt, 2010) and 
more importantly through meeting socially constructed standards of quality and desirability 
as well as performing in accordance with accepted standards of professionalism (Hearit, 
1995). After establishing legitimacy the next stage is maintaining legitimacy and this is done 
through maintaining performance and providing assurance of going concern and overcoming 
any potential obstacles (Ashford and Gibbs, 1990). Tilling and Tilt (2010) notes that society 
needs are dynamic and change over time as such maintaining legitimacy means that a firm’s 
performance keeps pace with these changes. In demonstrating its dynamism and 
responsiveness to society changes, a firm makes a number of disclosures as a means of 
communicating with society (Tilling and Tilt, 2010).      
 As firm activities respond to society changes, a need may arise to extend legitimacy. 
This is a third stage and is considered crucial in winning confidence of ‘wary potential 
constituents’ (Ashford and Gibbs, 1990). The final phase is the defence legitimacy where a 
firm provides responses when its legitimacy is threatened or challenged (Tilling and Tilt, 
2010).  This is a phase that is common to most organisations because as Hearit (1995 p.3) 
noted, in a capitalist society, ‘Satisfaction of stockholder interests often occurs at the expense 
of community concerns while, conversely, responsibility to the larger community often occurs 
at the expense of the stockholder’. In defending its legitimacy, Lindblom (1994) identified 
four strategies which a firm can use as follows: Change itself (The organisation seeks to 
inform and educate the ‘relevant publics’ about actual changes within the organisation); 
change the public (The organisation seeks to change the perceptions of the ‘relevant publics’, 
but does not see a need to change its own behaviour); manipulation (The organisation seeks 
to deflect attention from issues of concern to other issues. For instance, highlighting links 
with charity); and misrepresentation (The organisation may go as far as not being totally 
truthful about its activities that are of concern to the ‘relevant publics’).  
 Generally what triggers an organisation action in defence of its legitimacy or gaining 
one is the expectation gap that exists between its activities and society norms/expectations. 
O’Donovan (2002) explained that legitimacy expectation gaps can occur in a number of ways 
including a situation where a firm performance has been consistent but society 
tastes/expectations have changed due to evolving pattern of times. Hrasky (2012) argued that 
climate change falls in this category because firms are challenged to change course as issues 
31 
 
of climate change have risen in prominence in the society. Ihlen (2009) argued for the need to 
close the legitimacy gap that had been brought by increasing awareness of climate change 
issues by society. In the circumstances, Hrasky (2012) argued that legitimation response is 
required not because companies have altered the nature of operations but society/stakeholder 
tastes and awareness had implicitly altered the social contract existing between a firm and 
society. While climate change poses both direct and indirect risks to a firm as identified by 
Lash and Wellington (2007), Hrasky (2012) argued that it is the indirect risk brought by 
threat of regulation that might trigger legitimacy responses. There is growing evidence that 
firms are influenced by its stakeholders to incorporate environmental and sustainability issues 
in their strategic plans as a way of gaining legitimacy (Bouteligar, 2009; Sprengel and Busch, 
2011). Unerman (2008) explained that as stakeholder concerns about environmental issues 
increased, corporations were being forced to change their strategies as a matter of enhancing 
their reputation.          
 According to Suchman (1995), through its forms of responses, an organisation can 
gain three forms of legitimacy namely Pragmatic legitimacy; Moral legitimacy and Cognitive 
Legitimacy. Pragmatic and moral legitimacy involve and rely on discursive interaction with 
organisation audiences and this is where disclosures come in. Pragmatic legitimacy thrives on 
making attempts to win the support of organisation audiences and this may take the form of 
presenting an image of an organisation that is truthful and trustworthy and promoting values 
highly regarded by the audience and this is where firm efforts might be mere symbolism. 
Moral legitimacy is one that comes out of a positive assessment of an organisation’s activities 
by its stakeholders. Suchman (1995) subdivides moral legitimacy into two as follows: 
consequential legitimacy where stakeholders regard an organisation as legitimate by judging 
what it has actually achieved and procedural legitimacy where legitimacy is accorded based 
on the means/strategies used to achieve the end result. In the circumstances, if an organisation 
is to use disclosures as a means of gaining moral legitimacy then it is required that the 
disclosures reveal both the outcomes and the processes used to generate the outcomes 
(Hrasky 2012).          
 Therefore it is in the context of both moral and pragmatic legitimacy responses that 
the need for assessing the legitimacy intent of disclosures becomes an issue. In cases where 
disclosure take the form of attaining legitimacy symbolism, then an organisation actual 
activities remain shrouded in secrecy despite being viewed as open to reporting. This leads to 
less scrutiny by stakeholders.        
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 Empirically, the legitimacy theory has been tested. Particularly, in light of the 
resource based view, researchers tend to conclude that the survival of an organisation 
depends on legitimate standing in a society (Deegan and Unerman 2011; Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975). It is intimated that those deemed legitimate are considered trustworthy and 
hence deserve the support of the society while those who lack legitimacy are deemed less 
trustworthy and hence cannot easily access society resources (Hrasky 2012). Corporate 
legitimacy is seen in the way a firm interact with its society in a bid to fulfil its obligation of 
the ‘society contract’. A firm is deemed in breach of its society contractual obligations if its 
activities are seen to be inconsistent with society expectations (Deegan 2002). Corporate 
activities that contribute to environmental damage or climate change constitute those 
activities that stakeholders may find unacceptable. Firms use disclosure of information in 
order to shape stakeholder opinion of its activities in its favour so as to minimise its risk of 
being labelled illegitimate. Some researchers have documented evidence of increasing 
environmental disclosures in circumstances where a firm’s image of legitimacy was at stake 
(Deegan and Gordon 1996). Patten (1992) reported that after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 
Alaska in 1989, firms related to that industry and/or incident significantly increased the 
amount of environmental disclosures in their annual reports immediately after the spill. 
Deegan et al. (2002) found evidence that when there is growing public concern in a particular 
sector and firms are becoming under public pressure through media reports, they resort to 
increasing disclosures as means of demonstrating their legitimacy. The need to gain 
legitimacy in environmental matters is important because as Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 
(2009) argued, environmental legitimacy comes with it increased access to resources and 
improved exchange conditions with suppliers and more importantly protection from society 
scrutiny which reduces the risk of society sanction.       
 In addition, the theory has also been relied upon in climate change and GHG 
disclosure studies. Freedman and Jaggi (2005) in their study of the impact of Kyoto protocol 
on GHG disclosures argued that legitimacy was most befitting theory for disclosures because 
results of previous studies have been consistent with the proposition of this theory and hence 
it was the fundamental basis in their study of GHG disclosures in which results confirmed the 
same. Anbamozhi et al. (2011) also backed the views that the theory help explain GHG 
disclosures arguing that the public has now come to rely on words and numbers in annual 
reports as proxies of communication mode in which a company establish legitimacy. Again, 
KPMG (2008) survey noted increasing levels of climate change disclosures which reflected 
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the growing prominence of climate change issues in the society. However, there was an 
observation that disclosures were of wide variety and type. Hrasky (2012) suggested that the 
variations which KPMG (2008) reported could be a reflection of the nature of legitimation 
responses which differs from firm to firm. In legitimation responses, Hrasky (2012) states 
that responses can either reflect measures taken within the firm or mere symbolism without 
action on the subject matter. Other studies have reached similar conclusions. For instance 
Soobaroyen and Ntim (2013) concluded that ‘corporations adopt a combination of substantive 
and symbolic disclosures in a bid to achieve specific types of organisational forms of legitimacy and 
this mix of substantive and symbolic disclosures is altered as a result of changes in contextual events, 
stakeholder salience and the corporation’s current state of legitimacy’.    
 This seems to be a common practice in the environmental and climate change 
disclosures. For instance, Kolk et al. (2003) found evidence that despite the increase in social 
and environmental disclosures, the majority of the disclosures were merely statements of 
intent and concerns rather than reflecting actions done by the firm. The same was with carbon 
disclosures which according to CDP (2009) were little informative and highlighted disparities 
between what companies were seen to be doing through the disclosures and what actually 
science demanded in cutting emissions. Prior to CDP (2009), Kolk et al. (2008) in a study of 
CDP disclosures of Global 500 from 2003 to 2007 noted that information disclosed by firms 
was inadequate to investor needs explaining that in most cases firms did not go beyond 
merely responding to the questionnaire. Stanny (2011) likened the CDP disclosures to the 
analogy as described by Hopwood (2009) that firms may just use it as a corporate veil 
simultaneously providing a new face to the outsiders while hiding the true picture of an 
organisation. Stanny (2011) interpreted this as a confirmation of legitimacy theory since 
firms disclose the minimum possible just to meet stakeholder expectations and gain 
legitimacy (Cho and Patten, 2007).       
 Notwithstanding the fact that legitimacy theory helps to provide useful insight into the 
disclosure behaviour of companies, there is observation by some researchers that the theory is 
still underdeveloped as such very difficult to use it in making specific predictions (Owen, 
2008; Mobus, 2005). Thus the fact that the theory relies on management perception of the 
social contract (which differs greatly depending on individuals) means its predictive ability is 
limited to the extent of the managerial perceptions. Even in circumstances where managers 
agree that there is legitimacy threat, reasonably it is expected that different managers will 
adopt different strategies on available options which again makes predictability difficult.  
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Deegan ( 2002) argued that there are many ‘gaps’ not explained by the theory like whether in 
practice legitimating activities really work and in what form should they be communicated. 
Further, despite heavily relying on the concept of ‘social contract’ the theory is vague in 
explaining how managers become effectively aware of the community concerns and hence 
the terms of the purported ‘social contract’ (Owen, 2008). But Gray  et al. (1996) indicates 
that the explicit terms of the social contract can be specified by legal requirements yet as 
Deegan (2002) the implicit terms of the same remain unspecified and this may be a subject of 
managerial instinct.         
 Besides there is still uncertainty as to how managers can determine whether ‘relevant 
publics’ are conferring the much needed legitimacy (Deegan, 2002). Moreover others argue 
that the emphasis on ‘relevant publics’ means a shift in focus on the society as a whole as 
suggested in social contract to paying attention to particular segments of the society which in 
effect is the domain of stakeholder theory. Considerably the fact that emphasis is placed on 
‘relevant publics’ suggests that the notion of a ‘homogeneous society’ as assumed in 
legitimacy theory does not hold since as Nue et al. (1998) pointedly argued that in a society 
some stakeholders might be effective in demanding disclosures than others (Laine, 2009). 
Legitimacy theory is also considered inadequate in explain the nature of the disclosures as to 
whether they promote transparency and accountability. In this respect Deegan and Rankin 
(1996) argued that sometimes legitimising activities might be very misleading as managers 
are intentionally manipulating public perception. Indeed results from some prior studies like 
Guthrie and parker (1989) and Adams et al (1995) suggest that legitimacy theory fails to 
sufficiently explain the levels of disclosure or non-disclosure of environmental information. 
  Limitations aside, legitimacy theory helps explain partly the motivation for 
disclosures and so it still remains a viable theory for voluntary disclosures.  Deegan (2002) 
argued that legitimacy theory, while in need of some refinements, provides a foundation for 
understanding how and why managers might use externally-focussed reports to benefit an 
organisation. Climate change being an issue affecting the world society as a whole and 
demanding transparency and accountability on every player, this thesis will rely on 
legitimacy theory to understand the motivation behind voluntary disclosures.  
 
2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory views an organisation as an entity through which numerous and diverse 
participants accomplish multiple but not always congruent goals. Freeman (1984) work on 
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strategic management and stakeholder approach is what is believed to have laid the 
foundation of the stakeholder approach to disclosure studies.  Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines a 
stakeholder in an organization as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
accomplishment of that organization’s goals’. Stakeholders are categorised as either primary 
stakeholders i.e. those who controls resources critical to the survival of the firm 
(shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers and regulators) or secondary 
stakeholders i.e. those with the power to mobilise public opinion for or against a firm (media, 
consumer advocacy groups and environmental lobby groups) see (Clarkson, 1995). 
  Ullmann (1985), motivated by lack of a comprehensive theory to explain the 
motivation behind social responsibility disclosures which led to conflicting results, developed 
a conceptual framework from the stakeholder theory of management popularised by Freeman 
(1984). Freeman (1984) conceptualisation of the stakeholder theory was in the context of how 
an organisation’s decision making is to an extent affected by the presence of groups other 
than stockholders. Building on Freeman’s work, Ullmann (1985) attempted to draw 
relationship among social disclosure, social and economic performance. This was done 
through a three dimensional model comprising stakeholder power, firm’s strategic posture, 
and firm economic performance. Under stakeholder power, stakeholder influence is linked to 
level of stakeholder control of resources required by a firm thereby arguing that a firm’s 
response to stakeholder demands will be commensurate to its needs of resources controlled 
by the stakeholder.  As part of response, a firm may use disclosures to manage stakeholder 
demands. Dierkers and Antal (1985) argued that disclosures of social and responsibility 
information provide a basis for dialogue with various business constituencies.  Strategic 
posture describes how a firm’s key decision makers respond to the call for social demands. A 
response that include more social responsibility activities is described as active and if a 
company does not develop specific social programs to meet stakeholder demands then it is 
described as passive. When the response is active then more disclosures are expected. The 
third dimension posits that meeting the social responsibility demands is very much dependent 
on the economic viability of the firm meaning that given certain levels of stakeholder power 
and firm posture, sound economic performance can determine the social disclosures. 
 Despite the famous works of Freeman (1983) and Ullmann (1984) on stakeholder 
theory, some researchers still questioned the theoretical foundation and clarity of the theory 
arguing that what Freeman had done was merely stating a strategic management technique 
than developing a viable alternative theory of the prevailing norms of profit maximisation at 
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the time. In bringing clarity to the argument of stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) explained that the stakeholder theory should be understood to exist in three forms as 
follows; 
Descriptive/Empirical: This is where the theory has been used to explain specific corporate 
characteristics/behaviours (Brenner and Cochran, 1991; Clarkson, 1991). It places much 
emphasis on the past, present and future of the organisation.  
 Instrumental: In conjunction with empirical form, the theory is also used to draw 
connections or lack of it between management and traditional corporate objective i.e. 
profitability. Studies in this respect conclude that adherence to principles of stakeholders 
helps a firm achieve its ultimate objectives of profitability and growth (Preston and Sapienza, 
1990; Barton et al., 1989; Aupperle et al., 1985; Kotter and Heskett, 1992). This however 
does not attempt to explain the cause effect relationship explicitly.   
 Normative: In this sense the theory is used to define the function of the organisation 
including identification of moral or philosophical guidelines for the management of a firm 
(Carroll, 1989; Marcus, 1993). Here the stakeholders are to be treated as an end rather than a 
means to achieve an end as such they are expected to participate in the future direction of the 
firm (Evan and Freeman, 1988). The normative argument rests on the contemporary 
pluralistic theories of property rights like utilitarian, libertarianism, and social contract which 
when viewed together, post that a property owner does not have the exclusive rights of the 
property but that the same fundamental rights accorded to the owner also gives other groups a 
moral right or stake in the company.  It is in this respect that the responsibility of 
management is to select resources and direct resources to obtain benefits for all legitimate 
stakeholders.          
 According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), the three concepts of stakeholder theory 
are dependent on one another in that under descriptive, relationships are explained as 
observed in reality and this is supported by instrumental perspective which asserts that if 
certain practices are performed then certain expected level of results can be attained. The 
authors, however, argue that the foundational basis of the theory is normative perspective 
since the descriptive accuracy of the theory assumes that the normative concept is correct. 
However, when pursuing the moral obligations of satisfying various stakeholders interests in 
a company in order to achieve the ultimate aim of improving a firm’s financial performance, 
what is of prime importance is having the various stakeholders assured that their interests are 
being met. Hill and Jones (1992) suggest that one way this may be done is through 
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monitoring devices like public reporting that reduces the information asymmetry problem. 
The monitoring is meant to curb the opportunistic behaviour of managers which might 
disadvantage other stakeholders. However, as noted by Donaldson and Preston (1995), for the 
concept of aligning managers interests to those of other stakeholders to work then there is 
need for managers to operate within the concept of normative stakeholder theory which 
recognises that moral goals for an organisation are equally important in the realisation of the 
ultimate goal of profit maximisation.       
 Therefore, in the circumstances, the basics of stakeholder theory state that a firm’s 
success is not only dependent on managing its relationship with shareholders but rather a 
group of stakeholders with shareholders being a significant part of this group. In managing 
stakeholders a firm needs to take into account a number of their concerns one of which could 
be relating to environment/climate change. In managing stakeholders, Kent and Chan (2003) 
advises that a firm needs to differentiate between social issues and stakeholder issues because 
what matters in a firm/stakeholder relationship is the consideration of issues affecting a 
particular stakeholder rather than the whole society.     
 Considerably, for a viable firm-stakeholder relationship to exist there is need for 
accountability on the part of the companies not only to shareholders but to other stakeholders 
as well. From an accounting perspective, accountability refers to the responsibility of an 
organization to disclose information regarding its performance, financial position, financing 
and investing, and compliance in order to assist users to make appropriate decisions (An 
Australian Accounting Research Foundation (1990) cited An et al., (2011). In aiding 
accountability, the stakeholder theory has two branches namely the ethical (moral) branch 
and the positivist (managerial) branch (Gray et al., 1995a). The ethical branch is where all 
stakeholders have certain intrinsic rights (e.g. fair treatment) that should be protected by the 
organization, and the management should engage in activities for the benefits of all 
stakeholders (or seek to satisfy the demands, needs and expectations of all stakeholders) 
(Deegan, 2000; Deegan and Samkin, 2009). In this branch of stakeholder theory, the 
emphasis is on equal treatment of stakeholders hence an organisation is expected to disclose 
same information to all stakeholders even if a particular stakeholder is not interested in using 
it (Deegan and Samkin, 2009). The positivist (managerial) branch states that an organization 
needs to identify the group of stakeholders with a focus on those considered to be significant 
or powerful to the continued viability and success of the business (Roberts, 1992; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).         
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 Such identification is considered critical because as Mitchell et al. (1997) put it, it is 
not the equal consideration of all stakeholders interest that pays off rather it is the selective 
focus of the interests of those stakeholders with higher levels of power, legitimacy and 
urgency that help a firm manage its stakeholders. Therefore according to Gray et al. (1995a), 
the use of stakeholder theory in social accounting research is from the perspective of 
management who are concerned about a firm’s survival. In search for continued existence the 
firm seek the approval of its stakeholders which change over time and require a firm to keep 
on adapting its activities to these stakeholder interests. A company thus uses social 
disclosures as part of managing these expectations (Gray et al., 1995a). Roberts (1992) noted 
that CSR was being used successfully as a medium of managing stakeholder relationships.
 Precision as to how the firm-stakeholder relationship evolves over time is explained 
from the resource dependency theory. Frooman (1999) used the notion of resource 
dependency theory and explained that stakeholders can either use withholding or usage 
strategies in trying to force a firm align to their interests. Withhold is simply discontinuing 
provision of the resource whereas usage is by providing the resource with conditions 
attached. These strategies are implemented in two ways: direct – where a stakeholder directly 
manipulates flow of resources to a firm or indirect where stakeholders alters their dealings 
with other stakeholders of a firm like suppliers in a bid to put pressure on the firm. Frooman 
(1999) then identified four power levels in which a relationship between a firm and its 
stakeholders might exist. Elijido-Ten et al. (2010) summarised them together with the choice 
of strategies adopted as below: 
(1) Low interdependence – when neither the firm nor the stakeholders are dependent on each 
other. In this case the stakeholder will choose indirect withholding strategy to influence the 
firm. 
(2) Firm power – when the stakeholder is dependent upon the firm. Here the stakeholder will 
choose indirect usage strategy to influence the firm. 
(3) Stakeholder power – when the firm is dependent on the stakeholder. In this case, the 
stakeholder will choose direct withholding strategy to influence the firm.  
(4) High interdependence – when the firm and the stakeholder are interdependent. Here the 
stakeholder will choose direct usage strategy to influence the firm.    
 It is assumed that a firm will only respond to stakeholder demands depending on how 
their relationship depends on each other in terms of resources. Therefore to maximise their 
outcome it is incumbent upon stakeholders to choose the right strategy of enforcing a firm to 
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act in their interests. Frooman’s analogy implies that the lower the level of stakeholders’ 
dependence on the firm, the more likely that the stakeholder can afford to withhold a critical 
resource (Elijido-Ten et al., 2010). Disclosure of information is seen as one way in which 
firms respond to the stakeholder demands meaning that when the more powerful stakeholders 
demand more accountability, there is high probability that the firm will increase its 
disclosures to meet the demands. Nue et al. (1998) documented evidence to the effect that 
organisations were responsive to the demands of the more powerful ‘relevant publics’. Tang 
and Luo (2011) also hypothesised using stakeholder theory and argued that variation in 
disclosures is partly explained by an organisation’s efforts to match stakeholder influence and 
power which vary over time. They further articulated that the theory’s explanatory power is 
enhanced when seen as being complementary to legitimacy theory since the core incentive of 
managers in engaging stakeholders is to gain legitimacy.    
 Despite its wide popularity and further attempts to clarify the theory, there is still 
some criticism as to the validity of the stakeholder theory. As pointed out, critics argue that 
there is still no theoretical background for the influence of stakeholders on a firm noting that 
what Freedman (1984) did was to simply develop a management technique. While stating 
that the economic model of the firm had failed to accurately explain the behaviour of a firm, 
Freeman(1984) did not provide an alternative theory to explain the phenomenon that a firm is 
beyond the concept of a ‘resource conversion entity’ impacted by both internal and external 
actors (Key, 1999). Thus apart from identifying the existence of internal and external parties 
to a firm, stakeholder theory as conceptualised by Freeman(1984) fail to explain the 
dynamics existing within these relationship as is expected of any theory. Hence since 
stakeholder theory provides new framework without logic and causality of the variables then 
it cannot be relied upon to explain or predict the behaviour of a firm. Realising this 
inadequacy, other researchers like Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) and Jones (1995) have 
suggested that stakeholder theory rests on the foundation of contract theory. Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) also tried to attach the theory of property rights to stakeholder theory and 
stated that stakeholder theory could only be fully explained in normative perspective. But 
Weiss (2000) even questions the rationale of attaching property rights theory to stakeholder 
noting that in a capitalist society an individual has the right to set up business and operate 
without further sanctioning by society and that in the event society or the member of the 
society i.e. stakeholder feels hard by the actions of the firm then they have the right to legal 
redress. In this set up it means the company’s moral obligation is the same any member of the 
40 
 
society is expected to abide by hence no need to place moral restrictions on the exclusive 
rights of company owners.          
 In addition, the fact that some stakeholders have the ability to relate to the firm in 
multiple forms (e.g. an employee can also be a consumer or a member of an association that 
deals with the organisation at the same time) means that mere identification of their existence 
as done by Freedman gives little insight of what actually happens in practice.  Rowley (1998) 
suggested viewing stakeholders as a network while Donaldson and Preston (1995) suggested 
identifying stakeholders according to their interests noting that in practice it is difficult to 
categorise stakeholders just by the existence. The stakeholder theory does not also take into 
account the full effects of the environment on a firm instead it arguably over assumes that a 
firm’s environment is its stakeholders. Thus preoccupation with stakeholders has made the 
stakeholder theory unable to take into account the impact of environment on the business. 
The theory actually presents a firm as being in control of its surrounding and hence sets itself 
in sharp contrasts to other theories like institutional theory as developed by Dimaggio and 
Powell (1983).         
 Despite the criticism however, stakeholder theory has been widely used by social 
researchers. Key (1999) attributes this to the fact that the theory provides clarity as to whom a 
firm is responsible. Thus though it has previously been recognised that there is gain in 
demonstrating awareness to operating environment needs but questions still remained as to 
whom this awareness should be directed and this was clearly addressed by stakeholder 
theory.             
 The need to identify particular stakeholder interests needs no emphasis since in 
practice the interests of stakeholders conflict and overlap and hence it is left to management 
to resolve the conflicts and balance the overlaps (Jensen, 2001). For instance, the area of 
environmental performance is often in conflict with profitability (Macve and Chen, 2010). 
Tang and Luo (2011) added that the changing pattern of the operating environment also 
means that management should master the art of balancing both short term goals and long 
term success of business noting that changes in say regulation/public opinion in sensitive 
areas like carbon and environment might mean a change of power in stakeholder hierarchy 
necessitating adjustment of firm response to stakeholder demands.   
 Climate change and indeed management of GHGs require careful consideration of 
stakeholder expectations. Consumers are becoming increasingly aware of the devastating 
impact of GHG emissions as such are demanding firms to be environmentally responsible in 
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their activities. Investors are demanding all risks relating to climate change be accounted for 
and disclosed properly. The CDP is a demonstration of their quest for more information on 
climate change. Regulators, while grappling in the dark as to what viable option to adopt in 
the fight against climate are always keen on understanding what firms are doing to control 
emissions so as to determine where policy intervention might be needed to compliment firm 
efforts. Particularly in the UK, the CCA (2008) required the UK government to assess 
whether reporting of GHG emissions be mandatory as a way of consolidating efforts in the 
fight against climate change. The fact that other studies for instance Freedman and Jaggi 
(2005) found influence of a country’s commitment to Kyoto on climate change disclosures 
means that firms must always take into count the changing demands of government as a 
stakeholder. A number of lobby groups exist aiming at forcing firms perceived to be 
irresponsible polluters to change their behaviour. This then means that while a firm might 
have a number of initiatives meant at enhancing its legitimacy from the society as whole, 
such initiatives might only be beneficial to a firm if they successfully consider the demands 
of stakeholders carefully. 
 
2.3 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory as used in organisation research is believed to be based on the 
foundational works of Zucker (1977), Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983). The theory is premised on the assumption that organisations respond to pressures 
from institutional environments and adopt structures/procedures that are being socially 
accepted as being appropriate. Zucker (1977) primarily addresses the notion of how authority 
become institutionalised within and organisation whereas Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued 
that organisational choices are often not a reflection of efficiency but rather an attempt on the 
part of the organisation to act in the generally accepted manner which helps the organisation 
to defend itself against perception of irrationality. The informal institutional pressures 
emanate from industry leaders, peers and networks and help a firm to align its behaviour to 
those prevailing within its environment. In this respect, Pfarrer et al (2005) suggested that 
faced with uncertainty regarding the consequences of certain firm behaviour, a firm might 
often take a lead from how industry peers have dealt with the same situation.  
 With the organisational tendency to conform to predominant norms and traditions, the 
theory predicts that such behaviour will lead to homogeneity in structures and practices by 
organisations and that the same will be considered legitimacy benchmarks for any player 
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within the industry. This similarity in form and processes is what DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) termed as ‘Institutional Isomorphism’. However it should be highlighted that the 
social structures and processes in the understanding of institutional theory gain meaning and 
stability in their own right without due consideration to the ultimate end of the processes 
(Lincoln, 1995). This then means that firms in particular industry might have similar 
reporting pattern of say environmental issues merely to hedge against criticism but not to 
improve accountability or management of the impact of their activities.  
 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) categorised the pressures faced by organisations into 
three namely mimetic, coercive, and normative. Mimetic forces are pressures to copy other 
organisations activities, systems, and structures and this arises when there is uncertainty or no 
clear course of action. The uncertainty leads a firm to check competitor/peer actions and 
some researchers have documented evidence that in uncertain times, firms tend to copy after 
similar but larger or successful firms (Deephouse, 1996; Haveman, 1993; Greve, 2000). 
Ashworth et al (2007) explained that Mimetic forces are often behind the adoption of certain 
management practices for which there is little empirical evidence of performance benefits. 
Considerably this means that when industry leaders chart a course of action regarding a 
particular threat or new phenomenon facing their industry, other firms in the same industry 
might respond by simply imitating what these industry leaders are doing. Suchman (1995) 
argued that firms may be motivated to imitate a particular practice even if it has un known 
economic benefits because of the desire to gain social legitimacy which help guarantee the 
long term survival of the firm. According to Lewis et al. (2013), the decision to disclose, is 
both fraught with uncertainty and strategically important as the information is relevant to and 
acted upon by investors, customers, regulators, and non-governmental organizations. With 
climate change, reporting of GHGs by firms in a particular industry might therefore follow a 
similar pattern as a result of mimetic forces.      
 Coercive forces refer to external pressures exerted largely by regulatory regimes or 
other agencies on a firm to follow a prescribed preferred system. The pressure might also be 
as a result of contractual obligations restricting a firm to act in a particular pattern. These 
forces symbolises political pressure rather than technical pressure. Scott (2001) noted that the 
state’s ability to impose its will upon organizations through the use of sanctions is a major 
regulatory mechanism of control and one that can induce conformity. Arguably, in the UK, 
the introduction of DEFRA (2009) could be seen as a form of political pressure into 
indirectly forcing companies to adopt a particular preferred form of reporting GHG emissions 
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even if the guidelines are voluntary.  There are however arguments to the effect that coercion 
might deter voluntary action by companies. Thus in circumstances where non-compliance is 
punished firms may opt to hide deviant behaviour for fear of experiencing similar punishment 
like colleagues thereby making coercion counterproductive (Pfarrer et al., 2005). 
 Normative forces are those pressures emerging from professional standards or a 
professional community within the network of the organisation. These forces highlights the 
fact that a firm is expected to conform to professional standards deemed legitimate in a 
particular field in which the firm operates. These standards are communicated through 
education and specialised training and accreditation. Professional ties or networks within an 
industry acts as self-policing mechanism and has what Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) 
termed ‘trickle down’ effect which makes the firms be persuaded to pursue similar actions as 
their colleagues. Eldman et al. (1992, 1999 cited Pfarrer et al., 2005) found evidence that 
professionalism ties in the legal field had helped diffuse informal practices regarding firm 
arbitration procedures into de facto ‘laws of the land’ even though no formal laws regarding 
these procedures had ever been passed.        
 There is some criticism to the theory.   Critics warn that emphasis on the fact that over 
time due to imitation organisations become identical assumes that organisations are passive 
recipients of their environments which is not the case in reality (Suddaby, 2010).  In fact 
DiMaggio (1988) warned on the overemphasis by some researchers to explain organisational 
similarities using institutional theory arguing that organisations are not prisoners of their 
environments and that through entrepreneur spirit organisations can satisfactorily respond to 
its operating environment demands.        
 There is also criticism that institutional theory does not go far incorporating the role 
language and individuals can play in organisational processes. Thus both persuasive language 
and the nature of individuals assuming various roles in an organisation can affect its response 
to the environment. In this respect, institutional theory is criticised for predominantly 
concentrating on external influences on an organisation while neglecting the internal 
factors/dynamics that might affect whether an organisation will align to its environment or 
not. This is supported by the views of Rao and Giorgi (2006) who explained that 
organisations are interpretive mechanisms that filter, decode and translate semiotic social 
systems. Institutions are replicated through periodic activities of individuals as such the role 
of humans in organisational reaction to its environment needs no emphasis. Evidence 
emerging from current research suggests that managerial characteristics play a crucial role in 
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determining how an institution react to its external pressures more especially those relating to 
environmental issues (Lewis et al., 2013).      
 Criticisms aside, literature has evidence that based on institutional theory, mimetic, 
coercive, and normative forces influence firms to adopt environmental strategies including 
reporting (Lewis et al., 2013). Scot (1995) stated that environmental reporting could be 
deemed as a structure and practice that become institutionalised over time. Cormier et al. 
(2004) argued that adoption of an environmental policy by industry leaders might force other 
companies to follow suit whether symbolically or genuinely. Such adoption might be in line 
with mimetic action by a firm and not a reflection of economic driven choices.  
Environmental reporting is more susceptible to imitation because due to its sensitivity, 
managers might opt to imitate industry leaders/peers as a way of deflecting criticism on their 
practices. Reid and Toffel (2009) find that firms in the same institutional field react similarly 
to activist groups and government pressures while Cho and Patten (2007), note that firms 
operating in more environmentally destructive industries are more likely to provide 
significant disclosure of their environmental performance. In a study of the determinants of 
environmental disclosures in 337 firm year observations German firms using multi-
theoretical lens, Cormier et al. (2004) tested the influence of institutional pressures. The 
authors found that among other things, environmental disclosure quality was conditioned by 
the industry and that imitation and routine determined the disclosure quality as well. The 
results also indicated that the companies’ environmental reporting had a converging pattern 
over time and that companies were more interested in disclosing pollution abatement 
information than other environment information. Another study by Sampaio et al. (2011) 
investigating the influence of Vale S.A. mining company disclosures on the other companies 
in the industry, noted that indeed the disclosures of the company had significant influence on 
its peers disclosures. Their study analysed 45 annual and sustainability reports of Brazilian 
companies over a five year period i.e. 2005-2009 using regression analysis.   
 In the circumstances, in this study it is considered that institutional theory will have 
tremendous influence in determining GHG disclosures. Climate change being a sensitive area 
and seemingly costly to institute management systems to manage and report, the temptation 
on the part of the managers to imitate disclosures practices from industry peers is high. The 
current set up regarding mechanism combating climate change makes a recognition of the 
fact that other industries are carbon-intensive as such much in terms of mitigating efforts is 
expected from them. Therefore this suggests that the influence of industry practices on 
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disclosure of GHG information is paramount. Besides, there is a wide variety of voluntary 
disclosure guidelines which if companies adopt different guidelines might result different 
patterns of disclosures. Hence, arguably any similarity of the disclosures in companies over 
time might be explained by institutional theory.  
 
2.4 Agency Theory 
Agency theory discusses the impact of the principal-agency relationship arising due to 
separation of management and ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morris, 1987). 
Delegation of authority is the dominant characteristics of the modern day organisation. This 
has made it possible for security holders (shareholders and debt holders) to be different from 
those who manage the organisations thereby leading to an ‘agency relationship’. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), defined agency relationship as: 
.....a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent.       
 Two main assumptions underpin the agency theory namely: Individuals are of utility 
maximisers hence given an opportunity, agents will pursue actions that maximises their 
personal welfare at the expense of principals and; that individuals are rational and capable of 
taking unbiased decisions. Rationality then implies that individuals take into account the self-
interested motivations of others in their decision making.    
 Based on the assumptions, the agency theory states that if the individual’s acts are 
guided by self-interest then differences in self-interests will produce conflicts which result in 
agency costs being incurred by the parties involved. In a shareholder-manager relationship, 
these costs include loss of equity value if shareholders perceive managers to be acting out of 
line and the costs of monitoring and bonding managers so as to ensure they act in the 
perspective of the shareholders. Thus going by the agency assumptions, loss of share price is 
an opportunity loss for managers because it can be interpreted as shareholders reacting to 
managers’ self-interested behaviour and reflecting the same in the price. Other agency costs 
arise due to the presence of debt holders. These costs are mainly borne by shareholders and 
they include costs relating to asset substitution and under-investment which might see wealth 
transfer from shareholders to debt-holders. Like shareholders, debt holders are also rational as 
such they incorporate these agency costs in the price they pay for the debt.  
 Initially, the agency costs are assumed to be borne by the shareholders. Therefore, to 
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mitigate the share value loss and align managerial interests to theirs, shareholders might 
intensify monitoring managerial behaviour which then results in monitoring costs. The role of 
monitoring is often performed internally by the board of directors or through use of external 
analysts who analyse information possessed by management (Healy and Palepu, 2001). But 
Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that these costs might ultimately be borne by managers since 
their remuneration might be discounted by the same costs. Realising that monitoring costs is 
discounted in their remuneration, managers put in place mechanisms to help them act in 
accordance with shareholder interests with the hope of minimising these costs hence in the 
process they incur other costs known as bonding costs. Bonding costs may sometimes take 
the form of providing more information to shareholders. Healy and Palepu (2001) noted that 
it is always the case that management have more information than outside investors which 
leads to information asymmetry problem which increases the agency problem.  Disclosure of 
information minimises the agency problem and reduces the agency cost. Managers engage in 
the disclosures when they perceive that the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs incurred 
through the agency problem (Ness and Mirza, 1991). 
 Nonetheless in practice, effective monitoring has been a challenge for most 
shareholders. This is so in cases where ownership is highly diffused so much so that 
shareholders become so dependent on management on their information needs.   Apart from 
monitoring, principals may also design and offer incentives to management to limit the 
interest diversion (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These incentives include schemes which tie 
managerial compensation schemes to firm performance outcome like share price (McColgan, 
2001). Thus when part of managerial wealth is tied to shareholder wealth, the agency 
problem is minimised since both parties have a common goal.    
 There are also arguments that managers’ self-interested behaviour can be mitigated by 
well-functioning capital and labour market. Share value loss which might trigger a hostile 
takeover might be a deterrent to managers acting in their own interest. In case of a takeover 
then an efficient labour market will mean underperforming managers being replaced. But 
takeovers are sometimes costly and take long time to conclude which then puts their 
corrective ability in question (Jensen and Rubak, 1983). Others also suggest that there is an 
internal monitoring mechanism within a firm among various managerial levels because every 
manager realises that their destiny is tied to the collective performance of the firm as a whole 
which is normally a contribution from different individuals.    
 Studies have found that disclosure of information say in intellectual property help a 
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firm reduce information asymmetry and costs (See Oliveira et al., 2006 and White et al., 
2007). Ness and Mirza (1991) tested the social disclosures in 1984 annual reports of 131 
leading British companies and found that a positive relationship existed between the oil 
industry and the environmental disclosures. Their results were seen to be consistent with 
agency theory in that management were increasing disclosures to improve their welfare.  
 In this study, while testing the traditional factors of voluntary disclosures as found in 
literature, emphasis will be placed on the ownership and board structures. This is appropriate 
because institutional investors have shown keen interest in climate change risks/opportunities 
and in response firms have been reorganising their boards to reflect the pressure being 
exerted on them by the former. Such pressures are a reflection of the agency problem notably 
information asymmetry which then prompts management response. For instance, Peters and 
Romi (2012) in a study of GHG disclosures argued that creation of structures like 
environmental committees on the board is one way of trying to overcome agency problem 
and align shareholder interests to those of managers. They further argued that sometimes 
creation of these board committees and hiring of specialised positions like corporate 
sustainability officers could be a way of creating a perception of a firm’s sustainability 
strategy in order to gain legitimacy but not necessarily empowering these portfolios to 
achieve their goals. This is a form of symbolism. The authors further stated that by merely 
acting as symbols a firm may not have incentive to disclose more GHG information since the 
purported structures are achieving their aim. For instance, Rankin et al. (2011) examined the 
relation between voluntary adoption of environmental committees and the probability of 
GHG disclosures in Australian firms, as well as the extent and credibility of that disclosure, 
and find no association.       
 Nonetheless recognition is made that agency theory has some limitations which might 
affect predictability of the disclosure behaviour. Band (1992) argued that Agency theory 
reduces the complex nature of human behaviour in an organisation to a series of contracts 
between principal(s) and agent and exclusively considers the avoidance of responsibility by 
agents as self-interested behaviour. This is a huge underestimation of the human dynamics 
more so that principals are also human beings with their own self-interested motivations. 
Again in the bilateral contracts envisaged by agency theory, principals are presented as being 
at the mercy of the agents who appear to know exactly how much he can perform. In reality 
this may not be the case because in some cases agents gain their useful skills whilst on the job 
or through specialised training. Such human capacity development is within the influence of 
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the principal which if used to affect the career progression of the agent can materially alter 
the nature of relationship between the parties. The mechanisms used to overcome the agency 
problem have also come under criticism. For instance, the monitoring function meant to limit 
the managerial self-interested behaviour is performed by the board of directors which is one 
of the corporate governance mechanisms. However in practice it has been established that the 
effectiveness of the board is very much dependent on the relative power of the members 
which in cases of a dominant CEO presence is severely undermined (Band, 1992).   
 
2.5 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory, framed largely as a counterweight to agency theory, posits that there is 
no conflict of interest between managers and owners and that the ultimate aim of governance 
is to find mechanism and structure that promote the most effective coordination between the 
two parties (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The underlying assumption of the theory is that 
managerial interests are aligned to those of the owners and that managers tend to be benign in 
their actions (Donaldson, 2008). In this set up the principal stands to benefit since there is 
lower economic incentives and monitoring which reduces transaction costs on their part.  
Like the agency theory, man in stewardship theory is assumed to be rational only that here 
unlike in agency theory, a rational man is presented as perceiving greater utility in 
cooperative behaviours than in self-serving interests (Davis et al., 1997).   Being a steward, it 
is believed that the manager has intrinsic motivation and draws satisfaction from achievement 
of collective rather than individual goals. The emphasis on intrinsic motivation rather than 
extrinsic motivation implies that the manager acting as a steward will view organisational 
success as their own.         
 According to Donaldson and Davis (1991), the decision to act as a steward or agent in 
a corporate relationship is made by the manager and is shaped by both situational and 
psychological factors. Situation factors include an involvement-oriented management system 
or a control-oriented management system; collectivistic culture or individualistic one; low 
power culture or when corporate governance gives them authority and discretion. 
Psychological factors include having higher-order motivations, better disposition to identify 
with the objectives of the firm, value commitment orientation, and greater use of personal 
power as a basis to influence others (Davis et al., 1997). Apart from these factors, it is also 
anticipated that the expectation that each party has over the other will influence the nature of 
the relationship (Pastorizo and Arino, 2008).      
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 With stewardship theory in place, the role of the board, CEO and board chairman in a 
corporation becomes under scrutiny. Thus where managerial interests are aligned to those of 
the owners then stewardship theory advocates for the minimal role of the board since board 
mechanisms like separation of CEO and chairman are put in place as a way of solving agency 
problems which are ‘non-existent’ in stewardship theory. In line with strategic management 
thinking which suggests that shareholder returns could be improved when the CEO is given 
effective control of the organisation then stewardship theory advocates that the roles of CEO 
and board chair be occupied by one person (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In the same vein, 
stewardship theorists argue that superior corporate performance is associated with the 
majority of inside directors because they ensure more effective and efficient decision- making 
which in turn contributes to shareholder profit maximisation (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  In 
this respect the theory is in direct opposition to the notion in agency theory which highlights 
the separation of CEO and board chairman roles as the hallmark of board independence and 
an indication of improved monitoring. The role of governance mechanisms in stewardship 
theory is to ensure that executives are empowered to implement plans for corporate 
performance (Donaldson, 1985). In justifying the proposition of the theory, Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) investigated whether firms with CEO duality in USA had superior performance 
to those with separation of roles between CEO and board chairman. Their results failed to 
provide support for agency theory but provided some support for stewardship theory in that 
firms with CEO duality had a positive but insignificant influence on firm performance. The 
authors then argued that the results meant that CEO duality does not in any way negatively 
affect the performance of a firm.      
 Stewardship theory has some limitations. The process to which whether to act as an 
agent or steward is believed to be a product of psychological or situational factors but there is 
no attempt to explain what happens when the factors conflict and more importantly the 
underlying mechanism as to what motivates a manager to opt for one position to the other is 
not explored (Pastoriza and Arino, 2008). The assumption that becoming an agent or a 
steward is a rational choice made at a single point in time has been questioned in that at what 
point does one know that they have become a steward and that such simplification 
undermines the role long term relationship plays in the decision making process of the 
manager.           
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2.6 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory fundamentally addresses the problem of information asymmetry in an 
organisation. In social science studies, the theory is built on the seminal work of Spence 
(1973) who used the concept of the labour market to demonstrate how job applicants signal to 
prospective employers.  According to Spence (1973), high quality job applicants signal 
through high education papers and resumes distinguishing themselves from low quality 
applicants. Thus, the employers lack information about the quality of the applicants as such 
the applicants acquire education to signal their quality and reduce information asymmetry 
which often hampers the selection ability of the prospective employers.  In this instance, 
education is used as a means of communicating the unobservable characteristic of the job 
applicant (Weiss, 1995).        
 Applying the signalling model in a firm set up, Kirmani and Rao (2000 cited Connelly 
et al., 2011) categorised firms into high quality ones and low quality ones stating that high 
quality firms know their quality but such information may not be known to outsiders like 
customers and investors hence the availability of information asymmetry. The authors then 
suggested that in these circumstances, a high quality firm is motivated to disclose when 
benefits accrued to it are higher after signal than would otherwise be and at the same time the 
benefit of signalling for low quality firm should be lower than would be without signal. Thus 
the ultimate aim of the signal is to indicate a certain quality which if understood by the 
receiver, would positively affect their decision making perception of the signaller.   
Information plays a vital role in the decision making of an individual as such it is believed 
that in a seller and buyer relationship, a buyer values a product based on the weighted 
average perception of product which is basically shaped by information he has (Morris, 
1987). It is therefore argued that a seller whose products are of a higher quality stands to 
benefit if she signals the same to the buyer because with such information the buyer values 
the product appropriately. To be effective, the signal should be difficult to be imitated by the 
low quality sellers. Signalling will be an iterative process which continues as long as the 
higher in price obtained exceeds the signalling costs (Morris, 1987).   
 There are a number of ways in which companies can signal information about 
themselves. Among those, voluntary disclosure of positive accounting information (e.g. CSR) 
is considered to be one of the most effective (Ross, 1979; Watson et al., 2002; An et al., 
2011). Signalling theory can also be used to achieve the objectives of other theories. For 
instance a firm can choose voluntary disclosure of information to signal its compliance with 
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society norms as a way of gaining legitimacy (An et al., 2011). In the same manner a firm can 
manage the expectation of stakeholders through signalling in disclosures.   
 The case of signalling could also be behind the voluntary disclosures of GHG 
information. Firms may be disclosing more to signal to those investors who are looking for 
credible information regarding climate change risks for their decision making. Berthelot and 
Robert (2012), in a study of climate change disclosures for Canadian oil companies, partly 
used signalling theory to predict the behaviour of firm disclosures arguing that a firm with 
well-founded good news is bound to disclose information voluntarily to differentiate itself 
from one with bad news. In contrast, a firm which is in possession of information detrimental 
to itself is unlikely passionate to disclose the same to its stakeholders and more so if the 
stakeholders are not already aware of such information (Dye, 1985).    Disclosures could also 
be used as a signal to regulators that business are doing enough already and hence no need of 
intervention in form of regulation in any manner.     
 Nonetheless, there are a number of weaknesses with the signalling theory. Connelly et 
al. (2011) argued that though a widely used theory in social sciences, the tenets of the theory 
are still unknown and requires further development. Again as noted, for Signalling to have a 
predictive power, the signal must be difficult to imitate. This assumption is derived from the 
biological sciences where signalling is used mostly in the animal kingdom. Imitation in the 
animal world is difficult but the same cannot be true in the human controlled corporate world 
where imitation is the order of the day. The assumption categorising firms as high quality and 
low quality is also somewhat faulty since in reality institutions does exist in continuum not in 
dichotomy. Connelly et al. (2011) also adds that the fact that the theory emphasises the 
intentional signalling of positive information means that the role of unintentional signalling 
of negative information is underestimated. Spence (2002) argued that in practice parties send 
a wide range of signals without being aware they are signalling and this could potentially 
affect the intentional positive signal. Furthermore, the predictive ability of the theory relies 
on the assumption that the receiver will accurately notice and interpret the signal as originally 
conceptualised by the sender yet the dynamic nature of the operating environment means that 
timing and the quality of the signal might affect the interpretive ability of the receiver 
(Connelly et al., 2011).    
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2.7 Proprietary Cost Theory 
Proprietary cost theory is based on the foundational work of Verrecchia (1983) and posits that 
companies’ ability to disclose information is limited by the presence of disclosure related 
costs which he termed ‘proprietary costs’. Scott (1995) defines proprietary cost as any 
possible reduction in future cash flows that are attributable to disclosure. The costs arise due 
to proprietary information which Cormier and Gordon (2001) defined as private information, 
which is value-relevant to the price of a firm’s shares, or debt traded in capital markets.These 
costs comprise both those incurred in the preparation and disclosure of the information as 
well as costs associated with impact of decisions made by stakeholders accessing the 
disclosed information. In his seminal paper, Verrecchia (1983) used the analogy of a manager 
of risky assets and mathematically proved that his decision to disclose or hold information is 
dependent on the effect of that decision on the price of the risky assets. The author, however, 
adds that the manager’s decision is also affected by how traders will interpret his decision 
and that this leads to an equilibrium point of disclosure which is a point below which a 
manager’s motivation to withhold information is consistent with the traders conjecture as to 
how to interpret that action.         
 Thus in a situation where information is withheld, investors have two option namely 
assume the worst for the firm and will price down the company stock or require an interest 
rate premium of the debt or alternatively seek and collect more information but this will only 
happen when they have time, money and the benefits of the information outweighs the costs.  
Diamond (1985) argues that individual collection of information is inefficient from societal 
perspective since scarce resources like time and money are being used by so many people to 
collect same information. This then means that a firm’s voluntary disclosure of information is 
a more efficient way of meeting investor’s information needs and this will lower the cost of 
its capital in the long term. Reliance on capital markets should incentivise a firm to 
voluntarily disclose and lower its cost of debt or equity but then as Verrecchia (1983) stated, 
existence of proprietary costs brings confusion to this logic.     
 The theory assumes that in the absence of proprietary costs, companies are motivated 
to disclose voluntarily as way of reducing information asymmetry or signalling their quality 
hence the availability of proprietary costs tend to bring noise in the equilibrium model. 
Verrecchia (1983) proved that the higher the proprietary costs, the less negatively affected 
investors react to withholding of information and that this leads to less voluntary disclosure 
by companies. The proprietary cost model also predicts fewer disclosures in a highly 
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competitive market noting that managers might be sensitive as to how competitors might use 
their own disclosures against them. Thus where release of good news might see investors 
reacting positively to the company stock, the same might open up competition from other 
potential entrant into the market who might be attracted to such good news. If the opponent 
enters, the firm incurs an exogenously specified proprietary cost that reduces firm value 
(Martin, 1999; Wagenhofer, 1990).        
 That voluntary disclosure has benefits and that disclosure of GHG information is 
sought after by many stakeholders is well documented by many researchers (Cormier and 
Gordon, 2001; Botosan, 1997). However disclosure of such information is among other 
factors hindered by related proprietary costs. To begin with the cost of preparing GHG 
information is costly in itself as it requires adequate investment in personnel skill and systems 
to collect the information. This is especially true considering that climate change and GHG 
emission information does not naturally fall within existing generally accepted accounting 
practices but rather require specialised specification. For instance Ratnatunga and 
Balachadran (2008) stated that the rising in prominence of climate change issues meant that 
companies have to consider redesigning their management information systems in order to 
accommodate the demands of this new phenomenon. Besides, credibility of their reports may 
only be enhanced with third party review which means more costs on the part of the 
company. Though not mandatory, many voluntary reporting initiatives encourage entities to 
have their reports audited by third parties. However even after meeting the preparation and 
dissemination costs, potential threats still remain with the manner in which competitors and 
other stakeholders use such information. Climate change is a highly sensitive and politicised 
issue which attracts high media coverage and lobbyists as such any information disclosed by 
a firm might potentially be used to its disadvantage. Being new area where firms are still 
trying to develop their own technologies and systems to deal with climate change, there is 
also a danger that too many disclosures might mean handing over hard earned innovative 
secrets to competitors on a silver platter. In fact Cormier and Gordon (2001) argued that 
environmental information is considered proprietary information as such holding or 
subsequent disclosure of the same could materially affect how stakeholders in particular 
investors value a firm. Therefore disclosure being a subject of perceived benefit over costs of 
such disclosures then the extent of disclosure of GHGs might be also explained within the 
context of proprietary theory.         
 The Proprietary Cost theory has not been widely used in many disclosure studies as 
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Healy and Palepu (2001) explained there is little empirical evidence of the proprietary cost 
hypothesis. Scot (1994) provided a direct investigation into effect of information cost on 
discretionary disclosure using financial statement announcement of defined benefit pension 
plan information. The author found support for proprietary cost theory and found that 
increases in proprietary cost positively correlate with less disclosure. Prencipe (2004) did 
another comprehensive test of the theory with regard to the determinants of segmental 
reporting in Italian companies and found the theory successfully predicted some factors that 
determine quality segmental reporting. Again, Cormier and Gordon (2001), examining the 
social and environmental reporting strategies of three utility companies in Canada found that 
compared to social disclosures, environmental disclosures were very sensitive to proprietary 
information costs. In this study such sensitivity to proprietary costs is also anticipated in as 
far as GHG information disclosures are concerned. Proprietary cost theory literature suggest 
ownership structure, market structure, company size, capital market risk can alter the 
reporting pattern of a firm.           
 
2.8 Summary and Conclusion 
Based on prior studies, an attempt has been made to explain the possible reasons behind 
voluntary disclosures. Since voluntary disclosures are deemed to be done without the 
influence of any regulation then there must be proper justification for a firm to dedicate 
resources in providing them. Among some of the reasons, it is believed that voluntary 
disclosures are made based on economic rationality meaning that a firm might engage in 
these disclosures as a means of gaining business opportunity rather than demonstrating a true 
sense of social responsibilities. On the contrast, others believe that conviction in 
accountability and responsibility might also motivate managers to disclose voluntarily. When 
managers have a belief that their stakeholders have inalienable right to be informed whatever 
it takes on the part of the firm then they will engage in voluntary disclosures. Others view 
voluntary disclosures as a means of gaining legitimacy while others view it as a mechanism 
of managing stakeholders’ expectations. Again, the desire to forestall stringent regulations 
could also motivate firms to disclose voluntarily. Many have suspected that the increasing 
volumes of voluntary disclosure initiatives in climate change related issues by private sector, 
though meant to genuinely help firms manage their emissions, could be attempts to 
discourage regulations.        
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 Most of the motivations are discussed within the context of various theoretical 
frameworks. The theories, while giving more insight into the motivations, also help explain 
why despite being motivated by same reasons, the quantity of disclosures differ from one 
firm to another. Under legitimacy theory, it is stated that a firm is continuously seeking to 
assure its society that it is operating in accordance with the acceptable norms. The ultimate 
aim is to achieve the right perception from stakeholders as such they tend to use disclosures 
to acquire the legitimate perceived image. Thus disclosing information like environmental 
information is seen as a means of sending a message to an entity’s stakeholders that it is 
operating within the society norms. Unlike legitimacy which envisages a two party 
relationship between a firm and society, stakeholder theory analyses the relationship a firm 
have with many of its stakeholders which have different bargaining powers as such a firm is 
deemed to have different negotiated contracts with various stakeholders. While it is accepted 
that the primary objective of firms is to maximise shareholder return, there is also a wider 
societal belief that organisations are also expected to fulfil varying demands of its 
stakeholders which extends beyond the financial goal. A firm’s failure to change course 
according to stakeholder demands might eventually lead to its extinction/or disappearance 
from the market. Therefore in an attempt to satisfy these contractual obligations firms use 
disclosures like GHG disclosures.       
 Agency theory which recognises the need for more information disclosure on the part 
of management so that the other party i.e. owners are kept informed of what is going on has 
also been discussed. The understanding is that management voluntary release of information 
may act as an attempt to demonstrate to other stakeholders particularly shareholders that they 
are performing optimally. Such disclosures are meant to minimise the agency problem that 
come with the separation of powers between management and owners. The other theory that 
deals with information symmetry problem between management and outsiders is the 
signalling theory. The core of theory is information asymmetry between company managers 
and investors. Thus managers in some way have information which investors do not have as 
such disclosure is seen as a signal on the part of those who know (managers) to those who 
don’t know (investors) in an attempt to bridge the information asymmetry gap. Furthermore 
disclosure of information is seen as a signal of what management are capable of hence 
managers are motivated in voluntary disclosures as help demonstrate their know-how to the 
outsiders. Both aspects of signalling capability and the extent of a company’s initiative in a 
certain aspect are considered relevant in the study of GHGs since it’s a relatively new area 
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where government in the UK is critically looking at disclosures as way of making companies 
have initiatives to reduce emissions.         
 The cost of acquiring information and influencing the dynamics of the capital market 
has been discussed within the theory of proprietary costs. According this theory, disclosure of 
information is seen as an attempt on the part of the firm to lower the cost of acquiring 
information by its stakeholders notably investors. There is however need for a balance in 
between what is to be disclosed and the nature of information because certain information is 
strategic and hence cannot be easily disclosing for fear of competitors. Therefore proprietary 
costs, much as can influence a firm to disclose with a view of gaining cheap capital, they can 
also deter a firm from doing so depending on the nature of the information hence in this study 
the theory will be used to understand the variation in the disclosures made from firms more 
especially those in the same industry. This is important because under the institutional theory 
which has also been discussed here, disclosures are seen as a reflection of prevailing practice 
within an institutional set up. Institutionalism being a set of generally accepted norms 
prevailing within a particular setting which forces participants in that grouping to act in 
similar pattern. Therefore apart from differing influences of stakeholders, it is expected that 
proprietary costs, capital need and market structure can help explain the differences in 
disclosures of firms within the same industry/sector i.e. institutional set up.  
 The other theory discussed is stewardship theory which stemmed from Organisational 
psychology and sociology and is viewed as an alternative to agency theory.  It helps to 
explain disclosures on the basis of rational behaviour displayed by managers suggesting that 
in the long run managers will act in the interest of the organisation. They will do this because 
they perceive that their self-interest can only be fulfilled when the organisation needs are met.
 Going forward, the approach adopted in this thesis is a multi-theoretical approach. 
This is in line with a growing trend of literature in the social and environmental reporting 
research ((Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Chen and Roberts, 2010). While the chapter has 
discussed the theories in isolation, it should be highlighted that most of the theories are 
overlapping. Gray et al (1995a) argued that of the social political theories, legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories should not be seen as totally distinct rather they complement one another 
and their application can be at different levels.  Besides, prior evidence indicates that the 
notion of legitimacy cuts across different theories ranging from stakeholder, institutional 
theory and resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Deegan, 2002; Gray et al 
1996).  The overarching assumptions in these theories is the fact that organisations are 
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influenced by their societies and in turn through their actions organisations can influence 
their societies or operating environment (Gray et al 1995a; Thomson, 1967). Chen and 
Roberts (2010; p.652) suggest that these theories share  same ‘ontological worldview in that 
they see reality/structures are continually created, reproduced and reoriented by the 
interactions among social organisations’.  Suchman (1995, p.576) state that legitimacy and 
institutionalisation are virtually synonymous.  Suchman (1995) further argues that 
organisations, by adopting existing practices and structures through various institutional 
pressures, do so, on the pretext that the existing structures/practices have a form of 
legitimacy. Notwithstanding this, Chen and Roberts (2010) notes that though institutional 
theory can explain or describe existence of a legitimacy condition, it cannot explain the 
dynamic nature of legitimacy.        
 While legitimacy and institutional theories treat environment as a whole/one, 
stakeholder theory isolate and discuss a firm relationship with each of the environment 
constituent.  Stakeholder theory recognises that groups have unequal power and influence 
over an organisation and that organisations should manage these stakeholders differently.  
Chen and Roberts (2010) argues that a firm gains legitimacy through satisfying expectations 
of different stakeholders who subjectively confer legitimacy on the organisation. This ties in 
with the notion ‘relevant publics’ as being an important constituent of stakeholders to be 
satisfied in order to gain legitimacy rather than the society as a whole (Lindblom, 1994). 
When organisation legitimacy is under threat, organisation can target those relevant publics 
affected with a view of manipulating or changing their perception on the organisation. In this 
case communication and interaction becomes important and that companies should engage in 
communication with a ‘give and take’ spirit. Freeman (1984) emphasises compromise in 
communication and Chen and Roberts (2010) noted that it is through the spirit of compromise 
that organisations engage in voluntary actions like social and environmental initiatives and 
reporting.            
 On the other hand, there is also overlap on capital market oriented theories. Thus both 
Agency and signalling theories are founded on the information asymmetry problem between 
two parties i.e. managers and capital market players (Morris, 1987).  In this respect, managers 
are assumed to possess superior information than investors as such disclosure might narrow 
the asymmetry gap (Healy and Palepu 2001). In addition Healy and Palepu (2001) also argue 
that disclosure could be as a result of managerial intention to signal their talent with the hope 
that investors will incorporate that information in their valuation of the firm. In essence, firm 
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value is often seen as reflecting investors’ perception of managerial ability for continued 
business viability. Notwithstanding the need to overcome information asymmetry or signal 
firm superiority/managerial talent, the Proprietary theory argues that any decision to disclose 
is based on the trade-off between cost and benefit of such disclosure (Verrecchia, 2001). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) explain that when engaging in voluntary disclosure, firms are 
concerned about the political and contracting costs that may follow the voluntary disclosure 
decision.           
 More importantly to environmental disclosure, Toms (2002) has argued for a link 
between signalling and stakeholder theory. He notes that since environmental management 
reporting may necessitate significant investment in systems and resources then for any 
attempt to signal the same should target on stakeholders who matter. Toms (2002) further 
argue that firms will require connection to resourceful stakeholders in order to invest in 
environmentally friendly systems.       
 Therefore based on the existing interdependences among the theories, this study will 
adopt a multi-theoretical approach in investigating the extent and determinants of the 
voluntary GHG disclosures. Besides, prior evidence suggests that no single theory can 
satisfactorily explain the rationale behind voluntary disclosure.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Empirical Literature Review 
3.0 Introduction 
Substantial evidence suggests that, for various reasons, companies have been increasing their 
corporate disclosures and that these disclosures have extended beyond the providers of capital 
(Doh and Guay 2006; Brammer et al 2012). This has been matched by increased volumes of 
voluntary disclosure related studies whose conclusions tend to point to one thing: Disclosure 
is a substantive issue worthy of more research (Spence and Gray 2007; Bartlett and Jones 
1997; Beattie and Pratt, 2002). In this respect, many studies have investigated disclosure 
trends, causality between certain corporate governance, firm or industry characteristics and 
the disclosures while others have examined the theoretical basis of the motivations behind the 
various forms of disclosures. One particular aspect that has generated a considerable 
academic interest is corporate environmental disclosures. Just like in other disclosure studies, 
research in this area has mainly focussed on extent and nature of corporate environmental 
disclosure within annual/sustainability reports and its trend over time; its relationship to 
economic performance, environmental performance and corporate reputation; as well as the 
effect of certain corporate characteristics on the tendency to disclose environmentally 
relevant information (Aburaya, 2012).        
 Despite the growing academic interest in environmental disclosure studies, very few 
studies have examined specific aspects of environment like climate change and GHGs. 
Climate change and in particular GHGs is important in our time so much so that it is 
increasingly becoming a priority of targeted action both at national and international levels 
(see for example Kyoto Protocol 1997; UK Climate Change Act 2008 etc.). Of special 
interest is the role of companies in climate change which to a larger extent can be found in 
the GHG related information disclosures. Thus, stakeholders notably investors and regulators 
are keen to understand the role of companies in climate change as such there is growing 
evidence that they are demanding more GHG information (Stanny and Ely, 2008; Lash and 
Wellington, 2007).         
 Nonetheless, despite the realisation that the battle against climate change cannot be 
won without genuine and decisive action and accountability by the companies which are 
considered to be the main culprits (Solomon and Lewis, 2002), the policy move by most 
governments could at best be described as ‘cautious’, preferring firms to do things voluntarily 
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than issuing mandatory regulations. In the circumstances and in the broader context of 
environmental management, firms have been implementing their climate change and GHG 
emissions strategies and have been communicating the same through various mediums such 
as annual reports, sustainability reports and websites. However considering the voluntary 
nature of prevailing regimes coupled with the uncertainty surrounding the cost and benefits of 
engaging in such voluntary initiatives, questions still remain as to what determines the extent 
of these corporate voluntary GHG disclosures and indeed, what roles do existing decision-
making structures such as board mechanisms play in the disclosure decisions (Galbreath, 
2010; Peters and Romi, 2012; Rodrigue et al., 2013). This is especially germane given the 
potentially litigious nature of the disclosed GHG emissions information (Wegener et al., 
2013; Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010).      
 Therefore the aim of this chapter is to review the available literature on the 
determinants of the disclosures in particular those on environmental and GHG disclosures so 
as to identify existing gaps in literature.        
 The chapter begins by discussing selected corporate governance, ownership structure, 
and company attributes that determines the disclosures and in the second part it details some 
qualitative studies undertaken particularly focussing in GHGs or environment. The final 
section discusses the limitations of the GHG and other disclosure literature and explores the 
gaps which can be filled by the present study. A chapter summary is thereafter presented. 
 
3.1 Determinants of GHG Disclosures: Review of Literature 
 
3.1.1 Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Agency theory underpins most of the studies investigating the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms on voluntary disclosures. Agency theory conceptualised by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) provides a basis or justification on which governance mechanisms are put in place to 
resolve conflict of interest or incentive problems brought by the modern form of corporation 
in which ownership is diversified from management (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). 
Separation of ownership and control often leads to information asymmetries which if not 
checked are exploited by managers for their own benefit at the expense of the shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus corporate governance mechanisms serve as guardians of 
shareholder interests amidst competing interests by various stakeholders of the firm (Kumar 
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and Zattoni, 2013). Since at the heart of the agency relationship between managers and 
owners is an issue of information asymmetry, prior literature has documented evidence that 
corporate governance mechanisms help improve corporate disclosure as a way of minimising 
the information asymmetry gap (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2005; Rankin et al., 
2011; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). Therefore, in theory, corporate governance 
mechanisms should assist in aligning managers’ interests to those of the institution and so 
reduce agency costs in the long term.        
 The literature has identified a number of corporate governance characteristics that 
help influence voluntary disclosures. These include board composition and size, the presence 
of non-executive directors, CEO duality, audit committee and audit firm. Beasly et al. (2000) 
found the presence of non-executive directors on the board to be crucial in preventing 
management fraud thereby protecting shareholder interests. The board of directors are also 
meant to champion transparency and accountability which is essential in disclosures (Collier 
and Zaman, 2005). Studies on GHG disclosures particularly focusing on corporate 
governance characteristics have included Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) who 
investigated the role of board of directors in divulging relevant GHG information in a sample 
of FTSE Global 500 companies which participating in the CDP 2008 survey. The disclosure 
index was developed from the Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index (CDLI). Their results 
partly indicated that though firms are under public pressure to disclose GHG information, the 
board of directors sometimes discourages these disclosures if there is high probability of 
litigation i.e. more especially when the costs of disclosure outweighs the benefits. Their 
results also suggested that while the business environment has changed over time with the 
influence of other stakeholders increasing, as far as climate change related information is 
concerned, the board has continued to maintain the tradition of prioritising shareholder 
interests.            
 In another study focusing on which attributes of corporate governance influences a 
firm to make GHG disclosures, Peters and Romi  (2012) examined the determinants of GHG 
voluntary reporting in a sample of firms participating in the CDP from 2002-2006 and found 
evidence that GHG disclosures were positively related to what they called ‘sustainability 
oriented corporate governance characteristics notably the presence of environmental 
committee on board as well as the position of corporate sustainability officers. Expertise and 
size of the board members and sustainability officers were dominant characteristics of those 
firms that disclosed more GHG information. Knowledge synergies between environmental 
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committee and the audit committee were also found to be a significant element in increasing 
the likelihood of voluntary GHG disclosures. Galbrealth (2010) investigated how well 
governance structures by both US and non-US firms had enabled the firms to respond to 
climate change challenge using 98 firms in three industries across ten countries. Overall they 
found that the firms were underperforming in their governance responses towards climate 
change but noted that non-US firms had a better governance score than their US counterparts 
using the Ceres scoring methodology. In addition, board characteristics such as board size, 
and diversity (including female representation) had no statistical link to climate change 
disclosures, while directors’ age had some influence with younger directors exerting positive 
influence.          
 Below is a summary of how board characteristics adopted in this thesis have 
influenced other voluntary disclosures as per prior literature. The list is largely drawn based 
on sample characteristics and prior literature. For instance some characteristics like CEO 
duality and sustainability officers were left out because of insufficient observations. In 
particular it was observed that very few observations had instituted a specific department or 
full time employee responsible for sustainability and this was largely in years 2010 and 2011. 
 
3.1.1.1 Board Size 
Large sized board which reflect various stakeholder interests may in a way help reduce 
information asymmetry (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). The main function of the board is to 
formulate policies and strategies to be implemented by management. In discharging their 
role, the board is aware that information is an important link to its outsiders as such it may 
champion policies that encourage more disclosures. The large numbers on the board is likely 
to make the board function effectively in ensuring that policies and strategies are being 
implemented (Zahra et al., 2000). A large board is also likely to have diverse experience and 
skills that may be crucial in assisting management in the processing and disclosing useful 
information (Akhtarudin et al., 2009).      
 Nonetheless, others argue that large boards can be dysfunctional. Jensen (1993) 
argued that big-sized boards are synonymous with poor monitoring performance whereas 
small sized boards are efficient and might influence more disclosures of information. Thus in 
a large sized board, there are bound to be conflicts of interests of the various groups 
represented which in a way might hinder the monitoring process of the board. Coordination 
may also be a problem which can then lead to slow decision making thereby affecting the 
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efficiency of the board (Yermark, 1996). Despite this, it is intimated that the inefficiencies 
may only occur in circumstances where the board is excessively large (see Aburaya, 2012) 
and that even if the board is large indeed its inefficiencies maybe offset by the diversity and 
skills of the board members which if put to good use can improve monitoring abilities of the 
board (John and Senbet, 1998). A larger board may also result in well constituted sub-
committees which may improve the functionality of the board.    
 Empirical studies have found evidence of the influence of large sized board to 
disclosures. Peters and Romi (2012) noted that in addition to other board attributes, those 
firms with a large board size had more GHG disclosures. Similarly, Cormier et al. (2011) 
found a positive association of large board size and disclosures. The study by Cormier et al. 
(2011) investigated whether environmental disclosures substitutes or compliments efforts in 
reducing information asymmetry between corporate managers and stock market analysts on a 
sample of 137 large Canadian companies listed on Toronto Stock Exchange in 2005.  Their 
environmental disclosure score was weighted with a high score awarded if disclosures are 
quantitative and specific than qualitative and general. The results among other factors, found 
that board size was the only board characteristic that had a significant positive relationship 
with environmental disclosures.  Other studies such as Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) did 
not find any association but their sustainability disclosure index was broadly constructed as it 
also included social disclosures.  With regard to specific GHG disclosures, the only known 
study to have investigated the role of board size is Peters and Romi (2012).   
 
3.1.1.2 Proportion of Non-Executive Directors (PNED) 
Generally, the presence of independent NEDs and the separation of roles between CEO and 
board chairperson are used as indication of board independence (Prado-Lorenzo and Sanchez, 
2010). Considerably, the presence of non-executive directors helps the board discharge its 
monitoring responsibilities effectively (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Akhtarudin et al., 2009). In 
fact, according to the Combined Code (2012), Companies in the UK are encouraged to have 
more non-executive directors than executive directors on their boards as a way of improving 
board efficiency. It is intimated that board members with no material interest in the company 
are able to act both in the interest of shareholders and other legitimate stakeholders of the 
company. Thus from a stakeholder theory perspective, independent non-executive directors 
which represents the interest of other stakeholders other than management are viewed as a 
tool for monitoring management behaviour (Dixon et al., 2005). Such monitoring, from the 
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perspective of agency theory, helps to minimise the principal-agency problem that exists 
between shareholders and management.      
 Nevertheless, there is no study on GHG disclosures which has investigated the 
influence of non-executive directors and those that have focussed on environmental 
disclosures have documented limited and conflicting outcomes. Post et al.’s (2011) study 
investigated the influence of board characteristics on environmental social responsibility 
disclosures in a sample of 78 fortune 1000 companies listed in 2007. Disclosures made in 
annual reports, environmental reports, company websites and government websites were 
reviewed and in relation to board independence, the authors found that companies with high 
proportion of outside directors on their boards had higher environmental and social 
disclosures. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) studying the determinants of environmental 
information in the UK did not confirm any significant relationship.    
 In other voluntary studies other than social and environmental disclosures, the results 
are also inconclusive. A study by Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) used ordinary least squares 
regression to measure the impact of firm specific characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms on the disclosure of risk information in the interim reports of 79 UK companies.  
Board composition (represented by ratio of NEDs) alongside institutional ownership, role 
duality, board size, and audit committee size had no statistical significance on the corporate 
risk disclosures. Similarly, Ho and Wong (2001) did not find any association between 
voluntary disclosures and the presence of NEDs. However, Akhtarudin et al.’s (2009) study 
of corporate governance influence of disclosures on Malaysian firms found evidence that 
more NEDs meant more disclosures. Chen and Jaggi (2000) had a similar result to that of 
Akhtarudin et al. (2009). On the contrary, Eng and Mak (2003) found a negative relationship 
between independent NEDs and voluntary disclosures, and explained that the result was a 
reflection of the fact that many of NEDs on the board of companies in Singapore represented 
the interests of block holders which in many cases have privy information of the company 
hence might not be keen on public disclosures. 
 
3.1.1.3 Audit Committee  
The presence and the composition of an audit committee on the board are deemed 
fundamental to the oversight roles of the board. Good corporate governance practice requires 
companies to ensure that the audit committee is chaired by an independent qualified NED and 
its composition should have more NEDs than executive directors (Solomon, 2010). The 
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combined code (2012) recommends that the AC should involve at least three, or in the case of 
smaller companies two, independent non-executive directors. With such characteristics, the 
audit committee is expected to champion policies that improves transparency in the company 
and hence considered to have a positive influence on the quantity of the disclosures (Forker, 
1992). Thus, independence of the audit committee helps it to carry out its monitoring 
responsibilities objectively (Abbot et al., 2004). One key responsibility of the audit 
committee is to have oversight over the financial reporting process of the company (Uzan et 
al., 2004) which then makes it well placed to influence disclosures.    
 The audit committee is tested in terms of its size compared to the whole board or its 
independence (Akhtarudin et al. 2009). Aburaya (2012) studied the influence of corporate 
governance characteristics on environmental disclosures of a sample of UK FTSE All share 
companies over a four year period i.e. 2004-2007 and found evidence that the independence 
of an audit committee is positively related to environmental disclosures. Similarly, some 
studies on other voluntary disclosures have confirmed the positive association between audit 
committee and voluntary disclosures (Barako et al., 2006) while others like Akhtarudin et al. 
(2009) did not find any association. Studies on GHG voluntary disclosures have not focused 
on audit committee but instead the focus has been on the existence of other specialised board 
committees like environmental committee.  
 
3.1.1.4 Board Environmental Committee 
The presence of the environmental committee on the board signifies the seriousness with 
which the board attaches to issues of the environment and climate change in general (Rankin 
et al., 2011). It also demonstrates a firm’s desire to manage its reputation risk (Nue et al., 
1998). An environmental committee of the board could also reflect the strategic direction of 
the firm in repositioning itself for a carbon constrained future since the board by its nature is 
a custodian of long term strategy. Since climate change and GHG issues are highly sensitive 
then a firm might be using the presence of the environmental committee to champion 
measures that might reduce the potential risks of regulation by managing its stakeholders 
through disclosures.          
 The phenomenon of environmental committees is relatively new but prior studies 
have found evidence that the creation of specific board committees like corporate social 
responsibility committee or human resource committee leads to increased disclosure in those 
particular aspects (Berthelot and Robert 2012; Cowen et al., 1987).  More importantly, Peters 
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and Romi (2012) studying the influence of corporate governance on GHG disclosures argued 
that just as the presence of audit committee influences financial disclosures, the presence of 
environmental committee is also crucial to disclosure of GHG information. The authors noted 
that the fact that environmental committee is not mandatory as is the audit committee then its 
presence indicates the seriousness of management in controlling GHG emissions and 
communicating its efforts to relevant parties. In addition, Ewing (2008) argues that the key to 
managing climate risk lies in defining the roles of the board appropriately and creation of an 
environmental committee could be one of those efforts. Peters and Romi (2012) confirmed 
that the presence of an environmental committee on firms participating in CDP disclosures 
between 2002 and 2006 had positive influence on the disclosures. Their analysis went further 
and confirmed that size and diligence of the environmental committee coupled with the 
expertise of the sustainability officer were positively related to voluntary GHG disclosures. 
More importantly the authors also found that knowledge spill over from overlap between the 
environmental committee and the audit committee significantly increased the likelihood of a 
firm to disclose GHG information. The findings of Berthelot and Robert (2012) also lend 
support to the fact that it is not only the mere presence of the environmental committee that 
determines the GHG disclosures but the characteristics of the committee also matters. Thus 
Berthelot and Robert (2012) found that the presence of an environmental committee 
influences the disclosures but a critical review of this factor indicated that it was actually the 
number of committee members and the proportion of independent directors on this committee 
rather than the number of meetings that influenced GHG disclosures.  
 Nonetheless, Rankin et al. (2011) did not find any evidence that an environmental 
sub-committee of the board would influence GHG disclosures. Instead what they found was 
that firms with an environmental management system like those certified by ISO 14001 EMS 
was disclosing more GHG information and that the presence of an environmental committee 
merely improved the quality of the disclosures. The authors’ definition of quality included 
provision of an explanation behind the disclosures made.  
 
3.1.2 Ownership Structure 
Different forms of ownership structure have been studied in literature ranging from 
ownership concentration, managerial ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, 
family ownership to institutional ownership. In this study, two forms namely ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership are discussed.  
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3.1.2.1 Ownership Concentration 
When there is a wider diffusion of ownership, agency costs increase (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). This is the case since with wide diffusion of ownership; there is a rise in conflict of 
interests as opposed to when a firm has concentrated ownership. Shareholders are a key 
resource stakeholder to a firm and have power to influence how resources are managed. In a 
widely diffused ownership, shareholders are likely to find it expensive to mobilise themselves 
to exercise their power compared to more concentrated ownership structure. The high number 
of shareholders in highly diffused structure means more costs for the company when trying to 
bring shareholders together for a particular resolution. The other argument is that with a wide 
diffused ownership, the demands of shareholders are diverse as such a firm is forced to make 
more disclosures to satisfy these demands (Mitchell et al., 1995; Reverte, 2008). In mitigating 
against the high agency costs, meet the varied demands of the shareholders and signal to 
shareholders that they are acting in the interest of the company; managers can use a number 
of strategies including voluntary disclosures (Broberg et al., 2009; Christopher and Hassan 
1996). Berthelot and Robert (2012) studying the determinants of GHG disclosures in 
Canadian Oil companies found that a widely held ownership structure in a firm was 
positively correlated to disclosures. Prior studies like Hill and Jones (1992) also found that a 
widely diffused ownership is associated with more voluntary disclosures.   
 Others argue to the contrary that it is in a more concentrated ownership where a firm 
would make more disclosures. This view considers disclosures more of a product of 
shareholder power than otherwise. Thus, while noting that shareholders in a concentrated 
ownership are bound to use their power in concealing any information they deem detrimental 
to the company (see Cormier and Magan 1999), Zunker (2011) argued that such power can 
also be used to influence increased disclosures.  There is however little support for this view 
in literature. In a study of 2008 annual reports of 96 largest Australian firms listed on 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), Rao et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between 
environmental reporting and corporate governance attributes. Institutional investors (which 
represented close ownership concentration) had a small but positive impact on the 
environmental disclosures. The authors conjectured that this could be a reflection of the fact 
that institutional investors being active participants in capital markets where the risk of 
environment on stock value is appreciated might encourage more disclosures. Alternatively it 
could suggest that in closely owned firms, it is difficult to find an appropriate proxy for 
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control exercised in decision making regarding disclosures within firms. Despite this, 
however, it is reasoned that in a closely owned firm, there is less pressure to release 
information since shareholders are already aware of what management is doing (Berthelot 
and Robert, 2012). This view is also supported by the results of Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 
who, in a study of determinants of environmental disclosures in the UK, found a significant 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and environmental disclosures.  
 
3.1.2.2 Director Ownership 
According to agency theory, misalignment of management/shareholder interests leads to high 
agency costs.  Increased management shareholding reduces the prospect of the interests’ 
misalignment thereby reducing the agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen (1993) 
argues that the source of most problems in a company arise due to the fact that neither the 
manager nor non-shareholding directors have an interest in the company. It is the intention of 
reducing agency costs that makes management involve in disclosures hence where there is a 
greater extent of managerial ownership disclosures might be kept to a minimum.  This is also 
backed by signalling theory which helps to predict that in a situation where there is  
separation between ownership and management, managers are bound to disclose more to 
signal to the other party that they are acting in good faith. This desire for signalling may be 
reduced in a situation where management has substantial ownership. In addition, increased 
management control might also tempt management to limit disclosures as way of managing 
and manipulating other minority shareholders and competition.  It is also argued that 
managerial shareholding guarantees managers long term employment prospects as such they 
do not have incentives to pursue shareholder wealth maximisation policies since  labour 
market forces have no power over them.       
 Fan and Wong (2002) explains that control enables the controlling party to decides 
and choose reporting policies which leads to restrictions on other reporting parameters if the 
intention is to manipulate other parties.  This is in contrast to where management has no stake 
or have a low stake. In this case, it is argued that since management are aware of not being 
individually responsible for the costs of disclosure, they are motivated to make more 
disclosures which might be used to enhance their reputation and prestige in the eyes of the 
public (Halme and Huse 1997).        
  Eng and Mark (2003) using regression analysis of 158 companies drawn from 9 
different industries, observed that lower managerial ownership of companies listed on 
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Singapore Stock Exchange had significantly influenced higher disclosures. When managers 
reduce shareholding, it is argued that they become more interested in remuneration but have 
little incentive for job performance as such there is increased monitoring by outside 
shareholders. Increased monitoring increases costs as such managers might disclose more 
information to reduce these costs (Eng and Mark, 2003). Nonetheless others have found 
evidence to the contrary. Warfield et al. (1995) documented a positive relationship between 
managerial shareholding and the level of earnings disclosure. In this study, the authors 
reported that the earnings-return correlation is greater for firms with high levels of 
managerial ownership, and interpreted this result as evidence that accounting disclosures 
information content increases with the level of managerial ownership. Perhaps the most 
interesting result is one documented by Leung and Horwitz (2004) who, using Hong Kong 
listed companies, found that an increase in director ownership of between 1 and 25 was 
positively associated with increased segmental disclosures but a disclosure decrease was 
noticed for any levels of director ownership above 25 per cent.  
 
3.1.3 Company Characteristics 
3.1.3.1 Size 
Company size has been widely used and found to have a positive relationship with the extent 
of corporate GHG disclosures (see Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; 
Stanny and Ely, 2008 Rankin et al., 2011 etc.) and other disclosure studies (see Firth, 1979; 
Cooke, 1989; Gray et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Nue et al., 1998; Tauringana, 1997; 
Wallace et al., 1994;). Such usage is a reflection of the fact that size represents a wide range 
of things from political visibility (which means political costs as well as increased scrutiny by 
stakeholders), agency costs, to capital market incentives (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Cormier 
et al., 2005).          
 According to agency theory, there is an information asymmetry problem that comes 
with the principal-agent relationship. Such a problem leads to increased agency costs 
depending on the nature of management and ownership relationship. In agency theory, it is 
suggested that agency costs increase with increased share of external capital (see Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and this share of capital is deemed high when a company is of a large size 
(Leftwich et al., 1981). Disclosure of information is considered part of reducing the problem 
and related agency costs (Adrem, 1999). Besides, by virtue of its attraction to various sources 
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of external capital, it is expected that a large firm will be under pressure from a number of its 
stakeholders especially financial analysts to disclose more information to cater for those 
stakeholders that might be remotely aware of what is going on in the firm (Depoers, 2000; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993). In this case, disclosure may serve to enhance investor trust 
(Buzby, 1975).         
 Generally apart from attractiveness to providers of capital, large companies are 
believed to have high visibility to the extent of attracting huge political costs. By nature, it is 
argued that the media and the public are interested in large companies as such in keeping 
pace with what the company is doing they will demand more information of which the 
company will comply through the disclosures (Schipper, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). 
Apart from these stakeholders, large size companies may also attract government agencies. 
Such attraction may mean more political costs if intervention steps are taken as such firms 
may resort to disclosing more information hoping that transparency and accountability may 
limit the level of intervention (Buzby, 1975; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Scott, 2003; Gray et al., 1995a).     
 While firms may be inclined to disclose more information with the view to improving 
their capital market fortune, there is a realisation that disclosure of information is expensive 
and requires right skilled employees (Depoers, 2000). Even if a firm decides to meet the costs 
of disclosure, there is threat that such costs may adversely affect its competiveness (see 
Raffounier, 1995), and in some cases the disclosures themselves may pose a strategic threat 
to a firm if competitors access such information. Given these circumstances it is believed that 
a large firm is better placed to meet the costs of disclosures (see Depoers, 2000) and mitigates 
any threat of losing competitiveness than a small firm (Watson et al., 2002; Prencipe, 2004).
 There are a number of studies investigating GHG or climate change disclosures that 
have used size as a control variable with the outcomes confirming size as a significant factor. 
For instance, Freedman and Jaggi (2005) analysed the disclosure of GHG emissions in annual 
reports, separate environmental reports and websites of 120 entities in Chemical, Oil, Motor 
Vehicle, and Insurance industries. The companies were selected from both countries 
participating in Kyoto Protocol and those not participating in order to investigate the impact 
of the Kyoto on the company disclosures.  Using regression analysis, they documented a 
positive association between the disclosure index and those entities operating in countries that 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol and again size (measured by natural log of total assets) was 
reported to be one significant determinant of GHG information in these entities. Another 
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study by Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009), who using multiple regression of data obtained from 
content analysis of company website information, noted a positive relationship between size 
(sales turnover), market capitalisation and quantity of information on GHGs. They developed 
their disclosure index from EC Green paper on GHG emissions Trading, Kyoto protocol 
specifications and some indicators as specified by GRI (2002) standards. However the use of 
GRI index for a disclosure check list has come under criticism by other researchers (see 
Rankin, 2011) who argue that GRI (2002) is just a broader sustainability index and is narrow 
on GHG disclosures. Day and Woodward (2009) also made a similar observation regarding 
GRI calling it ‘a generic’ document that does not address a specific sector.  
 Some studies have utilised the CDP questionnaire responses to investigate among 
other things the influence of size on GHG disclosures. Peters and Romi (2010) conducted a 
longitudinal study covering years 2002 to 2006 for 28 countries and focussing on country 
specific influences on GHG disclosures. Size used as a control variable was found to be a 
significant determinant of the GHG disclosures. Their findings also revealed that the level of 
disclosure is related to the environmental regulatory stringency of the government, the private 
sector environmental responsiveness, as well as the capital market structure of each country. 
Similarly, Stanny and Ely (2008) reviewed the influence of environmental disclosures about 
the effects of climate change in a sample of US S&P 500. Factors investigated included 
company size, industry, capital expenditure, previous disclosures, foreign sales, asset age, 
Tobin’s Q, leverage, profitability and institutional ownership. The main focus of the study 
was on whether a company responded to the CDP questionnaire or not. Using binary logit 
regressions the results confirmed that company size, previous disclosures, and foreign sales 
were significant determinants of the disclosures. No significant association was found with 
regard to profitability, institutional ownership, leverage, industry, asset age, and Tobin’s Q.
  The use of CDP information has however, come under criticism as to their reliability 
in that firms tend not to disclose their specific climate change related information (Kolk et al., 
2008). The lack of specific GHG information in CDP questionnaire responses was also noted 
by Stanny (2011) who examined voluntary disclosures of GHGs by 500 US S&P 
participating in the CDP over a three year period i.e. 2006-2008. The focus was on 
documenting trends in questionnaire responses, actual emission disclosures and the 
accounting methodology used. She noted that many firms were responding to the 
questionnaire but were not disclosing their methodology or emissions. She referred to this 
disparity as being explained by legitimacy noting that firms responses were merely a means 
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of gaining legitimacy through participation in the project while in essence were not doing 
according to the spirit of the project as evidenced by their failure to disclose actual emissions 
and methodology used. She also established that previous disclosures were highly predictive 
of subsequent disclosures. This is consistent with the views that environmental disclosures 
are routine (see Cormier et al., 2005) and the findings of Aerts et al. (2006) who found that 
previous disclosures were highly predictive of the subsequent ones. By disclosing the 
minimum, Stanny (2011) suggested that it is an attempt to avoid setting a disclosure 
precedent as found by Graham et al. (2005) whose survey documented evidence that Finance 
Directors were bound to disclose the minimum possible in a bid to avoid setting disclosure 
precedent that may be difficult to maintain. In contrast to prior studies that used CDP data 
before, Stanny (2011) did not use content analysis instead the dependent variable was 
interpreted through the three disclosures namely response to CDP questionnaire; GHG 
emissions disclosed and the disclosure of the accounting methodology used.  In addition, the 
earlier period of CDP questionnaires i.e. 2003 to 2005 covered by the samples are 
characterised by changes in questions from year to year. Such changes also mean that it is 
difficult to document trends of disclosures even for a single company (Hesse, 2006; Kiernan, 
2008). This then means that studies based on CDP questionnaire response are not complete in 
themselves to explain the motivation and determinants for disclosures.  
 Other studies focussing on GHG disclosures which have confirmed the positive 
significance of size on the disclosures include: Liu and Anbumozhi (2009); Freedman and 
Jaggi (2005); (proxied by sales turnover); Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010); Rankin 
et al. (2011) (natural log of market capitalisation); Berthelot and Robert (2012) (total assets).  
Generally in disclosure literature, majority of the studies tend to confirm the positive 
relationship between disclosure and size as predicted by the theories (see Adams et al., 1998; 
Gray et al., 1995b; Hussein, 1996; Walden and Stagliano, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Patten 
and Crampton, 2004 etc.). Nonetheless there are other studies which did not confirm this 
positive relationship instead they found a negative relationship (Gray et al., 1995a; Roberts, 
1992; Kou and Hussein, 2007).  
 
3.1.3.2 Gearing 
Gearing as signified by the presence of debt holders in a company is explained principally by 
three theories namely agency, signalling and stakeholder (Broberg et al., 2009; Roberts, 
1992; Oliviera et al., 2006). Under agency theory, the principle is that a high debt ratio 
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increases agency costs as debt suppliers strive to secure their interests through various 
agreements and contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is through these contracts that 
restrictions on what management can do to affect wealth transfers between shareholders and 
bondholders are prescribed (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989). By providing more information, the 
uncertainty on the part of creditors is minimised thereby reducing the agency costs (Watson 
et al., 2002; Hossain et al., 1995). Agency theory therefore suggests a positive association 
between disclosures and leverage (see Broberg et al., 2009).   
 Others consider the influence of creditors from a stakeholder point of view. Creditors 
are deemed key to a firm’s financing resources therefore they deserve to be managed 
appropriately. If creditors perceive they are marginalised within the affairs of the firm they 
can exercise their economic power by either increasing the cost of capital or by withholding 
debt financing altogether (Mitchell et al., 1995). Since evidence states that disclosures 
sometimes reflect stakeholder power (Roberts, 1992) then it is suggested that high proportion 
of debt is likely to result in more disclosures.    
 Alternatively, using signalling theory, other researchers have argued that disclosures 
in low geared firm are likely to be more and a signal to the market about its capital structure 
(Oliviera et al. 2006; ). Some like Adrem (1999) have argued that even using agency theory, 
the presence of agency costs in free cash flow should imply a negative relationship between 
disclosures and leverage. Others simply argue that by being highly geared it means a firm is 
subject to various stakeholder controls and monitoring which then means that it cannot have 
incentive to disclose even more for fear of escalating costs (Jensen, 1986). Meek et al. (1995) 
provides empirical evidence to the effect that a low geared company is likely to disclose more 
information.           
 Despite the predictions as made by both stakeholder and agency theories, empirical 
studies have produced mixed results. In fact the majority of studies on GHG disclosures have 
found gearing to be insignificant. Rankin et al. (2011), in a study of voluntary GHG 
disclosures in Australia hypothesised a positive association but their results found gearing to 
be insignificant. The same result was found with Cotter and Najar (2011) who investigated 
institutional investor influence on climate change disclosures and noted that highly geared 
companies participating in the CDP were not disclosing more information. Gearing was only 
significant when those firms which did not complete the CDP were included in the sample 
thereby arguably suggesting that highly geared companies not participating in CDP provided 
more information hence they see no need of being part of CDP. Freedman and Jaggi (2005) 
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argued that creditors in a highly geared company that emit GHGs are bound to demand more 
disclosures to help them assess the risk of the company effectively. Despite this, however, 
their results did not confirm the assertion leading them to conclude that in climate change 
disclosures, creditors does not play a crucial role in influencing disclosure decisions. The 
Study of Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) concluded that gearing was insignificant and had 
negative relationship with GHG disclosures. This is similar to the findings of Brammer and 
Pavelin (2006) who, investigating environmental disclosures in the UK, found a negative 
association between disclosures and gearing.       
 Luo and Tang (2011) is an exception in that they found that GHG disclosures had a 
significant positive relationship with gearing. They examined the effectiveness of the CDP 
code and the determinants of the transparency of the carbon disclosure. Using a sample of the 
Global 500 firms the authors assessed the degree of transparency of carbon disclosures 
through a Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index which they renamed it carbon disclosure 
transparency score (CDTS) extracted from the CDP presented in 2009. Particular emphasis 
was placed on the influence of information needs of stakeholders and institutional effects on 
carbon transparency. The authors also found that, among other things, gearing was 
significantly associated with transparency in the carbon disclosures. Besides, while their 
findings confirmed that a growing number of firms were disclosing carbon information, they 
discovered disparities in the transparency of the information among firms in different sectors 
and industries. This lack of transparency was attributed to lack of incentives on the part of 
management to be accountable. Compared to other studies on GHG disclosures, here the 
focus was on what is disclosed than merely disclosures.     
 Results in studies on disclosures other than GHG disclosures have similar pattern of 
mixed outcomes. Some who found no association include Abraham et al. (2007); Oliviera et 
al. (2006); Linsley and Shrives (2006); Wallace and Naser (1995); Meek et al. (1995) while 
other studies have that a highly geared company discloses more information (see Malone et 
al., 1993; Naser et al., 2002; Hossain et al., 1994; Jaggi and Lee, 2002).  
 
3.1.3.3 Profitability 
Based on theoretical frameworks of agency, signalling and positive accounting, a positive 
association is assumed between disclosures and profitability (Ismail and Chandler, 2005; 
Broberg et al., 2009). According to agency theory, when a firm is profitable, management are 
bound to disclose more information as a way of justifying their positions and compensations 
75 
 
(Oliviera et al., 2006). Driven by the desire to be accurately valued by outsiders/investors, 
highly profitable firms are expected to disclose more information as a way of signalling the 
superiority of their firm over rivals and avoid undervaluation (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). 
Being profitable relative to industry peers also means that a firm is politically visible (with 
potential for more political costs) then a firm might use the disclosures to demonstrate how it 
has generated the profits in a bid to have goodwill of the stakeholders whose suspicion and 
intervention might potentially increase the political costs (Oliviera et al., 2006). Besides, with 
respect to disclosure costs, it is expected that a profitable firm will be able to meet these costs 
and disclose more than a less profitable firm would do (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986). The 
measures of profitability used in literature include return on equity (ROA), return on assets 
(ROA), (See Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005).   
 Empirical studies testing the association between profitability and disclosures have 
produced mixed results. In particular, the influence of profitability to environmental and 
GHG disclosures is somewhat inconclusive. Clarkson et al. (2008) stated that profitability 
had no influence in the environmental disclosures of American companies. Freedman and 
Jaggi (2005) found no significant influence of profitability in their study of environmental 
and climate change disclosures either. The same was with Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) whose 
study exclusively reviewed the determinants of GHG disclosures. Other GHG disclosure that 
found an insignificant relationship include Liu and Anbomuzhi (2009); Peters and Romi 
(2012); Rankin et al. (2011); and Cotter and Najar (2011).     
 However the results found by Liu and Anbomuzhi (2009) were different and 
interesting. Liu and Anbomuzhi (2009) investigated the determining factors of environmental 
information by Chinese listed companies based on the stakeholder theory. Factors 
investigated include shareholder power, government power, creditor power, while controlling 
for firm size, return on equity, age, location and learning capacity. Regarding profitability, 
they found that economic performance had no significant association with environmental 
disclosures but noted that companies with better economic performance (measured by ROE) 
were making more disclosures on specific environmental information particularly 
environmental investment and pollution control information. The dependent variable was 
derived from a combination of GRI indicators and China State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) guidelines and regression analysis was performed on the final sample 
of 175 companies. The study also found that government power rather than shareholder 
power and creditor power was significant determinant of environmental disclosures.
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 Other studies found a different result.  Berthelot and Robert (2012) examined the 
extent to which Canadian oil and gas firms were following the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountant proposed guidelines on climate change disclosures in their annual 
reports, and  whether the disclosures of these firms were influenced by their media visibility, 
the presence and operating characteristics of an environmental committee within the board of 
directors, their ownership structure, their audit firms, their political exposure(size), 
profitability and media visibility. Using regression analysis on a sample of 64 Canadian 
public oil and gas firms with production activities, they found that profitability (economic 
performance indicator) represented by ROA, widely held ownership, political exposure and 
media visibility had a positive significant relationship with the GHG disclosures.  It should be 
noted however that the study of Berthelot and Robert (2012) particularly focused on GHG 
disclosures made in annual reports. Most of the GHG disclosure studies that have found 
profitability to have an insignificant relationship with GHG disclosures have analysed 
disclosures made in multiple communication mediums including websites, sustainability 
reports and the CDP.  
 
3.1.3.4 Liquidity 
The influence of liquidity on disclosures is seen mostly from the stakeholders’ theory 
perspective. Ho and Taylor (2007) argued that the long term prospect of a firm is dependent 
on how its stakeholders evaluate its going concern. They state that liquidity considerations 
are high when stakeholders are deciding the going concern prospect of a firm. Therefore in 
order to be viewed positively, it is expected that a highly liquid company will undertake to 
disclose more information as a way of setting itself apart from its peers who might be having 
liquidity problems. Such motivation for disclosures is also explained by signalling theory. On 
the other hand, it has been argued from the stakeholder point of view that, a firm with low 
liquidity, under the influence of key stakeholders like government agencies who are 
concerned with business viability of low liquid companies, might be indirectly forced to 
disclose more information to demonstrate its viability (Al-Shammari, 2007). Ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities is used to measure liquidity.    
 Empirical studies produce mixed results relating to the influence of liquidity on 
disclosures. In a study of Triple Bottom line (TBL) disclosures, Ho and Taylor (2007) 
hypothesised a positive association between the TBL disclosures and liquidity in their study 
of 50 largest US and Japanese firms but instead their results was a negative but significant 
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relationship meaning that highly liquid firms tend to disclose low TBL information. However 
when Liquidity was tested specifically against environmental disclosures within the TBL 
disclosures, the relationship was negative and insignificant. In other voluntary disclosures, 
Barako et al. (2006) investigated the extent to which ownership structure, corporate 
governance and company characteristics influences voluntary disclosures including 
environmental disclosures. The sample comprised 54 Kenyan companies listed on Nairobi 
Stock Exchange from 1992 to 2001. Liquidity (measured as current assets divided by current 
liabilities) alongside profitability, board leadership structure, and type of external auditor did 
not have any significant influence on the voluntary disclosures.    
 A different outcome was obtained by Oyelere et al (2003). Using univariate and 
multivariate regression analysis, the authors examined the determinants of internet reporting 
in all 229 companies listed on New Zealand Stock Exchange at the end of 1998 and found 
that among other factors, liquidity (measured as cash assets divided by total assets) was a 
significant positive factor in internet reporting in New Zealand. The differences in the 
computation of liquidity in the study of Oyelere et al. (2003) to other studies like Barako et 
al. (2006) could partly explain the difference in the outcome.    
 So far the studies on climate change and GHG disclosures have not investigated the 
influence of liquidity. With climate change issues threatening the resource flow to and from a 
firm then there is still a case to investigate how liquidity position of a firm can influence its 
response to climate change which is reflected in the disclosures.  
 
3.1.3.5 Industry Sector 
The influence of industry on disclosures is justified in a number of theories namely positive 
accounting (political costs) theory, proprietary costs theory, legitimacy theory, signalling 
theory, agency theory and institutional theory.     
 According to political cost theory, industry belonging just like size makes it easy for a 
company to have political visibility and vulnerability (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Faced 
with the same political costs, companies in the same industry might resort to voluntary 
disclosures as a way of minimising these costs. With the agency theory, it is intimated that 
companies whose industries are deemed sensitive and subject to regulation are bound to have 
high agency costs (Watson et al., 2002). To minimise the agency costs and limit further 
regulation that might mean more compliance costs, companies might disclose voluntarily. For 
proprietary costs, different industries are bound to have different levels of these costs largely 
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due to market structural differences (Oliviera et al., 2006). Thus depending on the level of 
competition prevailing in a particular industry, barriers to entry or exit and what constitute 
private information in an industry, firms in the same industry are expected to disclose more or 
less information. In addition, there are some market norms and practices that differ according 
to industries. The expectation is that a firm in a particular industry is to behave in similar 
pattern to peers if it is to be deemed within the institutionalisation of that industry. Therefore, 
in this case, normative and mimetic forces might influence a firm to disclose voluntarily if 
such disclosures are an expected norm in that particular industry even if there no legal 
requirement (Holland, 2005). Related to this is an issue of a firm desiring to signal to other 
parties that it is within the bounds of the industry. Giner (1997) argued that if a firm is seen to 
deviate from the industry norms, the market may perceive it as bad news hence the firm 
might use disclosures as a signal of being in line with industrial norms.   
 In industries where activities have a significant impact on social and environmental 
issues, voluntary disclosures are explained from the legitimacy perspective. These industries 
are likely to have high public visibility and in most cases might be subject to negative 
publicity by the media. In these circumstances, disclosures are used a way of 
gaining/defending legitimacy (Patten, 1991). Thus, it is believed that the disclosure of 
information like social responsibility information enhances a firm’s public image in the face 
of its various political interest groups (Deegan and Gordon, 1993).   
 With regard to climate change and GHG disclosures, the issue of industry influence is 
a paramount one. Industries differ in their pollution levels as such those industries whose 
firms emit more GHGs are likely to be under greater scrutiny and subject to regulation 
compared to less emitting industries (PWC, 2008). Such scrutiny means increased business 
risks and the need for the concerned firms to invest in less carbon intensive industries 
(Rankin et al., 2011). The level of pressure in these energy intensive industries and those 
industries that rely on fossil fuel might influence disclosures in a way that might be different 
in those industries deemed to be less GHG emitters.     
 Empirical evidence regarding the influence of industry on voluntary disclosures has 
been mixed. Stanny and Ely (2008) examined the factors the influence voluntary disclosure 
of information related to climate change in a sample of 500 S&P firms participating in the 
CDP and found that contrary to their prediction, there was no positive association between 
high carbon intensive industries and carbon disclosures. The results by Stanny and Ely (2008) 
could be due to categorisation of the industries because even financial and technology 
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industries were deemed carbon intensive. Such sectors do not normally fall under carbon 
intensive category as per Kyoto Protocol (see Freedman and Jaggi, 2005). But in another 
study of determinants of voluntary corporate GHG disclosures in Australia, Rankin et al. 
(2011) found that those companies belonging to energy & mining and those deemed as 
‘industrial firms’ and hence high carbon intensive were disclosing more than companies in 
other industries.           
 The influence of industry on disclosures is also confirmed by Hackston and Milne 
(1996). The authors examined the determinants of Social and Environmental Disclosures 
(SED) in the 1992 annual reports of 47 New Zealand companies using regression analysis. 
Results indicated a significant positive relationship between industry and the SED. They 
argued that industry represents the ‘perceived risk’ of the company’s activities as such firms 
belonging in industries considered risky in some respects and are subjected to stringent 
scrutiny discloses more information as a way of reassuring existing and potential investors 
that all is well. Other studies who found similar results include Patten and Crampton (2004) 
and Roberts (1992).  
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Table 1 summarises some of the studies that have been undertaken so far. 
Table 1 Summary of GHG disclosure academic studies 
 
Researcher(s) Method and Sample Variables confirmed 
(Significant) 
Variables not 
confirmed (non-
significant) 
Freedman and Jaggi 
(2005) 
Multiple OLS regression. Annual 
reports, environmental reports and 
websites of 120 public firms belonging 
to Chemical, Oil and Gas, energy, 
motor vehicles and casualty insurance 
industries in 20 different countries 
Size, Industry ROE, Leverage 
Stanny and Ely (2008) Multiple OLS regression. A sample of 
494 firms of the S&P 500 firms that 
responded the CDP5 questionnaire. 
Size, previous disclosures, 
foreign sales  
Profitability, Leverage, 
Industry 
Prado-Lorenzo et al 
(2009) 
Multiple OLS regression. A sample of 
101 companies from USA, Australia, 
Canada and the EU.  
Size, Country Kyoto 
Membership, Industry 
Leverage, Profitability 
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Prado-Lorenzo and 
Garcia-Sanchez (2010) 
Multiple OLS regression. A Sample of 
283 companies which participated in 
the CDP6 questionnaire 
CEO duality Asset 
profitability, Company Size, 
Indebtedness ratio, Meeting 
number, Board size, Industry 
 
Board Independence 
(Number of Independent 
directors), Diversity of 
board members  
Peters and Romi (2010) Regression. A Sample of 4799 firm 
year observations participating in CDP 
questionnaires in 2002-2006 drawn 
from 28 different countries 
Environmental regulatory 
stringency, Country Market 
Structure, Cross listing, Firm 
size, Leverage 
N/A 
Peters and Romi (2012) Cross sectional logistic regression. A 
sample of 1462 firm year observations 
covering 2002-2006. US firms on 
FT500 and S&P 500 
Firm size, Environmental 
committee, Presence of 
sustainability officer  
Leverage, ROA, CEO 
duality and Institutional 
ownership 
Rankin et al (2011) Multiple OLS regression. Annual 
reports, sustainability reports, stand-
alone environmental reports of 187 
ASX 300 firms in 2007. 
Size, Industry, Participation in 
CDP, high quality corporate 
governance, Availability of 
environmental management 
system 
Participation in EU ETS, 
Leverage, Board 
Environmental 
committee and ROA 
were insignificant 
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Berthelot and Robert 
(2012) 
Multiple OLS regression.  A Sample 
of 64 Canadian public oil and gas 
firms with production activities 
Size, ROA, environmental 
committee and ownership 
structure (i.e. widely held 
ownership)  
Type of Audit firm. 
Stanny (2011) Logistic regression.  A Sample of 442 
firms which participated in CDP  from 
2006-2008 
Previous disclosures, Size, 
Regulatory threat, Price 
volatility 
Share turnover 
Cotter and Najah (2011) Multiple OLS regression. A sample of 
356 firms on FTSE Global Equity 
Index series 
Institutional investors, Size, 
Country 
Leverage and ROA  
 
Tang and Luo (2011) Multiple OLS regression. A sample of 
243 companies from G500 
Size, leverage, industry 
membership, participation in 
ETS, stringent environment 
regulations 
Kyoto Protocol 
participation by country, 
Legal System, ROA, 
Tobin’s Q  
 
 
Source: own construction  
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3.2 Overview of Qualitative Studies on GHG and Environmental Disclosures 
Apart from the quantitative studies that explain the determinants of disclosures from 
statistical relationship, there are other studies that have been conducted qualitatively to 
provide further explanations for the motivations (through primary data analysis) and review 
actual GHG information disclosed by the companies (through qualitative analysis of 
secondary data). Regarding GHG disclosures, the majority of the qualitative studies 
particularly focus on evaluating secondary data with the intention of understanding  the 
‘spirit’ or genuineness of the disclosures in the voluntary reporting regime. For instance, 
Kolk et al. (2008) developed a conceptual framework using the global governance theories 
and institutional theory in order to investigate the role of carbon disclosures in an emerging 
climate change regime. Their study focussed on data disclosed through CDP with an 
objective of analysing the effectiveness of the CDP disclosure avenue in terms of whether it 
provides satisfactory information linking climate change strategies, financial performance, 
and GHG emissions reductions to enable such stakeholders to make decisions regarding a 
firm. The sample comprised FT500 firms that responded to CDP questionnaire for the period 
2003 to 2007 and was analysed qualitatively using QSR NVivo 7 software package. The 
authors noted that the response rates had gone up but the comprehensibility of the responses 
remained questionable. They argued that lack of comparability and verifiability of the 
submitted data meant that even an experienced climate data analyst could not make sense of 
the CDP disclosures. They then called for a stricter standardised regime of carbon disclosures 
with mandatory verification requirement as a way of improving the disclosures.  
 In another study investigating whether the GHG disclosures were being used as 
‘legitimation strategy’,  Hrasky (2012) used content analysis of sustainability and annual 
reports of ASX top 50 companies for the period 2005 and 2008. The aim was to investigate 
whether companies’ disclosures were a reflection of symbolism or apparent change of 
behaviour leaning towards legitimisation of their operations. The study noted that firms in 
carbon intensive industries had legitimately increased their footprints information with 
disclosures showing clear intent to control emissions whereas those in less carbon intensive 
industries had disclosed as mere symbolism. With these findings, it recommended 
government intervention through regulation to change the behaviour of less carbon intensive 
firms and encourage efforts done by those in carbon intensive industries. However the study 
had a small sample and had concentrated on large companies only.   
 Haque and Deegan (2010) investigated the climate change disclosures related to 
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corporate governance made in annual reports, stand-alone social and environmental reports 
over a 16 year period from 1992 to 2007. The focus was on procedures available within a 
firm to address climate change issues. The sample was made up of five companies listed on 
Australian Stock Exchange namely BHP Billiton (manufacturing/mining), Caltex (oil 
refinery), Origin Energy Limited (oil, gas, and electricity), Rio Tinto (manufacturing/mining) 
and Santos Limited (oil and gas). Their results indicated that disclosures increased over the 
period and this was matched with increased corporate governance mechanisms relating to 
climate change within the firms. Thus in the latter years focused by the study, many firms had 
reported either instituting a committee responsible for environment and climate change or 
increasing board oversight responsibilities towards climate change.    
 The authors also noted that more disclosures relating to GHG accounting and 
‘research & development’ (for example, information about GHG inventory, GHG reduction 
targets from facilities and products, and the promotion of energy efficiency by developing 
low emission technologies) was being reported in standalone social and environmental 
reports compared to annual reports. However information pertaining to governance and 
management of GHG was being exclusively reported in annual reports. Overall, Haque and 
Deegan (2010) noted that the disclosures provided limited insights into climate change risks 
and opportunities and that almost all the companies in the sample failed to meet what they 
had referred to as ‘best practice’ based on their disclosure index.  
 Furthermore, Andrew and Cortese (2012) carried out an exploratory study on the 
carbon disclosures of Australasian mining companies over three years (CDP5; CDP6; CDP7) 
in compliance with a voluntary carbon disclosure regime – the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) – and assess those disclosures with respect to comparability, an important criterion for 
information usefulness. The analysis paid particular attention to the methodology used by 
firms in computing the disclosed information with a view of judging the comparability of the 
information. Beginning with CDP5, firms reporting under the CDP were advised to use the 
GHG methodology for the preparation of their information with a view of improving the 
comparability of the data. Out of the total sample of 46 companies that were requested 
information in one or more occasions in the period under review, only 18 provided responses. 
Of the 18 companies that did respond, only 13 disclosed information regarding GHG 
emissions, with the remaining 5 providing no emissions information. Firms that disclosed the 
GHG information used different methodologies of computing data despite CDP advising the 
GHG protocol. This then means that comparability of the data under CDP is still difficult. 
85 
 
 Other studies have investigated the credibility of GHG disclosures in other reports 
other than the CDP. Dragomir (2012) reviewed the annual sustainability reports of the sample 
companies (i.e. BP, Total, Shell, BG Group and Eni) in order to assess whether they were 
providing high-quality environmental disclosures at group-level for the period 1997-2010. In 
this qualitative study, the author benchmarked the carbon disclosures in the sustainability 
reports against the requirements of GHG protocol. In all the companies sampled, the study 
revealed lack of consistency in the methodologies used to compute GHG emissions data. 
Thus the author remarked that it appeared ‘the process of calculating and estimating GHG 
emissions is reformed every year, with disregard to previously collected data and the 
principle of comparability’ (Dragomir, 2012, p.234). It was also found that the disclosures 
considered ‘mandatory’ under the GHG protocol like breakdown on the six gases covered by 
Kyoto protocol were being omitted in the company reports. There was also lack of clear 
labelling of information according to scopes as is required under the GHG protocol. The 
author argued that lack of the consistency in the disclosures undermines the credibility of the 
disclosures and that it pointed to the anomalies and loose procedures in the European 
regulatory system. Overall the study concluded that existing environmental accounting 
systems were still far from producing both credible and reliable data.   
 In a related development, researching on the relevance of the GHG disclosures in 
various reporting channels including the CDP, Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) focussed on UK 
major supermarkets. Thus, they researched on the relevance of the voluntary disclosures of 
GHGs by reviewing the published reports (corporate responsibility reports, the 
supplementary corporate responsibility and climate change-related information provided on 
company websites, and on responses to the CDP) of the nine major supermarket groups in the 
UK (ALDI, ASDA, Co-operative Group, LIDL, Marks and Spencer, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s, 
Tesco and Waitrose) for the year 2010. The findings were that voluntary reporting in 
supermarkets did not meet investors’ needs. There was generally lack of comparability in the 
data disclosed and that this was more pronounced in indirect emissions from supply chains. 
Of the studied supermarkets, only Marks and Spencer had disclosed emissions from supply 
chains. One reason cited as contributing to lack of improvement in the CDP disclosures is 
that they are not widely used by the investors to evaluate corporate performance hence firms 
do not have pressure to improve. They also noted that initiatives in improving GHG reporting 
had placed much emphasis on listed companies so much so that there was a high risk of 
neglecting disclosure practices in unlisted companies. The authors argued that a clear 
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government position like introduction of mandatory reporting requirements might go a long 
way in improving carbon reporting and incentivising investors to use disclosed information.
 Other studies particularly those focussing on Social and Environmental Reporting 
(SER) have gone beyond a content review of information to testing primary data in order to 
explain the determinants and motivation behind the disclosures. Wilmshurst and Frost’s 
(2000) study examined the link between factors influencing disclosure of environmental 
information and the actual reporting practices. Using opinions of Australian firms’ CFOs 
obtained through a questionnaire survey and the firms’ actual reporting practices extracted 
from annual and other reports, they found significant correlations between the perceived 
importance of a number of factors and the reporting practices. The authors failed to find 
support that practitioners consider environmental groups highly in their disclosure decisions. 
The only other study that used primary data is that by Cormier et al. (2004) who used a 
questionnaire survey to determine management’s perceptions regarding importance of 
motives for environmental reporting. In particular senior environmental executives were 
asked about the determinants of environmental reporting and the responses were regressed 
against actual disclosures of the firms drawn from Europe and North America. A relationship 
was found between managers’ environmental attitudes towards various stakeholder groups 
and actual disclosures made.         
  Buhr (2002) used interviews in her case study approach of two Canadian companies 
and documented evidence that SER is a complicated process which varied significantly 
between the two firms. In one company, a dominant motivation was investor pressure whilst 
in the other it was the presence of one influential individual. Gray et al. (1995b) looking at 
how SER is implicated in organisational greening came to a similar observation that the 
presence of a dominant personality had a huge influence on the disclosures. Arguably, if this 
was to be viewed from the angle of quantitative studies that hypothesise using the presence of 
dominant CEO or duo roles played by CEO, the result might be deemed contradictory. 
Quantitatively, most studies tend to conclude that CEO duality (proxy for dominant 
personality) may deter disclosures. It is simplistic conclusions like these that justify more 
studies qualitatively.         
 Another qualitative study that demonstrates the complexity and diversity of 
motivations behind disclosures is the one done by Larrinaga-González and Bebbington 
(2001) who researched on whether there was connection between central values of an 
organisation and SER in nine Spanish companies. Their findings suggest that an organisation 
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response to environmental affairs reflects both the need to change the environmental agenda 
and the need to change its values thereby highlighting the fact that motivations behind SER 
are complex.           
 In a related development, Adams (2002) attempted to look at the factors affecting 
disclosures from a different angle. Using seven multinational companies operating in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors in the UK and Germany, she argued that beyond the 
traditional factors widely documented in literature as to influence social disclosures there are 
also other internal factors that affect disclosures. This argument was pursued using primary 
data collected through interviews and she indeed found other factors like organisational 
culture and country of origin as just influential as size. The study further noted that the way 
an organisation structures itself also influences the outcome of the SER.   Evidently the 
findings in these studies are peculiar and cannot be deduced by quantitative statistics derived 
from secondary data as is normally the case with many studies.  
 Particularly focussing on the UK, Miles et al. (2002) qualitatively concluded that 
organisations undertake SER because of four main reasons as follows: peer pressure and 
benchmarking activities; stakeholder pressure; government pressure; and pressure from the 
city. Their study further elaborated that through responding to pressure, SER benefits a 
company on a number of things ranging from enhanced external reputation; external 
recognition via awards/ ranking exercises; increased staff morale; and ‘business drivers, such 
as cost or risk reduction.        
 Furthermore, Spence and Gray (2007) conducted interviews with managers in 36 UK 
firms in an attempt to understand what motivates them to undertake SER. The interviews 
were based on the themes as identified by Adams (2002) and they were semi structured. The 
pilot study indicated that business case motivations were predominant and that respondents 
equated SER to CSR. The motivations were summarised as follows: Business efficiency; 
Market drivers (ethical investment decisions by stakeholders); Reputation and risk 
management; Stakeholder management (managing powerful stakeholders like NGOs, 
Government to forestall future regulatory initiatives); Mimetic motivations (actions as a 
result of peer pressure); and Internal Champions (the influence of the CEO or board).
 Apart from the qualitative literature and quantitative literature depicting motivations 
behind SER, Spence and Gray (2007) suggested that there is also the ‘business/professional’ 
literature whose conclusion point to the fact that there is only a business case to SER and that 
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is managing risks. Thus the professional literature seems to suggest that engagement in SER 
could be an effective way of managing risks which might be rewarding in the long run. 
 
3.3 Limitation of Disclosure Literature and Expected Contribution of Study  
In brief, studies on GHG disclosures have had the following characteristics: reliance on CDP 
data; mostly cross sectional with exception of a few; and more importantly none has 
attempted to test primary data instead most of the determinants are derived through statistical 
relationships based on secondary data. The dominance of cross section studies and lack of 
studies testing primary data are characteristics that are common to voluntary disclosure 
studies in particular those focusing on Social and Environmental Reporting (SER). Such lack 
of variety in the studies has led to little understanding in what really motivates firms to 
engage in these voluntary disclosures (Spence and Gray, 2007).    
 Over the period researchers have attempted to provide answers as to why corporations 
engage in SER other than mere desire for accountability (Gray et al., 1995a). GHG reporting 
is largely voluntary in the UK and this makes the question as to why organisations engage in 
it relevant. Understandably, Solomon and Lewis (2002) wondered why organisations engage 
in SER when the motivations are unclear while the disincentives are obvious. Quantitative 
studies have attempted to provide an answer to this puzzle.  As discussed, these have led to 
revelations that SER could be a product of a number of theoretical frameworks namely, 
legitimacy (Deegan, 2002), stakeholder (Roberts, 1992), political economy and positive 
accounting (Tinker et al., 1991 (see Chapter 2 for further details). Through many of these 
studies, it is known that disclosures can be linked to various attributes of a firm (see above for 
detailed coverage).          
 Though the theories have helped clarify the motivations, there is sense that what has 
been concluded so far is partial, contradictory and inconclusive leading to the need for more 
different patterns of research (Spence and Gray, 2007). Researchers note that the problems lie 
in the inherent limitations of the statistical methods used in inferring the motivations for 
disclosures (Roberts, 1992; Miles et al., 2002). This led to a number of researchers resorting 
to qualitative studies (see Adams, 2002; Buhr, 2002; Gray and Bebbington, 2000; Gray et al., 
1995b; Larrinaga-González and Bebbington, 2001; Larrinaga-González et al., 2001; 
O’Dwyer, 2002) whose results have suggested that quantitative explanations for SER are 
underestimated, and that in reality motives or determinants for disclosures are complex and 
variable (Spence and Gray, 2007). The argument is that the thinking, emotions of people 
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behind the production of the disclosures cannot be explained by statistical numbers which in 
many cases are historical and produced for other purposes (Miles et al., 2002). Therefore it is 
intimated that an alternative or complementary way of determining these motivations is to 
use qualitative approach through surveys or interviews. Spence and Gray (2007) argued that 
such an approach will help highlight the internal struggles between balancing corporate 
objectives leading to the disclosures.        
 It is believed that through studies involving primary data; more insights could be 
uncovered leading to clear understanding of the motivations and appropriate policy 
frameworks to encourage those not fully engaged. This is important in the study of GHG 
since to date, most of the studies have limited themselves to how the theories explain the 
phenomenon behind GHG disclosures. Thus part of what is lacking in the GHG disclosure 
literature is a systematic review of how those preparing reports for GHG disclosures 
articulate the company determinants for the same. One advantage of primary data is that it is 
able to obtain specific responses to a specific question unlike in secondary data where a 
proxy for say size might represent a number of things ranging from political costs, firm risk 
to environment influence (Graham et al., 2005). Appreciation of a firm's internal and external 
factors that motivates its disclosure policy through a survey is helpful in setting up any policy 
on GHG disclosures. Thus, evidence abound that the understanding of firm specific 
determinants is important in helping identify and highlight challenges or obstacles to the 
success of future regulatory efforts (Peters and Romi, 2010). Tauringana (1997) also pointed 
out that one importance of disclosure is that they help recommend or influence policy. But 
just as May and Sundem 1976 cited Graham et al. (2005) mentioned, policy adoption is as a 
result of the application of a choice among several alternatives and often a highly subjective 
judgemental process which in the opinion of Graham et al. (2005) can only have a sound 
grounding if supported by empirical evidence emanating from primary data. In the 
circumstances, one contribution of this research is that its results will help shape policy on 
GHG disclosures at a time when the government is stepping up efforts to ensure more GHG 
disclosures by companies.  
  Notwithstanding the above, Spence and Gray (2007) advised that the emphasis on 
qualitative studies should not mean a disregard to quantitative studies rather they should be 
used complementary. In view of this, this study will make use of both methodologies to 
understand the motivations behind GHG disclosures.     
 In addition to bringing insights through primary data, this study also brings the 
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understanding of GHG disclosure determinants on a longitudinal basis. Voluntary disclosure 
literature is dominated by studies that have focussed on a single period (Bartlett and Jones, 
1997). Over time attempts have been made to conduct studies on a longitudinal basis (see 
Choi, 1974; Firth, 1980; Barret, 1976). Critics of these studies point to the fact that they were 
based on annual reports that were purely formulated from stewardship point of view unlike in 
recent times when the annual report has been transformed into a public relation document 
(Bartlett and Jones, 1997). Recent studies on longitudinal basis include that of (Gray et al., 
1995a; and Lee, 1994) but these have not directly investigated the question of determinants 
(Bartlet and Jones, 1997). In trying to improve on the shortfalls of earlier and current studies 
on longitudinal basis, Bartlett and Jones (1997) carried their own but its major limitation is 
that it only focused on one company i.e. H.P. Bulmer Holdings and that limits its 
applicability. Studies as conducted by Stanny and Ely (2008); and Kolk et al. (2008), though 
fall under longitudinal studies specifically focussing on GHG yet they have inherent 
limitations in their use of CDP questionnaires. It is therefore intimated that a study that is 
done on a longitudinal basis using a modern form of annual report, covering a number of 
companies in diverse industries may provide useful insights to the general literature of 
disclosures since longitudinal studies tend to produce robust results (Oliveira et al., 2006).
 The relevance of longitudinal studies is well documented in literature. Brammer and 
Pavelin (2006) noted that a longitudinal study helps to highlight an evolving pattern of 
disclosure over time and the results of Rajab (2009) on risk disclosures in the UK, though 
done based on random years chosen over time supports this view. Other accounting 
disclosure studies particularly in social and environmental spheres have also displayed a 
pattern of increasing in response to a number of factors specifically regulation and public 
pressure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).  Therefore it is anticipated that this longitudinal study 
will reveal the trend of disclosures over time while noting the factors and motivation behind 
the same. This is particularly important in the UK setting since the period covered by the 
study is characterised by an increase in government initiatives relating to GHG reporting. 
Thus under the strong leadership of the government, the Climate Change Act 2008 and 
DEFRA guidance 2009 were introduced to help companies account and disclose GHG 
information and hence the need to assess the effectiveness of these initiatives.  
 The study also makes a general contribution to the existing gaps in the disclosure 
literature. In fact prior researchers (see Zarb, 2007) have called for more studies exploring the 
motivation and determinants behind disclosures arguing that despite many studies in this area 
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the motives have not been satisfactorily defined (Hackston and Milne, 1996). Again Adams 
(2002) called for more studies testing primary data to reveal the determinants behind 
disclosures arguing that these voluntary disclosure motives cannot be obtained by testing 
secondary data of certain selected variables alone. Other prior studies like that of Gray et al. 
(2001) and Patten (2002) also argued that results from existing studies on disclosures 
particularly environmental information are inconclusive owing to many limitations of the 
studies and hence called for more studies in this area. Among the limitations cited are sample 
size and lack of industry diversity. These will be addressed in this study by investigating 
more companies drawn from a diverse range of sectors and hence it is therefore believed that 
the findings of this research will go a long way in expounding current knowledge on motives 
of disclosures in general. In addition there is a general call by researchers like Rankin et al. 
(2011) for more studies exploring the motivations behind GHG disclosures and this study is 
part of the response to those calls.       
 This contribution is enhanced by the fact that the study is localised to one country i.e. 
UK while covering a diverse range of sectors unlike previous studies on GHG disclosures 
that have an international focus (covering many countries) but a narrow industry coverage. 
Thus previous studies have covered many countries but selective industries largely drawn 
from the Kyoto protocol document (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005). 
The rationale behind wide coverage in this study is that the most widely available GHG 
reporting frameworks are generic and applicable to all companies.    
 The focus on one country is important in as far as results are concerned. As noted by 
Kolk (2010); Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009), though climate change is a global problem, it 
affects countries differently as such policy guidance tends to reflect the effects experienced 
by a country and this may adversely affect international comparison. Gray et al. (1995a) in a 
review of environmental disclosure literature concluded in similar manner stating that a 
country of origin has a huge influence on disclosures. When researching on Corporate Social 
disclosures, Adams (2002) came to a similar conclusion. Other researchers have also singled 
out country of origin effects as a major limitation of international studies noting that 
voluntary disclosures are very much a reflection of mandatory disclosures which are heavily 
influenced by a country’s legal system (Einhorn, 2005; Zarb, 2007; Holland and Foo, 2003). 
In direct reference to GHGs Peters and Romi (2010) argued that different countries continue 
to develop numerous reporting mechanisms for GHGs hence making firm or country 
comparison difficult. Their study of CDP disclosures of companies drawn from different 
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countries revealed that company disclosures differed based on country in which a company 
was based. In the circumstances therefore it is justifiable that GHG disclosures which fall 
under climate science, an area where the public has divided opinion, should be studied in a 
local setting.           
 The choice of UK is justifiable in the sense that despite setting ambitious targets on 
GHG reduction and introducing a number of initiatives to lead the corporate sector into 
‘green economy’ very few academic studies have done to assess the disclosure practices of 
companies targeted by these initiatives. So far available studies on GHG practices in the UK 
have largely focused on what is being disclosed rather than the determinants behind the 
disclosures (see for instance, Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012 who focussed on GHG disclosures 
of UK major supermarkets).  Others like Sales de Aguiar (2009) focused on testing the 
impact of joining the UK ETS scheme on Global Climate Change disclosures. Using CDP 
data, standalone reports and annual reports covering the period 2000 to 2004 she documented 
evidence that participation in the UK ETS scheme had increased disclosures on global 
climate change mainly in the annual reports. This study has some limitations. DEFRA (2010) 
noted that though Schemes like UK ETS or EU ETS are important initiatives, they do not 
emphasise on accounting and reporting GHG which then makes a reading of the company’s 
disclosures under them limited.         
 A case could also be made that with the introduction of further voluntary reporting 
guidance like DEFRA (2009), the UK deserves more review as to the impact of such 
documents on the company’s disclosure behaviour not only in CDP disclosures but also in the 
annual reports.  
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
The chapter has provided a comprehensive review of the literature on voluntary disclosures 
particularly those focussing on GHG and environmental disclosures. This was done with the 
intention of putting the current study in proper context. Thus such a review helped identify 
the gaps in literature which the current study purpose to address. In doing this, the chapter has 
covered a number of characteristics which are deemed necessary for a disclosing firm. These 
include corporate governance attributes (board size, non-executive director ratio, audit 
committee independence, and environmental committee), ownership structure (managerial 
ownership, ownership concentration), and company characteristics like (size, profitability, 
liquidity, leverage, industry). The emphasis was on clearly identifying the link between these 
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factors and the theories on motivation for voluntary disclosures discussed in chapter three. It 
has therefore been demonstrated that GHG reporting just like environmental reporting is 
likely to be done by large companies; by organisations in high sensitive industries; and good 
corporate governance which among other things is characterised by presence of 
environmental committee. It has also been shown that these characteristics reflect the 
applicability of the theories and that in some circumstances other characteristics like size 
might represent the nature of more than one theory. This confirms the fact that the theories 
complement one another in explaining the motivations behind disclosures.  
 Having looked at the determinants of the disclosures, the chapter had a detailed 
coverage of selected qualitative studies whose focus was on social and environmental 
disclosures with a particular emphasis on those concentrating on GHGs. The analysis was 
aimed at bringing more insights into the findings of these studies by reviewing their salient 
features like sample used, methodology adopted and how the results differed from one study 
to the other. Compared to the quantitative studies, it has been demonstrated that very few 
qualitative studies on GHG disclosures have been done with the majority heavily relying in 
data extracted from CDP questionnaires. In all, the analysis has revealed that though GHG 
disclosures are being studied more, the studies are mainly quantitative and cross sectional and 
in many cases have relied heavily on CDP data. There is also evidence of inconclusiveness as 
to what really motivates firms to disclose GHG information despite the associated costs of 
such disclosures. Thus the chapter has shown that this reliance on secondary data based 
quantitative studies to understand determinants hugely underestimate the dynamics of parties 
involved in the disclosure processes and that for some time researchers have recognised this 
limitation. In overcoming this limitation, some researchers on SER have resorted to 
qualitative studies. Evidence coming from these qualitative studies suggests complex and 
conflicting factors motivating disclosures but many agree that no single approach is adequate 
in explaining these disclosures. No study on GHG has attempted to test primary data and in 
as far as the researcher is concerned, no study on SER has combined both methodologies in 
one attempt to understand the motivation behind disclosures. It is in this respect that this 
study has been taken to fill this gap.        
 In addition, the chapter has also justified the setting of the study being on UK 
companies and on a longitudinal basis. Few studies on voluntary disclosures have been on 
longitudinal basis but literature demonstrate that such studies bring a wealth of insights and 
trends in the disclosures which is what this study intends to establish on GHG disclosures. 
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Thus a longitudinal study will help track how GHG reporting has developed which may 
provide useful guidance as to what is not been reported and tracking where the major failures 
are in achieving reporting completeness. Regarding the choice of UK companies, at the time 
of this literature review, to the knowledge of the researcher, only one study focused on the 
UK examining the impact of joining EU ETS on climate change disclosures. It is appreciated 
that a number of initiatives notably the introduction of Climate Change Act 2008 and 
voluntary GHG disclosure guidance i.e. DEFRA (2009), makes the UK an interesting case to 
review the motivation behind the GHG disclosures. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Nature of Greenhouse Gases 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The aim of the chapter is to explain the nature and importance GHGs so as to highlight why 
they merit attention and require meaningful coordination at the international level. In doing 
this the chapter begins by laying down the scientific background of climate change and global 
warming. The composition and particular features of GHGs are explained and thereafter the 
link between human influence on GHGs, climate change and temperatures is briefly outlined. 
Having demonstrated why human influence is singled out as being responsible for global 
warming, the chapter covers some criticisms made against the scientific claim behind global 
warming. The impact of global warming is discussed after the criticisms which then lead to 
the discussion on the economic justification for policy intervention on global warming both at 
national and international levels. The chapter concludes by looking at the efforts and 
agreements that have been done so far in addressing the issue of climate change. These 
efforts have been discussed at two levels first focussing on international efforts and then 
secondly looking at UK efforts.  International efforts dwelt on United Nations negotiations 
beginning with the formation of IPCC in 1988 through to Kyoto protocol and the Durban 
platform in December 2011 while a look at the UK has concentrated on the policy measures 
implement to help it meet its domestic as well as international GHG emission reduction 
targets.           
 Throughout the chapter, emphasis is made that GHGs and global warming have 
become topical issues in our time so much so that no stakeholder can afford to neglect them. 
Thus there is a tension between the desire for continued economic development through 
means that bring GHGs and the need to preserve a habitable universe through good 
environmental management. In achieving the right balance, the international consensus is 
about a shift to economies propelled by clean energy and decelerating on the use of carbon 
intensive energy. To ensure that these goals are met, policy interventions are in place meant 
to help stakeholders manage their emissions and invest in green technologies. But for 
progress to be noteworthy there must be accountability and transparency which will ensure 
that all stakeholders are aware of each other’s contribution to climate change and efforts to 
manage the same.  Transparency and accountability is achieved when there is a credible 
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system of measurement and reporting. It is in this respect that measurement and reporting of 
GHGs becomes a pivotal element in all efforts developed so far to manage GHGs. Some 
evidence indicates that measurement and reporting enables a firm to manage its emissions 
(Deloitte, 2011). Nonetheless  reporting on its own does not lead to companies reducing their 
emissions rather its policies that encourage companies to measure emissions of which 
reporting is one of them that lead to GHG reductions (DEFRA, 2010).      
4.1 The Science of Climate Change 
The GHGs science is explained within the context of climate.  IPCC (2001) defined climate 
as an average of weather (wind, precipitation, temperature etc.) over time and area.  The 
climate system is powered by solar radiation and evolves over time under both its own 
internal dynamics and external factors referred to as ‘forcings’ (IPCC 2007). Changes in solar 
radiation are considered to be a major factor that alters climate patterns.  
 Scientifically, it is estimated that when solar radiation occurs, energy amounting to 
1,370 watts reaches the earth per second on a surface area of one square meter facing the sun 
during the daytime (Le Treut et al.,  2007).  Approximately two third of this heat is reflected 
back due to clouds and other particles while the un-reflected portion is absorbed by the 
earth’s surface and atmosphere. To keep a balance of the incoming energy and outgoing 
energy, the earth theoretically radiates the same amount of radiation it absorbs (Seinfeld, 
2011; IPCC 1995). It is through this process that the earth maintains its climate levels and 
hence any change to radiation is bound to alter climate pattern.  
 Nonetheless as the earth radiates back the solar energy, before it reaches the space, 
part of the energy is trapped in the atmosphere by the presence of some molecules referred to 
as Greenhouse gases. They are called Greenhouse gases because they hold heat like glass 
walls of a greenhouse (IPCC, 2007).  The trapped heat is reradiated into different directions 
and this process reduces the heat released into space thereby enabling the earth experience 
warmer temperatures than it would otherwise.  The ability of the GHGs to hold the solar 
energy and radiate it back to the earth making it experience warm temperatures is what is 
known as Greenhouse Effect (The Australian Academy of Science, 2008; Florides and 
Christodoulides 2008). The gases identified to have this effect are mainly water vapour and 
carbon dioxide but the effect of the latter is significant due to its life span in the atmosphere 
(Le Treut et al 2007).  Please refer to figure 1 below for an illustration of the greenhouse 
effect. 
97 
 
 Figure 1 The Greenhouse Effect Illustration 
 
(Source: Le Treut et al 2007. Historical overview of climate change. In: Climate Change 
2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 
 Figure 1 illustrating the movement of solar radiation from the sun to the surface of the 
earth and back into space. The term Albedo is used to refer to the percentage of solar energy 
that is reflected back by the surface and scientists use the understanding of local, regional, 
and global Albedo to help project climate change. Furthermore scientists believe that the 
warming effect of the gases is kept in balance by the right amount of the gases in the 
atmosphere. It is this right balance that ensures that the earth maintain appropriate levels of 
temperature to sustain life (Le Treut et al., 2007). 
4.2 The Greenhouse Gases Composition 
The atmosphere is made up of several gases of which 21.0 per cent is oxygen and 78.0 per 
cent is nitrogen while the other gases constitute the remaining 1.0 per cent (Australian 
Academy of Science, 2008). According to IPCC (2007), nitrogen, oxygen and the other 
atmospheric gases that exist naturally constitute 99.0 per cent of the gases but do not have 
any greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect occurs by the influence of the remaining 1.0 per 
cent of the gases of which carbon dioxide is about 0.038 per cent. The largest GHG is water 
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vapour whose portion ranges from a fraction of 1.0 per cent to about 3.0 per cent of the total 
atmospheric gases (IPCC, 2007). Apart from the water vapour and carbon dioxide, there are 
other gases that also exhibit the greenhouse effect. Those as identified by the Kyoto protocol 
(1997) are Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2 0), Hydrochlorofluocarbons (HCFCs), 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). However in the second phase of the 
Kyoto Protocol which covers a period from 2013 to 2020, nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), has been 
added to the list of the gases (UN, 2012).      
 Generally it is the right balances of the GHGs that help the earth maintain stable 
climate patterns to support life. Disequilibrium of the concentration of such GHGs can 
provoke a change in the earth’s climate with effects on surface temperature, precipitation and 
severe weather phenomena, such as hurricanes and extreme flooding (Jenowein et al., 2010). 
However among them, each gas has a different potential of influencing the greenhouse effect. 
The influence is mainly as a result of concentration and life span of the gases in the 
atmosphere (Le Treut et al., 2007).  Scientists acknowledge that GHGs other than carbon 
dioxide have a greater warming potential but their concentration and life span is less than that 
of carbon dioxide hence making the latter an important GHG (IPCC 2007).  The warming 
potential of each gas is calculated in the unit called Global Warming Potential (GWP) which 
compares the warming potential of each gas to that of carbon dioxide. IPCC (1990) defines 
the GWP of a particular GHG as the ratio of the integrated radiative forcing of the GHG over 
a time horizon to that of CO2 after their instantaneous releases to the atmosphere in the 
amounts of 1 kg. GWPs are used to convert the emissions of non-CO2 GHGs to ‘equivalent’ 
CO2 emissions, allowing policy-makers to consider and compare multiple options for GHG 
emission reduction (Tanaka et al., 2009). Due to the fact that gases do not stay forever in the 
atmosphere, the GWP is determined over a specific time interval of which the standard times 
are 20years, 100 years and 500 years.  The other GHGs other than carbon dioxide have very 
large greenhouse effect but it is their concentration and life span that tends to weigh down 
this influence. According to IPCC (1995) and Jager and Ferguson (1991) it is estimated that 
the global warming effect of carbon dioxide is 61.0 per cent followed by Methane at 14.0 per 
cent and all the others falling below 5.0 per cent over a 100 year period. Such influence is 
attributed to concentration and life span. 
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4.3 The Link between the Existence of Atmospheric Greenhouse Gases and Human 
Influence 
As noted, the earth maintains predictable patterns of climate by having the right balance of 
the GHGs. Without any human intervention, nature has a mechanism of ensuring the right 
concentration of the gases as most of them appear and disappear naturally. For instance 
carbon dioxide, an important GHG, is produced naturally when people and animals breathe 
and is absorbed by plants for their survival.  Volcanoes are also believed to produce carbon 
dioxide. Nitrous oxide is produced when plants die and rot while methane is known to come 
from cattle as they digest their food (IPCC, 2001).      
 However in the process of time, scientists began to document evidence of human 
influence on the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. According to Maslin (2004), 
Svante Arrhenius was the first to claim that human activity like fossil fuel combustion was 
one cause of global warming linking the concentration of carbon dioxide to temperature. 
Later substantial evidence of his claim was found by scientists and it became widely 
recognised in the public domain that human activity was partly responsible for the increased 
concentration of some GHGs notably carbon dioxide.     
 According to Forster et al. (2007), human activity primarily result in emission of four 
principal GHGs namely carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and the halocarbons group of 
gases containing fluorine, chlorine and bromine. It is the accumulation of these gases over 
time which increases their concentration thereby affecting their warming influence in the 
atmosphere. The human influence on the concentration of the GHGs is referred to as 
anthropogenic. Evidence exist that significant increases of these GHGs have occurred due to 
human activity since the industrial era began (IPCC, 2007; The UK climate Change 
Programme, 2006). Scientific evidence show that due to a combination of fossil fuel 
combustion and deforestation, the amount of carbon dioxide increased from 275 parts per 
million by volume before 1800 to about 355 parts per million by volume in the 20
th
 century 
(Lindzen, 2010).           
 As a matter of fact, there are a wide range of human related activities that lead to 
increased GHGs including burning of fossil fuels, cement production, deforestation, natural 
gas drilling, coal mining etc. But as Nordhaus (2007) explains, the major problem is the 
burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas which leads to the emission of carbon 
dioxide which then result in an imbalance of its required concentration in the atmosphere.  It 
is such increased concentration that makes them trap more radiated energy and reradiate it 
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back to the earth thereby making the earth have warm temperatures. In between 1970 and 
2004 GHG emissions weighed by 100 year GWP have grown by 70.0 per cent and the growth 
of carbon concentration in the same period is estimated to be 80.0 per cent (IPCC, 2007). 
Scientists established that the surface temperature of the earth has warmed by 0.8 degree 
Celsius above its level in 1750 due to anthropogenic greenhouse effect and it is estimated if 
nothing is done to reduce emissions the earth warming may increase by a margin of 2
o
c by 
the year 2050 and to between 3 or 4 degrees Celsius by 2100 (IPCC, 2007; Schneider et al., 
2010). 
4.4 Criticism of Global Warming Science 
Criticism principally targeting the fundamental basis of the climate change science is 
widespread.  Critics argue that changes in temperature are merely exaggerations since 
estimations are only dating back to 150 years ago and that there is too much reliance on 
recreations based on a number of proxies like tree rings and ice cores (Von Storch et al., 2004 
cited Stern, 2006). While this criticism is held by a few, there is also general unanimity to the 
fact that predicting the impact of global warming in future is not an exact science hence liable 
to inaccuracies (Stern, 2006). Lomborg (2007) while acknowledging the changes due to 
global warming argues that the adaptive capabilities of humanity aided by technological 
changes shall continue to keep pace with the changes. Similarly, Lindzen (1992) argued that 
even if the earth was to warm up, the internal dynamics of climate are so complex that they 
cannot just remain constant and that effects of any projected warming levels are manageable.
  Furthermore, the IPCC (2007) report where the fundamental science behind global 
warming confirmed came under severe criticism with many arguing that the finding had 
unduly relied on ‘grey literature’ mostly newspaper articles without peer review thereby 
undermining its scientific authority (Furrer, 2010). IPCC acknowledged the criticism and 
appointed a team of eminent scientists to review the criticised elements of the report 
(Pachauri, 2010). Despite the criticisms, however, the majority of scientists agree that since 
the industrial revolution the earth has been warming due to anthropogenic greenhouse effect 
(IPCC, 2001; Furrer et al., 2009). Overall, using the work Anderegg et al. (2010) who 
reviewed the work of 1372 climate change researchers publications and citations, Milne and 
Grubnic (2011) estimated that about 98 per cent of the climate change researchers accept the 
primary conclusions of IPCC (2007) findings that it is ‘very likely’ that ‘most’ of the 
‘unequivocal’ warming of the Earth’s average temperature over the second half of the 
twentieth century is due to anthropogenic GHG emissions. The IPCC position is further 
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confirmed in a report issued in 2013 in which it concludes that the warming of the climate 
system is unequivocal. Thus IPCC (2013) concluded that: 
 Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and many of the observed changes 
that have occurred since the 1950s are unprecedented over timescales of decades to 
millennia. Specifically, the atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow 
and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse 
gases have increased. 
 Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface 
than any preceding decade since the 1850s. 
 Ocean warming dominates the increase in energy stored in the climate system, 
accounting for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 and 2010. It 
is virtually certain that the upper ocean (0−700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010. 
 Over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been losing 
mass, glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide, and Arctic sea ice and 
Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover have continued to decrease in extent. 
 The rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean 
rate during the previous two millennia. Over the period 1901–2010, global mean sea 
level rose by 0.19 m. 
 Human influence on the climate system is clear. Human influence has been detected 
in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in 
reductions in snow and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in changes in some 
climate extremes. It is extremely likely (i.e. 95-100% likelihood) that human influence 
has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. 
4.5 The Effects of Anthropogenic Global Warming 
Without the anthropogenic greenhouse effects, the natural greenhouse effect is a significant 
factor that enables the earth to maintain an average temperature of 14
o
c with higher attitudes 
recording as low as -19
o
c. It is at these levels of temperature that the earth is able to support 
life and hence it is feared that any human induced warming of the planet might have dire 
consequences on the earth’s ability to sustain life (IPCC, 2007).   
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 Parmeson and Yohe (2003) cited IPCC (2007) highlight the fact that the ability of 
climate to determine the distribution of both natural and managed systems makes its changes 
or variations to be of great concern.  Many aspects of climate change affects life patterns on 
earth but scientists single out temperature changes as one aspect of climate change that 
provides clear signals of its consequences.  According to IPCC (2007), some of the notable 
impacts of a rise in anthropogenic global warming will be experienced as follows: 
 The mortality rate of most species will rise and food supplies will be endangered 
partly due to extreme summer heat weaves and other effects. Generally the entire 
cycle of agriculture will be destabilised due to variations in seasonal periodicity 
resulting in scarcity of food in some areas and a general imbalance between supply 
and demand thereby driving market prices up. 
 Changes in weather patterns affect water cycle resulting in severe floods in other 
areas while others having severe drought. Flooding often result in migration of people 
and this has an economic impact. IPCC noted that people will feel the great impact of 
climate change through its effects on the distribution of water highlighting that when 
water cycle is affected billions of people will either loose or gain water. 
 Sea levels are likely to rise affecting human settlements along the sea. This again 
necessitates the gradual relocation of people. IPCC (2007) estimates that around 5 per 
cent of global population live in coastal cities and is bound to be severely affected. 
 Warmer temperatures also threaten the survival of vulnerable groups like the aged. In 
fact by 2002, the World Health Organisation estimated that by the year 2000, climate 
change was responsible for premature deaths of about 150 000 worldwide (Schneider 
et al., 2010). Warmer temperatures are also believed to cause migration of disease 
bearing insects like mosquitoes.  
In addition to the effects caused by rising temperatures, IPCC (2007) notes that other impacts 
are a direct consequence of increased concentration of carbon dioxide. For instance increased 
levels of carbon dioxide absorbed by the oceans result in ocean acidification which 
destabilises the entire ecosystem and affect the oceanic food chain. IPCC (2007) further 
explains that with a warming of around 2
o
C around 15 per cent to 40 per cent of the species 
potentially face extinction especially when the warming happens rapidly without giving 
species ample time to adapt.        
 Furthermore, global warming on its own coupled with its impact on life sustainability 
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on earth is also expected to affect the business practice of many corporations across sectors 
and industries since corporations are part of the larger community (Sullivan, 2008; Lash and 
Wellington, 2007). Impact on production and infrastructure emanating from climate change 
effects of extreme weather changes, rising temperatures and rising sea levels is known as 
‘Direct Impact’ by IPCC (2007). In particular, Wittneben and Kiyar (2009) explained that as 
worldwide economic losses due to natural disasters accumulate, climate change related risks 
and opportunities have to be integrated into core financial operations of all firms regardless of 
their core business.   For instance, Packard and Reinhardt (2000) argued that floods affecting 
property and people’s livelihood through agriculture will heavily affect the property industry 
and necessitate reallocation of agricultural investments from affected areas to other areas. In 
most cases investments in affected areas will be rendered useless thereby affecting overall 
valuation of certain companies. Connected to this is the fact that the construction industry 
will be confronted with the need to redesign its products in a manner that withstands the 
effects of the changing weather patterns. Basically as people become affected with weather 
changes, companies will experience a shift in demand for their products and services 
(Jenowein et al., 2010). For instance, increase in diseases like malaria will mean more 
demand for pharmaceutical companies. Generally companies with climate sensitive assets 
like insurance companies, real estate and agricultural companies will have to devise effective 
ways of managing risks associated with weather changes and this may require substantial 
investment in collection of reliable information (Packard and Reinhardt, 2000; Kolk et al., 
2008).            
 Other climate change impact on businesses is expected to come from government 
actions in attempting to curb GHG emissions (Sullivan 2008). IPCC (2007) refers to this 
impact as an ‘indirect impact’ emanating from political frameworks and societal preferences. 
Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008) explained with the rise in prominence of global 
climate change in public policy circles, firms are now confronted with both regulatory and 
competitive risks emanating from policy instruments developed to tackle climate change. 
Thus though the scientific basis  remain a contested issue, the push for more regulation as 
was the case within the Kyoto protocol means that the days of ‘business as usual’ for 
corporations are over. Business activities like those in manufacturing sectors that generate 
more GHGs will have to change course as government actions begin to discourage use of 
fossil fuels either through taxes or any other means. Evidently, any regulation discouraging 
use of particular substance like fossil fuels in favour of those with low carbon intensity will 
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result in change of asset values leading to loss of value for those assets depending on heavy 
fossil fuel and a gain in value of those assets connected with low carbon emissions (Packard 
and Reinhardt 2000). Enkvist et al. (2008) reported that valuations for “clean technology” 
companies had increased significantly with the growing prominence of climate change issues. 
Kolk and Levy (2001) explained that in a ‘constrained carbon future’, firms face competitive 
risks as a result of competitive advantage of low intensive goods and services compared to 
carbon intensive ones.  Generally policies placing a price on carbon emissions increase the 
cost of production and reduce the value of the companies that do not take mitigation action 
(OECD, 2010). Besides, Berthelot and Robert (2012) stated that, among other things, 
companies who are emitters will face numerous consequences ranging from increased 
operating costs, reduced demand, reputational risk, litigation, penalties and increased 
stakeholder demand for useful information on GHGs. With countries like the UK taking a 
lead in climate change mitigation initiatives and the private sector in particular institutional 
investors championing the need for more climate information, measurement and reporting 
emissions has become the focus of attention by different stakeholders.  
 Overall therefore, due to the effects of climate change, there will be a re-evaluation of 
companies’ portfolio of assets sensitive to climate change and a rethink of investment 
strategies in low emitting carbon technology. In general, Rezai et al. (2011) reasoned that 
devastating effects of climate change will result in loss of the productive capacity of the 
world economy thereby necessitating action by various stakeholders. In the circumstances, 
pressure on firms to demonstrate their green credentials has been growing and, in return, 
firms are strategizing on managing those expectations (Bansal, 2005; Sharma and Henriques, 
2005; Kock et al., 2012). However despite the increasing pressure, studies are yet to emerge 
assessing the extent of disclosures by the pressured firms. 
4.6 Global Warming and the Justification for Policy Intervention 
Though scientists had been researching on climate change for a long time (Nordhaus, 2007) 
and the issue of climate change was signalled in the 19
th
 Century (Gupta 2010), it was the 
rising concerns of the effects of global warming on humanity that help bring the issue to the 
forefront of public debate (Brown, 1998).  Evidently when the side effects of increased 
carbon concentration was brought to light, humanity found itself in a fix of trying to 
accelerate economic development on one hand (which resulted in more release of carbon 
dioxide), and on the other hand the need to control carbon emissions whose increased 
concentration not only undermined the economic gains but also threaten its survival. Thus the 
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tremendous progress made by human kind since the industrial revolution is tied to the ability 
to use fossil energy which is responsible for pollution (van Koten et al., 2009). An increase in 
economic activity coupled with inaction on global carbon emissions is likely to make the 
impact of global warming be felt by humanity substantially (Stern, 2006).  
 Nordhaus (2007) argued that intervention in climate change issues is a dilemma 
because it is a unique problem in that it is a public good with complex scientific and 
economic uncertainties. Such being the case, he noted that the challenge is to develop a 
policy that balances economic costs of action or inaction today to corresponding future 
economic or ecological benefits. However, as stated by Brown (1998), it is the compelling 
evidence of the likely consequences of climate changes that have pushed the policy makers to 
make a move.           
 A comprehensive economic justification for policy intervention is documented by 
Stern (2006) who argued that the benefits of controlling emissions far outweigh the costs of 
controlling the same. Stern (2006) estimated that the cost of acting on GHGs is 1 per cent of 
GDP while if nothing is done its impact is 20 per cent of GDP. However, it should be noted 
that there has been criticism regarding the findings of Stern Review with some arguing that 
the figures are overestimated due to a low discount rate used (Carter et al., 2006; Weyant, 
2008). Despite these criticisms the findings of Stern review are highly regarded and were 
confirmed by the IPCC report in 2007.       
 Most economic analysis studies on the impact of climate change have so far looked at 
it in the context of a public good and externality. Stern (2006) explained that climate change 
is an externality in the sense that those whose action are responsible for climate change are 
not liable or do not face the full consequences and that the effects are not corrected through 
market mechanisms on their own hence justifying the need for intervention.  The failure by 
market correction is explained by climate change being a public good.  Thus being a public 
good, markets will be reluctant of developing innovative ways of mitigating the effects for 
fear of being easily copied by competitors at no cost unless patented. Though an externality 
and a public good, climate change is unique in the sense that its causes and consequences are 
global regardless of where emissions occur and that its effects are likely to be felt over a long 
period of time (Sovacool and Brown, 2007). Stern (2006) argued that these characteristics 
coupled with the fact that the global warming effects tend to affect the poor more than the 
rich makes a case for any policy intervention to incorporate ethical and welfare issues. 
 A study showed that the most effective policy intervention was pricing carbon 
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emissions so that faced with a charge; emitters will be forced to reduce emissions (Hepburn, 
2007). Nordhaus (2007) argued that such pricing may take the form of limiting the number of 
emissions (Cap and trade) or by levying a tax on carbon emissions. However as noted by 
Prins and Rayner (2007), the tax policy route is a tricky one due to political consideration 
more especially to big polluters like the USA while a cap and trade systems requires careful 
controls in the supply side of allowances if the policy is to achieve emission targets. With this 
in mind, Stern (2006) recommends that the choice of policy tool should be done at national 
level after taking into account its interaction with existing policies. While pricing carbon has 
an influence in making firms switch to low carbon technologies, Stern (2006) argues that to 
remove uncertainty as to the future viability of any firm’s investment in low technology, then 
other aspects of climate change policies adopted should cover technology aspect. 
 Nonetheless as rightly highlighted by Stern (2006), climate change being an 
externality and a global public good, any policy intervention requires international 
cooperation and the ethical and welfare considerations should be dealt by making rich nations 
shoulder more burden of carbon emissions reduction than poor nations.  This appears to be 
the direction policy intervention at international level has been taking since 1988 when the 
IPCC was established. The international negotiations on global warming have followed what 
is termed as ‘common but differentiated approach’ where more burden for emissions 
reduction is placed on the richer nations than the poor and developing nations (UNFCCC 
1992).   
4.6.1 Global warming policy intervention efforts at international level 
Generally many economic policy researchers agree that the economics of GHG reductions 
suggests that the effective way to handle it is through international corporation (See 
Nordhaus 2008; Jacoby et al., 2008) since achieving any target set by individual country are 
unlikely to result in significant reductions (Bosetti et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2009; OECD 
2009). Falkner et al. (2010) elaborates that international cooperation removes the problem of 
‘free riding’ as identified by Stern (2007) to be dominant with climate change as a public 
good.             
 In realisation of the benefits of international cooperation, the international community 
took the first step of cooperation in 1988 with the formation of the IPCC as the scientific arm 
responsible for climate change science research under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.  The UNFCCC was endorsed by 160 countries in 1992 in 
Rio de Janeiro (Houghton 2004). While acknowledging the uncertainties surrounding climate 
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change science, the UNFCCC went on to emphasise the need to mitigate against the effects of 
global warming and the overall target of cutting emissions by 5.0 per cent by the year 2000 
using 1990 levels was set. Falkner et al. (2010) noted that the UNFCCC was modelled from 
the Vienna convention on Ozone layer depletion and hence it has similar tenets like placing 
more responsibility on industrialised nations to cut emissions while helping developing 
nations adapt low carbon emissions technologies. This is referred to as the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility (UNFCCC, 1992). It also insisted on commitments 
from industrialised nations to set targets which will later pave way for a legal binding 
protocol. Suffice to mention that the short term goal of the agreement was not achieved as by 
2000 global emissions had risen by 10.0 per cent on 1990 levels (Houghton, 2004). Gupta 
(2010) attributes part of the failure to the fact that most of the underlying principles of 
meeting the targets were vaguely worded, non-participation of key countries like USA and 
the categorisation of countries into two groups that fuelled more disagreements than 
necessary.         
 Notwithstanding the failure to meet the set target, there was progress on the 
negotiation front. A summit on negotiations for specific quantified agreements was held in 
Berlin in 1995 where a protocol was formulated in which industrialised nations stated their 
reduction commitment for the period 2008-2012 (Houghton, 2004). Basic structure and 
principles were set in Kyoto in 1997 but comprehensive details were agreed in 2001. The 
Kyoto protocol only came into effect in 2005 after the ratification of the treaty by Russia 
(Zedillo, 2007).  
4.6.2 The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto protocol was ratified in 1997 and it came into force in 2005 with the aim of 
preventing dangerous interference with the climate system by limiting the emission of GHGs 
into the atmosphere (UNFCC 2008; Kyoto Protocol, 1997). Within the Protocol, countries are 
divided into groups namely Annex A (developing nations) with no specific mandatory 
requirements to reduce GHG emissions and Annex B (developed nations) which have 
mandatory requirements to reduce GHG emissions in the first phase of the protocol i.e. 2008-
2012 (Kyoto Protocol, 1997). The Kyoto protocol controls emissions from six GHGs namely 
Carbon dioxide, Methane, Nitrous oxide, Hydrofluorocarbons, Perfluorocarbons, and Sulphur 
hexafluoride (Ramaswamy et al., 2001).  Basically under the protocol, emissions reductions 
are to be achieved through national measures but the protocol offers additional range of 
policies and options mainly through three markets based special mechanisms as follows: 
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Joint Implementation (JI): Allowed developed nations (Annex II countries) to 
implement projects that reduce emissions or increase removals by sinks. Article article 6.1 of 
the Protocol allows the transfer or acquisition of Emission Reduction units (ERUs) between 
Annex I states, which are also engaged in emissions trading. Examples included replacement 
of a coal-powered plant with a more efficient combined heat and power plant.  
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): Allowed industrialised nations to 
implement projects that reduce emissions in developing countries e.g. rural electrification or 
reforestation of degraded lands. Article 12 of the protocol established the CDM to help Non 
Annexe I countries to achieve sustainable development and help Annexe I countries with 
alternatives to meet their targets. The CDM works by rewarding developing countries for 
their efforts in adopting low carbon emission strategies than they would otherwise. For 
instance if a country builds wind powered electricity from wind farms instead of coal 
powered plant to generate electricity then under the CDM it can convert the difference in 
potential carbon equivalent emissions between the coal plant and wind farm are calculated 
and converted into CDM after monitoring and certification of credits (formally called 
‘‘Certified Emissions Reductions,’’ or CERs), then sold to industrialized nations seeking to 
purchase CERs under the Kyoto Protocol. Wara (2007) suggested that in theory the revenue 
generated can be used to build more wind farms.     
 Emissions Trading: Allowed industrialised countries to purchase ‘allocated amount 
units’ of emissions from other industrialised countries that find it easier to meet their targets. 
Thus Article 17 of the Kyoto protocol allows Annexe B countries to participate in emission 
trading for the purposes of meeting their commitments and that this should be supplemental 
to their domestic actions. The largest scheme so far is the EU ETS.    
 Besides the three mechanisms, the Kyoto protocol also recognises the use of carbon 
sinks i.e. forests and cultivated land to absorb carbon or off-set it in the atmosphere. 
Offsetting is however considered an ineffective option owing to the fact that comparing 
emission reductions across GHG emissions is scientifically contested and that involves huge 
costs (Wittneben and Kiyar, 2009). There is also an emphasis on the implementation of a 
compliance system to ensure effective implementation of the protocol. Boiral (2006) 
highlights that the protocol’s inclusion of a compliance system means that there must be a 
precise measurement and reporting criteria by parties involved.    
 The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol through the mechanisms is dependent on 
both country and private sector involvement. Kulovesi (2007) noted that it is through the 
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special mechanisms that the private sector plays an active role in the operationalisation of the 
protocol. Thus while states retain overall responsibility for compliance, the flexible 
mechanisms of the protocol accommodates participation of legal private entities. Under both 
CDM and JI, states are expected to approve the projects; appoint competent national 
authorities and authorise private entities to participate in the projects and trade credits. In 
addition, Boiral (2006) points to the emissions trading scheme as an area where private sector 
have taken a leading role more especially in the European GHG trading scheme which 
permits emitters to buy and sell emission credits depending on meeting prescribed emissions 
quotas. In fact Kolk et al. (2008) referred to the carbon trading scheme as a form of 
somewhat fragmented, decentralised carbon governance where various stakeholder interests 
like those of government, businesses, NGOs, key academic and professional establishments 
have converged.          
 Using its implementation mechanisms, the Kyoto protocol aimed at reducing emission 
by 5.2 per cent in the period 2008-2012 using 1990 levels (Grubb et al., 1999) and this is 
wholly the responsibility of Annexe B countries. Just like prior treaties the Kyoto was 
founded on the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ which saw 
industrialised nations having differentiated reduction commitments while developing 
countries were excluded (Falkner et al., 2010). The justification of such a principle rests on 
the fact since the industrial revolution, developed nations are believed to be responsible for 
almost 70 per cent of carbon emissions while the developing nations are only responsible for 
less than a  quarter (Stern, 2007). To promote international cooperation, the protocol also 
placed responsibility on industrialised nations to transfer financial resources to developing 
nations for climate change adaptability and mitigation. Under the protocol countries are 
encouraged to develop domestic measures and policies that help them achieve their targets 
and ensure sustainable development (Article 2 UN, 1998). Many consider the success of the 
protocol as being the first international attempt to lay down quantifiable targets for emission 
reductions (Falkner et al., 2010).       
 However the road to Kyoto ratification was characterised by a number of setbacks. 
Zedillo (2007) cites the unwillingness of the USA to be party to the treaty and the 
overgenerous terms offered to Russia as major drawbacks. The USA did not like the treaty’s 
insistence on developed countries (Annexe I countries) having legally binding targets while 
excluding (Non-Annexe I countries) mostly developing countries whose emissions were 
projected to rise. Cost of compliance was also considered a burden to the growth of the USA 
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economy (Gupta 2010; Manne and Richels, 2004).  Without the USA, the world’s greatest 
emitter, the Kyoto protocol was deemed to fail.     
 Criticism for the Kyoto protocol was widespread. Prins and Rayner (2007) argued that 
the protocol was hastily assembled without much consideration to the peculiarities of climate 
change since it was simply modelled on previous treaty regimes like Ozone Depletion and 
Nuclear Arms Control which were wholly dependent on verifiable targets and timetables. 
Nordhaus (2007) stated that the protocol lacked effective enforcement action and had an 
inefficient allocation of emission rights and again did not attempt to link to any existing 
economic or environmental policies. Overall, Bosetti and Victor (2010) argued that from the 
beginning Kyoto was bound to fail due to varying political and developmental interests of 
countries who were to be party to the arrangement. Others point to its reliance on the 
goodwill of markets to solve the problem and letting countries set low targets as key catalysts 
for its ineffectiveness (Gupta, 2010). There is also some criticism to the flexible markets 
mechanisms within Kyoto as being a mere attempt to commoditise the earth’s atmosphere 
which will lead to exchange of pollution at the expense of serious engagements in reducing 
emissions (Hepburn 2007; Lohmann, 2006). Sovacool and Brown (2009) specifically singled 
out the CDM mechanism as one that can be easily ‘gamed’ noting that by 2009, 300 projects 
had been approved of which more than half targeted one GHG i.e. Trifluoromethane and not 
carbon dioxide.        
 Notwithstanding the shortfalls, the implementation of the protocol went ahead under 
the leadership of the European Union which in 2005 established the first emission trading 
system. It went on to shape the climate agenda in Bali 2007 where the foundation of the 
Copenhagen 2009 was laid (Falkner et al., 2010). 
The Kyoto protocol was originally going to expire on 1 January 2013, but was 
extended until 2020. During the second commitment period, Parties committed to reduce 
GHG emissions by at least 18% below 1990 levels in the eight-year period from 2013 to 
2020. However, the second phase only covers about 15% of global emissions after Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand and Russia opted out (UN, 2012).  
 
4.6.3 The Copenhagen Accord 
With the Kyoto Protocol nearing expiry period, the international community focussed its 
attention on negotiating its replacement. The road map was drawn in Bali in 2007 with the 
111 
 
detailed protocol to be agreed upon in Copenhagen two years later. The Copenhagen Accord 
(2009) emphasised the need to hold mean temperatures below 2
o
c and all major economies 
agreed to non-binding commitments to reduce emissions. Under the Accord, Annex I 
countries as categorised in Kyoto protocol are to state their targets while Non-annex I parties 
are to state their actions based on their own assessment of economic and political feasibility 
(Hufbauer and Kim, 2010). While making use of the Kyoto mechanisms the Copenhagen 
went further establishing principles for a system of international monitoring, reporting and 
verification. Financial resource pledges were also made to contribute towards developing 
economies programmes of mitigation and adaptation. The fund referred to as ‘Green Fund’ 
was to raise $100bn annually by having an initial capital injection from developed countries 
in form of reserve assets and thereafter to be completed by private sector participation by way 
of issuing low cost ‘green bonds’ in capital markets (Bredenkamp and Pattillo, 2010). 
 The outcome of the Copenhagen Accord was however deemed a failure by many 
climate change advocates pointing to its failure to set legally binding targets as a weakness 
(Falkner et al., 2010; Nordhaus, 2011). At the core of the disagreement was the same 
rationale as in Kyoto where industrialised nations were asked to make legally binding 
commitments whereas developing nations were insisting on being excluded and aided in 
mitigation and adaptation (Hufbauer and Kim, 2010). Others however were positive about the 
outcome of the accord pointing to its focus on the long term environmental goal and the green 
fund as useful basis for future negotiations (Doniger, 2009; Bodansky, 2010). 
4.6.4 The Durban Platform 
Following the disappointment of the Copenhagen summit, negotiations continued aimed at 
finding common ground on emission reductions leading to the Cancun agreement in Mexico 
2010 of which details were to be agreed upon in Durban in 2011. According to UN (2011) the 
Durban summit saw 194 parties to the UNFCCC agreeing on a decision pack known as 
‘Durban platform’ which among other things include measures to develop a legal binding 
protocol applicable to all members. More importantly the Durban platform extends the Kyoto 
Protocol and emphasise that a successor protocol be negotiated by 2015 to be implemented in 
2020 (The UK House of Commons 2012).  The Green climate fund agreed upon in the 
Copenhagen Accord was launched and a technology transfer mechanism to enable 
developing countries access clean, low carbon technologies was established alongside an 
adaptation committee.         
 Despite its ability to keep the debate of climate change alive, many analysts argued 
112 
 
the Durban Platform fell short of emphasis on preventing the global temperatures to rise by 
2
o
c (The Economist, 2011). Others argued that  its lack of insisting of emission reduction 
targets now but rather delaying it to 2020 meant that the Durban had managed  to usher a ‘do 
nothing’ era in as far as climate mitigation efforts were concerned (The Australian, 2011).
 With seemingly minimal or no breakthrough in achieving international coordinated 
effort to fight global warming, there are signs that some nations are trying to ensure that the 
fight for global warming is not lost. For instance a group of six countries led by America (i.e. 
America, Brazil, Ghana, Bangladesh, Mexico and Sweden) have agreed for a five yearly plan 
to cut emissions of other GHGs (soot, methane, and hydrofluorocarbon) which have a shorter 
lifespan in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide but have strong impact on the amount of solar 
energy absorbed (The Economist, 2012). It is estimated that these GHGs contribute a third of 
the human related rise in global temperatures. The Scheme is called the Climate and Clean 
Air coalition to reduce Short Lived Climate pollutants. According to US State department 
(2012) cited Economist (2012), if successfully implemented the scheme is likely to slow 
global warming by 0.5
o
C by 2050. 
4.7 The UK Climate Change Policy Framework 
The UK climate change policy framework recognises that much of global warming is 
anthropogenic and is a public good which requires policy intervention (Stern, 2006). The 
policy is premised on setting global trend in emission reduction and it also places emphasis 
on international cooperation (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2007). 
For instance, after committing itself to the Kyoto protocol and voluntary targets, it went on to 
champion climate change agenda when it took leadership of G8 in 2005 which led to the 
Gleneagles action plan on climate change in July 2005 which aimed at increasing the speed 
with which to reduce GHG emissions (The UK Climate change programme, 2006). The Stern 
Review (2006) commissioned by the government to carry out a comprehensive review of 
economic impact of climate change also helped shape policy direction of climate change 
policy worldwide (see Milne and Grunbic, 2011).      
 The policy direction has been evolving over time from a predominantly mitigating 
focus to one that also highlights the need for adaptation. The climate policy framework uses a 
mix of diverse policy instruments to achieve its objectives. Thus while the government 
champions market oriented policies through incentives that encourage innovations, 
prescriptive regulations are used where appropriate (DEFRA, 2007). The majority of 
mitigation policies target the energy carbon dioxide emissions which accounts for almost 
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four-fifths of total emissions in the UK (Bowen and Ridge, 2011).  Based on the Stern 
Review (2006), the policy makes recognition that climate change is a public good and an 
externality but due to its uniqueness in that it is global and affects the poor more than the 
rich, the policy framework also contain elements of ethics and welfare.    
 The key element of the policy is to price externalities in a market friendly manner that 
encourages both firms and households to reduce emissions through consumption and 
production adjustment. Arguably the UK’s main pricing instrument is the EU Cap and Trade 
Scheme which in 2009 covered 48 per cent of UK emissions (Bowen and Ridge, 2011). The 
EU Cap and Trade Scheme set quantifiable limits for emissions by firms from within its 
scope and the price is set by trading quotas. However there is criticism that the EU trading 
prices are too low to help reduce emissions and that volatilities in the trading price has 
created uncertainty in the private sector (Prado and Valor, 2007; Climate Change Committee 
2009). Other sector specific regulations also exist like in the energy sector where labelling for 
energy efficiency products is a requirement meant to promote clean energy.  In sectors not 
covered by the EU emission scheme policies have also been developed. For instance in the 
business and public sector which are considered as ‘light industries’ a range of policies like 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment, Building regulations and climate change levy are in 
place to assist organisation manage their emissions (Carbon Trust, 2012a). However the 
climax of the UK climate change policy is characterised by the Climate Change Act 2008 
which gave legal force to domestic carbon reduction budgets. Following the Act, a Climate 
Committee is set responsible for assessing the prospects towards long term emission 
reduction targets and advising on the viable mitigation and adaptation policies (See section 4 
for more discussion). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 
 
Below is Table 2 with an overview descriptions of some policy instruments used by the UK 
is its climate change policy 
Policy Instrument Purpose 
Regulation Design policies that set minimum standards e.ge emission limits 
or building standards 
Fiscal Charge Designing policies that price environmentally damaging goods 
e.g. environmental levies, charges, taxes. 
Subsidy Policies meant to reduce the price of environmentally friendly 
goods. E.g. lower VAT for energy efficient technologies 
Market Creation Policies that fix quantity e.g. GHG emissions or Renewable 
Electricity. Prices are determined by the market  
Information provision Policies that seek to enhance information to firms and consumers 
Voluntary and 
Negotiated Agreements 
Policies that encourage a firm or group of firms to make 
commitments to achieve a particular emission reduction target. 
Source: DEFRA 2007. Synthesis of climate change policy appraisals. Available from: 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20an
d%20energy/tackling%20climate%20change/programme/synthesisccpolicy-appraisals.pdf.  
In implementing the policy instruments, the government uses various initiatives and 
programmes which depending on their specific objectives uses an appropriate policy 
instrument to achieve the same. 
4.8 The UK Climate Change Initiatives/Programs Implemented using the Policy 
Instruments 
 
4.8.1 Climate Change policies prior to Kyoto Protocol 
A number of initiatives were taken prior to the Kyoto protocol to help the UK reposition itself 
for carbon constrained future mainly in the energy sector. For instance, under the Electricity 
Act 1989, the Non Fossil Fuel obligation (NFFO) and the Scottish Renewables obligation 
(SRO) were established (Agnolucci, 2005). These were meant to support nuclear electricity 
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generation as a way of promoting clean energy and were funded by fossil fuel levy paid by 
suppliers of electricity from fossil fuels (Agnolucci, 2005). It should be noted, however, that 
these policies did not specifically target reducing emissions and that at this particular time the 
UK had no specific target to achieve in terms of GHG emission reductions. Nevertheless 
notable success was achieved by this program as the cost of electricity went down and the 
investment in Wind farms increased in the UK (Renewable UK, 2011). In 2002, these were 
replaced by the Renewables Obligation which was the primary renewable energy policy 
instrument (OFGEM, 2007). The emphasis of this policy was to encourage electricity end 
suppliers to purchase part of their annual electricity supply from producers using renewable 
technology and was meant to assist the government in achieving its GHG emissions targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
4.8.2 Climate Change Policies after Kyoto Commitments 
 
4.8.2.1 The Climate Change Programme 2000 
The UK made a commitment to cut emissions by 12.5 per cent by 2012 using 1990 levels 
under the Kyoto Protocol and it had its own voluntary target of reducing emissions by 20 per 
cent below the 1990 levels by 2010 (The UKCCP, 2006). In order to meet these targets the 
UK complimented its earlier initiatives by launching a climate change program in 2000 
which contained measures to achieve the targets (de Muizon and Galachant, 2004). 
Wordsworth and Grubb (2003) highlighted that the program had two principal aims namely 
increasing investment in low carbon technologies and increasing government expenditure in 
promoting innovation in low energy techniques. The key instruments designed within the 
program were the climate change levy, the negotiated climate change agreements and the UK 
emission trading scheme (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007: National Audit Office (NAO) 
(2007). 
4.8.2.2 The Climate Change Levy (CCL) 
The CCL, set out in FA 2000 budget and implemented in 2001 is a form of an environmental 
tax taking the form of a single-stage excise imposed to energy users in industry, the public, 
and agriculture at different rates depending on fuel type (NAO, 2007; Carbon Trust, 2012a). 
NAO (2007) explains that the aim of the Levy was to encourage businesses to use energy 
more efficiently and therefore to reduce GHG emissions from the levels they otherwise 
would have been. To encourage clean energy, exemptions are offered to energy generated 
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from good quality sources like fuels from waste, and for renewable energy sources like wind 
and solar power. The CCL is also designed to link to other instruments within the Climate 
change program like the climate change agreement. In this respect, firms in energy intensive 
sectors with a negotiated climate change agreement are eligible for an 80 per cent discount 
from the CCL (Pearce, 2005). This was reduced to 65 per cent in 2010. This is meant to 
encourage more firms to participate in the CCA which in turn provides more participants for 
the ETS (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). The CCL scheme managed to raise £0.7 billion in 
2009 (Bowen and Ridge, 2011). 
 
4.8.2.3 Climate Change Agreements 
The CCAs are agreements negotiated between the sector industry organisations and the 
government through DEFRA in which firms take collective quantitative targets for 
improvements in carbon emissions in return for a 65 per cent discount in CCL. The 
agreements are two tiered in structure in that they specify obligations for the sector and then 
translate these into targets for individual firms. Enforcement action focuses on meeting both 
target and Failure to meet target is penalised by loss of the 80 per cent discount on CCL for 2 
subsequent years (DETR, 2000). In the first year of compliance i.e. 2002, there were signs of 
over-compliance by participating firms which was either the fear for the penalties or low 
level targets which were deemed as ‘business as usual targets’ (Pearce, 2005).  
4.8.2.4. The UK Emission Trading Scheme 
The UK emission trading scheme was launched in 2002 with aim of providing flexibility for 
firms in meeting their GHG abatement obligations and also to position the UK in particular 
London as the global location for environmental location (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). 
The scheme covers the six GHGs as identified by Kyoto protocol and individual emission 
limits and the unit for trading are defined in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents. Firms 
participating are grouped into two: Direct Participants (DP) and Agreement Participants (AP). 
DP comprises the 32 firms which joined the scheme as a result of subsidy payments auction 
conducted by the government in 2002 (NAO, 2004). The subsidy was meant to incentivise 
the firms to offer abatement of their emissions in the period 2002-2006 against baseline 
emissions in 1998-2000. Specifically firms joining the auction were to commit to a specified 
level of abatement in 2006 and to make phased progress towards between 2002 and 2005 
with 2002 target being 20 per cent of 2006 and then rising to 40 per cent, 60 per cent and 80 
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per cent in subsequent years (NAO, 2004). The DP are subject to a cap and trade system of 
emission trading where allowances equal to their baseline emissions are allocated, less the 
contracted abatement commitment for each year. Selling and buying of allowances was 
permitted in the ETS depending on whether abatement exceeded contracted level or not 
(Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). The AP mainly referred to the firms that were covered by 
the CCAs.  Under this category, firms can generate or sell allowances by exceeding their 
negotiated emission reduction targets or can comply by buying permits in place of abatement 
obligations. The participation was to be on voluntary basis but actual participation however 
depended on how firms had reacted to the CCL and CCAs.     
 Overall, the UK ETS was to some extent a success as most of the DP managed to 
meet the obligations. For instance DEFRA (2004) illustrated that within the first year the DP 
managed to exceed their abatement targets. NAO (2004) argued that the compliance of the 
DP was much to do with failings in efficiently allocating baseline emissions and not the 
firms’ efforts. NAO (2004) noted that in some cases baseline emissions were above the 
emissions of participants at the start and this made it easy for them to meet the targets without 
further action. NAO (2004) further stated that in some cases the emissions reductions could 
still have been achieved without the program underscoring its observations that the targets 
were overgenerous. The scheme was later replaced by the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) in 2006. 
4.8.2.5. The UK Climate Change Program 2006 
The UK CCP 2006 replaced the UKCCP 2000 and it outlined policies and measures to help 
the UK cut its emissions and more importantly it also spelt out plans to adapt to the impact of 
climate change (UKCCP, 2006). The focus of the program was to help the UK meet both its 
Kyoto obligations and the domestic targets (DEFRA, 2006). The UKCCP 2006 also revised 
downwards the UK domestic targets from 20 per cent on 1990 levels in 2010 to between 15 
and 18 per cent because earlier projections were deemed too optimistic and that available 
evidence showed that the government would not be able to meet the target (House of 
Commons environmental Audit Committee, 2007). Besides, NAO (2006) noted that the 
revisions were necessitated by inaccuracies emanating from projections modelling techniques 
which were complex and made it difficult to accurately determine the desired targets. There 
was however an emphasis of the UK plans to reduce emissions by 60 per cent by 2050 on 
1990 levels.           
 Being a successor of UKCCP 2000, the UKCCP 2006 extended most of the policies 
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that were under its predecessor.  For instance under energy use and supply, policies like the 
CCL, CCAs, and the Renewables obligations were extended. Other measures intended to 
improve energy efficiency use were introduced. Thus the Energy Efficiency Commitment 
(EEC) was introduced and it required energy suppliers to achieve energy savings through 
assisting the implementation of home energy efficiency improvements (Bowen and Ridge, 
2011). Energy suppliers were also expected to make changes to appliance standards labelling, 
better metering, billing and improved customer information. Policies also covered other 
sectors like Agriculture and transport sector. In Agriculture there was emphasis in woodland 
planting and in transport there was the renewable transport fuel obligation where suppliers of 
fossil fuels were to ensure that a certain percentage of the UK road fuel supply was from 
renewable fuels (UNA UK, 2008).  Nonetheless the two major policies that came with 
UKCCP 2006 were the RTFO and the EU ETS (DEFRA, 2007). The EU ETS was intended 
to help the government meet its domestic and international targets as it covers almost 50 per 
cent of carbon dioxide emissions (UKCCP 2006; UK House of Commons Environmental 
Audit Committee, 2007).  
4.8.2.5.1. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
In the UK, the EU ETS replaced the UK ETS which was closed in 2006.  The EU ETS is a 
key policy instrument used by the EU to achieve its Kyoto protocol obligation of ensuring an 
8 per cent reduction in emission from 1990 levels (Carbon Trust, 2012b; Delbeke (ed.), 
2006). It focuses on reducing GHGS and helping Europe build a low carbon economy in an 
economically and environmentally efficient manner (House of Commons, 2012). The scheme 
covers over 11,000 installations, including combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron 
and steel plants, and factories making cement, glass, lime, brick, ceramics, pulp, and paper 
was implemented in three phases with the first largely being research and learning by doing 
and it run from 2005 to 2007 (Helpburn, 2007). The second phase covers the period 2008 to 
2012 and includes revised monitoring and reporting rules, more stringent emissions caps and 
additional combustion sources. Thus in the second phase, member states proposed National 
Allocations Plans (NAPs) to the EU, allocating a set of the proportion of a country’s total 
2008 -2012 emission budget to sectors covered by the scheme  and then tradable quotas were 
divided among firms (Bowen and Ridge, 2011).      
  The EU ETS works on a Cap and Trade principle meaning that there is a cap or limit 
on certain GHGs that can be emitted by firms and that within this cap companies can sell or 
buy allowances from another as needed (EU ETS, 2013). Annually firms are expected to have 
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enough allowances to cover their emissions or risk a penalty and those with spare allowances 
can be used against future emissions or sell them to others. At the end of phase two in 2012 
the scheme will include emissions from Aviation. The third phase is expected to commence 
in 2013 when the scheme expands to cover emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and 
aluminum industries. The third phase will run up to 2020 and some additions will include, 
harmonised allocation methodologies and additional GHGs and emission sources. The goal of 
the third phase is to achieve a 20 percent emission reduction by 2020 on 1990 levels. The EU 
ETS is arguably the largest in the world and it covers half of the EU emissions and by 2010 it 
was operational in 30 countries (EU ETS, 2013).     
 Generally a review of the first and second phases of the scheme seems to have mixed 
outcomes. The success of the first phase is unclear in as far reducing emissions is concerned 
because of data problems but Parker (2010) considers the ability to lay down structures for 
the subsequent phases as the real success of the this phase which helped place the EU on the 
path to Kyoto compliance. The second phase has however managed to help some countries 
achieve some success. For instance the UK reported a 23.3 percent reduction in GHG 
emissions of the six GHGs under the Kyoto protocol in 2010 from 1990 levels (DECC, 
2012). This compares favorably to the domestic target of 20 percent reduction by 2010 (see 
Summerton, 2011) and hence it is on course to meeting its Kyoto obligation. The reported 
figures incorporate the net emissions achieved under the EU ETS. On the other hand, critics 
consider the EU ETS to be an underachiever citing its failure to efficiently allocate emissions 
while others also argue that the good intentions of the scheme were later watered down due to 
intense lobbying (Parker, 2010; Carrington, 2010). The EU acknowledged some of the 
weaknesses of the scheme and plans to eliminate the weaknesses during the third phase 
commencing in 2013 (Parker, 2010).       
 Under the EU ETS, there is monitoring system in which member states are required to 
report their progress in meeting the Kyoto protocol targets. Reports are expected to cover 
GHG emissions by source and removals by sinks (EU ETS, 2010).  
4.8.2.5.2. The Climate Change Act 2008 
After the launch of the UKCCP 2006, the UK demonstrated its seriousness in tackling 
climate change by giving a legal force to its targets and initiatives through the enactment of 
the Climate Change Act in 2008. The CCA 2008 is structured in five parts. The first part set a 
legally binding target of reducing emissions by 80 percent in 2050 from 1990 levels with the 
medium term goal being a reduction of 26/34 percent by 2020 or higher depending on global 
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deal (CCA 2008). In this part there is also requirement by the government to set five yearly 
carbon budgets and lay before parliament its policies to achieve the budgets. The principle of 
the 5 yearly carbon budgets commenced in 2009 when three budgets were set covering 
periods 2008-2012, 2013-2017, and 2018-2022. The fourth budget covering 2023-2027 was 
approved in 2011 (Bowen and Ridge, 2011). Requirements to outline a system of carbon 
accounting are also spelt out in this part.  Arguably the budgeting system is the most 
innovative element of the CCA 2008 as it provides linkage to the other provisions of the Act 
notably on carbon accounting, reporting and monitoring. In part two, the key provision is the 
one that establishes a Climate Change Committee (CCC) responsible for helping the UK 
move towards a low carbon economy by assessing the prospects towards achieving the long-
term emission targets and also to champion mitigation and adaptation policies (McGregor et 
al., 2011).   Thus the CCCs main role is advising government of the technical issues of 
climate change and has no executive powers to ensure full implementation of its 
recommendation and some consider this as an institutional weakness of the current regime of 
climate change efforts (Stallworthy, 2009). It is the CCC that champions the task of drafting 
the carbon budgets.          
 The third part of the CCA 2008 empowers government to establish new trading 
schemes in the UK through secondary legislation. The schemes could be set by capping GHG 
emission from a particular sector or activity or encourage low carbon emitting activities.  In 
this respect the Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme (CRS EES) was 
established and it covers emissions by firms and public bodies not already subject to the EU 
ETS or other agreements. The main components of the scheme are the reporting requirements 
and a carbon levy (Bowen and Ridge, 2011) .The fourth part covers issues relating to impact 
of climate change and adaptation. Here regular reports regarding how the change in climate is 
impacting on UK should be provided as well as plans and programs to adapt to the changes. 
The last part of the CCA 2008 contains provisions covering a number of things ranging from 
reporting on, measuring and reducing carbon emissions in different sectors of the economy. 
The provisions also contain powers to introduce a waste reduction scheme, charges for single 
use carrier bags, and more importantly allows the government to consider introducing 
requirements for companies to report their emissions (CCA 2008).  There is also requirement 
for the government to include emissions from Aviation and Shipping by 31 December 2012 
or explain its failure to do so.         
 The CCA 2008 had set particular milestones in as far as emissions’ reporting by 
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companies was concerned. It required government to publish guidance on the measurement 
of GHG emissions to assist companies reporting the same by 1 October 2009 (see Section 83 
CCA 2008). Thereafter it demanded the government to review the contribution that reporting 
makes to emission reductions by 1
st
 December 2010 (see Section 84)  and then by 1 April 
2014 to use powers in the Companies Act 2006 to make GHG reporting mandatory or explain 
to parliament its failure to do so (see section 85).       
 In compliance with section 83 of the CCA 2008, the government issued the DEFRA 
guidance on GHG emissions measurement and reporting in 2009. Thus in DEFRA 2009 
specific measurement and reporting criteria on GHGs were outlined and the guidance was 
modeled from the GHG protocol and was also aligned to the ISO 14064-1 (DEFRA, 2009). 
In 2010 the government complied with section 84 of CCA 2008 and presented a report to 
parliament demonstrating how reporting contributes to a company’s efforts in reducing 
emissions (DEFRA, 2010). There is no direct link between reporting and GHG emissions 
control but rather reporting is one policy that encourages firms to measure their emissions 
and it is measurement that has a direct impact on GHG emission control (DEFRA, 2010). It is 
in this respect that GHG disclosures are encouraged. Consultations are now in place as to 
whether the reporting should be made mandatory in compliance with section 85 of the CCA 
2008. 
4.9 Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter has demonstrated that GHGs play a significant role in influencing the earth’s 
climate system mainly by altering the solar radiation and exerting the greenhouse effect 
which help the earth maintain warmer temperatures suitable for life. Greenhouse effect is a 
natural phenomenon and is exerted by a number of gases notably water vapour and carbon 
dioxide. However over time through scientific research human influence was linked to the 
increased concentration of some GHGs notably carbon dioxide which as a result has been 
exerting more greenhouse effects than usual thereby making the earth much warmer. Carbon 
dioxide is singled out as a critical GHG because of its life span which is longer than the other 
GHGs. Examples of human activities that increased the levels of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere include the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and cement production.
 Global warming if unchecked, its consequences are dire and costly on both life and 
the economy on which day to day life has come to depend on (IPCC, 2007). Changes in 
temperature patterns are bound to change the way the earth sustain life. For instance global 
warming effects are likely to result in premature deaths, increases of diseases, displacement 
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of people and devastating effects on conditions on which most economic activities of 
mankind rely. In general the increase in global warming will mean a fundamental change in 
the way life is on earth and hence require substantial adjustment.   
 Despite the majority of the scientific community agreeing to the evidence that human 
induced global warming has occurred for the past 150 years, there is still some criticism of 
the science of global warming. Some point to too much reliance on proxies in estimating 
centuries old temperatures and projecting future temperatures which in their arguments 
undermine the integrity of the evidence. Others note the findings but argue that humanity has 
the ability to withstand any global warming that may occur. Notwithstanding the criticisms, 
public opinion and the verification of previous findings weighs the balance of argument in 
favour of the science behind global warming.     
 Faced with the reality of the devastating impact of a rise in global warming, the 
international community has been mobilising efforts to confront the dangers of global 
warming and limit GHG emissions. Being a public good and an externality with 
consequences likely to affect the poor more than the rich, there has been consensus that the 
best way to tackle climate change is through international cooperation with the rich bearing 
more burden of reduction than the poor.  Early efforts are traced to the formation of the IPCC 
in 1988 as the scientific and policy research arm of the United Nations. With input from the 
IPCC, the UN negotiations have been taking shape aiming at reducing GHG emissions. This 
culminated into the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 which came into effect in 2005. The Kyoto 
protocol targeted a 5.2 per cent reduction in GHG emissions by 2012 from 1990 levels. 
Further negotiations followed after Kyoto protocol notably the Copenhagen Accord and the 
Durban platform.         
 Suffice to mention that international efforts so far have failed to reach consensus on 
the best option to fight global warming. Kyoto Protocol failed to have the support of all 
international players like the USA citing the mechanisms of the protocol that had favoured 
the poor and developing nations than the rich. They also complained of the high cost of 
compliance which would undermine their economies. Subsequent summits failed to reach 
consensus on the need to have a legally binding protocol largely because of the clause of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ which makes developed nations have legally 
binding targets while developing nations set their legal targets.   
 Notwithstanding the failures of the international efforts, there has been progress in 
ensuring that stakeholders notably corporations are taking measures in reducing their 
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emissions. Many point to the innovative mechanisms within the Kyoto protocol as the 
success story of the international efforts. They note that through the international efforts, 
carbon has been commoditised and has a price which gives firms incentives to participate in 
efforts meant at reducing emissions. It is also through mechanisms like Joint projects and 
CDM that the roles of the states and corporations have been clearly noted with each having 
their own responsibilities in the fight against global warming. With governments beginning to 
take a prominent role in shaping policy on global warming, firms have the right environment 
that is conducive to innovations towards a less carbon intensive technologies.  
 As international negotiations continue, there are some improvements being made to 
existing agreements which are meant to improve the accountability of the schemes. For 
instance under the Copenhagen Accord, an international system for reporting, monitoring and 
verification of GHG emissions was established.  Arguably this suggests that principles of 
accounting and reporting will remain at the heart of any regime that might be operational at 
international level.         
 After brief review of the international policy framework for GHG management and 
control, the chapter then concentrated on the policy framework within the UK, the setting of 
the study. The UK climate change policy recognises that much of the global warming in 
recent times is due to human related activities as such there is an urgent need for action. 
Through the Stern Review (2006), the policy identifies climate change/global warming as a 
public good and an externality requiring government intervention. It also emphasises the need 
for international cooperation highlighting that climate change is a global problem requiring 
moblisation of all resources necessary. Means of intervention range from carbon pricing to 
some form of regulation and markets based measures like Emission trading.  
 Since the early 1990s, a number of initiatives have been implemented within the 
policy framework to help the UK achieve emission reduction targets. Long before 
championing the need for GHG emission reduction, measures introduced like the Non-fossil 
fuel obligation were meant to promote clean energy use. Once the need to control emissions 
became apparent i.e. after ratification of the Kyoto protocol, these measures and other 
additional measures like the climate change levy were part of comprehensive climate change 
programs meant to help the UK migrate to the low carbon economy. One of the most 
innovative market oriented measures brought by the climate change programs was the 
creation of the UK ETS scheme which was later replaced by the EU ETS.  These schemes did 
not only mean that firms were accounting and reporting GHG emissions, they commoditised 
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carbon which meant more scrutiny behind the accounting and reporting mechanisms within 
the scheme. By use of the EU ETS and other measures within its climate change program, 
The UK was able to meet its 2010 domestic target for GHG emission target of 20 percent 
reduction by 2010 on 1990 levels.        
 The Results of more than a decade long initiatives in tackling climate change 
culminated into the enactment of the Climate change Act in 2008, making the UK, the first 
nation on earth to have legally binding targets. The Act committed the UK to ensuring an 80 
percent GHG reduction by 2050 on 1990 levels while aiming at 34 percent reduction by 
2030. The enactment of the Act brought in new dimension to the fight against global 
warming in the UK. Notably it established the Climate Change Committee and the system of 
formulating carbon budgets which would cement the seriousness of both current and 
subsequent governments in meeting the set targets.   Another important element in the Act 
was the provision to ensure that a measurement and reporting guidance has been published by 
the government. The guidance was published in 2009 and the impact of measuring and 
reporting GHGs was assessed in 2010 in compliance with the provisions of the Act with a 
view of deciding whether GHG measurement and reporting should be mandatory or not. Such 
emphasis and intention arguably highlight one thing; Measurement and reporting of GHGs is 
of prime importance to the success of any policy framework developed to control emissions. 
However currently there is academic study that has investigated the extent of reporting by 
UK companies in light of the policy initiatives introduced. There has been surveys 
commissioned by both government and private institutions trying to bring insight into the 
GHG disclosure practices of companies in the UK in particular listed ones.   However many 
studies and surveys have only concentrated on establishing the number of entities disclosing 
GHG information vis-a-vie their efforts to reduce the same (FTSE 350 Carbon Disclosure 
Report 2010; DEFRA, 2010) whereas no study has been undertaken to review what 
determines the extent and motivation of  GHG information disclosure by these entities. 
 While it is appreciated that much research has been published testing a number of 
variables that help link a number of theories and explain the motivation of certain accounting 
disclosures other than GHGs, the majority of the studies have tested secondary data extracted 
from various sources like annual reports (see Cahan et al., 2005; Prencipe, 2004; Hanifa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ferguson et al 2002; Gray et al., 2001;  Owusu-Ansa, 1999; Wallace and Naser, 
1995; Hossain et al., 1995; Cooke 1993 etc.). Few have attempted to test primary data in 
order to explain the extent and motivation behind information disclosures (Bartlett and Jones, 
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1997; Adams, 2002). Therefore with this in mind it is necessary that a study be undertaken as 
to what determines the quantity of GHG information disclosed in the annual reports of these 
listed companies by testing both primary and secondary data. The findings of such research 
may help shape public policy since in accordance with the Climate Change Act 2008, a 
review as to the disclosure practices of the UK companies was undertaken in November 2010 
with an aim of establishing linkage between GHGs disclosures and efforts to curb GHGs 
emission. Such evidence is deemed to exist indirectly and as such the government is 
contemplating introducing mandatory reporting in 2012 (DEFRA, 2010). The study to be 
undertaken on a longitudinal basis will also help track if public efforts through regulation like 
the DEFRA 2009 have helped increase the amount of disclosures over the period. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Framework in the United Kingdom 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The chapter analyses the financial reporting context in which Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) are 
measured and reported in the United Kingdom (UK). It is claimed by some researchers that 
reporting of GHG emissions is one of the key drivers influencing a firm to manage its 
emissions (DEFRA, 2010). The rationale for such a claim is that in business it is believed that 
what gets measured gets managed (Deloitte 2011; GHG Protocol, 2004).  Reporting in form 
of GHG disclosures is also important to many stakeholders in particular investors who 
require a thorough review of business risks including climate change. Besides, 
governments/regulatory agencies are also interested in company reporting of GHG emissions 
as they strive to create a sustainable environment for a carbon constrained economy. This has 
created pressure on entities to report their GHGs both from the voluntary and regulatory 
perspectives. It is now estimated that there are over 100 voluntary and regulatory reporting 
initiatives world-wide (IPIECA, 2012). In return there is evidence that companies are now 
increasing their level of GHG reporting.     
 Notwithstanding the available reporting initiatives, climate change being relatively 
new, the reporting framework is arguably still in an evolving phase. Reporting guidance in 
the UK has largely remained voluntary though with a few emission schemes requiring 
participants to make certain disclosures. Therefore in this chapter the focus will be on what is 
there in the available guidelines to help firms make disclosures which are considered 
important in the management of GHG emissions. It begins by explaining how the reporting of 
GHGs has been developing in the UK from existing legal framework. Thereafter, available 
voluntary reporting frameworks within which companies can measure and report their GHGs 
are discussed. In this respect, initiatives like the GHG protocol; DEFRA guidance and the 
CDP are covered in detail followed by a summary of other schemes both international and 
local under which firms can be guided to report GHG emissions. The chapter then winds up 
by discussing the lack of consensus at the international level to issue an international 
reporting standard for GHGs which has potentially led to lack of harmonisation in reporting 
practices by firms.   
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5.1 GHG Measurement and Reporting Frameworks in the UK 
In the accountancy profession through IASB, much attention and work has been directed at 
providing guidance on accounting for emission allowances leading to little attention paid to 
the measurement and reporting frameworks of GHGs to assist stakeholders decision making 
regarding carbon related assets and investments. Despite this, however, companies wishing to 
be transparent about their carbon emissions are not without guidance (KPMG Australia 
2008). There are various international and national initiatives meant at providing guidance to 
carbon measurement and reporting like GHG protocol, ISO 14064-1, Global framework for 
carbon disclosure, Carbon Disclosure Standard Board, Etc.     
 In the UK, GHG measurement and reporting has been developing through both 
mandatory and voluntary initiatives. Mandatorily, it was arguably through the rise in 
prominence of environmental reporting that led to the significant evolution of GHG 
reporting. The genesis of environmental reporting is traced to Companies Act 2006 in 
particular S.417 which makes a provision on environmental reporting. Under this Act, quoted 
companies are required to report in their business review, environmental information and 
their related impact on the understanding of the business. Environmental risks, policies and 
KPIs should also be reported by listed companies. In order to assist companies meet the 
requirement of the Companies Act 2006, DEFRA (2006) issued guidelines for reporting 
environmental key indicators. In these environmental KPIs, companies are required to report 
on GHGs in particular total emissions as expressed in Co2e metric tonnes, GHGs covered etc. 
(DEFRA, 2006). There has, however, been criticism on the provision of the Companies Act 
(2006) to the effect that many consider it too general to adequately address GHG disclosure 
requirements and that managers were given too much discretion as to what to disclose 
(Williamson and Lynch-Wood, 2008).       
 The rise in prominence of climate change issues and policy framework has also seen 
the rise in efforts towards more mandatory reporting frameworks specifically for GHGs.  The 
second phase of the UK climate change program (see Chapter 3) ushered in the Climate 
Change Act (2008) which in S.83 particularly required the government to issue reporting 
guidance on GHG emissions.  This has been done through the issuance of DEFRA (2009) 
which stipulates voluntary guidelines on measurement and reporting GHGs. Other initiatives 
rolled out in the second climate change programme were various schemes like EU ETS 
(meant to promote emission trading) and CRC meant to promote emission trading for those 
not participating in EU ETS and discourage intensive energy usage. The monitoring of these 
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schemes is done on the premise of a set of reporting requirements which are mandatory. 
Furthermore, companies participating in EU ETS have been monitoring and reporting carbon 
dioxide emissions since 2005 whereas those involved in the Carbon Reduction Commitment 
Energy reduction scheme started reporting their emissions in 2010. The CRS covers over 
5000 firms in the UK.   
5.2 Mandatory GHG Reporting Schemes in the United Kingdom 
5.2.1 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme 
The CRC, which came into effect on 1 April 2010, is a mandatory scheme for non-energy 
intensive organisations in public and private sector with a threshold of 6000 MWh of annual 
energy usage (CRC, 2011). The first phase runs from April 2010 to 2013 and thereafter 
subsequent phases of 7 years each will follow up to 2043.  Reporting is to be done on 31
st
 
March every year regardless of the financial year end. The scheme is enforced through an 
audit risk based approach where one in five companies is audited every year. The scheme 
intends to drive down energy usage by using three mechanisms namely: ensuring annual 
measurement and reporting of participants’ energy consumption; trading of emission 
allowances sufficient to cover their emissions; and instituting reputational drivers through 
publishing of the league table for comparative performance assessment. More importantly, 
the scheme has civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance. Under the CRC, participants 
are required to submit a footprint report which summarises the energy supplied in the 
previous year. Primarily the report is meant to demonstrate that a company’s emissions are 
covered by existing schemes i.e. EU ETS, CCA or CRC. The report is expected to cover: 
Core and residual energy supplies excluding those covered under EU ETS or CCAs; CCA 
exempt emissions as well as EU ETS emissions; quantity of electricity generating units 
eligible to claim credits; the supplies of other fuels to the organisation; and report any 
organisational changes likely to affect the footprint report (CRC, 2011).  
 Though disclosure is a mandatory requirement under the scheme, participants are 
given discretion as to what to disclose more particularly regarding the emission reduction 
measures. Accordingly, besides permitting limited disclosure on emission reduction 
measures, in some instances, the CRC permits non-disclosure of this information under 
confidentiality concerns. It is also not mandatory for reporting firms to externally publish 
their report. This then means that information disclosed under the scheme may vary greatly 
depending on how companies exercise the discretion thereby making comparison difficult. 
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Arguably the discretion aspect of the scheme makes it relevant to investigate what could 
possibly differentiate firm disclosures participating in this scheme.  
5.2.2. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
The EU ETS, as noted (see Chapter 3) is regarded as an important scheme meant to help the 
UK meet both domestic and international emission reduction targets. Under the EU ETS, 
monitoring, reporting and verification activities are considered useful tenets in ensuring the 
integrity of the scheme. The reporting guidelines under the EU ETS, are legally binding. To 
begin with, participants to the scheme are expected to identify the installation and have them 
verified. Once this is done they are to disclose the verifier as well the installations under the 
scheme and the period to which the report relates. Disclosures should also be made when 
there are relevant changes in the operations of the installations including appropriate 
approvals to the same. Specific GHG disclosures include: Total emissions as expressed in 
metric tonnes Co2 equivalent; other gases emitted expressed in tonnes of Co2 equivalent; 
Methodology used in computation of data and emission factors chosen; and information on 
emission sources and streams (EU ETS, 2010).       
 Not much empirical study has been done to ensure the GHG reporting behaviour of 
firms participating in the scheme. However, the one done by Sales De Aguiar (2009) 
concluded that firms participating in the EU ETS had comparatively higher GHG emission 
disclosures than their counterparts which were not part of the scheme. This will be explored 
further in this study in order to ascertain whether belonging to such schemes as EU ETS has 
any impact on the quantity of GHG disclosures made by scheme participants.  
5.3 Voluntary Reporting Frameworks 
GHG emission voluntary reporting initiatives began to emerge in the early 2000s and were 
largely spearheaded by NGOs who aimed at providing either generic or industry specific 
guidelines (IPIECA, 2012).  Such initiatives have led to availability of a wide range of 
reporting initiatives which have helped companies improve their GHG reporting. Notable 
frameworks include the GHG protocol (2004); The Global Framework for Climate Risk 
Disclosure (2006); The Carbon Disclosure Project (2012); The Carbon Disclosure Standard 
Board (2010); The Global Reporting Initiative (2006); PricewaterhouseCoopers Typico Co. 
illustration (2009); the DEFRA (2009); ISO 14064-1 and etc. All but DEFRA (2009) are as a 
result of private sector initiatives and partnerships meant at improving information available 
to stakeholders i.e. investors.  
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5.3.1 DEFRA 2009: Guidance on measuring and reporting GHGs 
The DEFRA 2009 guidance on measuring and reporting GHGs was issued in compliance 
with Section 83 of the CCA 2008 and was aimed at supporting UK firms in reducing their 
contribution to climate change (DEFRA, 2009). The guidance is meant for firms of all sizes 
and it outlines how a firm can measure and set targets for GHG reduction.   
 The guidance is based on GHG Protocol which is an internationally recognised 
standard for corporate GHG accounting and reporting (DEFRA, 2009). Other measurement 
and reporting guidelines to which the DEFRA guidance aligns include (ISO) 14064-1, 
Publicly Available Standard (PAS) 2050 and ISO 14040 (DEFRA, 2009).    
 While setting the minimum benchmark the government expects firms to measure and 
report, the guidance is voluntary and it gives a step by step guidance on how an organization 
can master their GHGs control needs through measurement and reporting. Thus the fact that 
the guidance covers all GHG emissions of an organisation means that it helps an organisation 
have a complete picture of its GHG emissions unlike in other schemes like EU ETS or CRS 
where GHG measurement and reporting only covers certain aspects of the organisation. The 
guidance also encourages firms to set emission reduction targets and report on all gases as 
identified by the Kyoto Protocol.        
 The guidance is structured in 11 parts in which the process of measuring and reporting 
GHGs is explained and thereafter technical details are outlined in 11 annexes which range 
from A to K. According to DEFRA (2009) the process of measuring and reporting GHGs 
begins by identifying the appropriate ownership structure which will then highlight the 
appropriate category within which GHGs can be reported on. Thus in a complex organisation 
set up where a firm is not 100 per cent responsible for the emission activities, the guidance 
advises the use of either the equity approach (where an entity reports GHG emissions from 
operations according to its share in the operations) or the control approach (where an entity 
reports 100 per cent emissions in operations where it has control and does not report anything 
in operations where it has an interest but not control). Control can either be financial or 
operational but the guidance encourages the financial control approach.   
 Ultimately, GHG reporting follows similar financial reporting guidelines to 
organisation in that in cases where an organisation is part of a group, GHG emission 
reporting is to be done on a group basis as per ‘traditional’ accounting classification of the 
organisation’s operations. Generally the guidance attempts to highlight the fact that 
accounting for GHG emissions should overall follow the main stream accounting principles. 
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For instance, in Annex B emphasis is made that GHG emission information should follow 
accounting and reporting principles ranging from relevance, completeness, consistency, 
transparency, and accuracy. The aim of aligning GHG accounting and reporting to 
mainstream accounting framework is to ensure that reported information represents a faithful, 
true, and fair account of the company’s GHG emissions (World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development/World Resources Institute, 2004). Alignment to existing 
accounting framework also helps to simplify the internal procedures of information 
preparation (OECD, 2010).There is nonetheless an omission of other important qualitative 
financial reporting attributes like comparability, reliability and understandability which 
makes some to question the GHG reporting frameworks alignment to the mainstream 
accounting. Such omission, argues Andrew and Cortese (2010), puts the value of information 
disclosed in question. Firms are also encouraged to report data on an annual basis as is the 
case in mainstream accounting. However, in the initial year firms are to choose a base year 
which is either the earliest year that verifiable emissions data is available or a multi-year 
average (see part 9 of DEFRA, 2009). The emphasis on the choice of base year is to ensure 
that progressively a firm reports data that can be comparable in terms of performance 
benchmarks (Sullivan and Gouldson 2012).      
 Once the organisational structure is appropriately defined, the guidance requires firms 
to identify their GHG emissions under three broad categories as follows: 
 Scope 1 (Direct emissions): Activities owned or controlled by the firm that release 
emissions straight into the atmosphere. Examples include combustion in owned or 
controlled boilers, furnaces, vehicles, emissions from chemical production in owned 
or controlled process equipment. 
 Scope 2 (Energy indirect): GHG emissions released into the atmosphere as a result of 
an organisation’s consumption of purchased electricity, heat and cooling. 
 Scope 3 (Other indirect): Emissions resulting from an organisation’s actions, which 
occur at sources, not owned or controlled by it and cannot fall under scope 2. 
Examples include business travel by means not owned or controlled by the 
organisation, waste disposal etc. 
The guidance specifically recommends reporting under either scope 1 or 2 and considers 
reporting under scope 3 as discretionary since scope 3 is deemed to be complex and difficult 
to accurately identify. But where an organisation’s scope 3 activities are considered to be 
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significant then reporting is encouraged.      
 GHG emissions are determined by multiplying ‘activity data’ by ‘emission factors’. 
Activity data is information collected about organisation’s relevant activities and this could 
be litres of fuel consumed by an organization’s fleet of vehicles which can be extracted in 
form of receipts or bills related to the activity. Firms are also permitted to use data collected 
in other schemes like EU ETS or CRC provided they are transparent regarding the calculation 
methods used and the emission factors adopted. Emission factors are provided by DEFRA 
and DECC and the standard measurement is tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents. Any 
emission factors used and the calculation approach adopted are to be duly disclosed. 
 After activity identification and measurement, the guidance explains the general 
principles of disclosures of the GHG emissions data. Part 8 of the guidance advises firms to 
publish GHG emission data and supporting explanations and have the discretion to decide 
where this information is disclosed. Discretion is also left to individual organisation to decide 
whether to have their GHG emissions data verified by a third party or not. Under the DEFRA 
guidance there is no specification of the minimum level of reporting rather organisations are 
encouraged to ensure completeness in their reporting endeavours. It covers all the six Kyoto 
GHGs but disclosures of other non-Kyoto gases are encouraged. Detailed disclosure 
requirements by DEFRA (2009) can be found in Appendix 2.    
 The introduction of DEFRA (2009) guidelines is considered by many as a step in the 
right direction. Souza (2009) noted that such guidelines help companies find their way out in 
circumstances when they do not know how to do it. There has been evidence to the effect that 
some firms have found DEFRA (2009) useful. For instance Deloitte (2011) noted that 9 per 
cent of the firms on FTSE 100 were reporting GHG emissions based on DEFRA guidelines. 
There is, however, concern that being a voluntary document, comparison among 
firm/industry practices is difficult (CDP, 2011; Deloitte, 2011). The guidance has also some 
limitations ranging from being open to interpretations on reporting boundaries; limited scope 
3 guidance; heavy reliance on GHG protocol for defining reporting boundaries; and limited 
guidance on materiality, benchmarking, and estimation of incomplete data (Environmental 
Resources Management, 2010). These shortfalls make comparability of data from firm to 
firm difficult.  The guidance is also silent on corporate governance mechanisms relating to 
climate change and GHG emission management. Again despite encouraging firms to disclose 
targets and performance benchmarks like the intensity ratio, little guidance is given on target 
setting and performance assessment and companies are not required to disclose their likely 
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future projections of GHG emissions. For more information about what DEFRA (2009) 
requires to be disclosed in comparison to other reporting frameworks please refer to Table 3.
 Despite the evidence as documented by Deloitte (2011) that firms, no known 
academic study has looked at the GHG reporting pattern of UK firms more especially at a 
time when the government has taken steps to highlight reporting as an essential element in a 
firm’s GHG emission management.  Arguably even the ‘compliance or usage’ rate in the 
Deloitte (2011) report is considerably low and hence may necessitate further review as to 
what form of reporting frameworks companies use in disclosing GHG emissions. More 
insights could be obtained when an investigation targets the impact the issuance of DEFRA 
(2009) had on the GHG reporting behaviours of firms as the same could be used to estimate 
the likely impact of the fully fledged regulation on GHG reporting.  
5.3.2 The GHG Protocol 
Apart from the DEFRA guidelines, firms in the UK can use the GHG protocol in their 
preparation of the GHG information. As explained, the DEFRA guidance was substantially 
derived from the GHG protocol. GHG protocol initiative was convened by WBI/WBCSD in 
1998 to develop a set of internationally accepted GHG accounting and reporting standards for 
business (WBI/WBCSD 2004). The GHG Protocol Initiative is funded by the Alcoa 
Foundation, British Petroleum, The Energy Foundation (a coalition of philanthropists), The 
Hewlett Foundation (a private philanthropic endeavour), The Robertson Foundation (a 
private Philanthropic group committed to promoting market based solutions to climate 
change), the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the Wallace Global Fund (a private philanthropic fund). The 
GHG Protocol Corporate Standard was released in 2004 after rigorous testing of the first 
edition with structured feedback invited from companies including IKEA, Sony, Seattle City 
Lights, Eastman Kodak, Nike and Tokyo Gas. Further consultations were done with various 
firms and amendments were done. Though the process of consultation was comprehensive, 
many faulted its lack of proper representation from the accounting profession as only two 
professional firms joined and no academics were involved (Andrew and Cortese, 2010). 
Proper representation of key stakeholders is deemed important since formulation of standards 
is highly influenced by the participants.        
 The measurement and reporting criteria in GHG Protocol is as outlined in the DEFRA 
2009 guidelines. According to the GHG protocol, reporting is expected to adhere to 
principles of complete, consistence, accuracy and transparency. The report is to be prepared 
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using the best data available with all material discrepancies identified. Before any disclosures 
are made, an organisation is required to define the organisation boundary within which the 
reported GHG emissions cover. This is done through the notion of control as explained in 
DEFRA (2009) above. The standard emphasises that when reporting, the contents should 
very much reflect the needs of the intended users. Where public availability of certain 
information say ratios threaten to undermine the confidentiality of the business, then the 
standard advises non-disclosure but that such information should be made available to those 
certifying the report. Reporting under the standard is in two forms namely recommended or 
optional. GHG Protocol disclosure requirements are detailed in appendix 3. 
 Though widely regarded as a leading standard for carbon with comprehensive but 
flexible approaches, GHG protocol has some shortfalls. For instance there is no linkage to 
any policy requirements and no attempt is made to provide guidance to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). Lack on minimum standards for materiality threshold and inability to 
stipulate verification requirements makes it inadequate to influence firms to produce 
comparable information (Environmental Resources Management, 2010). 
  
5.3.3 The Carbon Disclosure Project 
The CDP was formed in 2000 in the UK with the aim of collecting climate related data from 
firms for public consumption so as to enable investors have appropriate climate information 
in their decision making and help the responding firms manage climate related risks (CDP 
2012). The CDP is funded by different organisations such as AXA, Merrill Lynch, Pictet 
Asset Management, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Standard Chartered, Environmental Protection 
Agency (US), DOEN Foundation (Netherlands), Esmée Fairbairn Foundation (UK), Oak 
Foundation (Switzerland), Nathan Cummings Foundation (USA) and the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) (UK, Germany and India) and it maintains that it is independent and not-for-
profit. Nevertheless, some have expressed doubt to the claim of CDP independence arguing 
that though it is funded by various organisations, they are supposedly unified by one purpose 
which is to avert increased environmental legislation (Andrew and Cortese, 2010). 
 Unlike the DEFRA (2009) and the GHG Protocol (2004) which has prescribed tools 
on GHG calculation, categorisation and reporting, the CDP is largely a platform for firms to 
disclose GHG emissions and their actions in managing the same. Such being the case it 
encourages (but does not require) participants to use the GHG protocol. To gather data the 
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CDP sends out a questionnaire to companies worldwide and firms can respond voluntarily. 
Basically the questionnaire is structures in four parts (CDP, 2011). The first part captures a 
firm strategy in managing climate change risks and asks a firm to identify risks and 
opportunities from climate change including regulation, physical risks from extreme weather 
events, changes in technology and shifts in consumer attitude and demand. In this part a firm 
is also expected to disclose how it has integrated climate change issues into the business 
strategy. The second part concentrates on the governance mechanisms of a firm in having 
oversight on climate change issues. The third part requests a firm to detail out its accounting 
and reporting procedures/mechanisms of GHG information and state whether this information 
is verified. When reporting the GHG emissions in scopes, total emissions under Scope 3 are 
not required but rather a firm is required to disclose only relevant emissions under scope 3. 
The fourth part deals with information relating to firm’s progress in achieving carbon 
reduction targets. When disclosing the emission reduction activities, a firm is required to state 
whether they are mandatory or voluntary. For more details of the disclosure requirements 
under CDP refer to table 3.         
 The first data request was sent in 2003 and 235 firms responded. Participation has 
been increasing and in 2009 the project had nearly 3000 participants covering over 60 
countries (CDP, 2012). By early 2012, some 655 institutional investors were working with 
CDP representing US$78 Trillion in assets, an increase from just 35 in 2003 (CDP, 2012). In 
contrast, the response rate and quality of responses has been disappointing. Andrew and 
Cortese (2010) noted that there was generally low response rate and that in most cases firms 
were returning incomplete responses and opting for anonymity. Inconsistency in data 
preparation was common and this made comparability impossible. This could be attributed to 
the fact that despite recommending GHG protocol as the basis for their data preparation, the 
CDP allows firms to choose their own guidance. The CDP has, however, been improving the 
quality of the responses by standardising the reporting requirements with a view of 
encouraging comparability. Part of the improvements made in 2007 was to request firms to 
be disclosing their methodologies (CDP 2007).     
 Despite its shortfalls, CDP has had significant influence on GHG disclosure behaviour 
of firms in the United Kingdom. Okereke (2007) mentioned that Schemes like CDP managed 
to influence top UK corporate companies to begin to disclose GHG data. Since the CDP was 
launched, firms mostly in FTSE 350 have been active participants and in 2008 they had a 68 
per cent response rate and 22 per cent of firms in Global 500 Carbon Disclosure Leadership 
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Index were from FTSE 350 (CDP FTSE 350, 2008). In 2011, 236 firms of the FTSE 350 
responded to the CDP questionnaire and 79 of the respondents indicated that they had 
managed to reduce GHG emissions by implementing specific measures in the prior year 
(CDP FTSE 350, 2011). Due to lack of standardised guidelines, CDP data disclosed by FTSE 
350 are often inconsistent and incomparable (CDP FTSE 350, 2011). Some have criticised 
the open ended nature of the question in CDP which means more discretion to reporting 
companies but then difficult to obtain easily comparable data (Sullivan, 2006). 
5.3.4 ISO 14064-1:  Specification for measurement and reporting GHGs at 
organisational level 
The standard was first released in 2006 and is divided is divided into three parts namely: 
Part 1: Specification with guidance at the organization level for quantification and reporting 
of greenhouse gas emissions and removals 
Part 2: Specification with guidance at the project level for quantification, monitoring and 
reporting of greenhouse gas emission reductions or removal enhancements 
Part 3: Specification with guidance for the validation and verification of greenhouse gas 
assertions  
Therefore it is ISO 14064 part 1 that primarily guides the GHG reporting at company 
level. However the standard is fundamentally dependent on the principles and concepts 
outlined in GHG protocol. The standard encourages organisations to prepare a GHG report to 
facilitate GHG inventory verification, and a firm’s participation in various GHG programs as 
well as informing external users. While reports are expected to be complete, consistent, 
accurate, relevant and transparent, the organisation has the discretion to determine the 
structure, content and dissemination methods of the report depending on its needs. Where an 
organisation claims conformance to ISO 14064-1 then it is required to make available a 
report compiled according to the specification of this standard and where possible a 
verification report to that effect (ISO 14064-1, 2006).     
 The disclosure requirements in ISO 14064-1 are in most respects similar to those 
required under the GHG protocol albeit with minor variations. ISO 14064-1 has a total of 29 
reporting requirements compared to 27 under the GHG protocol. Both standards categorise 
the requirements as mandatory and optional. Of the 19 mandatory requirements under ISO 
14064-1, only five are not included in the 18 mandatory requirements under GHG protocol 
and these are; Organisation description; authorship of report; separate quantification of 
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removals; quantified internal projects; statement as to compliance with ISO 14064-1; and 
statement as to whether the emissions have been verified. A total of 10 optional disclosures 
are needed under ISO 14064-1 against nine in GHG protocol of which 5 are not in GHG 
protocol as follows: Company mission statement; disclosure of schemes to which a firm 
belongs; planning information; monitoring procedures; statement from the Chief Executive 
Officer. One notable omission under ISO 14064-1 is that there is no mention of the need to 
report on Non-Kyoto Gases which might then suggest that disclosures under the standard 
might be incomplete.   
5.3.5 The Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB 2010) 
The CDSB disclosure framework is designed to assist firms disclose climate change 
information that is relevant to investors. In this respect, the CDSB (2010) encourages firms to 
disclose information that lead to understanding of the impact of climate change on business 
objectives and strategy, and the organisational performance.  The disclosure requirements are 
also aligned to requirements specified in other initiatives like CDP, WRI GHG protocol, ISO 
14064-1, CERES October 2006 Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure, GRI –G3 
Guidelines, and the US SEC’s 2010 interpretive guidance on disclosure of climate risk. Thus 
apart from disclosures of quantified GHG emission data as prescribed in other disclosure 
frameworks like GHG protocol and ISO 14064-1, the CDSB also emphasises disclosure on 
strategic analysis, risk and governance of climate change. In this respect management must 
outline the impact of climate change on operational and strategic strategies and the 
governance processes to mitigating the same. Risks and opportunities arising from climate 
change should be clearly identified and reported. The GHG management plans should set out 
clear targets and timelines and duly disclosed together with information on the emission 
schemes to which a firm belongs (CDSB, 2010). Refer to appendix 4 for a detailed disclosure 
requirements of CDSB 2010. 
5.3.6 Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure (GFCRD, 2006)  
This framework was initiated in 2005 and launched in 2006 to help improve corporate 
disclosure of climate change risks and opportunities and is applicable to all companies 
(GFCRD, 2006). It encourages standardised climate risk disclosures which are easy for 
companies to prepare and investors to follow. The framework is not a new reporting 
mechanism as such companies using it are encouraged to ensure that they continue to follow 
existing reporting mechanisms like CDP, Global Reporting Initiative, etc. Companies using 
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the framework are expected to disclose climate change information in the following four 
categories: Emissions disclosure; Strategic analysis of climate risk and emission 
management; Regulatory risks; Physical risks.  Disclosures under these headings are quite 
similar to those provided for in other reporting frameworks save for the fact that the Global 
Framework is quite detailed on the particular risks to be disclosed.    
 Thus under physical risks, a firm is expected to disclose how climate change has 
affected business operations including supply chain and actions/strategies taken to adapt to 
these risks. These effects could be weather patterns, sea level rise, water availability and 
hydrological effects etc.  Disclosure of regulatory risks are to include any known trends, 
events, demands, commitments, and uncertainties stemming from climate change that are 
reasonably likely to have a material effect on financial condition or operating performance. 
This analysis should include consideration of secondary effects of regulation such as 
increased energy and transportation costs. The analysis should incorporate the possibility that 
consumer demand may shift sharply due to changes in domestic and international energy 
markets; all GHG regulations applicable in the country in which the firm operates and where 
possible their impact on company operations; The company’s estimate of future cost of 
carbon under various scenarios of reductions (GFCRD, 2006). The scenarios to incorporate 
assumptions as envisaged in GHG regulations. Disclosure of future scenarios is hailed as 
being unique and important in helping investors make investment decisions in relation to the 
projected scenarios (Sullivan, 2006).   
5.3.7 The Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines for GHGs 
The GRI is a non-profit organisation formed in 1997 and it develops and publishes guidelines 
for sustainability reporting including environment and GHG in particular (GRI, 2013). The 
guidelines, which were first published in 2000, revised in 2002 and were further reviewed in 
2006 (this version is referred to as the third generation G3), are developed through multi-
stakeholder consultative process. Overall, the GRI reporting framework provides principles 
and guidance for standard disclosures on strategy, an organisational profile, report 
parameters, governance, a ‘management approach’ description and performance indicators 
(comparable information on the economic, environmental, and social performance)  (Kraal, 
2012).  The GRI based reports are expected to be complete, consistent and a reflection of the 
economic reality of the organisation with due consideration for relevant stakeholders. 
Accuracy and timeliness of the reports are also emphasised as they are crucial to stakeholder 
assessment.           
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 Under the GRI 3, there are a total of 79 performance indicators expected to be 
disclosed some of which are quantitative while other are qualitative (GRI, 2006). Fifty of 
these indicators are considered core depending on their perceived usefulness to stakeholders 
as such are expected to be prioritised in the disclosures (GRI, 2006). Organisations using the 
framework are expected to disclose their reporting range which is categorised from C through 
A+ and this removes the need for self-declaration that the organisation is reporting using GRI 
framework as was the case in GRI 2. The guidelines for climate change disclosures are 
included under the environmental performance section of the document. Thus indicators 
EN1-EN30 relates to environmental disclosures but it under EN16 to EN18 where specific 
disclosures for GHG emissions are specified. These disclosures are: EN16: Total direct and 
indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight; EN17: Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas 
emissions by weight; EN18: Initiatives to reduce GHG emissions and reductions achieved.
  The reporting guidelines in GRI are applicable to all organisations regardless of size, 
location or sector. Though voluntary, usage of the guidelines has been gradually increasing. 
A KPMG survey of 2008 on G250 by revenue from 22 different countries found that almost 
75 per cent of the companies were using GRI guidelines in their sustainability reporting 
(Sherman, 2009). Again by 2009, almost 1300 organisations worldwide published a GRI 
based report (GRI, 2013). Despite its supposedly wide usage, GRI guidelines have been 
criticised as being too general and not very suitable for some specific sectors and GRI has 
responded to these concerns by introducing sector specific standards for sectors like financial 
services, transportation and logistics etc. (Sherman, 2009). 
 
5.3.8 Other GHG Reporting Frameworks 
In addition to the frameworks discussed above, there are further guidelines issued by various 
bodies which can be used by a firm disclosing GHG emissions. For instance in trying to help 
firms use available measurement and reporting guidelines, PwC (2009) developed a 
template/model specifying the kind of disclosures that can improve carbon transparency and 
accountability in a firm. The model was aimed at demonstrating how companies can 
incorporate GHG emission data and strategy into their overall business strategy. It also 
managed to show linkages between GHG information and the financial performance 
indicators of a firm. Through the model, it is suggested that disclosed information should 
cover the following: company background and the purpose of the report; the company’s 
climate change strategy; Impact of climate change on business; prevailing environmental and 
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regulatory governance on the company; analysis of financial performance in relation to 
climate change; directors responsibility of approval of environmental strategy; primary 
statement of GHG emission for the company with comparable data in the reporting period; 
and an assurance statement (PwC, 2009). Both quantitative and qualitative disclosures are 
demonstrated through the model.       
 There are other guidelines like the Publicly Available Standard (PAS 2060) and 
DECC Carbon Neutral guidance which aim at helping companies claim their carbon 
neutrality. The PAS (2060) was developed by the British Standard Institution (BSI) to 
provide best practice guide as to how a company can achieve carbon neutrality. The standard 
set measures and requirements for companies to demonstrate carbon neutrality for their 
products and services. For measurement the PAS 2060 encourages firms to use GHG 
protocol, ISO 14064-1, and PAS 2050. It requires measurement of all Scope 1 and 2 and 
Scope 3 emission which makes 1 per cent of total footprint. After measurement, the standard 
requires an entity to draw up a public commitment plan to reduce emissions. The plan is to 
contain the following: a time scale, specific targets for reductions, the planned means of 
achieving reductions and how residual emissions will be off. Offsetting should only be done 
with highly certified carbon credits. The standard requires public disclosure of documentation 
used to claim carbon neutrality as a way of promoting transparency.   
 Again, the DECC Carbon Neutral guidance which was issued in September 2009, also 
aimed at improving the transparency on organisations claiming carbon neutrality. The 
guidance mainly outlines how a company can calculate emissions, what constitutes and how 
to report emission reductions and carbon offsetting. The guidance does not set out 
measurement criteria and instead encourages companies to use existing standards for 
methodology. For instance, when claiming carbon neutrality for products, the guidance 
advises companies to use either PAS 2050 or ISO 14040. Apart from disclosures on GHG 
emissions as required in other frameworks, the guidance emphasises on the disclosure of the 
activities that leads to offset of carbon emissions and impact. Consequently, companies are 
expected to disclose the following: time period to which the carbon neutral claim relates; 
Information on how carbon neutrality has been verified including type and subject of 
verification (if no verification is done then an explanation for not been carried out); state the 
reduction measurement (absolute or intensity) and justify the choice and the state time period 
to which the reductions relate; reduction activities undertaken; the amount of off-sets 
purchased with clearly identifiable supplier and quantification methodology; and disclosure 
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of how off-sets projects were validated and verified i.e. the quality criteria should be stated.
 For a detailed overview of the disclosure requirements under various reporting 
frameworks, refer to table 3 below. 
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Table 3. Disclosure Requirements as stipulated in various Reporting 
Frameworks 
    
            
Disclosures\Frameworks 
ISO 
14064-1 
PwC 
2009 
Carbon 
Disclosure 
Standards 
Board 
(CDSB 
2010) 
Global 
Framework 
for Climate 
Risk 
Disclosure 
(2006) 
Global 
Reporting 
Initiative 
(GRI G3) 
World 
Resource 
Institute/
GHG 
Protocol 
(2004) 
Department 
of 
Environment, 
Food and 
Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA 
2009) 
The 
Carbon 
Disclosure 
Project 
(CDP) 
DECC 
Carbon 
neutral 
guidance 
(2009) 
The 
EU 
ETS 
The CRC 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Scheme 
                        
GHG Emission: General                       
Institutional background 
and period covered by 
report                       
Total GHG emissions in 
Co2 metric tonnes                      
Scope 1 emissions                       
Scope 2 emissions                        
Scope 3 emissions                       
Organisational 
Boundary/consolidation 
approach                      
GHG emission targets set 
and achieved                       
Historical comparative 
data                       
Base Year                       
GHGs covered             
 
        
Sources and sinks 
used/excluded                      
GHG emission 
performance ratios e.g. 
Intensity ratio                       
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Conversion factors used     
 
               
Regulated Schemes to 
which a firm belongs                       
Reporting Guidelines used 
in reporting                      
An assurance statement on 
disclosed information                      
                        
Strategic Analysis                       
Statement on company 
position on climate change 
and related responsibilities                       
Actions/measures taken to 
reduce/mitigate climate 
change impact                      
Corporate governance on 
climate change                       
Incentives available to 
executive management on 
Climate change                       
Climate change 
opportunities and company 
strategies                       
                        
Risk Analysis                       
Climate change impact on 
business operations 
including supply chains                       
Adaptation strategies to 
climate change effects                       
Regulatory risks as a result 
of climate change                       
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Future Scenario analysis 
incorporating provisions of 
the law or potential 
regulations                       
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Table 3 demonstrates wide availability of a number of GHG measurement and reporting 
frameworks. The underlying principles of accounting and reporting frameworks of these 
voluntary initiatives have largely remained common targeting the GHGs identified under the 
Kyoto protocol and an emphasis on reporting on GHGs primarily in two scopes. Thus, from 
the table it can be seen that though information disclosure requirements differ from one 
framework to the other, overall there are commonalities in what companies are expected to 
disclose on climate change. Generally companies are expected to disclose the governance and 
management structures in place for climate change; assessment of the impact of climate 
change on the business; risks and opportunities arising from climate change; and company’s 
strategies/targets and actions meant to reduce/control emissions. Specific disclosures relating 
to GHGs include: total GHG emissions expressed in metric tonnes of Co2; measurement 
criteria and emission factors used; scope of reporting; and a statement to whether the data has 
been verified. The other similarity in the frameworks is that they are generic and are 
applicable to all sectors. This is, however, a concern in that such lack of specific sector 
considerations makes it difficult for investors to have a meaningful comparison or 
performance benchmarks to assess companies (Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012). 
 However, from above, it is evident that very few frameworks place emphasis on 
forward looking information rather most emphasise on historical data. Only the Global 
Framework for climate Risk Disclosures (GFCRD, 2006) and GRI G3 require incorporation 
of likely future scenarios in their climate risk analysis. Such information is deemed useful in 
decision making. The backward looking nature of the guidelines makes them inadequate to 
meet some investor needs which are concerned about the future (Sullivan, 2006). There is 
also no emphasis on quality or indicators that might encourage quality of the disclosures 
which again undermines the decision usefulness of the disclosed information.  
 In practice companies appear to use the frameworks in their GHG preparation reports. 
For instance Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) researching on how the retail sector in the UK 
report GHG emission found that six of the nine retailers studied were claiming/using GHG 
protocol. In addition, Deloitte (2011) also found that 9 per cent of FTSE 100 was using the 
DEFRA 2009 guidance. However, no academic study has provided evidence as to the extent 
of GHG reporting influenced by these voluntary reporting initiatives. It is also not known 
whether the introduction of DEFRA (2009) made a significant contribution to the GHG 
reporting pattern of firms in the UK.  
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5.4 International Financial Reporting Standards and GHGs Reporting   
Despite the numerous voluntary guidelines on GHGs reporting, there is generally consensus 
on quantification and level GHG information disclosures. In the UK, firms using either 
DEFRA (2009) guidance or the GHG protocol are likely to quantify and disclose GHGs in a 
similar manner since the former was modelled on the latter. Besides, as explained most 
reporting frameworks do not prescribe their own measurement criteria instead they encourage 
firms to use the GHG protocol for guidance. Nonetheless, there is no GHG reporting 
guidance from International Accounting Standard Board (IASB). Depending on classification 
as to asset or liability form, GHG can be reported within the bounds of the current IASB 
reporting standards (Barbu et al., 2012). The IFRSs mostly applicable to environmental and 
GHGs are those covering valuations, provisions, transparency and presentation (ICAEW, 
2009). For instance under IAS 1 a company is expected to make reasonable judgement as to 
what information is to be presented and disclosed in the financial statements with due 
consideration to the decision usefulness of such information to stakeholders. In this respect a 
company is supposed to disclose all environmental and social information which would help 
stakeholders form an overall picture of the company. Generally just like any other accounting 
information disclosure, environmental and GHG disclosures under IFRS are expected to be 
guided by materiality and substance over form principles. Thus under materiality concept, 
size, nature and circumstances of the subject in question determines what is to be disclosed. 
Substance over form in relation to GHG emissions means that disclosures among other things 
will be made based on whether GHG emissions lead to new assets or liabilities.
 Notwithstanding the fact that most GHG emission disclosures can fall within existing 
IASB standards, there is generally a lack of consensus/guidance on how to account and report 
GHG emission allowances brought by innovative schemes like those in Kyoto protocol or the 
EU ETS.  In addition, categorising a carbon sink or source (identified within the framework 
of the Kyoto protocol) as either an asset or liability is also not a straight forward criterion 
(Ratnatunga, 2007). A number of surveys and studies on the financial statements of firms 
participating in say the EU ETS have revealed diversity of emission allowance accounting 
and reporting practices being used by firms (Lovell et al., 2010; PwC and IETA, 2007).  This 
is attributed to lack of a generally accepted international reporting standard for GHGs for the 
treatment of the emission allowances (Guenther and Stechemesser, 2011).  Ratnatunga (2007) 
argued that the current accounting framework is ill equipped to meet the information 
challenges of global warming noting that even though monetary quantifiable unites are 
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assigned to carbon or other gases, the question of how to account them in the assets and 
liabilities framework is still unanswered. Lack of common accounting methodology for firms 
participating in the EU ETS is of concern as it undermines the effectiveness of the emission 
markets itself whose valuation and re-evaluation is dependent on accounting criteria (Lovell 
et al., 2010).           
 The operation of the EU ETS is what calls for thoughtful accounting practice. In the 
first phase of the EU ETS, emission allowances were allocated freely and this either meant a 
nil value in the accounts if the cost basis is adopted or other if the market value approach is 
considered. Once the allowances were allocated, the focus shifted to the valuation of the 
allowances being sold or purchased by firms for various reasons in a bid to control their 
emissions. Often trading on the allowances was characterised by huge volatilities which for 
instance in between 2008 and 2010, the price had fallen from 28 Euros to 8 Euros hence 
necessitating accounting practices that reflect the underlying forces of the market. Subsequent 
allowances under the EU ETS phases two and three which commences in 2013 and 2020 
respectively will be auctioned meaning a fundamental change in the way emission allowances 
can be accounted for. Other areas also exist where accounting guidance is needed. For 
instance accounting for allowances and obligations where there is no active market and how 
should intermediaries like brokers and other position taking institutions not subjected to caps 
account for their operations (Ratnatunga, 2007).     
 Firms participating the EU ETS and are listed on the FTSE 350 are required to 
prepare financial statements based on International Financial Reporting Standards (Deloitte, 
2012). This then means that their reporting GHG emission allowances should be in line with 
the guidance as provided by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). However, 
to date IASB has issued no guidance on how firms should account for emission allowances. 
Earlier, an attempt was made to issue accounting guidance for EU ETS emission allowances 
through International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) 3: emission 
rights. IFRIC 3 recommended that the EU allowances (Assets) should be treated independent 
of the liabilities arising under the EU ETS meaning that liabilities could not be measured on 
the carrying amount of the underlying assets. Under IFRIC 3, emission allowances were to be 
categorised as intangible assets hence falling under the accounting treatment stipulated in IAS 
38. Fair value was recommended as the accounting methodology of determining the values 
hence allowances were to be measured at fair value initially with the difference between the 
amount paid for and fair value identified as government grant under IAS 20. The grant was to 
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be classified as deferred income in the balance sheet and subsequently recognised as income 
over the compliance period. Regarding liabilities IFRIC 3 stated that they should recognised 
at market value as provision under IAS 37 in the accounts as allowances are made (Deloitte, 
2007).             
 The IFRIC 3 did not see the light of the day as it was withdrawn due to widespread 
criticisms. Lovell et al. (2010) explains that the controversy rested on IFRIC 3 
recommendation that gains and losses derived from the valuation of liabilities be reported in 
income statement, while the gains and losses from any valuation of emission allowances were 
to be treated under equity in balance sheet. With IFRIC 3 there was clearly a mismatch in 
how different assets could be treated and this led to the criticisms (Ratnatunga, 2007; 
Mackenzie, 2009).         
 With the withdrawal of IFRIC, firms in the EU ETS have no official guidance on 
accounting for emission allowances. Therefore in the absence of the guidance, firms are 
expected to follow paragraph 10 of IAS 8: Accounting policies, Changes in Accounting 
Estimates and Errors which gives management discretion on accounting principles to be 
followed in consultation with their auditors in situations where there is no guidance.  Such a 
vacuum, as noted by Lovell et al. (2010) has led to array of accounting standards being used 
in accounting for emission allowances. Other surveys have also confirmed diversity in the 
Accounting practices for GHG emission allowances (see PwC and IETA, 2007; Mcgready, 
2008).            
 Going forward, the IASB is corroborating with the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) of the USA to come up with a joint accounting criteria for emission 
allowances (FASB, 2010). Lovell et al. (2010) noted that the IASB/FASB joint project is a 
wider initiative to cover all emission allowances but no substantial progress is being made 
due to fundamental differences in traditional accounting cultures between the two bodies.  
5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter discussed a number of reporting frameworks which can be used to disclose GHG 
emission information in the United Kingdom. It began by highlighting the fact that though 
reporting is one important factor in helping a firm manage its emission and forms the basis of 
accountability and transparency in emission trading schemes, there are largely no mandatory 
requirements for firms not belonging to any scheme to disclose their emissions. Firms 
belonging to emission trading schemes like EU ETS and CRC have a set of minimum 
mandatory requirements for GHG disclosures. In addition, Companies Act 2006 requires 
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companies are to disclose environmental information which includes GHG emissions. 
Despite this, there are numerous voluntary reporting frameworks which firms can use for the 
GHG reporting requirements. Therefore the GHG reporting practices in the UK can be 
described as a mixed of both mandatory and voluntary regimes. Thus in compliance with the 
Companies Act 2006, and in particular DEFRA (2009) guidance, companies can disclose 
their GHG emissions which includes total emissions as expressed in metric tonnes of Co2 
equivalents and the types of GHGs covered.  Similar information is to be disclosed by 
companies participating in EU ETS. Companies under the CRC scheme are required to give 
detailed disclosures on GHG emissions and other disclosures regarding energy usage and 
suppliers and any non-compliance is either a civil or a criminal offence. While the schemes 
prescribe disclosure requirements, much of the disclosures and measurement criteria are 
drawn from various voluntary reporting frameworks notably the GHG Protocol (2004). 
 A number of voluntary reporting frameworks are available which can be used by 
companies in making GHG disclosures. These include the GHG Protocol, CDSB, ISO14064-
1; DEFRA (2009), CDP (2012), PwC Typico Illustration (2009), etc. DEFRA (2009) 
guidance which came as a result of the CCA 2008 ushered in a new era in the measurement 
and reporting of GHGs in the UK in that for the first time firms were provided with a formal 
guidance on measuring and reporting their GHG emissions. DEFRA (2009) was modelled on 
the GHG protocol which is considered as the ‘generally accepted standard for carbon 
measurement and reporting’ worldwide. Under DEFRA, firms are to calculate emissions 
from activities falling under their control. Once this is properly identified then carbon should 
be categorised in three scopes with measurement being done multiplying activity data by 
emission factors as provided by the authorities from time to time. The DEFRA (2009) 
guidance is voluntary as such firms are not compelled to follow it. The guidance, in 
recognition of its dependency on the GHG protocol also recommends that firms can measure 
and report based on the GHG protocol.       
 It should be noted however that even prior to the DEFRA guidance, firms in the UK 
had been participating in other voluntary schemes meant at encouraging firms to control their 
emissions. One such scheme is the CDP which was launched by a group of institutional 
investors who realised that with no international consensus on how GHG emissions should 
accounted for, many stakeholders could risk having incomplete information in their decision 
making. Since the CDP is barely a reporting mechanism meant to improve transparency and 
accountability, it does not have its own criteria on how firms should measure GHGs and 
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instead it encourages firms to use the GHG protocol. The lack of having a single standard 
with which firms can use to measure GHGs has meant that comparability of accounts is 
unattainable which suggests that GHG information, in as far as other stakeholders are 
concerned, does not meet the criteria of quality accounting information.   
 Under the available guidance, companies are required to measure their carbon 
footprint before any disclosures are made. Both direct and indirect footprints should be 
measured and then the organisation should disclose total emissions expressed in Co2e tonnes 
and the measurement criteria/standard used. Once measurement is done and disclosed then 
the organisation is required to carry out a strategic analysis of the carbon emission which will 
lead to disclosure of actions taken to reduce emissions, corporate governance processes 
instituted to manage the emissions. Disclosures under strategic analysis should clearly 
identify the opportunities available in carbon emission management e.g. emissions trading 
schemes. Finally the guidelines stipulate the need to make carbon related risk disclosures. At 
a minimum the risks should either be physical risks i.e. the impact of climate change on 
company operations and regulatory risks e.g. the impact regulation of carbon could have on 
company operations. In as far as there are commonalities in the disclosures, there are also 
common shortfalls in the reporting frameworks notably the fact that they are mostly 
backward looking and generic which then limits their usefulness in decision making.
 Currently there is no specific international accounting standard for GHG emissions. 
GHG emissions depending on their categorisation can be accounted for and reported using 
available international accounting standards. While the lack of a common accounting 
standard does not cause much disparity in terms of measurement and reporting of actual GHG 
emissions, there is a huge difference in how firms account for emission allowances emanating 
from the initiatives like EU ETS. The controversy lies in how emission allowances and 
liabilities should be presented on the financial statements in light of prevailing accounting 
practices. This then calls for more work in issuing guidance of which the IASB and FASB are 
engaged in.           
 Overall the chapter has demonstrated availability of a wide range of voluntary 
disclosure guidelines which companies can use in preparing their GHG reports. Despite the 
minor differences in the voluntary initiatives, the ‘core’ disclosures are the same and hence it 
is expected that companies might display similarities in their GHG disclosures regardless of 
the guidelines used. In the UK, the GHG reporting environment is predominantly voluntary 
but not much academic research has been done to ascertain the impact the reporting 
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guidelines have had on the GHG reporting behaviour of the companies. In addition, the UK 
government has signalled their readiness in ensuring that firms provide measure and report 
credible GHG information by issuing the DEFRA (2009) guidelines. The impact of the 
government initiated DEFRA (2009) guidelines on firms GHG reporting behaviour is not yet 
known since no known empirical study has been done to that effect. By reviewing the 
disclosure practices of the FTSE 350 companies over a four year period covering 2008-2011, 
this study will assess the extent to which the disclosures reflects the disclosure requirements 
in the voluntary guidelines. The period covered by the study will also provide an opportunity 
to assess whether issuance of DEFRA (2009) had an impact on the GHG disclosures of the 
company. The next chapter therefore proceeds outlining the research hypothesis that will be 
used to fulfil the research objectives.     
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CHAPTER SIX 
Hypotheses Development 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The chapter draws on theoretical discussions and empirical literature review presented in 
chapters 2 and 5 respectively to explain the rationale behind the set hypotheses.  Thus based 
on prior evidence a list of possible determinants is drawn and these are then each discussed in 
light of their suitability to current study with its exclusive focus on GHG voluntary 
disclosures.            
 The chapter is organised as follows: the first part discusses the determinants 
beginning with corporate governance characteristics and then the firm characteristics. The 
chapter ends with a summary and conclusion.  
6.1 Corporate Governance Characteristics  
Based on prior literature (see Chapter 2 for more details), the following governance 
characteristics have been identified as possible explanatory factors for a firm’s decision to 
voluntarily disclose GHG emissions information; Board Size, Presence of Non-executive 
Directors on board, Audit Committee, Presence of Board Environment Sub-committee, 
ownership concentration and Managerial ownership.  
6.1.1 Board size 
The board of directors, instituted as a mechanism to resolve the agency problem, has over the 
period seen their role increasingly becoming champions of communication between 
management and a firm’s various stakeholders (Rupley et al, 2012; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; 
Monks and Monow, 2004). Prior researchers have argued that the way a board is structured 
affects the way it discharges its responsibility (Galbrealth, 2010; Rogrigue et al., 2012). 
Based on significant progress made in corporate governance area, listed companies in the UK 
are expected to institute some governance structures or explain their failure to do so 
(Combined Code, 2012). Large numbers of board members which represent various 
shareholder interests may in a way help reduce information asymmetry (Chen and Jaggi, 
2000). The main function of the board is to formulate policies and strategies to be 
implemented by management.         
 In discharging their role, the board is aware that information is an important link to its 
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outsiders as such it may champion policies that encourage more disclosures. The large 
number of board members is likely to make the board function effectively in ensuring that 
policies and strategies are implemented (Zahra et al., 2000). A large board is also likely to 
have diverse experience and skills that may be crucial in assisting management in the 
processing and disclosing of useful information (Akhtarudin et al., 2009).  However there 
also those who argue for smaller board insisting that such boards exhibit greater operational 
efficiency. Thus they argue that small boards are easy to coordinate and effective, while large 
boards have higher coordination costs synonymous with social loafing (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993). Coordination and communication difficulties within large boards give 
the CEO an opportunity to dominate in important matters, including disclosure decisions; 
Yoshikawa and Phan (2003) argued that CEOs sometimes create large boards as a deliberate 
way of dispersing power so they themselves can control the agenda. To the contrary those for 
large sized boards argue that large sized boards have diverse range of experience and skills 
which may enable them discharge their duties effectively (Dalton et al., 1999). The diversity 
in skills and experience means that different board members may be representing different 
values on the board including environmental and GHG issues. Thus dysfunctional due to 
large size is offset by appropriate mix of skills and experience. Moreover, Booth and Deli 
(1996) argue that the uncertainty surrounding environmental issues generally leads to large 
board sizes in order to allow firms access expertise necessary to overcome this uncertainty. In 
addition, de Villiers et al. (2011, p.1645) stated that larger boards means wider and diverse 
connections with the important stakeholders as such a firm with a large board is ‘likely to 
facilitate access to critical financial resources, allowing such boards more financial leeway 
to pursue environmental initiatives’.        
 Empirical studies have found evidence of the influence of large sized board to 
disclosures. Peters and Romi (2012) noted that in addition to other board attributes, those 
firms with a large board size had more GHG disclosures. Similarly, Cormier et al. (2011) 
found a positive association of large board size and disclosures. That study investigated 
whether environmental disclosures substitutes or compliments efforts in reducing information 
asymmetry between corporate managers and stock market analysts on a sample of 137 large 
Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 2005. Their environmental 
disclosure score was weighted with a high score awarded if disclosures are quantitative and 
specific than qualitative and general. The results among other factors, found that board size 
was the only board characteristic that had a significant positive relationship with 
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environmental disclosures.  Others like Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) did not find any 
association. Given that there are both arguments for expecting a positive and a negative 
relationship, no prediction of the sign of the relation is predicted. It is therefore hypothesised 
that: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between board size and GHG information disclosure.  
6.1.2 Non-executive directors 
The presence of non-executive directors (NEDs) is one indication of the level of board 
independence (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez., 2010). Arguably, the presence of non-
executive directors helps the board discharge its monitoring responsibilities effectively (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Akhtarudin et al., 2009). According to provision B1.2.of the Combined 
Code 2012, companies in the UK are encouraged to have more non-executive directors than 
executive directors on their boards as a way of enhancing board independence and improving 
board efficiency. It is intimated that board members with no material interest in the company 
are able to act both in the interests of shareholders and other legitimate stakeholders of the 
company. Thus from a stakeholder theory perspective, non-executive directors who represent 
the interests of other stakeholders other than management are viewed as a tool for monitoring 
management behaviour (Dixon et al., 2005). Such monitoring, from the perspective of agency 
theory, helps to minimise the principal-agency problem that exists between shareholders and 
management. Forker (1992) found evidence that increased numbers on NEDs on the board 
had led to increased quality of financial disclosures. However, in the study by Ho and Wong 
(2001) for Hong Kong listed companies, the positive hypothesis was not supported. Post, 
Rahman, and Rubow (2011) found a positive relationship between presence of NEDs and 
environmental disclosures while the study of Brammer and Pavelin (2006) focusing on UK 
companies’ environmental disclosures did not find any association. However considering the 
uncertainty surrounding GHG matters, the presence of more NEDs on the board is likely to 
help a firm keep pace with the dynamics of climate change and of the action needed. The 
presence of more outside directors may also force or persuade firm management to be more 
transparent about its role in climate change which then may lead to more disclosures on GHG 
information. In view of this therefore we state the hypothesis as follows: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of NEDs on the board and GHG  
      information disclosure. 
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6.1.3 Audit Committee Size 
Audit committee is one mechanism that plays the key role of monitoring board and 
management activities. To enable it discharge its duties effectively, good corporate 
governance demands that it be made up of majority of independent NEDs and also be headed 
by an independent director. The UK Combined Code (2012) recommends that an AC should 
be comprised of at least three (or in the case of smaller companies, two) members, who 
should all be independent non-executive directors.  Mangena and Pike (2005) explain that an 
independent audit committee is likely to be free from management control leading to 
improved operations of the board. Cadbury (1992) argued that appropriately structures audit 
committees have the potential to improve the financial reporting processes of a firm. The 
focus on audit committee is also important in the sense that it represents to a larger extent all 
initiatives meant at improving governance in developed countries (Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 
2013). Kalbers and Forgaty (1993) argued that regardless of the characteristics of the Audit 
committee, the formation of the networks within committee members may provide useful 
links to an organisation which in turn can be vital for survival.    
 Empirical evidence is mixed. According to the authors, the size of the audit 
committee is also a symbol of resource and authority availability which is essential to the 
delivery of its duties. Li et al. (2012) investigated the influence of audit committee on 
intellectual capital disclosures of 100 listed UK companies and found a positive significant 
association which was consistent with the results of Mangena and Pike (2005) and Barako et 
al. (2006) for Kenyan companies). Aburaya (2012) also found that audit committee had a 
positive influence on the disclosure of environmental information in the UK. On the contrary 
others like Akhtarudin et al (2009) did not find any association. So no study on GHG 
disclosures has investigated the role of the audit committee in GHG disclosures. In this study, 
while it is anticipated that the presence of an environmental committee is a clear indication of 
a firm’s seriousness in environmental matters, recognition is made that the setting up of a 
special environmental committee is a new phenomenon and may not be appropriate for all 
companies. In the circumstances, the role of audit committee is investigated on the basis that 
with increased awareness of environmental issues by various stakeholders coupled with the 
absence of a specialised committee on the environment might lead to an audit committee 
assuming wider responsibilities including environmental matters. Deloitte (2013) reports that 
social and environmental reporting has come to stay as such it is increasingly becoming an 
essential focus of the audit committees. Deloitte (2013) argues that environmental 
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information like carbon emission constitutes a significant part of operational risks as such it is 
incumbent upon audit committees to provide leadership oversight.    
 Besides, it was observed that of the firms that constituted social and environmental 
committees, some members of these committees were drawn from the audit committee. This 
could suggest desire on part of firms to draw upon the expertise of the audit committee 
members in establishing their oversight roles over environmental management. In the 
circumstances we expect a large sized audit committee to be well prepared to assume the 
wider responsibilities and positively influence the GHG disclosures.  
H3: Firms with large Audit Committee Size will disclose more GHG emissions voluntary 
information 
6.1.4 Environmental Committee 
Prior empirical disclosure literature has investigated the role of governance structures like 
committees on disclosures of information (Eng and Mak 2003; Chen and Jaggi 2000; 
Tauringana, 1997; Peters and Romi, 2012; Berthelot and Robert, 2012). The basis of these 
studies is the fact that board operations through the committees mitigate the agency cost 
problems by way of reducing information asymmetry.  The understanding is that the 
effectiveness of the board is not only dependent on the board composition as a whole but also 
the structure of its committees. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) argued that subgroups of directors 
in a committee enable them to consider issues of interest thoroughly than a full board would. 
Board committees are expected to be champions of transparency and guardians of various 
interest groups in particular shareholders. In this respect, agency theory supports the view 
that board committees and in this study an environmental committee will help monitor 
management activities and decision relating to GHG disclosures.  Neu et al. (1998) stated that 
the presence of an environmental committee symbolises a firms’ concern about their 
environmental reputation especially in the eyes of powerful stakeholders.  Rankin et al. 
(2011, p1047) added that the presence of such a committee demonstrates ‘evidence of 
proactive corporate governance to guide the organisational long term strategy towards a more 
carbon constrained future’. Peters and Romi (2012) suggests that an environmental 
committee occupies the same position as the audit committee in as far as environmental 
information is concerned. Therefore while championing implementation of long term 
strategies on climate change, such a specialised committee may also timely communication 
of the strategy and other related disclosures to the public and stakeholders.  
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 While existence of other board committees like Audit and remuneration has always 
been the tradition of board structures, environmental board committees are a fairly new 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, Michaels (2009) noted that faced with operational and strategic 
environmental related challenges, firms are now designating specific committees of the board 
to address environmental issues. There is documented literature based evidence on the 
influence of an environmental committee on climate change and or GHG disclosures. Peters 
and Romi (2012) found that GHG emission accounting disclosures were positively associated 
with presence of an environmental committee of the board in the study of companies 
participating in the CDP from 2002 to 2006. Similarly Berthelot and Robert (2012) concluded 
that Canadian Oil and Gas companies with an environmental committee had higher levels of 
GHG disclosures than their counterparts. Rankin et al. (2011), despite hypothesising a 
positive relationship between GHG disclosures and governance environmental committee, no 
evidence was found. However the authors found that existence of operational structures like 
an environmental management systems and certification with ISO 14064-1 had a positive 
significant influence on a firm’s production of credible emissions information. Other 
disclosure studies have also provided mixed evidence relating to existence of a specialised 
committee and related disclosures. Hassan (2010) focussed on corporate social responsibility 
disclosures and found that the presence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee is 
associated with the quantity and quality of corporate social disclosure. A similar result was 
obtained by Cowen et al. (1987) who concluded that human resource disclosures were 
positively associated with existence of a corporate social responsibility committee in a firm. 
However no positive association was found between the presence of a CSR committee and its 
related disclosures in a study by Rupley et al. (2012).    
 Nonetheless consistent with the desire to reduce information asymmetry and manage 
stakeholder relationships, in this study, it is expected that a firm with an environmental 
committee will disclose more GHG information as a way of satisfying powerful stakeholder 
demands and reduce asymmetry of information. 
H4: Firms with an environmental committee will disclose more information on GHG 
emissions.   
6.1.5 Ownership concentration 
Separation of ownership and control often leads to information asymmetries that, if 
unchecked, are exploited by managers for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, ownership structure is considered part of the governance 
that helps monitor managerial behaviour. Nonetheless, monitoring becomes difficult when 
ownership is dispersed, due to the ‘free rider’ problem, with managers taking advantage of 
their freedom and benefitting themselves at the expense of others. It is argued that block 
holding (or high concentration of ownership) means stakes are high should managers make a 
mistake or act irrationally; the owners are therefore expected to have resources for (and a 
special interest in) monitoring management behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Noe, 
2002). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that large-block holders (often with a large 
resource base) are more likely to absorb monitoring costs than individual holders. Besides, as 
agency theory suggests, monitoring has costs that may eventually be passed onto managers 
through contractual arrangements, hence with high ownership concentration, managers may 
have incentives to disclose more as a way of minimising the information asymmetry and the 
subsequent monitoring costs.         
 Others have warned that where block holders have aligned themselves with managers 
(and so are privy to the information available to managers), they might have less incentive to 
push for more disclosure (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Thus, block holders’ alignment with 
managers undermines the block holders’ monitoring responsibility and often results in a 
conflict of interests with other groups, such as minority shareholders. In this respect, high 
ownership concentration is considered detrimental to voluntary disclosure. Chau and Gray 
(2002) assert that when ownership structure is concentrated, large shareholders have access to 
inside information and are less concerned about voluntary disclosure. Berthelot and Robert 
(2012) found a positive relationship between widely held ownership and voluntary disclosure 
of climate-change information by Canadian oil and gas companies. Matolcsy et al. (2012) 
found that high concentration of ownership had a negative association with disclosure. 
Similarly, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) found that UK firms with high ownership 
concentration disclosed less environmental information, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive relationship.     
 Since environmental issues are sensitive, we expect ownership structure to play a 
crucial role in moderating the amount of information disclosed. Due to increased scrutiny by 
various parties and the risk associated with climate change, we expect high ownership 
concentration to play a crucial role in forcing managers to disclose more information on 
GHGs as a way of safeguarding their investments. The fact that institutional investors have 
collaborated through initiatives that provide a platform for firms to disclose their GHG 
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information (such as the CDP); their presence within an organisation may influence managers 
to lead by example and so make more GHG disclosures. We therefore hypothesise that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and GHG disclosure, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
6.1.6 Director share ownership 
Director participation in ownership is considered one way of overcoming agency problem as 
it helps to align managerial interests to those of owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Management exerts strong influence on the type of information communicated to outsiders 
because they are fully aware that outsiders judge their performance based on the disclosed 
information. Director share ownership places the burden of economic consequences arising 
from managerial actions on management themselves, thereby mitigating agency costs; hence 
management have incentives to reduce the cost of making more disclosures (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In this case therefore firms with low managerial ownership could be said to 
have more agency costs and the need for more disclosures as a way of mitigating the costs. In 
addition, Morck et al. (1988) argued that managerial ownership presents an opportunity for 
managers to pursue self-interest non-value maximising actions at the expense of their 
shareholder wealth. These non-value maximising actions may include withholding of 
information or making inappropriate disclosures. There is evidence that increased insider or 
managerial ownership could lead management to make aberrant decisions (Dunn, 2004). 
Mohd Ghazali (2007) argued that substantial investment expected or required to be made in 
systems to enable a firm to discharge social and environmental responsibilities, coupled with 
uncertainty as to the payback possibility of such investment, may make managers with high 
share ownership resist voluntary activities including disclosures. The studies of Mohd 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Ahmed Haji (2013) found director ownership to be 
negatively associated with disclosure.        
 On the contrary, Johnson and Greening (1999) argued that increased director or 
managerial ownership increases the probability of managers being sympathetic to social and 
environmental activities as they deem them potentially able to create goodwill, thus inducing 
customers to be more favourably disposed to their companies' products, which will in turn 
improve the companies' standings with other stakeholders like bankers, government and 
investors. However their results found that though managerial ownership was positively 
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related to multi-stakeholder needs, their relationship with the people dimension of corporate 
social performance was insignificant, leading them to conclude that ‘top managers' equity 
does not contribute to a managerial emphasis on communities, women, minorities, and 
employees’ (Johnson and Greening, 1999:574). Therefore in this study managerial ownership 
(represented by proportion of ordinary share ownership by executive and non-executive 
directors) is expected to be related to GHG disclosures in the negative form; hence the 
hypothesis is set out as follows: 
H6: There is a negative relationship between directors’ share ownership and GHG 
       information disclosure 
 
6.2 Firm Characteristics 
Drawing from theoretical and empirical literature, the following company/firm characteristics 
have been used to draw the hypotheses: size, profitability, gearing, liquidity and industry. 
 
6.2.1 Company Size 
Corporate size is one indicator of public visibility hence large companies tend to attract the 
attention of diverse stakeholders. Out of intense pressure and scrutiny by stakeholders, large 
companies are forced to engage in other social and environmental activities as a way of 
maintaining their legitimacy within their operating environment (Stanny and Ely, 2008).  
Engagement in social and environmental activities and subsequent disclosures of the same 
require substantial resources in terms of finance and skill. Large firms are deemed resource 
capable to meet the pollution abatement costs and related disclosure costs (Freedman and 
Jaggi, 2005). In this case the underlying assumption is that large firms will disclose more 
information than small firms. The availability of resources is paramount when dealing with 
climate related issues which in most cases significant changes to the way a firm conducts its 
business. Generally size, (proxied by several measures ranging from number of employees, 
market capitalisation to total assets) has been used in many disclosure studies as a control 
variable. The majority of GHG disclosure studies have found a significant positive 
relationship between size and GHG disclosures (see Rankin et al., 2011 (natural log of market 
capitalisation); Berthelot and Robert, 2012 (total assets); Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009 (Total 
revenue); Freedman and Jaggi, 2005 (log of total assets); Stanny, 2010 (log of total assets); 
Peters and Romi, 2011 (log of total assets)). Other disclosure studies which confirmed the 
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positive relationship include Reverte, (2008); Hackston and Milne (1996); Hannifa and 
Cooke, 2002) Therefore consistent with theory and the findings of most empirical studies on 
GHG disclosures, we argue for a significant positive relationship and the hypothesis is set as 
follows: 
H7: There is a significant positive relationship between company size and the GHG 
disclosures 
 
6.2.2 Gearing 
Based on the tenets of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), managers in a highly 
geared company are expected to disclose more information in order to minimize the agency 
costs.  In fact leverage is considered a measure of risk exposed by both equity holders and 
debt holders. In essence in a highly geared company, creditors are worried that if a firm is not 
properly monitored then there might be wealth transfer from them to shareholders. In this 
case, if not provided with adequate information, creditors find their own means of monitoring 
management behaviour. Increased monitoring result in increased agency costs (Depoers, 
2000). Therefore in accordance with the predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
managers increase their levels of disclosures in a highly geared company as a way of 
minimising agency costs. Despite the theoretical predictions however empirical GHG 
disclosure literature has produced mixed evidence. Freedman and Jaggi (2005) concluded that 
creditors had no role in determining climate change disclosures while Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
(2009) found a negative and insignificant relationship between GRI based climate change 
disclosures and gearing. Similarly Rankin et al. (2011) did not find any significant 
relationship between GHG disclosures and leverage for a sample of Australian companies. In 
other disclosure studies the evidence has been conflicting. Others have found no significant 
relationship (see Whiting and Woodcock, 2011) while others found a significant positive 
relationship (see White et al., 2007; White et al., 2010). While recognition is made that prior 
studies on climate change disclosures have not found a positive relationship between leverage 
and disclosures, this study will proceed hypothesise a positive relationship based on agency 
theory predictions. The present study has its own distinctive characteristics like its focus on 
FTSE350 UK listed companies and disclosure index drawn from a wide range of GHG 
reporting frameworks which could make it result in different outcome from prior studies on 
GHG disclosures. The hypothesis is set as follows: 
H8: There is a significant positive relationship between gearing and GHG disclosures  
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6.2.3 Profitability 
Based on theoretical and prior empirical evidence, profitable firms are expected to disclose 
more information as managers attempt to present compelling reasons for compensation and 
job retention (Cerf, 1961; Inchausti, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1999). Profitability is also an 
indicator of a firm efficiency in resource allocation as such management could be motivated 
to provide more information about their profitability and other areas of stakeholder interest as 
a way of attracting more capital than the less profitable firms. Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 
noted that profitability provides managers with a pool of resources which can be used to 
absorb the costs of environmental disclosures. Others also argue that profitable firms are 
exposed to the public than others and hence stakeholders may be interested in more 
disclosures as to how a firm is making its profits (Fields et al., 2001). Therefore faced with 
public pressure, high profitable firms might use disclosures like environmental disclosures in 
demonstrating their profitability case (Bewley and Li, 2000).  Disclosures in this respect 
could be a means of gaining public trust and legitimacy regarding their ways of making 
profits. Others however argue that it is the less profitable ones that make more disclosures as 
a way of reassuring their stakeholders. Reverte (2008) suggests management uses the social 
and environmental disclosures as being a responsible business not only motivated by the 
pursuit of profit and also as an investment for future profitability.     
 Just like the two divergent views, empirical evidence has been mixed. Using ROE and 
ROA as measures of corporate performance (profitability), Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) failed 
to find a positive relationship. Instead ROE had a negative and significant relationship with 
GHG disclosures while ROA displayed a non-significant and negative effect.  Similarly 
Freedman and Jaggi (2005) found that ROA (as measure of operating performance) had a 
statistically insignificant relationship with pollution disclosures. Nevertheless other studies 
found a significant positive relationship (Berthelot and Robert, 2012; Amran et al., 2012). 
Based on the conflicting evidence therefore a non-directional hypothesis is drawn as follows: 
H9: There is a significant relationship between profitability and GHG disclosures 
 
6.2.4 Liquidity 
Liquidity denotes the ability of a firm to meet its short term liabilities. Based on signalling 
theory argument, a company with high liquidity ratio is expected to disclose more 
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information to distinguish itself from other companies with less favourable liquidity position 
(Aly et al., 2010; Oyeler et al., 2003; Cooke, 1989). However, the opposite may also be true 
if seen from the information asymmetry propositions of agency theory where firms with low 
liquidity positions may provide more information to satisfy capital market players and 
creditors demands (Aly et al., 2010). Prior evidence has been mixed. Oyeler et al. (2003) 
found that liquidity was a key determinant of internet financial reporting in New Zealand and 
that it had a positive significant relationship with voluntary disclosure. To the contrary, Aly et 
al. (2010) found that liquidity had no influence or significant relationship with internet 
reporting in their sample made up of Egyptian companies.    
 Again, Wallace et al. (1994) examined the characteristics that explain financial 
disclosure in the 1991 annual accounts of a sample of 50 companies (30 listed and 20 
unlisted) by using a very detailed index that includes 16 mandatory items. They found a 
significant negative relationship between financial disclosures and liquidity. Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002) investigated the influence of liquidity on two data sets one drawn from Dutch 
firms and other UK firms and found a significant positive relationship in the case of Dutch 
firms and an insignificant negative relationship for UK firms.  No study on GHG disclosures 
has investigated the influence of liquidity. However, based on the assertion that 
environmental related activities including disclosures may necessitate adequate liquid 
resources, we hypothesise as follows: 
H10: There is a significant positive relationship between liquidity and GHG disclosures.  
 
6.2.5 Industry 
There is documented evidence in literature that disclosure practices vary according to 
industry (Amran et al., 2011; Tagesson et al. (2009). Apart from size which is an indicator of 
a company’s exposure to many stakeholders, industry membership represents a certain level 
of risk attached to a firm thereby attracting scrutiny. According to Young and Marais (2012) 
firms in industries deemed as ‘sensitive’ face increased stakeholder pressure for greater 
transparency. Thus, the dynamics and pressure of a particular industry might force a firm or 
firms respond to issues differently from firms in other industries. In line with institutional 
theory, normative and mimetic forces in a particular industry forces firms in that industry 
adopt common standards as way a being in line with ‘acceptable’ standards. Generally firms 
in industries deemed as ‘environmentally sensitive’ attract intense scrutiny from the public as 
such they tend to disclose more environmental information compared to counterparts in other 
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industries (Deegan and Gordon, 1996).       
 Prior studies have found evidence that disclosures are to a certain extent a product of 
industry belonging. Kolk and Pinkse (2010) demonstrated that firms with high environmental 
and social impacts began using CSR reports earlier than others, such those in the financial 
industry. Amran et al. (2012) studying the relationship of firm attributes, ownership structure 
and business network on climate change efforts in Malaysia found that among other things, 
industry had a positive and significant influence on a firm’s efforts to mitigate against climate 
change. The authors had companies categorised into six industries as per Bursa Malaysia 
industry membership.  Similarly Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) investigating factors influencing 
the disclosure of GHG emissions in companies world-wide categorised companies in 11 
industrial sectors as a way of determining whether industry was part of the factors. While ten 
had a positive association with GRI indicators, only four namely Chemicals, Utilities, 
Airlines, Motor vehicles & Parts had statistical significance. Other GHG disclosure studies 
that found positive and significant relationship include Rankin et al. (2011) and Freedman & 
Jaggi (2005). In the circumstances we hypothesise that industry sector will have an impact on 
GHG disclosures with those belonging to the environmental ‘sensitive industries’ expected to 
provide more disclosures.  
H11: There is a positive association between Industry sector and GHG disclosures 
 
 
6.3 Summary 
The chapter has discussed the hypotheses to be tested in this study ranging from corporate 
governance characteristics to firm characteristics. A total of ten hypotheses involving 
variables board size, NED, Audit committee, Board Environmental Committee, ownership 
concentration. Director ownership, company size, profitability, gearing, liquidity and industry 
category have been presented and their suitability justified through prior literature. The next 
chapter begins to discuss results of the econometric model and also the outcome of the survey 
questionnaire.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Research Methodology 
 
7.0 Introduction 
In preceding chapters, discussion focussed on theoretical framework, empirical literature, 
hypotheses development and the context in which the current study has been set out.  This 
chapter outlines the proposed methodology and overall design used to achieve the research 
objectives.           
 The chapter is divided into four main parts. It begins by describing the research 
philosophy/paradigm and data collection and analysis methods. This is followed by a section 
on population and sample and then different aspects of secondary data methodologies are 
discussed based on their suitability to current study. The final part discusses the primary data 
collection mechanisms in particular survey questionnaire design. The chapter ends with a 
summary and conclusion. 
7.1 Research Philosophy/Methodology 
Methodology refers to a framework or procedures/principles that underpin a particular study 
or research. Leady (1989 cited Russell, 2011) referred to it as an operational framework to 
unlock the meaning of facts whereas Bogdan and Taylor (1975) described it as a set of 
procedures used to approach problems and seek answers. It is therefore expected that each 
research should clearly set out the philosophical assumption and procedural framework used 
to explain its findings. According to Saunders et al. (2009), such set of procedures or 
processes consists of six layers namely research philosophies, approaches, strategies, choices, 
time horizons, techniques and procedures.       
 The outer layer of the onion is the research philosophy which denotes development of 
knowledge and the nature of that knowledge (Sanders et al., 2009). There are a wide range of 
philosophical assumptions but the ones commonly used in social sciences and management is 
Ontology (realism v. nominalism) and epistemology (positivism v. anti-positivism or post-
positivist) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Ontology originates or takes its meaning from the 
word theology and addresses assumptions of what constitutes social reality within the context 
of human nature (Wellington et al., 2005; Fisher, 2010). In this respect two contrasting 
positions are identified i.e. realism and nominalism (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Saunders et 
al., 2009). Realism argues for the social world to be real and made up of tangible structures 
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while nominalism considers the social world to be just a product of constructs or labels that 
provide a basic structure for reality (Holden, 2004). Therefore research conducted based on 
nominalism require clear identification of objectives that will help form structure for reality.
  On the other hand, epistemology is generally a theory of knowledge largely 
concerned with what does and does not constitute knowledge in a social reality (Blaikie, 
1993). Bryman and Bell (2007) explains that the meaning or identification of knowledge 
should be within what is acceptable in a particular discipline. There are two epistemological 
positions namely positivism and anti-positivism (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Under 
positivism, principles or methods of natural science are applied to the study of social science 
and hence just as in natural science, the role of research becomes to test theories or further 
develop them (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Generally with the positivist approach, the researcher 
is often independent of the study object and knowledge or conclusions is discovered or drawn 
through observation or measurement of the phenomenon (Krauss, 2005).  On the other hand 
anti-positivism highlights the importance of the researcher in understanding differences 
between humans and social actors and do not emphasise on results generalisation (Saunders 
et al., 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).       
 Suffice to mention that there are other philosophical approaches within which a 
research can be conducted. These include Human nature (deterministic v. voluntarism) which 
deals with relationship between humans and their environment with the former arguing that 
humans have no control over their environment and that environment determines what 
humans should do while the latter presents humans as masters of their destiny who create 
environment in which social world should be understood; Methodology (nomothetic v. 
ideographic) relates to methods used in understanding the social world with nomothetic 
advocating for systematic implementation of research involving rigorous testing of 
hypotheses while ideographic views research as being subjective and that truth or knowledge 
can only be obtained by having researcher imbedded in the research; Radical change which 
prefers new ways of doing things and hence changes and assumptions are made that bring 
about fundamental changes to present order of things; and Regulation where the status quo is 
maintained and reinforced with a set of rules and where possible suggestions of 
improvements are made but within existing structure (See Saunders et al., 2009 for detailed 
discussion).  
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7.2 Research Paradigms 
A research paradigm is an interpretive framework or a basic set of beliefs that guides action 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). The paradigms transcend from the basic ontological and 
epistemological positions and they help classify different research approaches. The key 
paradigms often used in management are positivist (Classical), interpretivist/constructionist 
and realist (contemporary) (Bryman and Bell, 2003).   
7.2.1 Positivist 
According to Remenyi et al (1998, p.32) a positivism involves ‘working with an observable 
social reality and that the end product of such research can be law-like generalisations similar 
to those produced by the physical and natural scientists’. In essence this involves testing of 
hypothesis developed from existing theory hence it is deductive in nature. Positivism assumes 
an external and independent existence of social world which then enables knowledge to be 
obtained through observations which can lead to generalisations.  To obtain the valid 
knowledge, positivism relies on quantitative methods like surveys and experiments and 
statistical analysis (Blaikie, 1993; Saunders et al., 2009; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008).Thus research from a positivist perspective often follow a structured methodology so 
as to enable replication and their emphasis is one quantifiable observations that leads to 
statistical analysis (Gill and Johnson, 2002). In organisation context, the use of positivist 
paradigm assumes that organisational nature and activities can be understood by 
categorisation and scientific measurement of the behaviour of people and systems (Hatch and 
Cunliffe, 2006). 
7.2.2 Interpretivist/Constructivist  
Interpretivists argue that the social world is simply too complicated to be understood within a 
set of rules that lead to generalisations and hence epistemologically they advocate for the 
need of the researcher to understand the differences between humans and social actors. 
Generally the understanding is that humans play a part in the social world as such they 
interpret their social roles in accordance with the meaning given to their roles. This then 
means that from an interpretivist perspective there are multiple realities of the social world 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). In this respect understanding of knowledge is often from one’s 
own interpretation of the realities they are facing based on their experiences hence it is 
inductive or theory building in nature (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006). There is no generalisation 
from this perspective as the emphasis is on what people think or feels, how they communicate 
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and hence often associated with qualitative methods of data collection (Saunders et al., 2009; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
7.2.3 Realist 
According to realism, there is a proposition that reality exists independent of the human 
mind. Realism is in line with positivism to the extent that it assumes a scientific approach to 
the development of knowledge but it is less deterministic than positivism.  It also draws from 
interpretivism in that though it is concerned with the existence of things and how these things 
behave, it also acknowledges that things may just exist without science or observation hence 
the need to pay attention to these things as well (Blaikie, 1993). Thus while realists tore the 
interpretivist position that social reality is pre-interpreted, it also goes along with positivism 
notion that science should be empirically based with clear rationale and objectives rather than 
mere reliance on language or discourse. Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) explain that with realism, 
reality appear in stratified form in which surface events are shaped by underlying events and 
that what is observed is only partial than complete. Bhaskar (1989) explain that research can 
identify what we don’t see through practical and theoretical processes of social sciences. 
Therefore to enrich knowledge acquisition and understanding, realism encourages research to 
be undertaken from multiple perspectives and hence is often seen as inductive or theory 
building. 
7.3 Research Methods 
The choice of research method in a study is informed by the ontological or epistemological 
position taken by the researcher. However, broadly there are two methods of research often 
discussed in literature and these are quantitative and qualitative methods.  Though these two 
methods constitute alternative strategies, it is advisable to view them as complementary with 
quantitative methods able to provide breadth of the study and qualitative providing depth and 
detail (Patton, 2002; Jick, 1979). 
7.3.1 Quantitative Method 
Quantitative methods fall under nomothetic methodology where the key objective is to search 
measurable observations to understand things (Creswell, 1998; Hussey and Hussy, 1997). It 
follows a deductive approach and incorporates the practices and norms of natural science 
which treats social reality as an external and an independent object (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
Due to its positivist inclination, findings from quantitative research can be generalised and 
the study can be replicated (May, 2001).However the disadvantage of quantitative method is 
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that overreliance on measurements, instruments and theory may risk making research to be a 
distant apart from everyday reality (Bryman and Bell, 2003).  
7.3.2 Qualitative Method 
The qualitative approach emphasises words rather than numbers or quantification in the 
collection and analysis of data. It aligns with both constructionist/interpretivist paradigm and 
ideaographic methodology. In this perspective, there is greater role for human nature which is 
assumed to have an urge to volunteer and is totally autonomous and free willed which then 
makes them able to create the environment rather than the environment influencing them 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Its data collection procedures may involve interviews, 
documents and sometimes audio visual (Creswell, 2003). With qualitative method the social 
world is understood or examined through interpretation of that world by participants (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). It is often considered the more suitable method in circumstances where little 
or no meaning can be deduced from numbers alone and is also seen as a method that can 
successfully bring together theory, human interactions, meanings and any relationships that 
may exist. But its critics point to its lack of repricability and results generalisation ability as 
its weakness (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Others also point to its active involvement of human 
actors as weak point that makes it lack objectivity (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). 
7.4 Approach to the Current Study 
This study whose aim is to investigate the extent and determinants of voluntary GHG 
disclosure studies by FTSE350 companies in UK will mainly adopt a positivist position. In 
this case knowledge is seen as main objective to arrive at social world reality of the GHG 
voluntary disclosure.  Literature has been used to inform the study and it is set out to test 
existing theory through a set of hypotheses and hence will rely on quantitative data. The 
research will mainly rely on regression analysis and due to the nature of the data set panel 
regression analysis will be employed. The study is also interested in understanding whether 
the knowledge as informed by theory is perceived as such in practice so as to enrich the 
understanding of the phenomenon behind voluntary disclosure in general. In this respect, it is 
considered to be deductive in nature. Suffice to mention that in voluntary disclosure and 
GHG voluntary disclosure in particular, the deductive-hypothesis approach has been used 
widely (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Rankin et al., 2011; Peters and Romi, 2012 etc.).  
7.5 Data Collection Sources 
Data sources are generally categorised into two namely primary data and secondary data.  
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7.5.1 Secondary Data 
This refers to readily available data but one that is published for other reasons other than the 
research problem at hand. According to Saunders et al. (2009), secondary data can be 
gathered through different sources including books, companies’ annual reports, media 
sources, government publications etc. Researchers note that the main advantage of secondary 
data is that it is cost effective and saves time and that sometimes its nature may permit 
longitudinal analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2003). However some of the limitations of secondary 
data include lack of control over data quality, lack of familiarity with data and sometimes the 
dataset might be incomplete (Saunders et al., 2009). To a large extent this study will rely on 
secondary data particularly annual reports.  
7.5.2 Primary data 
Primary data involves the generation of new data set specifically for the research problem at 
hand. Primary data can originate from respondents, analogous situations or experimentations 
(Kinnear and Taylor, 1991). In the present study, discussion is limited to respondents’ 
category due to its suitability for the study. According to Kinnear and Taylor (1991, p.135), 
where a ‘study require data about respondents’ attitudes, perceptions, motivations, 
knowledge, and intended behaviour, asking people questions is essential’. In this respect the 
techniques used include observation, interviews, and questionnaires etc.  Due to the intention 
of triangulating the results, the study will also use primary data particularly collected through 
survey questionnaire. 
7.5.2.1 Survey Questionnaire 
Questionnaires can be administered in four ways namely through postal, on-line, face to face 
interview and telephone interview (Robson, 2002; Forza, 2002). Questionnaires often follow 
a structured approach and questions are constructed after a careful review of theory and prior 
evidence and hence are characterised as being positivist. When questionnaires are of 
positivist in nature then questions are closed in nature whereas in cases where questions are 
open then they are considered to lean towards the ant positivist approach (Collis and Hussey, 
2003). Where questionnaires are administered through postal as opposed to face to face 
interviews the anonymity is increased and the interviewer effect is eliminated thereby making 
it more convenient for the respondents.  However its limitation is lack of control by the 
researcher over completion process which may lead to low response rates (Bryman and Bell, 
2003).  Those administered through email are likely to yield high response rates and are of 
low cost in nature but they are limited to the on-line population (Kent and Lee, 1999). In this 
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study a postal questionnaire was used due to the nature of the target sample. Please refer to 
section 7.10 on how the survey was constructed and administered.  
7.6 Triangulation 
Triangulation involves combination of methodologies in the same study (Denzin, 1978). 
According to Bryman and Bell (2003) triangulation enables the researcher to address 
different angles of the issue at hand and increases the probability of the research achieving 
high degree of validity and credibility while overcoming single method limitations. 
Triangulation can take different forms namely data triangulation, observer triangulation, 
methodological triangulation and theory triangulation (Robson, 2002). In this study, data 
triangulation and theory triangulation is used to compare and contrast theory based findings 
and the perception of GHG emissions information preparers. Data triangulation entails the 
use of more than one method of data collection whereas theory triangulation involves use of 
multiple theories or perspectives (Robson, 2002). Nonetheless critics of triangulation point to 
the fact that it is difficult to replicate results since personal perceptions are involved 
(Lamnek, 1993).  
7.7 Population and Sample 
In order to test the hypothesis and meet the research objectives, the study made use of annual 
reports, stand-alone environment or sustainability reports over a four year period i.e. 2008-
2011 drawn from a sample of FTSE350 companies. The FTSE 350 is chosen largely due to 
two reasons namely; it is considered broader enough to cover a wide range of industries and 
that it comprises big companies which may set pace in as far as GHG reporting is concerned. 
Thus the focus of large companies is in line with prior studies on GHG reporting (see 
Freedman and Jaggi 2005) and Prado-Lorenzo et al 2009) who argued that large companies 
are more likely required to, be reporting to regulatory agencies and that they could be more 
concerned with pollution disclosures than small or medium sized companies. The use of large 
companies is also in line with theory (e.g. stakeholder theory) which suggests that large 
companies are bound to disclose more information to serve diverse needs of stakeholders. In 
addition, according to Brammer and Pavelin (2006), the use of large companies drawn from a 
diverse range of industries permits a comprehensive review of the disclosures and reasonable 
generalizability of the results.         
 The period 2008-2012 is chosen because a number of significant milestones were laid 
by the UK government in the fight against global warming. The Climate Change Act 2008 
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was enacted followed by the issuance of DEFRA (2009) on the voluntary measurement and 
reporting guidelines for GHGs. Besides, the government through DEFRA conducted a study 
aiming at understanding the impact of GHG reporting on GHG emission control and found 
that there is an indirect link GHG reporting and GHG emissions control hence there are plans 
to make GHG reporting mandatory by 2013. Arguably through these initiatives, issues 
pertaining to GHGs reporting have had increased awareness which is paramount in 
incentivising the companies to report voluntarily. More importantly in this study, the issuance 
of DEFRA (2009) is considered potentially significant in influencing corporate GHG 
disclosures. Since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the issuance of the IPCC 
report (2009) and other high profile climate change summits like the Copenhagen (2009), the 
public awareness of the dangers of climate change has been increasing forcing nations to take 
decisive steps to slow the pace of global warming. A number of private initiated GHG 
reporting guidelines have been issued over the years to help companies measure and report 
GHG emissions and the issuance of DEFRA (2009) is more complementary to these. 
Therefore investigating the disclosure trends at the chosen period when the interest in the 
topic was high on the agenda of both business and political leaders would help demonstrate 
whether such a rise in interest has been translated into meaningful action by the corporate 
world. Besides, the choice of longitudinal data will help explain whether these initiatives had 
an impact on the GHG disclosures.        
 The study of a UK based sample will help track the impact of the efforts and 
initiatives introduced by the government is helping firms report GHG emissions. Cognisance 
of the fact that GHG reporting initiatives have been championed by various regulators and 
private institutions worldwide, the choice of FTSE350 companies will help the study have a 
sizeable number of companies with multiple listings, which suggests a sample of firms 
meeting similar disclosure pressures which may be crucial when considering results 
generalizability.           
 The selection of the sample starts with getting a list of FTSE 350 companies available 
on London Stock Exchange website on 10 October 2011. The final sample was chosen based 
on the following criteria. Financial sector firms, including banks, insurance companies, 
investment trusts, unit trusts and real estate companies, are excluded from the sample because 
they are subject to different disclosure and statutory requirements that may significantly 
affect their accounting policies, disclosure decisions and corporate governance structures 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). The total number of financial firms excluded was 93. In 
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addition, firms with unpublished annual reports and/or missing data on DataStream and 
elsewhere (e.g. as a result of deletions caused by subsequent mergers and acquisitions) are 
deleted to assure comparability of the results. Other reasons for exclusion include a company 
not being listed for the entirety of the study period and where a company is a subsidiary of 
another company already represented in the sample. A total of 42 firms were excluded using 
these criteria. The final sample came to 215 firms which over four years translates to 860 
firm years drawn from a total of 9 diverse industries. Find below tables 4 and 5 summarising 
the outcome of the final sample and the industrial representation in the sample. 
Table 4 – Sample from FTSE350 
FTSE350 UK Listed Companies Number of companies 
Total Firms at start 350 
Financial Firms excluded 93 
Other Firms excluded (due to insufficient data, mergers etc.) 42 
Final Sample 215 
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Table 5 – Sample companies by industry sector 
Sector Number of Companies Sector % of Sample 
Oil & Gas 17 8% 
Basic Materials  26 12% 
Industrials 61 28% 
Consumer Goods 24 11% 
Health Care 7 3% 
Consumer Services 52 24% 
Telecommunications 6 3% 
Utilities 8 4% 
Technology 14 7% 
Total 215 100 
 
As per table 5 above, the majority of the firms in the sample were categorised as Industrials 
(28%) seconded by Consumer Services (24%).   
7.8 GHG Disclosure Measurement Instrument 
In order to achieve objectives one and two, the study involved the construction of a disclosure 
index based on the various available guidelines on GHG measurement and reporting. 
Construction of the GHG disclosure index entails that the study follow the general principles 
of content analysis which is a widely used technique in disclosure studies (Freedman and 
Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al 2009; Clarkson et al 2008; Stanny and Ely 2008). Content 
analysis is used in both quantitative and qualitative studies as a way of measuring the 
volumes of disclosure with the intention of drawing inferences or meanings about those 
disclosures (Gray et al 1995a; Krippendorff, 1980; Unerman, 2003). Krippendorf (1980, 
p.21) defined content analysis as ‘a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data according to their context’. This aligns with the definition of Holsti 
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(1969) who referred to content analysis as the research technique for making valid inferences 
through objective and systematic observation of the characteristics of the message. Silverman 
(1993) considered content analysis as the analysis of texts and documents. Content analysis 
involves codifying and categorising texts according to their groups based on predefined 
criteria or standard (Wolfe, 1991). Thus the availability of a standard/criteria means that one 
advantage of content analysis is that the outcome is replicable, reliable, systematic and above 
all, objective (Krippendorff, 1980). In addition, Wolfe (1991) observed that content analysis 
has several advantages to the researcher among which is the ability to provide opportunity to 
analyse documents produced on regular basis at different times on a longitudinal basis and 
that it allows the researcher to work directly with core human and organisational behaviour 
communication.         
 Bryan and Bell (2007) explained that by being systematic, content analysis procedures 
supress the level of bias and ensures results reliability.Content analysis is conducted in 
different stages. Weber (1994) identified a series of stages that a content analysis should go 
through as follows: Identify questions to be investigated; Determine the sampling units; 
Determine and define the content categories; Determine the recording units; Determine the 
coding mode; Test coding on sample of texts; Assess reliability and validity. Going through 
each of these stages enable the researcher to address important elements of the research 
notably which documents to be used in the analysis; what kind of information/items to look 
for and how to look for the same i.e. coding.  Determining the recording units and coding 
mode are considered fundamental to the reliability and validity of the results.  
7.8.1 Determining the Recording Units 
In determining the units, selection of the sample unit and the components of the texts/words 
to be analysed is considered important (Krippendorff, 1980). Krippendorff (1980: 57) defines 
sampling units as “those parts of observed reality or of the stream of source language 
expressions that are regarded independent of each other”. In order to address research 
objective one and two, the sampling unit in this study is primarily the annual reports and if 
available the sustainability report. This is in line with a stream of current literature focusing 
on GHG disclosures which have used a wide range of sources including annual reports, 
sustainability reports and website information in analysing the GHG disclosures (see 
Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Rankin et al., 2011). Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) argued that the 
use of multiple sources help overcome the limitations of prior studies that depended on single 
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source and that it is recognition of the fact that corporations are increasingly relying on a 
number of communication channels to relay their important information.   
7.8.1.1 Annual Report  
Considerable amount of research have relied on the annual report as a sampling unit (Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Patten 1991; Oliviera et al. 
2006; Unerman, 2003; Berthelot and Robert, 2012). A number of reasons are cited in 
disclosure literature regarding the annual report being an essential sampling unit. Gray et al. 
(1995b) explained that the annual report is generally considered to be an official and legal 
document in which organisations attempt to reconstruct their image. In most cases the annual 
report is used as a platform for revealing organisation information to its stakeholders (Adams 
et al., 1998; Botosan, 1997) and more importantly others like (Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; 
Wiseman, 1982; Owen, 2008) report that annual reports were increasingly being used as the 
main communication platform for companies’ social and environmental disclosures. The 
regular pattern in which annual reports are produced also makes them a reliable source of 
information. In all, prior disclosure studies have argued that annual reports are credible and 
consistent when compared to other forms of communication (Neu et al., 1998; Tilt, 1994), 
accessible and widely distributed (Campbell, 2000), and formal and statutory (Buhr, 1998).
 The use of the annual report as part of the sampling unit in this study is on the 
understanding that climate change being an important topical element affecting various 
segments of a company’s operations is likely to be a prominent feature of elements reported 
in the annual report. Aerts and Cormier (2009) argued that for firms whose intention is to 
signal good environmental behaviour then there is no other place other than the annual report. 
Thus the annual report, being the most comprehensive document covering the overall 
performance of a firm, could be deemed incomplete if such important information as climate 
change and GHG gases emissions are not afforded commentary or coverage in separate 
segments of the annual report or within other existing segments like the risk aspects of the 
business.  The other basis for choosing the annual report is that the Companies Act 2006 
requires companies to report environmental information (including GHG information) as part 
of KPIs reported in annual report. Besides, companies’ information pertaining to risks in a 
broader sense of which climate change and GHGs could be part of, are expected to be 
disclosed within the annual report (ICAEW, 2002). More importantly, most studies on GHG 
disclosures have considered the annual report as one important sampling element (Berthelot 
and Robert, 2012; Rankin et al 2011). 
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7.8.1.2 Sustainability Reports 
While the use of annual report as a sampling unit is widely accepted, others argue that 
exclusive focus on annual reports alone may mean incomplete or partial understanding of the 
reporting behaviour of companies (Sen et al., 2011). Holland and Foo (2003) argued that the 
sole focus annual report may lead to wrong conclusions because in recent times, 
organisations produce a separate sustainability report which may be interpreted as a signal on 
their part that environmental/sustainability reporting is deemed important just like as other 
parts of financial reporting. Unerman (2000) warned that the sole reliance of annual reports 
as a medium of disclosures risk underestimating the volumes of disclosures companies 
engage in. Indeed there has been recognition of the growing importance of other forms of 
communication channels like internet and stand-alone sustainability reports (Sen et al., 2011) 
as such researchers have also been turning their attention to these. Sustainability studies and 
in particular those exclusively focussing on GHG disclosures have in addition to annual 
reports used sustainability reports, and website information (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; 
Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). Other disclosure studies have also used stand-alone reports to 
assess the level of disclosures (Ho and Taylor, 2007; Harte and Owen, 1991). While it is 
appreciated that focussing on annual reports is a risky option which may lead to incomplete 
picture of the disclosures, a review of disclosures in all possible avenues is deemed 
impossible due to resource constraints (Unerman, 2000). Therefore in this study, only the 
sustainability/environmental reports will be used to complement the disclosures in the annual 
reports. 
7.8.2 Text of analysis in sampling Unit – Disclosure Index 
Content analysis demands a clear outline of the subject matter under investigation. 
Gray et al. (1995b) advises that an objective criterion is one which can be confirmed by an 
independent person doing a similar exercise. A systematic criterion is one which involves a 
comprehensive set of rules defining what is and is not GHG disclosures in the sampling units 
chosen.  In this study, company GHG emissions disclosures are assessed using a disclosure 
index or check list following prior studies (Clarkson et al., 2008; Stanny and Ely, 2008; 
Rankin et al., 2011; Berthelot and Robert, 2012). Generally the disclosure index is considered 
to be the main means of evaluating information disclosures in both public and private 
companies (Bonson and Escobar, 2006). Here, an index is constructed based on GHG 
disclosure requirements stipulated in various reporting frameworks in particular GHG 
protocol, DEFRA (2009), ISO 14064 etc. (See appendix 5 which outlines the checklist 
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items).            
 The checklist was drawn as follows: Prior literature was extensively studied to 
understand the basis of their disclosure instruments vis-a-vie their suitability to the current 
study; All GHG measurement and reporting frameworks applicable in the UK were reviewed 
outlining their differences and similarities with a view of documenting items deemed 
essential (loosely determined by the frequency/common appearance in various disclosure 
guidelines) in the disclosure of GHG information. While reviewing the disclosure 
frameworks it was discovered that some disclosure items were very particular to certain 
organisation and could only be disclosed if an organisation deemed them necessary in a 
particular period. These items include information about linking executive compensation to 
environmental performance, Co2 emissions from combustion of Biomass; purchased or 
developed GHG emission reduction and removal enhancements; and a description of 
applicable GHG program requirements. Since it is very unlikely that all organisations can 
engage in transaction that will require disclosures in these categories then a decision was 
made to drop these items from the checklist. In addition, after a pilot study which comprised 
76 companies of the studied sample, it was noticed these items were hardly disclosed. Such 
absence may indicate their lack of importance as such these items were also dropped. In 
addition to assessing the index against prior studies and existing GHG disclosure guidelines, 
the validity and suitability of the research index was reviewed and confirmed by three 
independent persons in the UK two of which are experienced academics and one a PhD 
student with considerable experience in Accounting and Finance. The final tally on total 
items in the disclosure was 60 Categorised into two namely qualitative (34) and quantitative 
(26). This checklist is comparatively broader and comprehensive than previous studies like 
Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) who had a checklist of 19 items only and other prior studies that 
have only used one reporting framework since it pools together all the important elements 
required in the disclosure of GHG information. The disclosure items used in this study are in 
appendix 5.          
 After construction of the disclosure index, the next stage was quantification of 
constituent components of the index. Evidence from prior literature indicates two ways in 
which disclosure item quantification can be done i.e. through weighted approach (see Buzby, 
1975; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Rankin et al., 2011) or un-weighted approach (Prado-
Lorenzo et al., 2009; Wallace and Naser, 1995). The weighted approach involves assigning 
different weights/numbers to the items on the disclosure checklist based on the understanding 
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that each item can have different meaning and importance to stakeholders whereas the un-
weighted approach uses the dichotomous procedure in which an item is scored 1 if it is 
disclosed or 0 otherwise assuming that every item is important to the users of the annual 
reports. Both approaches have inherent limitations in estimating the level of disclosures and 
are thus criticised the former for being prone to subjectivity and the latter for being naïve in 
assuming all items have equal relevance in decision usefulness (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Where subjectivity is involved like in weighted approach then reliability and comparison of 
results is difficult and questionable. Both approaches have been used in studies pertaining to 
GHG disclosures. In particular Freedman and Jaggi (2005) used both approaches in their 
study and found consistent results while Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) only used the un-
weighted index and found results that were in consistent with those of Freedman and Jaggi 
(2005). Therefore considering that the use of both weighted and un-weighted indices seem to 
yield similar results, this study has adopted the un-weighted index approach. Hence the total 
number of scores a company can get is equal to the total number of items on the disclosure 
checklist. 
7.8.3 Disclosure Scoring Rules and Process 
After determining and defining the content categories through the development of the GHG 
disclosure index, the next critical stage is to decide how to capture and identify information 
themes from the disclosure sources. This takes two forms namely coding which is identifying 
information or items from the annual reports/sustainability reports and then measuring 
decisions which aims at assigning meaning to the coded themes (Campbell et al., 2006). To 
ensure a credible coding system that can facilitate replicability of results, Gray et al. (1995b) 
advises the use of well-established decision rules. Thus decision rules help to clarify which 
items should be coded or scored under which category in the designed disclosure instrument. 
Since the study of GHG disclosures is relatively new, there are no established rules regarding 
the coding process of information. Prior studies (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Freedman and 
Jaggi, 2005; Rankin et al., 2011, Choi et al., 2013) relied on the procedures done in other 
studies focussing on environmental disclosures and the specifications within the source of 
their research disclosure instrument. In this study, the requirements of various GHG reporting 
frameworks are complemented by the decision rules on environmental disclosures developed 
by the UK Centre of Social and Environmental Research (CSEAR). Other studies like that of 
Aburaya (2012) investigating the quantity and quality of environmental disclosures in the UK 
also used the CSEAR rules. Below is a list of the rules used: 
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 Any disclosure item that discusses or mentions the GHGs or climate change and/or 
their relationship to the organization is recorded. 
 All disclosures must be explicitly stated, they cannot be implied meanings. 
 All disclosure items are to be recorded regardless of their format, including financial 
statements, narratives, and non-narratives such as pictures, photographs, charts and 
graphical representations. 
 Disclosures having more than one possible classification or containing two or more 
information items are classified under each relevant category or item. 
 Repeated disclosures are not recorded, disclosures containing the same information 
item are considered only once.  
Having designed the disclosure index and the coding rules, the next step was to decide on 
the unit of analysis to be used in this study. Disclosure literature provides two options in 
which information content can be assessed namely using a measuring unit and a scoring 
system (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). Measuring units include counting words (Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996) sentences (Wiseman, 1982; Milne and Alder, 1999) or page proportions 
(Campbell, 2000). The scoring system was adopted in this study since it was felt mere 
counting of words or sentences may not be ideal in a highly sensitive area of climate change 
related disclosures in which companies are rumoured to ‘greenwash’ rather than disclosing 
substantial steps or actual reductions in GHG emissions (Stanny, 2011; Hrasky, 2012).  
Besides, others like McMurtrie (2005) discredit the use of sentences or words to determine 
disclosure arguing that one risks leaving important powerful messages relayed through other 
means like tables, photographs, graphs etc. It is expected that scoring procedure that takes 
into account a thorough review of disclosed information with a view of determining whether 
required items are disclosed will not only demonstrate the quantity but also the quality 
characteristics of the disclosures which is essential in decision making. This is important in 
climate change and GHG disclosures because the primary reason companies are encouraged 
to disclose is because it is believed that through measurement and disclosure they can keep 
control of their emissions. In this respect it is therefore appropriate that any instrument used 
to measure GHG disclosures is able to bring out issues that can enable interested parties 
understand the substance of the disclosures rather than sheer volumes through words and 
sentences. This is in line with prior studies on GHG disclosures like Freedman and Jaggi 
(2005) who considered both the requirements & consequences of Kyoto protocol and the 
181 
 
issues relating to shareholder environmental needs when designing the scoring instrument.
 Before the scoring process commenced, another important element considered was 
the determination of the volume of disclosures to constitute an item on the disclosure 
checklist. Disclosure literature recommends two options. One is the use of binary variable, 
which takes the form of 1 if it is reported or otherwise 0 (Cooke, 1989) while the other 
estimates a score ranging from 1 to 0 or any other ranges deemed necessary. The latter option 
is not widely used and others like Giner (1997) have criticised it for being prone to 
subjectivity. The studies focussing on GHG disclosures have used either option. Freedman 
and Jaggi (2005) while using a weighted disclosure index also used an estimated score of 
disclosed information based on what they called ‘our perception of their (information 
content/items) contribution to the evaluation of a firm’s global warming performance’ while 
Rankin et al. (2011) also weighted the volumes of the disclosures on a scale of 1to5 to reflect 
the relative importance placed on the item by their source i.e. ISO 14064. Thus according to 
Rankin et al (2011), where the ISO 14064 required an explanation behind a disclosure item 
then scoring weights of between 1 to 5 were assigned to assess the quality of the explanation. 
However the study by Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) used the binary variable of either 1 or 0 
depending on whether the item is disclosed or not arguing that subjectivity presented a major 
challenge for the other option and that their study which also considered internet reports or 
website information was better suited for binary variable option. This study focusses on the 
availability of the disclosures in line with what is required in various reporting guidelines as 
such it does not place any importance on any kind of disclosure. Therefore in line with Prado-
Lorenzo et al. (2009) and other disclosure studies (Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Hossain, 
2000), the study adopts the binary variable disclosure option. Besides there is no any 
particular basis to support that certain items of disclosure under climate change or GHGs are 
more important than others and moreover Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) add that using an 
equal- weight (or un-weighted) scoring system permits an analysis to be independent of the 
perceptions of a particular user group which is a key consideration in differential weighted 
index studies (Firth, 1979).         
 Based on the coding rules and procedures outlined above, the annual and 
sustainability reports of the sampled companies covering a four year period i.e. 2008-2011 
were downloaded and carefully analysed/scanned in order to judge the suitability of the 
disclosures to the disclosure checklist items. In the annual reports, particular attention was 
paid to the narrative sections of the reports where the majority of other disclosures are made. 
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In sustainability reports, emphasis was placed on sections relating to environmental 
information where GHGs are presented in most reports. Disclosure index forms were used to 
record the scores emanating from the review of the reports. Recording was done by ticking 
the disclosure items on the checklist based on the reviewed information and any additional 
information deemed important but cannot be accommodated within the categories of the 
disclosure items was written at the bottom of the relevant disclosure score sheet for further 
consideration during analysis. Thereafter the contents of the disclosure scoring sheets were 
transferred to an excel sheet for further data manipulation and analysis.   
 As mentioned, the maximum score a company can get is 60 which is the total number 
of items on the disclosure checklist. The total score for a company is derived by summing all 
the scores attained as per score sheet. Subtotals per category i.e. qualitative and quantitative 
are also obtained by summing up all the scores in that particular category. Below is 
estimation on how the total scores are derived expressed as a proportion of the total 
maximum possible scores: 
               
∑             
            
  
Where: 
CGHGD  is the Corporate GHG disclosure quantity  
Quantityi = 1 if item i is disclosed; 0 if item i is not disclosed, 
Max Dis Quantity Score is the maximum applicable disclosure quantity score, 
n = number of items disclosed 
 
7.8.4 Reliability and Validity of Coding Process and Disclosure Index 
Reliability and validity of the coding process as well as the disclosure index was given due 
consideration in this research to ensure accuracy and consistency of results. Coding and 
measurement reliability is considered essential in having research outcomes that can be 
reproduced by another researcher (Webber, 1990).  
7.8.4.1 Reliability assessment 
Reliability relates to the repeatability of results if the same instrument is used several times 
(Carmines and Zeller, 1991). This suggest that when a company is scored high using the 
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same instrument then repeated trial should yield the same results and this should be the same 
for the sample of population being tested. Hassan and Marston (2010) identified three forms 
of reliability assessment namely test-retest, inter-coder reliability and internal consistency.  
Test-retest concerns the stability of results obtained from a measurement instrument over 
time and in studies involving a disclosure index this could be obtained by the same coder 
coding same content more than once (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Hussainey et al (2003), 
using Nudist software coded all annual reports at one point and after a short period coded 
them again using the same software and had the scores matched thereby proving the stability 
of the measurement instrument. Critics consider it uneconomical in terms of time, money and 
effort more especially when the scoring is done manually (Hassan and Marston, 2010).
 Inter-coder reliability is another form of reliability test which involves more than one 
researcher coding the same sample using the same instrument and obtaining same results 
(Milne and Alder, 1999). Comparison of results is done through correlation computations and 
the higher the correlation coefficient the higher the reliability of the index. Despite high 
correlation coefficients, discrepancies between coders are expected to be resolved if the 
instrument is to be deemed reliable.  Tauringana (1997) used the expertise of three academics 
that were professionally qualified in the accounting field. Disclosure scores obtained after 
retest of a sample of 10 companies by the researcher was compared to perceived disclosure 
scores by the three academics. Then thereafter companies were ranked according to 
disclosure score from the index and the disclosure rating number assigned by the academics. 
Correlation coefficients were high and the instrument was deemed suitable. The other form of 
inter-coder testing was performed by Rankin et al. (2011) in their study of the determinants of 
GHG disclosures in Australia. In this study, all members of the research team used the same 
index to score the reports and compared results. Discrepancies were resolved and the 
appropriate use of the instrument was agreed upon. Before the revised instrument was finally 
used, a further sample of ten companies were scored by one member of the team and checked 
by another to ensure that the index had been applied as initially agreed.  The consensus was 
then reached. Other studies like Linsley and Shrives (2006) have tested inter-coder reliability 
using Scott’s pi. Scott’s pi calculates the level of inter-coder reliability after eliminating 
agreement due to chance. Generally a pie of 0.8 is considered very good while one below 0.5 
is deemed poor.  Others calculate Krippendorff’s alpha and/or Cohen’s kappa (Beattie et al., 
2004).            
 Internal consistency is the third form of reliability testing and it is an indicator of how 
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well the different items in an index measure the same issue (Litwin, 1995 cited Hassan and 
Marston, 2010). Cronbach’s alpha (which estimates the expected correlation between one test 
and a hypothetical alternative form containing the same number of items) is the popular 
measure of internal consistency.  It takes a value from one to zero and an alpha of 0.8 for 
widely used scales is deemed suitable.  Hassan et al (2009) used Cronbach’s alpha to measure 
the internal consistency of the items in their disclosure index.    
 Notwithstanding the fact that the measures of reliability are well known and applied 
in other studies, they are rarely performed or reported in accounting disclosure studies. 
Hassan and Marston (2010) reviewed a total of 50 cases and discovered that only 16 had 
performed and reported the procedures undertaken to ensure index reliability. In a total of 15 
quantitative GHG disclosure studies reviewed in this study none reported reliability test. In 
this study a comprehensive reliability test has been performed based on essentials as outlined 
by Krippendorf (1980).         
 In fact, Krippendorf (1980; 2004) identified three areas of consideration for reliability 
to be achieved and these are stability, reproducibility and accuracy. Stability relates more to 
the coder being able in achieving consistent scores/results over time. Stability of the coder 
can be attained through proper training of the process i.e. by testing a pilot sample or by 
having clear stipulated rules (Milne and Alder, 1999; Krippendorff, 2004). In this study both 
options were adopted. First, though the researcher is considered partly experienced in 
disclosure index studies having done two similar studies in the immediate past, a pilot study 
was undertaken to determine the suitability of the coding process and the disclosure 
instrument. The pilot study sample comprised 76 company annual and sustainability reports 
over a four year period. Before the disclosure index was used in the pilot study, it was 
intensely scrutinised by two independent academics with extensive experience in disclosure 
studies. Once the instrument was agreed upon, the initial coding and scoring process was 
done by the researcher and one PhD student in Accounting and Finance on 10 randomly 
selected companies over a four year period in the pilot study. The use of another independent 
coder was to attain reproducibility of the results. The two outcomes had minor variations as 
such the researcher proceeded to scoring the reports of the companies in the pilot study after 
resolving the same. During the scoring process it was discovered that certain elements 
included on the disclosure index notably on future estimates of risks arising from climate 
change were not disclosed by any of the companies in the sample particularly due to the fact 
that these were not common in most disclosure guidelines. These are considered inapplicable 
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items which according to prior studies (Chau and Gray, 2002) could be dropped to avoid 
penalising companies for non- disclosure unnecessarily. Accordingly these were dropped and 
the index was refined accordingly. Consistency and fairness in the scoring process was also 
improved by sticking to the rules adopted in this study. The outcome of the pilot study 
confirmed the suitability of the coding process and the GHG disclosure index.  
 After the pilot study but before the commencement of the actual study, the disclosure 
index was again reviewed by the researcher and three independent academics, two of which 
were not involved in the pilot phase. Like in the pilot phase the academics had considerable 
experience in disclosure related studies. This review was meant to capture any important item 
or drop an unnecessary item which might have been overlooked during the pilot phase. The 
use of a panel of experts like academics is widely used in literature as a way of validating the 
content of the disclosure checklist (Sekaran, 2003). This resulted in minor review of the 
instrument particularly focusing on the wording and positioning of some items. Similarly, an 
initial coding and scoring of 10 companies over a four year period was done by five persons 
including the researcher. The other four comprised three independent academics and one PhD 
student in the Accounting and Finance stream. The results showed no significant differences 
in the scores. The minor differences centred on scoring the identification of the contact 
person responsible for climate change/GHG reporting within an institution in that among 
those that disclosed, they either identified a person or a committee. Discussions were held to 
discuss and reconcile the differences.  
Find below a table 6 summarising the correlation matrix results of the five independent 
researcher.  
  Table 6: Correlation among Independent Disclosure index scorers 
    
    
  
    1 2 3 4 5 
1 Current Study Researcher 1.000 
   
  
2 PhD Student 0.9766*** 1.000 
  
  
3 Experienced Academic A 0.9689*** 0.9159*** 1.000 
 
  
4 Experienced Academic B 0.9615*** 0.9691*** 0.9375*** 1.000   
5 Experienced Academic C 0.9540*** 0.9431*** 0.9201*** 0.9045*** 1.000 
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The correlation matrix from the table indicates that the scores were strongly correlated 
and significant at p<0.000. Literature based evidence (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Botosan, 
1997) suggests wide reliance on correlation matrix in assessing the validity of disclosure 
scores. In this respect therefore the coding process and index scores are deemed reliable. In 
addition, a series of statistical reliability tests like the Scot’s Pi, Cohen’s Kappa and the 
Krippendorff alpha was calculated to further enhance reliability of the content analysis 
results. The Krippendorff alpha obtained was 79% and this compares favourably to the 
minimum agreement threshold of 70% (Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004). Both the 
Cohen Kappa and the Scot’s Pi were close to 80.0% and hence deemed satisfactory. 
Table 7 – Statistical reliability tests of the disclosure scores       
  
      
  
  
% 
agree 
Scot's 
Pi 
Cohen's 
Kappa 
Krippendorff's 
Alpha 
No. 
agreed 
No. 
Disagree 
 No. 
Firms 
Pilot vs Final 
sample 80.30% 0.795 0.796 0.797 61 15 76 
 
In calculating the Krippendorff alpha, Scot’s Pi and Cohen’s Kappa, firm scores as 
per pilot study scores are compared to the same firm scores in the final sample. Overall an 
agreement of 80% suggests sufficient reliability in the method followed.  
7.8.4.2 Validity assessment 
Validity concerns the ability of the instrument/index/process to measure the concept in the 
manner intended by the researcher (Sekaran, 2003). Validity takes three forms: criterion 
validity, content validity and construct validity. Content validity is about how 
adequate/representative are the items included in a measure and is generally assessed through 
seeking subjective judgement from both experts and non-experts in the field. Since it involves 
subjective judgements, some consider it inadequate to measure validity (Hassan and Marston, 
2010). Rajab (2009) sought the expertise of two experienced researchers in risk disclosure 
when validating his scores. Similarly, Aburaya (2012) also used three academics with 
expertise in audit to help in refining the disclosure checklist. In this study the expertise of 
three independent academics has been sought and used.     
 Construct validity focusses on the extent to which a measure is consistent with 
theoretical expectations and literature based evidence. Hassan and Marston (2010, 30) noted 
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that ‘testing for the construct validity of a measure of disclosure requires a pattern of 
consistent findings with prior studies’.  In this study a comprehensive review of GHG and 
other general disclosure studies has been done leading to identification of Certain corporate 
characteristics (size, profitability leverage etc. ), governance characteristics (Board size, 
Environmental committee etc.) as being behind the voluntary disclosures.  
 Criterion validity measures how well an instrument compares against another 
instrument of predictor and is determined through correlation coefficients (Litwin, 1995). 
Generally high correlation coefficients are considered a signal for instrument suitability. 
Criterion validity concerns both concurrent validity (correlation between a measure and the 
criterion at the same time) and predictive validity (correlation between a future criterion and 
the relevant measure). Botosan (1997) used the AIMR scores, number of wall street journal 
articles about a firm and the number of analysts following the firm to compute correlations 
with her self-constructed index as a way of determining criterion validity.  However as 
Hassan and Marston (2010) observed, criterion validity is difficult to be tested in most social 
science studies since most measures represent theoretical constructs of which there is no 
generally accepted criteria to compare. In this study focussing on GHG disclosures which is 
fairly recent and highly divisive in terms of the scientific background, it was noted that there 
was no known available criteria that could suit the sample to enable the researcher carry out a 
criterion validity test as such it was not done.     
 After ensuring both the reliability of coding through the test sample by five 
researchers and the validation of the instrument, the researcher proceeded to code and scores 
all reports by himself to ensure consistency. The annual and sustainability reports scored 
during the pilot phase were also scored again together with other companies. This was 
carefully done by adhering to the set decision rules. Despite the rigorous process undertaken 
in this study, recognition is made that the use of content analysis in general is far from perfect 
as it is still prone to subjectivity. The use of independent experts and decision rules is meant 
to limit the level of subjectivity.  
7.9 Statistical Tests Performed to ensure Appropriateness of Data 
When testing hypotheses about a population using multiple models then it is advisable that 
the random sample should satisfy four assumptions which are as follows: the observations are 
independent; there should be a linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables; Homoscedasticity i.e. for each of the independent variables, there must be a normal 
distribution of values of the dependent variable and; the distributions should have one 
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variance (Norusis 2004). He further suggested usage of non-parametric tests if any of these 
assumptions are violated.        
 Generally researchers agree that the larger the sample the high the probability of 
satisfying these assumptions. As a rule of thumb a sample of more than 30 observations is 
assumed to satisfy these assumptions (Field, 2009). The sample of 215 firms which over a 
four year period translates to 860 firm observations is considered sufficient to enable a robust 
empirical analysis. The sample compares favourably to prior studies on GHG disclosures like 
Freedman and Jaggi (2005), 120 firms; Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009), 101 firms and Rankin et 
al. (2011) 80 firms.          
 A number of parametric statistical tests including descriptive statistics, Pearson and 
Spearman correlations and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression have been 
undertaken using STATA 12. Data have been panelled according to time i.e. four years. In 
addition, a pooled OLS regression was performed to provide a comparative basis to the panel 
regression since it deals with data as one unit with same distribution error unlike panel data 
regression. Three confidence intervals of 99%, 95% and 90% are used in the analysis.  
7.9.1 Econometric Modelling  
Due to the nature of the data the study employed two techniques. The first level of modelling 
used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The initial model used was estimated as 
below:  
GHG DISx = β0 + β1BOARDSIZEx + β2NEDRATIOx + β3Envirocommx + β4Auditcomx 
β5DOWNx + β6OWCONx + β7 Sizex + β8Profitabilityx + β9Gearingx + β10 Liquidityx  + β11 
Industryx  +ε 
Where; 
GHG DISx  is the Greenhouse Gas emissions disclosure index obtained after analysing 
  company x’s annual report; 
BOARDSIZEx is the number of people making up the board committee of company x. 
NEDRATIOx is company x’s ratio of Non-Executive Directors on the board; 
Envirocommx represents presence of board environmental committee and is a dummy i.e. 1 if 
  available or otherwise 0. 
Auditcomx  is the size of Audit committee in relation to total number of board members of
  company x. 
DOWNx  is proportion of shares held by directors of the company; 
OWCONx is proportion of shareholding by shareholders with 3 per cent or more;  
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Sizex   is company x’s variable related to corporate size; 
Profitabilityx is company x’s variable representing profitability e.g. profit after tax; 
Gearingx  is company x’s gearing/leverage, established as the ratio between total debt 
  and stockholders’ equity; 
Liquidityx is company x’s variable representing liquidity e.g. Current assets divided by
   current liabilities; 
Β1-11  Coefficients 
ε  Residual 
β0  Constant 
The second level stage involved panel data techniques. In a panel data set like our 
sample, panel data techniques help to capture variation across different agents in space and 
changes emerging over time (Inchausti 1997; Baltagi 1995). More importantly it enables the 
researcher to take into account omitted or unobserved variables. Unobserved heterogeneity 
existing among companies can also be controlled in panel data sets. The static model of panel 
data is as follows: 
The equation for the fixed effects model becomes: 
Yit = β1Xit + αi + uit    [equ.1] 
Where 
– αi (i=1….n) is the unknown intercept for each entity (n entity-specific intercepts). 
– Yit is the dependent variable (DV) where i = entity and t = time. 
– Xit represents one independent variable (IV), 
– β1 is the coefficient for that IV, 
– uit is the error term 
 
The rationale for this model is that if unobserved variable does not change over time 
then any changes in the dependent variable could be due to influences other than these fixed 
characteristics [39].  
The fixed effects model can also be estimated using binary variables. So the equation 
for the fixed effects model becomes: 
Yit = β0 + β1X 1,it +…+ βkXk,it + γ2E2 +…+ γnEn + uit  [equ.2] 
Where 
–Yit is the dependent variable (DV) where i = entity and t = time. 
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–Xk,it represents independent variables (IV), 
–β k is the coefficient for the IVs, 
–uit is the error term 
–En is the entity n. Since they are binary (dummies) you have n-1 entities included in the 
model. 
–γ2 is the coefficient for the binary repressors (entities) 
 
Both eq.1 and eq.2 are similar 
 
When both time and firm effects are included in the same model i.e. double fixed 
effects then the model is estimated as follows: 
Yit = β0 + β1X1,it +…+ βkXk,it + γ2E2 +…+ γnEn + δ2T2 +…+ δtTt + uit  [equ.3] 
Where 
– Yit is the dependent variable (DV) where i = entity and t = time. 
– X1, represents independent variables (IV), 
–βk is the coefficient for the IVs, 
– uit is the error term 
–En is the entity n. Since they are binary (dummies) you have n-1 entities included in 
the model. 
– γ2 is the coefficient for the binary regressors (entities) . 
–Tt is time as binary variable (dummy), so we have t-1 time periods. 
–δt is the coefficient for the binary time regressors. 
 
The equations are based on the work of Stock and Watson (2003). 
 
In using panel data, the researcher must decide whether to employ a fixed or random 
effects model. The random effects model assumes a single common intercept term, and that 
the intercepts for individual companies vary from this common intercept in a random manner; 
the fixed effects model assumes different intercept for individual companies (Stock and 
Watson, 2003). In order to choose the appropriate model, both the fixed effects and random 
effects estimators were used to estimate the co-efficients in the model below. Then the 
Hausman test was performed, which rejected the null hypothesis that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors. This finding meant that the random and the 
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fixed effects were significantly different, and that the fixed effects was the more consistent 
and efficient one to use. The following model was tested; 
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where i is 1,……215, t is 1(2008), 2(2009), 3(2010), 4 (2011), xbs is board size, xned is 
proportion of Non-Executive Directors, x
aud
 is Audit Committee, x
evc
 is Board Environmental 
Committee, x
ow
 is owcon, x
do
 is down,  x
s
 is logta, x
roa
 is profitability, x
gea
 is gearing, x
liq
 is 
liquidity, x
ind
 is industry and αt are intercept variables that vary from year to year. They 
capture the difference between years assuming the individual sample members are 
homogeneous. This model helps to analyse whether the change in GHG disclosures was 
largely due to the company characteristics identified or events happening in between time 
periods (introduction of Climate Change Act 2008) or both influenced the disclosures. 
 
7.9.2 Outliers 
The study carefully scrutinised the existence of outliers so as to ensure that the regression is 
not significantly influenced by any such cases. The regression was run twice with the first 
preliminary trial aiming at identifying outliers. The basis of judgement was the work of Field 
(2009) who suggested that outliers could be identified by monitoring among other things 
Standardised Residuals, Values of Cook’s distance and Mahalanobis distance. Thus 
according to Field (2009), any cases with standardised residual values of above 3 could be an 
outlier and again any case whose Cook’s Distance value is above 1 is deemed to have 
influence on the regression. Similarly a crude check on Mahalanobis distance value of above 
15 for smaller samples indicates presence of outliers. In this study no case was found to be in 
violation of these conditions hence the results can be seen in light of no bias by any 
influential case. 
7.9.3 Multi-Collinearity 
 Multicollinearity in independent/predictor variables has been reviewed by analysing 
correlation factors and Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) in line with the work of Weisberg 
(1985). Preliminary results indicated that the highest simple correlation between independent 
variables was 0.47 between Audit committee and Board size. Bryman and Cramer (1997) and 
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Field (2009) suggest that simple correlation between independent variables should not be 
considered harmful unless they exceed 0.8. or 0.90. In terms of VIF, Field (2009) highlights 
that VIF greater than 10 should be considered a signal of harmful multicollinearity. 
Alternatively Bowerman and O’Connell (1990) explain that an average VIF which is 
significantly greater than 1 may suggest that the regression is biased. The average VIF is 2.57 
when the nine industry dummies are included while their exclusion sees the VIF mean 
dropping to 1.4. This suggests inclusion of the industry dummies may potentially result in 
multicollinearity problems. In view of this the final regression model will ensure 
multicollinearity is controlled for by use of robust and also transforming the industry 
variables into one dummy. 
7.10 Survey Questionnaire  
The third objective of the study i.e. investigating the motivation/determinants behind 
voluntary GHG disclosure in practice was addressed through a survey questionnaire. Survey 
questionnaire method is widely used in social sciences for understanding the characteristics 
and interrelations of sociological and psychological variables (Roberts, 1999). In fact Hussey 
and Hussey (1997) argued that individual perspectives or opinion on a particular subject 
matter can either be examined by a questionnaire or interview. In this respect the study seeks 
to establish GHG information preparers’ opinions about their motivation in disclosing such 
information voluntarily hence the survey method is considered appropriate. Information 
collected in this manner is meant to enhance the understanding of GHG disclosures derived 
from secondary data inferences. This is therefore an explanatory survey which is meant to 
test/confirm hypotheses derived from theory (May, 2001).     
 The use of the survey method has a number of advantages. It can enable the 
researcher to collect information from very large proportion of the population which offers a 
firm basis for generalizability (Graham et al., 2005). However there are some criticisms 
against the use of surveys one of which is that questions/responses can be taken out of 
context and data derived from the same cannot justifiably be used to identify causal 
relationships. In addition, others also argue that in cases where the motivation of the 
researcher in using the survey methodology is not clear, then outcome is shrouded in 
certainty (de Vaus, 2002). In this study the focus is not on establishing causal relationships 
and the researcher has used a carefully designed and administered form of questionnaire 
based on prior literature to limit bias emanating from unclear motives.     
 The survey method generally involves a questionnaire. According to Collis & Hussey 
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(2003, p. 173), a questionnaire is “a list of carefully structured questions, chosen after 
considerable testing with a view to eliciting reliable responses from chosen sample. The aim is to find 
out what a selected group of participants do, think or feel”.      
 A survey questionnaire is considered to be a more flexible tool than other methods 
and that if administered properly, it gives a degree of freedom to the respondents. A 
questionnaire can be administered through a number of ways ranging from telephone 
interview survey, internet survey, face-to-face interview survey, and to self-completion 
mailed survey (Thomas, 2004). Each of the option has strengths and weaknesses. For instance 
while the self-completion mailed survey is appropriate for large dispersed groups and cost 
effective, it is synonymous with a low response rate (Forza, 2002). In contrast, the face to 
face interview often results in high response rates but is not appropriate and cost effective 
with large dispersed groups. The internet is generally considered medium to high in terms of 
response rates and quality for any size while the telephone is generally high in similar 
categories (Forza, 2002; Thomas, 2004). In this study, a self-completion mail survey was 
adopted on the basis of cost effectiveness (time and money) and the convenience it gives on 
the part of the respondent (Forza, 2002). Target participants in this survey (finance directors) 
are often busy as such it was felt that a survey questionnaire which they can complete at their 
convenience would suit them well. Survey questionnaires were sent through both postage and 
emails beginning with the former and then the latter during reminders of those who did not 
respond in the first instance.        
 Nonetheless it is appreciated that by adopting the mail option, the study was prone to 
many of the weaknesses associated with this method. In particular mail surveys are prone to 
low response or inappropriate responses in cases where the respondents have misunderstood 
the true meaning of the statements (Thomas, 2004). Low response rates are major concern 
when considering results generalizability while inappropriate responses may lead to 
inappropriate responses. As mentioned, a reminder was sent to help improve the response 
rates but again the questionnaires were accompanied by a separate letter explaining the 
importance of the study and the need for the company participation (see appendix I) Both in 
the letter and the introduction part of the actual questionnaire, participants were assured of 
anonymity and confidentiality to increase the chances of responses. A pre-stamped self-
addressed envelope and a writing pen were provided with each questionnaire to facilitate its 
return. More importantly, participants were advised to write down their contact addresses if 
they wanted a copy of the final report. Thomas (2004) considers such an offer as an incentive 
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that can boost response rates. The issue of getting inappropriate responses due to lack of 
clarity in survey questions was addressed through a proper design of the questionnaire. 
7.10.1 Questionnaire Design  
Questionnaire designing is one of the critical elements that can directly impact on the validity 
and reliability of data collected and response rates (Saunders et al., 2009). Thus question 
validity determines the accuracy of data collected whereas the question reliability ensures that 
data is collected consistently (Forza, 2002). In all what is important is that questions are 
understood by respondents in the way intended by researcher and that answers are understood 
by researcher in the way intended by respondent (Foddy, 1994). In order to achieve question 
validity and reliability and attract high response rates, researchers are advised to ensure that a 
number of issues like appearance, layout, length and even the colour of the paper used are 
properly addressed (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). Although guidelines for designing a 
questionnaire may differ depending on authors (see Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002 who 
suggested 12 guidelines and Thomas, 2004 who had 11), they all agree that a well-designed 
questionnaire should be visually attractive, look short, look interesting, be easy to complete, 
and be easy to return. In this study, while following guidelines available, extensive review of 
GHG and other disclosure literature was carried out so as to ensure that questions were 
determined by data to be collected.       
 Since GHG disclosure studies are few and none according to the researcher has 
attempted to collect primary data, the list of determinants included in the question used here 
was adapted from both environmental and GHG disclosure studies (Freedman and Jaggi, 
2005; Berthelot and Robert, 2012; Rankin et al., 2011; Stanny and Ely, 2008; Wilmhurst and 
Frost 2000; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2004 etc.). The use of adapted or adopted 
questions (in this case, determinants) is highly recommended in literature where the 
researcher intends to replicate or compare findings with another study (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Since to a larger extent this study intends to confirm whether generally accepted theoretical 
explanations for voluntary disclosures are the same in practice then the choice of adapted 
questions or list of determinants is considered appropriate.    
 Despite this however, caution was exercised when choosing the work to be adapted by 
considering the quality of the work to be adapted and the nature of questions. Generally there 
are two forms in which questions can be constructed namely open questions (which allow 
respondents to give answers in their own way and closed questions (which provide a number 
of alternative answers from which a respondent is instructed to choose). Either has its own 
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weaknesses and strengths but the closed questions is deemed quicker and easier to respond 
which may increase response rates (de Vaus, 2002; Dillman, 2000). Some of its weaknesses 
include lack of response variety and depth and the possibility of investigator bias which 
emerge when the researcher includes the only response options he likes (Kumar, 1999; de 
Vaus, 2002). The adapted work in this study used closed questions on a Likert-style rating 
scale. The main question was pre-coded on a scale of 1 to 5. The limitations of the closed 
questions have been minimised by the fact that the researcher uses response options which 
have been tried and tested before. Enough space was also provided to those who wanted to 
provide further explanations to their responses which aimed at enhancing the variety of the 
responses (see appendix I for a copy of the questionnaire). 
7.10.2 Questionnaire Content 
The questionnaire started with a few instructions advising participants of their confidentiality 
and the manner in which the responses are to be given. Thereafter it was structured into two 
different sections as follows: 
Section A: Background information. This had three sub-sections. The first sub-section asked 
respondents to provide personal background, such as gender, age, name of their company and 
position they hold, length of period on position and their qualification. The second sub-
section requested information on Chief Executive Officer (age, time in role and their 
qualifications). The last sub-section sought company background relating to revenue/turnover 
and number of employees. The company and CEO characteristics were selected based on 
prior literature on disclosures which suggests that differences in some governance and 
corporate characteristics might influence disclosure. 
Section B: Determinants of voluntary GHG disclosures 
This section contained question 1 which had 12 items of various corporate governance and 
general company characteristics and participants were asked the extent to which they agreed 
or disagreed that the characteristics influence voluntary disclosures.  
7.10.3 Pilot Testing 
It is advisable that before the questionnaire is used in the research it should be pilot tested. 
The pilot testing is meant to refine the questionnaire so that respondents will have no 
problems answering and that problems in data recording are minimised (Saunders et al., 
2003; Forza 2002). Pilot testing also help improve the reliability and validity of the 
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questionnaire (Roberts, 1999). Thomas (2004) argued that feedback obtained from pilot 
testing however small it may be is extremely important in shaping the final outcome of the 
questionnaire. To ensure content validity, Mitchell (1996) advises that at the very initial 
stages of the questionnaire development, it should be assessed by experts in the subject 
matter who will comment on both the suitability of the questionnaire to bring required data 
and structure. In fact according to Zikmund (2000), two pre-testing procedures can be done 
namely screening the questionnaire with other experts and having a trial run. In this research 
both procedures were followed including a further third procedure. To begin with, the 
researcher developed the questionnaire and it was initially reviewed by the two project 
supervisors. After incorporating their initial comments the draft questionnaire was also 
scrutinised by two independent academics with considerable experience in survey designs 
from another department and a group of three PhD students. Comments from these people 
mainly centred on instrument clarity and design and the time taken to complete the same. 
Once their comments were incorporated, the draft version was again reviewed by the two 
supervisors involved in the project to ensure that subject specific contents have not been 
marginalised with advice obtained from the others. Modifications arising from this process 
related to the wording and scaling of certain questions which resulted in the questionnaire 
being shortened, complex questions deleted and sensitive questions reworded. After this 
process the questionnaire was used in the pilot study which involved 76 companies. No major 
modifications were made after the pilot study (see appendix I for the final version used in the 
study). 
7.10.4 Ethical consideration 
Research involving human participants is required to have ethical clearance as way of 
ensuring the confidentiality and well-being of the respondents (Converse and Presser, 1986). 
In this study, all ethical clearance procedures of the university were followed. An ethical 
clearance form was completed at the beginning of the project and was submitted for approval 
by the University’s Research Ethics committee. Overall, the research was classified as of no 
risk to the participants. In the letter accompanying the questionnaires, participants were also 
assured of their confidentiality. 
7.10.5 Questionnaire administration and sample 
The questionnaire was addressed to the finance directors of 215firms and stamped-addressed 
envelopes were enclosed for their replies. Non-respondents were followed up three times, 
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through email, telephone and a second letter containing a copy of the questionnaire. This 
resulted in 69 firms responding; 62 responses were usable (i.e., all questions were 
completed), representing a 28.8 per cent response rate, which compared favourably with 
previous studies. For example, Beattie and Smith (2012) reported a response rate of 9.3 per 
cent, while Verma and Dewe (2004) had a 5.8 per cent response rate. Though our response 
rate compares favourably to prior studies, we reckon that it is still a low response rate. Baruch 
(1999) argued that in itself a response rate is meaningless rather the necessity and difficulty 
lies in explaining the low response rates. In this study, the low response rate could be 
attributed to a number of reasons. Our target group, the listed companies’ directors are among 
the difficult group to target in a survey questionnaire due to their busy schedules. Ten of the 
companies that declined to take part sent emails through their directors’ personal assistants 
stating that their finance directors were too busy to participate in our survey. 
 Beattie and Smith (2012) noted that due to the nature of this group, a response rate of 
between 10 and 20 per cent is considered appropriate or sufficient. The other reason could be 
the subject matter which is considered topical and sensitive. While non-response rates might 
be peculiar to certain firm characteristics i.e. size and industry, Verma and Dewe (2004) 
argue that it may also mean that those who did not respond did not value the subject matter 
and that in itself is a finding. Therefore, in our case, we consider the low response rate to be a 
reflection of the sensitivity surrounding climate change.       
 The responding firms and a sample of those that did not respond were subjected to 
non-response bias tests to determine the representativeness of respondents. In particular, a 
two-tailed t-test was performed using the mean turnover and number of employees of the 
initial sample and the responding firms; the outcome was not statistically significant. In line 
with prior studies (Darnall et al., 2010), we also ensured that our survey was free from a 
social-desirability bias. This was achieved by ensuring that all respondents were informed of 
their anonymity and was unaware that their responses would be compared with actual 
disclosure in annual and sustainability reports. One characteristic of social-desirability bias is 
that there is less variability in responses, which could affect the statistical significance of the 
results.            
 The analysis was in large part based on descriptive statistics. In addition, apart from 
ranking based on mean, based on prior literature (Graham et al., 2005; Nauman and Giel, 
1995), a modified top two box and bottom two box scores were used to explore the pattern of 
the responses. Using this approach, the original five point scale in the surveys was collapsed 
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to increase the clarity of the data for reporting purposes.  Scales were collapsed into “bottom 
two box” and “top two box” scores.  Bottom two box scores represented the percentage of 
respondents who selected responses that were considered negative i.e. disagree or strongly 
disagree, taken from the bottom portion of the five point scale.  The top two scores represent 
the percentage of respondents who selected responses that were considered positive i.e. agree 
or strongly agree. The middle column which referred to neutrality formed its own group. 
Thereafter the summarized results were subjected to a t-test between the mean score of each 
item and its neutral score. 
7.11 Summary 
This chapter discussed the research philosophy/paradigms, methods, sample and data as well 
as analysis techniques to be used to achieve the set objective of the study. The chapter has 
also discussed at length the reliability and validity assessment applied to the disclosure 
instrument used in this study both during construction and its use. Steps undertaken to design 
and implement the survey questionnaire have also been explained.    
 The study is positivist and deductive in nature but it also has limited inclination 
towards interpretivist through its use of survey questionnaire. The research will largely use 
secondary quantitative data and test a series of hypotheses in order to achieve the first two 
objectives. This data set will be extracted from annual, sustainability and website reports of a 
sample of FTSE350 companies listed on LSE in the period 2008-2011. The analysis uses a 
research index methodology in which the extent of disclosure is measured by comparing the 
disclosed information with a set of required disclosures by the various reporting frameworks. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Results and Analysis 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter explores the nature and relationships of variables in our models as specified in 
the preceding chapter and goes further to report and analyse the results of our modelling in a 
bid to address the research objectives. It begins by discussing the descriptive statistics of the 
variables in the model so as to ensure that statistical assumptions underpinned by our final 
model are adhered to. Thereafter results of regression analysis used to test the hypotheses as 
presented in Chapter 6 are presented and discussed. Results are discussed in light of both 
empirical and theoretical framework literature as presented in Chapters 2 and 5 respectively. 
The final part discusses the results of the secondary data modelling in light of the insights 
obtained from the survey questionnaire responses.   
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8.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Tables 8 and 9 present detailed descriptive statistics for the disclosures.  
 
Table 8: Consolidated Disclosure Scores for all industries 
        
 
Disclosure item 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
    
Absolute 
Freq. 
Relative 
(%) 
Absolute 
Freq. 
Relative 
(%) 
Absolute 
Freq. 
Relative 
(%) 
Absolute 
Freq. 
Relative 
(%) 
 
Qualitative Disclosures 
        1 Institutional background 206 95% 213 99% 213 99% 213 99% 
2 Period covered by the report 203 94% 212 98% 212 98% 212 98% 
3 Statement on company position on climate change and related responsibilities 190 88% 200 93% 203 94% 202 94% 
4 Corporate governance on climate change 165 76% 182 84% 187 87% 191 88% 
5 Climate change opportunities and company strategies 110 51% 126 58% 138 64% 137 63% 
6 Climate change impact on business operations including supply chains 80 37% 95 44% 105 49% 111 51% 
7 Identification of regulatory risks as a result of climate change 40 19% 53 25% 61 28% 67 31% 
8 Identification of all other risks as a result of climate change 54 25% 64 30% 78 36% 92 43% 
9 Actions/measures taken to reduce/mitigate climate change impact 183 85% 203 94% 206 95% 207 96% 
10 Adaptation strategies to climate change effects 77 36% 96 44% 101 47% 103 48% 
           11 Regulated Schemes to which a firm belongs 31 14% 58 27% 73 34% 79 37% 
12 Reporting Guidelines used in GHG reporting 84 39% 112 52% 132 61% 135 63% 
13 An assurance statement on disclosed information 35 16% 45 21% 53 25% 58 27% 
14 Contact or responsible person for GHG reporting 113 52% 138 64% 155 72% 163 75% 
           15 Organisation boundary and consolidation approach 65 30% 77 36% 89 41% 98 45% 
16 Base Year 77 36% 92 43% 111 51% 126 58% 
17 Explanation for a change in base year 40 19% 51 24% 59 27% 69 32% 
18 GHGs covered including those not required by Kyoto protocol 44 20% 58 27% 62 29% 68 31% 
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19 Sources and sinks used/excluded 51 24% 64 30% 74 34% 88 41% 
20 Conversion factors used/methodology used to measure or calculate emissions 40 19% 58 27% 70 32% 83 38% 
21 
Explanation for any changes to methodology or conversion factors previously 
used 31 14% 43 20% 59 27% 64 30% 
22 A list of facilities included in the inventory for GHG emissions 16 7% 23 11% 29 13% 37 17% 
23 
Information on the quality of the inventory e.g. causes and magnitude of 
uncertainties in estimates 2 1% 5 2% 9 4% 13 6% 
24 Information on any GHG sequestration 18 8% 29 13% 37 17% 37 17% 
25 Disclosure of the supplier and the name of the purchased green tariff 8 4% 8 4% 11 5% 13 6% 
           
26 
Explanations for changes in performance of total GHG emissions in Co2 
metric tonnes 100 46% 126 58% 141 65% 154 71% 
27 Explanation of any country excluded if global total is reported 75 35% 93 43% 106 49% 111 51% 
           28 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 1 emissions 35 16% 49 23% 60 28% 69 32% 
29 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions from scope 1 22 10% 34 16% 50 23% 55 25% 
30 Explanation for the reason of any exclusion from scope 1 18 8% 29 13% 40 19% 45 21% 
           31 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 2 emissions 34 16% 48 22% 58 27% 65 30% 
32 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions from scope 2 22 10% 34 16% 49 23% 53 25% 
33 Explanation for the reason of any exclusion from scope 2 18 8% 29 13% 39 18% 44 20% 
           34 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 3 emissions 23 11% 35 16% 48 22% 59 27% 
           
           
 
Quantitative Disclosures 
        35 Total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 117 54% 138 64% 154 71% 170 79% 
36 Comparative data of Total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 103 48% 125 58% 142 66% 159 74% 
37 Future estimates of total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 10 5% 13 6% 13 6% 15 7% 
38 GHG emission by business unit/type/country 75 35% 90 42% 108 50% 123 57% 
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39 GHG removals quantified in tonnes of Co2e 23 11% 29 13% 36 17% 43 20% 
           40 Scope 1 emissions 28 13% 41 19% 54 25% 63 29% 
41 Comparative data on scope 1 emissions 20 9% 32 15% 47 22% 56 26% 
42 Future  estimates of scope 1 emissions 1 0% 2 1% 3 1% 3 1% 
           43 Scope 2 emissions  28 13% 40 19% 53 25% 62 29% 
44 Comparative data on scope 2 emissions 20 9% 32 15% 46 21% 54 25% 
45 Future  estimates of scope 2 emissions 1 0% 2 1% 3 1% 5 2% 
           46 Scope 3 emissions 18 8% 29 13% 39 18% 50 23% 
47 Comparative data on scope 3 emissions 14 6% 24 11% 36 17% 45 21% 
48 Future estimates of scope 3 emissions 1 0% 2 1% 3 1% 3 1% 
           49 Emission of direct Co2 reported separately from scopes 60 28% 68 31% 81 38% 95 44% 
50 Emission not covered by Kyoto and reported separately from scopes 57 26% 67 31% 83 38% 95 44% 
51 
Emission attributable to own generation of electricity/heat/steam sold or 
transferred to another organ. 81 38% 93 43% 103 48% 116 54% 
52 
Emission attributable to own generation of electricity/heat/steam purchased for 
resale to end users 36 17% 48 22% 54 25% 63 29% 
53 For purchased green tariff state the reduction in tonnes of Co2e per year 7 3% 13 6% 16 7% 17 8% 
54 Additional carbon saving associated with the tariff as a percentage 2 1% 6 3% 6 3% 5 2% 
           55 Quantitative data estimates of the regulatory risks as a result of climate change 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 
56 Quantitative data estimates of all other risks as a result of climate change 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 2 1% 
           
57 
GHG emission performance measurement against internal and external 
benchmarks including ratios 57 26% 79 37% 89 41% 105 49% 
58 GHG emission targets set and achieved 82 38% 108 50% 122 56% 139 64% 
59 GHG emission offsets information 26 12% 33 15% 39 18% 48 22% 
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60 Comparative information on targets set and achieved 75 35% 99 46% 115 53% 133 62% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Table 9: Summary GHG disclosure scores per year  
         2008 2009 2010 2011  
Type of disclosure 
All 
firms 
Score 
Max. 
poss. 
score* 
% of 
score 
All 
firms 
Score 
Max. 
poss. 
score* 
% of 
score 
All 
firms 
score 
Max. 
poss. 
score* 
% of 
score 
All 
firms 
score 
Max. 
poss. 
score* 
% of 
score 
 
Qualitative disclosures 2310 7344 31% 2782 7344 38% 3118 7344 42% 3321 7344 45%  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
Quantitative disclosures 944 5616 17% 1215 5616 22% 1447 5616 26% 1670 5616 30%  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
Total GHG disclosure 
score 3254 12960 25% 3997 12960 31% 4565 12960 35% 4991 12960 39%  
* Maximum possible score is derived by multiplying total number of firms and total disclosure items available per category 
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There was a wide variety of information in the disclosures ranging from policy statements on 
climate change, governance structures relating to climate change, risk assessment arising 
from climate change, reporting frameworks adopted, quantitative emission data, to future 
plans and targets on carbon emissions. A review of the disclosures indicates that overall, 
more qualitative disclosures are made compared to quantitative ones. For instance in 2008, 
the firms disclosed about 31 per cent of all available qualitative disclosures against just 18 
per cent of the available quantitative disclosures (See table 9 above and chart 1 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However over the period, firms have progressively increased their level of 
quantitative disclosures reporting about 31 per cent of the items in 2011 against 18 per cent in 
2008. On the qualitative disclosures, the most frequently reported item was the 
actions/measures taken to reduce/mitigate climate change impact with almost 95 per cent of 
the firms reporting it in 2011 (See table 9 above). This could suggest desire on the part of the 
companies to shift focus of their target audience from their actual impact on climate change 
to intended actions on the same. The least disclosed qualitative information in all the years 
was the disclosure of supplier and the name of the purchased green tariff.  The number of 
firms disclosing their reporting framework guidelines has also increased from 49 per cent in 
2008 to 71 per cent in 2011. Over the same period, there has been a marginal increase in the 
number of firms obtaining assurance services on their GHG emissions reporting from 25 per 
cent in 2008 to 38 per cent in 2011. This could imply unwillingness on the part of the 
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companies to dedicate resources in improving the quality of their GHG reporting. As argued 
by Hrasky (2012) companies have now resorted to mere symbolism in terms of carbon 
disclosure hence the need for government intervention to improve the quality of disclosures. 
 The frequently reported quantitative item in all the years under review was the total 
GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes which were reported by 84 per cent of the firms in 
2011. However over the same period, evidence indicates low levels of GHG quantitative 
disclosure per scopes. For instance only 13 per cent of the firms reported their GHG 
emissions per scope 1 in 2008 and by 2011 the figure had risen to only 29 per cent. A similar 
finding was recorded by Dragomir (2012) who noted that a sample of companies comprising 
BP, Total, Shell, BG Group and Eni had largely disclosed GHG emissions in total rather than 
in scopes. Overall there was lack of quantitative information relating to future estimates of 
emissions and quantifiable estimates of regulatory risks arising from climate change. This 
reflects the findings of Haque and Deegan (2010) who noted Australian companies GHG 
emissions disclosures had provided only limited insights into climate change risks and 
opportunities. This could arguably imply failure on the part of the firms to fully integrate 
GHG reporting to the other parts of the business. Kolk et al. (2008) reported that in general, 
their sampled firms GHG disclosures had demonstrated no link among strategy, performance 
and GHG emissions which meant lack of GHG integration into mainstream business 
strategies. Stanny (2011) interpreted the lack of firm efforts to improve quality of disclosures 
as confirmation of legitimacy theory arguing that in this respect firms only disclose the 
minimum possible just to meet minimum stakeholder needs.  
Evidently there was also a remarkable increase in the disclosures from 2008 to 2011. Refer to 
chart 2 below. 
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From chart 2, the extent of disclosure has moved from just 19% in 2008 to about 30% 
in 2011. Overall, the volume of disclosures increased from a mean disclosure score of 15.0 in 
2008 to a mean disclosure score of 23.3 in 2011. While there is marginal increase between 
2010 and 2011 (about 8.1 per cent), a significant increase is recorded between 2008 and 2009 
and 2009 and 2010 (about 16.1 per cent and 16.5 per cent respectively). In addition it was 
noted that the disclosure pattern of firms in 2011 was to a large extent a repetition of what 
was disclosed in 2010.This could partly imply a positive response to the introduction of both 
the Climate Change Act in 2008 and DEFRA guidelines on measurement and reporting in 
2009. About 14.5 per cent of the sampled companies disclosed the use of DEFRA (2009) in 
compiling and reporting their information.    
8.1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Dependent and Independent variables 
The pooled data (2008–2011) descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent 
variables are presented in table 10 below.  
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics - Aggregate 2008-2011     
  
     
  
Variables Mean Std dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Disclosures - All 0.3245 0.2236 0 0.8833 0.6606 2.3707 
Qualitative Disclosure 0.392 0.2352 0.000 1.000 0.638 2.437 
Quantitative Disclosure 0.2358 0.225 0.000 1.000 0.665 2.367 
Board Size 9.1891 2.6182 4 31 1.4347 8.7902 
Non-Executive Director 0.6515 0.1118 0.2857 0.9285 -0.2629 2.7461 
Environ. Committee 0.0729 0.26 0.000 1.000 3.285 11.793 
Audit Committee 0.4038 0.0972 0 0.8 0.2594 3.3753 
Ownership Concentra. 40.2311 17.8013 3.55 91.47 0.1689 2.4692 
Director Ownership 5.4573 13.2501 0 85.37282 2.9868 11.5893 
Size 7.6374 1.5519 3.6888 12.752 0.6425 3.4497 
Profitability 8.9738 11.5724 -84.6 120.388 1.1108 30.3831 
Gearing 1.5219 12.5195 0.0208 246.2383 15.4521 255.2499 
Liquidity 1.6165 1.7014 0.1858 27.2794 7.4616 90.2653 
 
These results indicate that companies’ GHG scores ranged from 0 to 88.3 per cent, but that 
overall the mean disclosure for the four years is 32.45 per cent, an indication that the extent 
of GHG disclosures by FTSE 350 companies is still low. When categorised into two as 
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qualitative and quantitative, the disclosures have a similar pattern to overall disclosures with 
each having a mean of 0.39 and 0.23 respectively.       
 The descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables indicate that the 
mean board size was about nine directors, with a minimum of four and maximum of 31. In 
the same period, the audit committee size has ranged from 2 to 8. The companies had low 
levels of director ownership (as indicated by a mean of 5.46 per cent) and moderate levels of 
ownership concentration (as suggested by the mean of 40.23 per cent over the four-year 
period). In fact director share ownership ranged from 0 to 64.4 per cent in 2008 and this 
remained relatively constant over the period while for ownership concentration, the 
maximum was above 80 per cent over the same period. Refer to table 11 below; 
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics  
2008   2009 
Variables Mean Std dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis   Mean Std dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Disclosures - All 0.252 0.198 0 0.783 0.935 2.988   0.308 0.217 0 0.85 0.743 2.444 
Qualitative Dis    0.314 0.211 0.000 0.941 0.849 2.922   0.378 0.2299 0.000 0.941 0.730 2.494 
Quantitative Dis 0.1711 0.1975 0.000 0.692 1.023 3.069   0.2165 0.2168 0.000 0.731 0.716 2.344 
Board Size 9.251 2.606 5 19 0.829 3.896   9.287 2.966 4 31 2.378 15.717 
Non-Exec. 0.641 0.118 0.285 0.923       -0.319 2.841   0.642 0.113 0.311 0.928 -0.151 2.69 
Environ. Commit. 0.069 0.254 0 1 3.387 12.475   0.069 0.254 0 1 0.254 12.474 
Audit Committee 3.516 0.879 2 7 1.023 4.851   3.516 0.879 2 7 1.02 4.851 
Director Own. 5.782 13.363 0 64.404 2.784 10.145   5.797 14.014 0 85.372 3.087 12.68 
Ownership Conc. 39.878 18.447 3.59 91.47 0.19 2.58   39.862 17.548 3.98 87.82 0.253 2.612 
Size 8645.5 28093.63 40 282401 7.13 61.609   9064.76 29771.94 53.7 292181 6.871 57.171 
Gearing 1.846 16.772 0.02 246.24 14.491 211.63   1.296 9.479 0.025 139.243 14.436 210.5 
Profitability 7.738 14.568 -84.6 84 -1.682 19.888   7.533 9.709 -20.07 78 1.85 15.791 
Liquidity 1.598 2.184 0.297 27.279 8.617 94.536   1.583 1.325 0.228 10.28 3.473 19.003 
2010   2011 
Variables Mean Std dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis   Mean Std dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Disclosure 0.352 0.229 0.016 0.883 0.604 2.238   0.385 0.226 0 0.8833 0.399 2.09 
Qualitative Dis 0.423 0.2368 0.000 0.971 0.591 2.327   0.453 0.2396 0.000 1.000 0.422 2.174 
Quantitative Dis 0.2597 0.2364 0.000 1.000 0.604 2.361   0.2959 0.2293 0.000 0.769 0.346 2.027 
Board Size 9.116 2.443 4 17 0.833 3.424   9.101 2.432 5 17 0.936 3.455 
Non-Exec. 0.651 0.11 0.375 0.909 -0.186 2.549   0.669 0.103 0.375 0.916 -0.303 2.756 
Environ. Commit. 0.078 0.269 0 1 3.129 10.791   0.074 0.262 0 1 3.252 11.58 
Audit Committee 3.613 0.929 2 7 1.186 4.683   3.641 0.91 2 8 1.548 6.41 
Director Own. 5.195 12.936 0 64.434 2.991 11.3   5.054 12.724 0 64.429 3.043 11.67 
Ownership Conc. 39.978 17.385 3.78 85.03 0.159 2.416   41.181 17.909 3.55 84.21 0.075 2.267 
Size 9947.5 33083.2 50.7 322560 6.955 58.275   10718.26 35289.84 51.5 345257 6.967 58.858 
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Gearing 1.412 10.655 0.033 
155.37
5 14.111 203.77   1.532 12.021 0.033 173.997 13.865 198.213 
Profitability 9.927 10.025 -11.41 103 4.134 36.568   10.695 11.09 -16.13 120.388 4.79 46.676 
Liquidity 1.615 1.271 0.185 10.099 2.88 14.642   1.669 1.863 0.215 21.612 6.775 65.909 
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  The firm size (measured by total assets) had a wider range and great variability 
between years. For example, total assets ranged from £40 million to £345,257 million, with a 
mean of £9,594 million and standard deviation of £31,638 million. The majority of the firms 
sampled were highly geared (mean of 1.52). There was great variability with regard to 
profitability. For example, companies in the sample had a return on assets ranging from −84.6 
per cent to 120.4 per cent, with a standard deviation of 11.5724. It is also noticeable that the 
company size, gearing, liquidity and profitability variables have high levels of kurtosis. 
However, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) argued that in large samples, the impact of skewness 
and kurtosis values from normality is suppressed. In this case, therefore, the effect of the non-
normal distribution in the independent variables is unlikely to affect the final outcome. 
Nonetheless the regression model involving all these non-normal variables will be subjected 
to robustness option in Stata 12. Only 7 per cent of the sampled firms had environmental 
committee and for over 4 years this number has hardly changed. 
8.1.2 Correlations 
Table 12 below two shows the correlation between all variables used in the study. 
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  Table 12: Correlation among dependent and independent variables                   
    
             
  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Disclosure - All 1.000 
            
  
2 Qualitative Dis 0.974*** 1.000 
           
  
3 Quantitativ. Dis 0.953*** 0.859*** 1.000 
          
  
4 Board Size 0.386*** 0.381*** 0.360*** 1.000 
         
  
5 Non-Executive. -0.28*** 0.159*** 0.156*** 0.109*** 1.000 
        
  
6 Environ. Comm 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.080** 0.155*** 1.000 
       
  
7 Audit Comm. 0.259*** 0.248*** 0.254*** 0.477*** 0.239*** 0.041 1.000 
      
  
8 Ownership Con -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.24*** 0.018 -0.074** -0.25*** 1.000 
     
  
9 Director Own. -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.021 -0.14*** 0.213*** 1.000 
    
  
10 Size 0.274*** 0.275*** 0.250*** 0.457*** 0.199*** 0.057* 0.202*** -0.15*** -0.09*** 1.000 
   
  
11 Profitability -0.016 -0.013 -0.019 -0.041 0.073** 0.045 0.007 0.041 0.033 0.036 1.000 
  
  
12 Leverage -0.034 -0.037 0.028 -0.039 -0.018 -0.022 -0.042 -0.064* -0.029 -0.015 -0.025 1.000 
 
  
13 Liquidity -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.054 0.01 -0.10*** 0.177*** 0.112*** -0.071** -0.021 -0.015 1.000   
14 Industry -0.042 -0.043 -0.043 0.063* 0.05 0.092*** 0.03 0.033 0.049 0.170*** 0.025 0.092*** 0.218*** 1.000 
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 As expected, GHG disclosure is positively related with size, board size, environmental 
committee, and audit committee.  Non-executive directors, director ownership, ownership 
concentration, gearing, liquidity, profitability and industry are negatively correlated with 
GHG disclosures but it is only profitability, gearing and industry whose relationship is not 
significant. A similar pattern is repeated for both qualitative and quantitative disclosures. 
There were also some significant correlations between independent variables with the highest 
being that of board size and audit committee size at 0.47. However this is considered no 
threat as it falls below the maximum threshold of 0.8 or 0.9 as recommended by Field (2009). 
Although the correlation matrix does not depict a highly significant correlation between the 
independent variables, the variance inflation factors was also analysed. According to Field 
(2009), low values of VIF are expected if the multi-collinearity problem is to be controlled. 
Our mean VIF was 2.57 and the highest VIF was 2.58 for company size. This means then that 
multi-collinearity is not prevalent in the model. To control for hetero-scedasticity in the 
standard errors the option of robust in Stata 12 (Greene, 2008) was used. Thus apart from just 
addressing hetero-scedasticity issues, the robust option deals with other minor concerns 
bordering on failure to meet other assumptions like normality or excessively large residuals, 
or influence from a particular variable. Therefore without altering the point estimates of the 
coefficient as derived from OLS, with the robust option, standard errors adjust for any 
concerns of data abnormality or hetero-scedasticity. 
 
8.2 REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 13 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) panel regression with 
robust standard errors of the governance and firm characteristics on GHG voluntary 
disclosures.  
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Table 13: Model 1 - Disclosure and all variables 
   
GHG Disclosure (DV) Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
   Board Size 0.0062 0.0040 
Non-executive Directors -0.0179 0.0701 
Environmental Committee 0.0565* 0.0303 
Audit Committee -0.0684 0.0814 
Ownership Concentration -0.0011*** 0.0004 
Director Ownership -0.0016*** 0.0005 
Size 0.0666*** 0.0063 
Profitability 0.0006 0.0005 
Gearing -0.0010*** 0.0002 
Liquidity 0.0061 0.0053 
Industrials 0.1327*** 0.0288 
Consumer Services 0.1126*** 0.0317 
Oil & Gas 0.0551 0.0353 
Basic Materials 0.0722** 0.0343 
Consumer Goods 0.0434 0.0306 
Telecommunications 0.0527 0.0556 
Utilities 0.0668 0.0491 
Technology 0.0219 0.0293 
Year 2009 0.0562*** 0.0177 
Year 2010 0.0912*** 0.0183 
Year 2011 0.1184*** 0.0185 
   R-Squared 0.37 
 Adj. R-Squared 0.35   
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10. 
Results indicate a significant positive relationship between GHG voluntary disclosure and 
each of company size (p≤ 0.001), Industrials (p≤ 0.001), Consumer services (p≤ 0.001), basic 
materials (p≤ 0.001) and Environmental committee (p≤ 0.10). A significant negative 
association was obtained between GHG voluntary disclosure and each of ownership 
concentration (p≤ 0.001), director ownership (p≤ 0.001), and gearing (p≤ 0.001). However, 
there was no significant relationship between GHG voluntary disclosure and each of board 
size, non-executive directors, audit committee, profitability, liquidity and other industry 
categories namely oil & gas, consumer goods & services, telecommunications, utilities and 
technology. Only audit committee had a negative non-significant relationship with GHG 
voluntary disclosure while the others were non-significant but positive. The model has an 
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adjusted R Squared of 35.8% implying that almost 35% change in GHG voluntary disclosures 
is explained by the modelled determinants.       
 Beyond assessing the suitability of the financial variables to overall GHG disclosure 
the study extends investigation to see if the suitability of these variables differs depending on 
the nature of GHG information disclosed. In this case the dependent variable is decomposed 
into qualitative and quantitative disclosures. In environment and climate change disclosures 
in particular, prior literature documents evidence of symbolic disclosure or greenwashing or 
simply legitimation disclosures (Hrasky 2012; Westphal and Zajac 2001; Tilcsik 2010).  
Under green washing or what Marquis and Toffel (2012) term ‘attention deflection’ 
disclosures, firms disclose by highlighting certain desirable activities or their intention to do 
something  as a way of avoiding scrutiny in their actual practices. Thus under greenwashing, 
organisational disclosures are awash with positive environmental attributes or initiatives 
while negative ones are concealed.        
 While the debate on extent of environmental disclosure is now gradually moving 
towards disclosure quality (Brammmer and Pavelin, 2008; Clarkson et al 2008; Clarkson et al 
2011; Aburaya, 2012), there is still no generally agreed benchmark as to what constitute 
quality. Despite this however there is growing consensus that though quality is a subjective 
notion, disclosures that include a diverse range of items and are quantified signifies quality 
and a step further on the part of the disclosing firm to inform its target audience (Siddique et 
al 2011; Liu et al 2011; Van der Laan Smith et al 2005; Patten 1995; Beattie et al 2004). In 
fact Van der Laan Smith et al (2004) argued that quantitative disclosures provide more useful 
information to users while Al-Tuwaijri et al (2004) attributed a higher score to quantitative 
items in their environmental disclosure quality.      
 In this study while not focussing on GHG disclosure quality, cognisance is made of 
the fact that some disclosures might be made for greenwashing purposes hence the 
decomposition of the disclosure index into qualitative and quantitative disclosures. This is not 
fully explored in the growing literature on GHG voluntary disclosure. Aggregated measures 
have the tendency to shift attention or mask exactly what is being disclosed hence it is 
possible that firm characteristics might influence different disclosures differently.  Previous 
evidence suggests that analysis of disclosures in different categories provide a comprehensive 
and richer insights into disclosure quantity (Beattie et al 2004) and that this help to profile 
different disclosure strategies employed by firms (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004).   
 When disclosure quantity is categorised into qualitative and quantitative groups, there 
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is a slight change in the way the explanatory variables relate with the dependent variable. 
Under qualitative disclosures, the relationship between GHG voluntary disclosure and 
environmental committee is positive and significant at (p≤ 0.05) and all other explanatory 
factors that were significant with overall disclosure are significant in the same direction. The 
same remain true of non-significant relationships with the exception of non-executive 
directors and telecommunications which take a negative direction as opposed to positive in 
the overall disclosure.  
Table 14: Model 1 - Qualitative and Quantitative Disclosure and all variables 
 
Qualitative Disclosure 
 
Quantitative Disclosure 
Variables Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
      Board Size 0.0049 0.0041 
 
0.0079* 0.0042 
Non-executive Directors -0.0273 0.0730 
 
-0.0057 0.0748 
Environmental Committee 0.0640** 0.0284 
 
0.0467 0.0347 
Audit Committee -0.0940 0.0850 
 
-0.0351 0.0840 
Ownership Concentration -0.0011** 0.0004 
 
-0.001*** 0.0005 
Director Ownership -0.0013*** 0.0005 
 
-0.002*** 0.0005 
Size 0.0730*** 0.0066 
 
0.0584*** 0.0069 
Profitability 0.0007 0.0005 
 
0.0004 0.0005 
Gearing -0.0012*** 0.0002 
 
-0.001*** 0.0003 
Liquidity 0.0067 0.0005 
 
0.0053 0.0054 
Industrials 0.1384*** 0.0283 
 
0.1252*** 0.0325 
Consumer Services 0.1087*** 0.0311 
 
0.1178*** 0.0325 
Oil & Gas 0.0588 0.0370 
 
0.0502 0.0363 
Basic Materials 0.0528 0.0339 
 
0.0977** 0.0378 
Consumer Goods 0.0261 0.0303 
 
0.0659* 0.0352 
Telecommunications -0.0331 0.0414 
 
0.1649** 0.0857 
Utilities 0.0696 0.0491 
 
0.0631 0.0514 
Technology 0.0239 0.0299 
 
0.0195 0.0327 
Year 2009 0.0636*** 0.0187 
 
0.0465** 0.0186 
Year 2010 0.0988*** 0.0189 
 
0.0813*** 0.0196 
Year 2011 0.1242*** 0.0193 
 
0.1108*** 0.0198 
      R-Squared 0.38 
  
0.32 
 Adj. R-Squared 0.36     0.30   
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10. 
    
Under quantitative disclosures, in addition to all explanatory variables significant with overall 
disclosure, voluntary GHG disclosure is positive and significant with each of board size (p≤ 
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0.10), telecommunications (p≤ 0.05), and consumer goods and services (p≤ 0.10). Non-
executive directors’ proportion also has a negative non-significant relationship with voluntary 
GHG quantitative disclosures. Both the qualitative and quantitative models have explanatory 
powers of 36% and 30% respectively.       
 In addition, based on survey of prior literature it is noted that industry variable is 
categorised differently (e.g. Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009 had 11 categories; Rankin et al., 2011 
had 4 industries; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005 had 5). Therefore, the industry variable was 
classified based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and this resulted in 9 
industries after excluding financial industry. However, to overcome some multicollinearity 
problems the industry variable is transformed into one dummy variable and then the 
regression is run again. Cho et al (2012) noted that variations in industry classification might 
affect the outcome hence called for a careful scrutiny as to how industry variables are 
included in models.  The results are summarised in Table 15 below. 
Table 15: Model 2 - Disclosure with one Industry 
Variable 
   
GHG Disclosure (DV) Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
   Board Size 0.0045 0.0039 
Non-executive Directors -0.0618 0.0695 
Environmental Committee 0.0474 0.0299 
Audit Committee -0.1014 0.0795 
Ownership Concentration -0.0010** 0.0004 
Director Ownership -0.0016*** 0.0005 
Size 0.0681*** 0.0061 
Profitability 0.0007 0.0005 
Gearing -0.0007*** 0.0002 
Liquidity 0.0024 0.0055 
Industry -0.0452*** 0.0134 
Year 2009 0.0567*** 0.0177 
Year 2010 0.0920*** 0.0184 
Year 2011 0.1199*** 0.0186 
   R-Squared 0.35 
 Adj. R-Squared 0.34   
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10. 
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When the industry variable is transformed into one dummy variable and the main 
regression model is run again, there is a minor change to the results. The industry dummy 
becomes negative but significant at (p≤ 0.001). Overall this model explains 34% change in 
voluntary GHG disclosures. 
 
8.3 Discussion of Results  
Based on table 15 which has the main model, the R
2 
adjusted
 
is 34 per cent and the model is 
highly significant (F=21.95, p=0.000). The explanatory power of the model is consistent with 
some prior studies (Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) had 38.3 per cent; and Freedman and Jaggi 
(2005) had 32.0 per cent.  The results which indicate that four corporate governance 
mechanisms, board size, proportion of non-executive directors’, audit committee and 
environmental committee are not significantly associated with GHG disclosure means that 
hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4 are rejected. However, the results also indicate that the other 
two corporate governance mechanisms (ownership concentration and director ownership) 
have a significant negative relationship with GHG information disclosure. This suggests that 
hypotheses H5 and H6 in respect of ownership concentration and directors’ share ownership 
are confirmed respectively. Of the firm characteristics, only size and gearing are significant 
(β=.07, p.001; β=.0001, p.001) while profitability and liquidity are not. Thus hypotheses H7 
and H8 are confirmed while hypotheses 9 and 10 are rejected with respect to the firm 
characteristics.          
 The significant negative relationship between both ownership concentration and 
directors’ share ownership and GHG disclosure means that those firms whose ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of a few and directors owning fewer shares disclose more GHG 
information. The result on ownership concentration is both consistent with other prior 
evidence (Matolcsy et al., 2012; Brammer and Pavelin 2008) and contradictory to others 
(Berthelot and Robert, 2012; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Suffice to say that of these studies, it 
is only Berthelot and Robert (2012) that exclusively focused on climate change disclosures 
while the others focused on environmental disclosures in general. Similarly, no prior 
evidence is found testing the relationship between managerial ownership and GHG 
disclosures. With regard to ownership concentration, in addition to managers satisfying these 
shareholders through other means which may lead to fewer disclosures, this result may imply 
a power conflict between shareholder demands and managerial discretion on matters of 
strategic importance. From strategic management literature (David et al., 2007; Ashforth and 
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Gibbs, 1990; Brehm and Brehm, 1981), it is understood that managers are not always 
receptive to external challenge on their authority over matters of corporate policy; when 
faced with such a circumstance as shareholder influence on climate change and GHG 
emissions disclosure policy, they may engage in any mechanism to defend their status quo. 
David et al. (2007) argued that in reaction to such increased pressure managers may simply 
react by diverting resources from such activities and use them to resist external pressure and 
towards retaining their discretion.         
 The non-significant results in respect of board size and non-executive directors 
contradicts the prediction by agency theory which posit these as pillars of transparency and 
accountability that may lead to more voluntary disclosure. For example, the Combined Code 
(2012) encourages boards to have more non-executive directors as a way of enhancing board 
independence and improving its monitoring efficiency in a bid to reduce managerial 
opportunism, yet the results suggest no such influence. The board size results also contradict 
prior evidence (Peters and Romi, 2012; Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan and Aerts, 2011) but is 
consistent with other studies like Michelin and Parbonetti (2012) whose focus was on 
sustainability disclosure. Based on the descriptive statistics, the study sample, just like prior 
studies, exhibited presence of large sized boards which in themselves might be a source of 
conflict and monitoring problems. Prior literature suggests that lack of coordination in boards 
slows down decision making and hence decreases board performance efficiency (Yermack, 
1996; Jensen, 1993).           
 The result on board size could also be interpreted in line with existing debate 
regarding the existence of a U-shaped board-environmental relationship where an optimal 
board exists mid-way (Cormier et al 2011). Thus with a U-shaped relationship it is argued 
that below the optimal size there is a positive relationship between board size and information 
asymmetry and thereafter a negative relationship follows. The descriptive statistics suggest 
that companies on FTSE350 have, on average, large sized board as such this may make the 
board less effective as it is often plagued with monitoring and coordination problems 
(Yermack, 1996). The result may also been seen in light of the institutional theory in that 
over time with both mimetic and coercive pressure companies have instituted their boards in 
similar manner/pattern as such GHG disclosure cannot be differentiated based on board size. 
This then entails the need to go beyond board size and review the particular characteristics of 
members of the board responsible for environmental and GHG reporting. Prado-Lorenzo and 
Garcia-Sanchez (2010) also concluded that boards as a whole are not proactive when it comes 
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GHG information disclosure rather they do intervene whenever they deem that non-
intervention or lack of being seen to be on top of the related environmental matter may 
adversely affect the firm. In this respect authors like Money and Schepers (2007) have long 
called for the restructuring of the board as it currently stands so as to ensure a balance 
between pro-shareholder interests’ structures and pro-other stakeholder interests’ structures.  
 Similarly, there is no known GHG voluntary disclosure study that investigated NED 
but the non-significance of NED in the model suggests that proportion of NEDs on board do 
not have any influence of GHG disclosures.  As NEDs often represents the level of 
independence relating to board decision, it suggests that whether the board is free from 
material influence by either owners or managers is of no consequence to GHG disclosures. 
Seen in the light of agency theory, this is a contradiction because agency theory encourages 
high numbers of NEDs on the board as a mechanism to keep in check managerial 
opportunism and reduce agency costs. However the result is consistent with other prior 
studies (Ho and Wong, 2001; Brammer and Pavelin (2006) but also contradicts others (Post 
et al., 2011 who found positive significant relationship with environmental disclosures). The 
result could be due to a number of reasons. Mangena and Tauringana (2007) argue that NEDs 
might be preoccupied with other matters and hence may not give necessary attention to 
equally important matters of disclosures or may simply delegate it to a particular sub-
committee. Others argue that, in practice, NEDs may not be independent per se due to other 
influences that may compromise their professional judgements (Buniamin et al., 2008). De 
Villiers et al (2011) also argued that while  board independence as symbolised by presence of 
NED is important in influencing environmental performance, extremely high levels of 
independence in a board may result in lack of specific firm knowledge necessary in 
environmental related issues. In their findings they had a non-linear relationship between 
board independence and environmental performance.      
 Another plausible explanation could be that these board structures are yet to 
reposition themselves to meet the challenges of climate change. In the sample only 7 per cent 
of the firms had indicated having a special social and environmental committee.  Kock et al. 
(2012) alluded to the fact that board characteristics as those covered in the study were 
primarily designed for different set of objectives as such may not be useful in achieving 
environmental objectives. Mallin et al. (2013) argue that there is no straightforward path 
between corporate governance to social and environmental disclosures hence called for 
innovative techniques of proving the link. Arguably the period covered by the study 
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coincided with the financial crisis hence firms and their boards were preoccupied with 
repositioning themselves to respond to the inadequacies exposed during the crisis hence 
issues relating to GHGs might have had less prominence.      
 The presence of corporate environmental committee had no meaningful significance 
on voluntary GHG disclosures. This contradicts our theoretical framework which argued for 
more disclosures by companies with such a committee and other prior studies (Peters and 
Romi, 2011; Hassan, 2010). One reason could be that though social and environmental 
committees are being entrenched within FTSE350 companies, they are yet to find their feet in 
as far as GHG emission reporting is concerned. This could be supported by the fact that when 
regressed against qualitative disclosures it turns significant but non-significance is maintained 
with quantitative disclosures.  Rankin et al. (2011) who also found the presence of 
environmental committee to be non-significant argued that firms might just be creating these 
portfolios just to gain legitimacy but in reality real power and authority to achieve genuine 
GHG emissions reductions has not been given to them. The other reason for the weak 
significance in EC could be that in practice committees do not make final decisions on 
matters of their jurisdictions rather they do recommend and is up to the board to adopt it or 
not. In their mixed method approach which included interviews, Rodrigue et al (2013) 
reported that informants had stated that in practice decisions to implements environmental 
projects are taken by the board as a whole and not at committee hence this might explain how 
the final outlook on environmental initiatives may not be fully influenced by the presence of 
the environmental committee alone. Overall they concluded that environmental committees 
are primarily set up to ensure that environmental regulatory issues are complied with but ‘are 
not intended to proactively improve environmental performance’. Seen in the light of 
legitimacy theory this implies that environmental committees may be set up for legitimation 
purposes rather than real intention of being green (Peters and Romi 2012; Hrasky 2012). This 
is also consistent with the findings of Liao et al. (2014) who found that environmental 
committees of FTSE 350 companies did not have significant effect on the extent of carbon 
disclosures. In this respect they argued that though board environmental committee may 
decide on disclosure policy yet the decision as to what actually is disclosed could be taken at 
a lower technical level.  
 Though audit committees are credited with enhancing the board monitoring 
efficiency, the model results did not find any significance. One possible explanation could be 
that there is little if none auditing relating to environmental information hence the role of the 
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audit committee may not be deemed necessary unless such information has direct effect on 
balance sheet figures which seems not the case at the moment. The descriptive statistics show 
that only 27 per cent of sampled firms had indicated the use of assurance services with regard 
to GHG emission information in 2011 underscoring the fact that significant role of auditing 
on GHG emission information is yet to emerge.       
 The positive and significant relationship between size and GHG disclosures are 
consistent with prior literature (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; 
Rankin et al., 2011; Berthelot and Robert 2012; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Gray et al, 
2001; Cormier and Magnan, 2007). As noted being large means being very visible and 
subject to intense public scrutiny which then might force a firm to make more disclosures as 
way of deflating criticism. But being large is also synonymous with being resource rich 
which may enable managers exercise more flexibility in their disclosure decisions unlike in 
small firms where resources are deemed in short supply (Bowen, 1999; Liu and Anbumozhi, 
2009; Rupley et al., 2012; Reverte, 2008).  A large firm is also expected to have a large 
network of stakeholders hence might engage in disclosures to manage their expectations. This 
result is also consistent with the findings of the review done by Guidry and Patten (2012) 
who found that six of the ten studies they reviewed had found size to be positive and 
significant. The authors however noted that in most of these studies (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier and Magnan, 1999; Ho and Taylor, 2007; Magness, 
2006; and Bewley and Li, 2000), size was often a control for political cost exposure rather 
than information asymmetry based proxy.       
 The negative but significant coefficient in respect of gearing means that highly geared 
companies are likely to disclose less information on GHG emissions. While the result 
contradicts findings of prior studies on GHG disclosures (see Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; 
Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2011), it is consistent with the findings of Brammer 
and Pavelin (2008). This result could be seen in light of signalling theory in that low geared 
firms could be motivated to disclose more GHG information to signal to market with the 
hope of tapping into the euphoria of attracting cheap capital through investors interested in 
socially and environmentally responsible firms.       
 The coefficients for profitability and liquidity are statistically insignificant meaning 
that the level of profitability and liquidity do not influence the level of voluntary GHG 
disclosures. This result, particularly profitability, is in line with prior studies (Wegener et al., 
2013; Freedman and Jaggi 2005; Rankin et al., 2011; Stanny and Ely, 2008) but contradicts 
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agency theory and stakeholder theory propositions. Thus according to Oliviera et al. (2006), 
profitability just like size makes a company to be politically visible and hence a target of 
many stakeholder pressure for transparency. In addition, contrary to the findings of Liu and 
Anbomuzhi (2009) who documented non-significance of profitability with overall 
environmental disclosures but significant with some specific environmental information, the 
current study did not find any significance in both qualitative and quantitative models.  
Liquidity, though not yet tested in GHG voluntary disclosure studies, is also comparable to 
other prior studies. Others found negative association (Ho and Taylor, 2007; Gul and Leung 
2004) while Barako et al. (2006) found no significance. The finding on liquidity contradicts 
the set hypothesis but it is difficult to put in the right perspective since most secondary data 
based environmental and almost all GHG voluntary disclosure studies have often excluded it 
from their models hence making comparison hard.      
 The finding on the industry variable is interesting but ambiguous when compared to 
prior studies. Prior literature  on climate change and GHG emissions disclosures (Prado-
Lorenzo et al., 2009; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Rankin et al., 2011) though not in complete 
agreement of which sectors are more prominent when it comes to disclosure largely agree 
that some industries deemed heavy polluters are the ones that disclose more information. The 
results contradict this and instead find evidence that those industries deemed as less 
environmentally risky disclose more information than their counterpart. When the industry 
dummy is decomposed into nine categories, a similar pattern is observed with most of those 
deemed heavy polluters in the name of oil & gas, utilities and consumer goods having a non-
significant relationship with GHG voluntary disclosure. Apart from sample characteristics 
and instrument of measuring extent of disclosure, the result may also reflect the nature of 
GHGs itself. Those firms in heavy polluting industries may feel that more disclosures may 
expose them more hence may not be forthcoming when it comes to transparency and 
accountability of their emissions (Wegener et al., 2013). On the other hand, less 
environmentally risky industries may disclose more as a way pre-empting and any potential 
regulation that might be costly to comply with. In addition as highlighted by Lewis et al. 
(2013) lack of disclosures in these heavy polluting industries could be a reflection of the 
uncertainty surrounding stakeholder reactions on firms after its disclosure.  
 Besides industry effects, the results have also clearly demonstrated the effect of time 
in the disclosure trend. The importance of time effects in 2010 and 2011 can be seen through 
the t-ratio which is higher in those years than in 2009. In particular the difference between 
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2009 and 2010 is higher compared to the difference between 2010 and 2011. Arguably this 
could be as a result of a number policy initiative that motivated or encouraged firms to 
measure and report GHG emissions notably the introduction of DEFRA (2009) guidelines. 
DEFRA guidelines came into effect in 2010 hence the difference could be attributed to the 
same. Thus the increase in the extent of reporting could be the direct consequence of the 
DEFRA guidelines which were introduced in 2009 and were available for use for reports in 
2010. The positive outcome here is consistent with prior studies for instance Freedman and 
Jaggi (2005) whose investigation found that firms operating in Kyoto ratifying countries had 
more disclosures than their counterparts not in Kyoto ratifying countries. Similarly, Sidaway 
and De Lange (2011) found that the introduction of National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting (NGER) in Australia had positively influenced firms not targeted by the Act to 
voluntarily disclose climate change information. Besides, in other prior research evidence, 
there is an indication that companies tend to respond positively to government guidance or 
proposal in anticipation of regulation. For example, Llena et al. (2007) state that every time 
there was significant milestone achieved related to environment and GHGs such as the Kyoto 
Protocol or the issuance of European Commission (EC) recommendation on measuring and 
reporting environmental information in annual reports, general interest relating to accounting 
and reporting of such information increased among European Union based firms. Inchausti 
(1997) found that in Spain, legislation, even before it became compulsory, had a strong 
bearing on the voluntary accounting disclosures made by companies. Rankin et al. (2011) 
attributed the increase in GHG disclosures by Australian firms over time as a possible 
response to public and policy pressure.       
 From the evidence it could be argued that firms appeared to have embraced the 
DEFRA (2009) guidelines as pseudo-regulatory guidelines that were pointing out to future 
policy direction hence they considered compliance with the same as yardstick to complying 
with future legislation. It could also suggest that the DEFRA (2009) provided a reasonable 
justification for management to invest in systems that could collect and report GHGs. In fact 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), an influential industry umbrella body in the UK, 
hailed the introduction of DEFRA (2009) as the right step that will lead to mandatory 
reporting which they had been calling for as a way of achieving consistency and 
comparability of results (CBI, 2011). Thus although there is available evidence of 
institutional investor activeness in certain voluntary GHG reporting a scheme like CDP, there 
is little or no evidence that investors pressurise managers to disclosure this information in 
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other forma avenues like annual reports or sustainability reports. Gouldson (2012) argued that 
the reason the quality of GHG disclosures was low in UK major supermarkets reports was 
due to lack of genuine interest in such information by major shareholders. This then means 
management could not reasonably justify any significant investment in GHG systems that 
could ensure disclosures in the absence of pressure from investors hence relying on the 
DEFRA guidelines to justify the same. In fact Griffiths et al. (2007) argued that in the 
absence of a government regulation or persuasion, GHG disclosures remain the discretion of 
management. Therefore in light of institutional theory, the introduction of DEFRA (2009) 
and other government initiatives on climate change are seen as coercive forces meant to 
pressure firms into following a preferred system of reporting.  
 
8.4 Primary Data Analysis 
8.4.1 Respondents’ background 
The results of Section A of the questionnaire (see Appendix I) indicated that out of the 62 
respondents, seventeen or 27 per cent identified themselves as having a senior position in 
finance and accounting, nine or 14.5 per cent stated that they were company secretaries 
and/or investor relations directors while the majority, 36 or 58 per cent indicated they were 
senior managers or heads of sustainability and environment.  The fact that the majority were 
senior managers dealing with environmental issues is not a cause for concern as such 
individuals are considered appropriate replacements of finance directors when it comes to 
disclosures of environmental information (Wilmhurst and Frost, 2000). For example, Cormier 
et al. (2004) suggested that environmental managers should be the focus of attention with 
respect to environmental disclosures since they are managers who implement the broad 
disclosure policies established by the board and communicated by the CEO. Regarding 
gender, only seventeen per cent of respondents were female, an indication of male dominance 
in senior management positions within the sample.       
 The majority of the respondents (33 i.e. 53 per cent) indicated they were below fifty 
years of age while 47 per cent were fifty or older.  Twenty three (23) of the respondents or 37 
per cent indicated that they had been in their positions for a period of over ten years while 63 
per cent had been in their positions for a period of between four and nine years. Solomon and 
Lewis (2002) noted that length of service was important because the longer someone stays in 
a position the more knowledgeable they are. In levels of education, 48.3 per cent stated that 
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they had qualifications above a college degree, while the rest indicated that they were in 
possession of a college degree.  
  
8.4.2 Questionnaire results 
Respondents were asked to consider a list of ten variables (six corporate governance 
mechanisms and four firm specific variables) and then to indicate on a five point Likert scale 
(1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree) the extent to which each of the variables influence 
GHGs voluntary disclosure in their firms (see Appendix I, Section B). Results are presented 
in table 16 below.  The results of a two way sample t-test for the four corporate governance 
mechanisms (board size, proportion of non-executive directors, ownership concentration and 
directors’ share ownership) that were also investigated using the quantitative approach  
indicated that the mean scores except for ownership concentration were statistically different 
from the neutral point (3=neutral) and significant at a one per cent level.  Since the mean 
values of the three corporate governance mechanisms are all below the neutral point, this 
suggests that the respondents do agree that GHG voluntary disclosures are influenced or not 
influenced by three corporate governance mechanisms. Similarly, the lack of significant 
difference in respect of ownership concentration means that there is no evidence to suggest 
that the respondents perceive ownership concentration as influencing or not GHG voluntary 
disclosures.  
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Table 16: Determinants of 
GHGs – Survey Responses      
      
Determinants of GHG 
disclosures 
Mean 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
% agreed or 
strongly agreed 
% disagree or 
strongly 
disagree 
% 
neutral   
      
Board committee Size 2.10*** 0.86 2.8% 63.9% 33.3% 
Audit committee size 1.97*** 0.94 2.8% 63.9% 32.4% 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board 2.35*** 0.86 5.6% 55.6% 38.9% 
Board Committee on 
environment 3.40** 1.23 62.2% 21.6% 16.2% 
CEO Duality 2.33*** 1.00 13.9% 54.1% 29.7% 
Ownership concentration 2.73 1.13 36.1% 44.4% 19.4% 
Director share ownership  2.50*** 0.93 11.1% 50.0% 38.9% 
Size of company 3.51*** 0.93 55.6% 13.9% 30.6% 
Company gearing  2.46*** 0.92 8.3% 50.0% 41.7% 
Company profitability 2.83* 1.06 22.2% 44.4% 33.3% 
Company liquidity 2.48*** 0.94 8.3% 50.0% 41.7% 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 significantly different from a mid-neutral point of 3  
      
Of the remaining corporate governance mechanisms (CEO duality, audit committee and sub-
board committee on environment) included in the questionnaire but not in the regression 
analysis below, the results suggest that their t-values are statistically significant from the 
mean. However, the mean value of 3.40 in  respect of the sub-board committee on the 
environment  which is above the neutral point of 3.0 means that this mechanism is perceived 
as having a significant influence on GHG voluntary disclosure. The mean value for CEO 
duality of 2.33 which is below the neutral point suggests that this mechanism does not 
significantly influence the extent of GHG voluntary disclosures.    
 The results of a two way sample t-test for the four firm variables show that the mean 
values are all different from the neutral point and statistically significant. However, the fact 
that the mean value for firm size is higher than the neutral point means that this variable is 
perceived as having a significant influence by our respondents. In fact about 55 per cent of 
survey respondents said either agreed or strongly agreed that size plays a vital part on their 
GHG disclosure decisions. Since the mean values of the three financial variables are all 
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below the neutral point, this suggests that the respondent do not agree that GHG voluntary 
disclosures are influenced by three company specific financial variables.  
 
8.5 Regression Results of the Respondent Companies 
In order to compare like with like, a sample of the respondent companies (62) were selected 
and OLS regression for the year 2011 was carried with a view of triangulating with the 
survey responses. Table 17 shows the results of our regression model including all the 
governance and control variables.  
 
Table 17: OLS regression of respondent firms for year 2011   
    
Variable Model   
GHG disclosure (DV) Coefficient 
Std. 
Error   
Board size -0.026 0.129  
Non-Executive Directors  -0.051 0.344  
Ownership Concentration -0.024** 0.006  
Director Ownership -0.012** 0.004  
Size 0.079*** 0.211  
Profitability 0.003 0.004  
Gearing 0.173 0.099  
Liquidity 0.028** 0.007  
    
R-squared 0.395   
Adjusted R-squared 0.292     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
 
The R
2 
adjusted
 
is 29.2 per cent and the model is highly significant (F=3.84, p=0.000). The 
explanatory power of the model is consistent with some prior studies (Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
(2009) had 38.3 per cent; and Freedman and Jaggi (2005) had 32.0 per cent.  The results 
indicate that two corporate governance mechanisms, board size and proportion of non-
executive directors’ are not significantly associated with GHG disclosure. However, the 
results also indicate that the other two corporate governance mechanisms (ownership 
concentration and director ownership) have a significant negative relationship with GHG 
information disclosure (β=-.02, p.01; β=-.01, p.001) respectively. Of the firm characteristics, 
only size and liquidity are significant (β=.07, p.001; β=.02, p.01) while profitability and 
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gearing are not.          
 Nonetheless the sample size of 62 could be somewhat small to accommodate all the 8 
variables at the same time as this may result in model over fitting. According to Miller and 
Kunce (1973); Field (2009), a rule of thumb allows 1 variable per ten observations meaning 
to avoid over fitting the appropriate number of variables is six. Therefore a further 3 models 
containing different combination of the variables up to a maximum of six were regressed to 
assess whether the outcome will be materially different from the original. Table 18 below 
summarises the results.          
  
 
Table 18: Alternative Multiple regression models for 
survey respondents         
         
Variable 
Model 1 (exc. BS & 
ROA) 
 
Model 2 (exc.NED & 
ROA) 
 
Model 3 (exc. BS & 
NED) 
GHG disclosure 
(DV) Coefficient 
Std. 
Error   Coefficient Std. Error   Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
Board size 
  
-0.0001 0.016 
   Non-Executive 
Directors  -0.005 0.284 
      Ownership 
Concentration -0.024** 0.009 
 
-0.024** 0.009 
 
-0.024** 0.009 
Director 
Ownership -0.012*** 0.005 
 
-0.012** 0.006 
 
-0.012** 0.005 
Size 0.072*** 0.179 
 
0.072*** 0.024 
 
0.075*** 0.018 
Profitability 
     
0.003 0.004 
Leverage 0.133 0.119 
 
0.133 0.118 
 
0.172 0.126 
Liquidity 0.023** 0.01 
 
0.023** 0.01 
 
0.028** 0.012 
         R-squared 0.386 
  
0.386 
  
0.395 
 Adjusted R-
squared 0.311     0.31     0.321   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
       
 As per table 18 above there were no material differences regarding the explanatory 
power of the original model and the other models. In particular there was no change in 
direction and significance of variables in all the three models. This then means that the 
original model is not affected by the problem of over fitting. Moreover Knofczynski and 
Daniel Mundfrom (2008) states that minimum thresholds like those of sample size to 
predictor ratios are there for a guide only and that prior literature and the objectives of the 
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research should be considered first before applying the minimum guidelines.  
 Furthermore, as part of robustness test the study also reviewed the possibility of 
including CEO duality, audit committee and board environmental committee in the model 
since these were specifically included in the survey questionnaire. However based on the 
sample these were deemed inadequate to generate meaningful statistical results. For instance 
there were only three firms with CEO duality while only 9 firms had a board social and 
environmental committee.      
 
8.6 Discussion: Survey Results vs. Regression Results 
Taken overall, the results from the two research methods are consistent in that they both 
suggest that corporate governance characteristics (board size and proportion of non-executive 
directors) do not determine the extent of GHG disclosures. The lack of support for the 
relationship between these governance variables and GHG disclosure, while surprising, is in 
line with a growing body of literature that suggest the inadequacy of existing board structures 
in championing sustainability reporting (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Walls et al., 2013). 
Wang and Hussainney (2013) argued that it is still debatable as to whether certain governance 
characteristics as advocated by UK corporate governance guidance are effective in improving 
narrative reporting in general. Mallin et al. (2013) suggested that there is no straightforward 
relationship between corporate governance and social and environmental disclosures, and 
hence called for innovative techniques to prove the link.      
 The results from both the primary data and secondary data quantitative approach may 
also suggest that traditional board proxies are not effective/good enough to depict the role of 
the board relating to legitimating activities. This could explain why when put to them, survey 
respondents unequivocally disagreed with a score of over 50 per cent on each item i.e. board 
size, NED, and CEO duality, that these do influence disclosure decision, but unanimously 
agreed with presence of a board sub-committee on environment. Being a new phenomenon 
(only eight firms in our sample had such a committee), the strong agreement by survey 
respondents may suggest that firms now realise the need to go beyond existing board 
structures in order to discharge their environmental information disclosure responsibilities. 
Kock et al. (2012) alluded to the fact that board characteristics such as board size and NEDs 
were primarily designed for different set of objectives, and so may not be useful in achieving 
environmental information disclosure objectives. Moreover researchers have found evidence 
that despite all the talk about environment and governance, the directors perceive their role as 
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being primarily centred on the old tradition of protecting shareholders’ interests, and hence 
they set aside any stakeholder pressure for more environmental action as their reputation is 
not at stake (Rodrigue et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 2001).     
 On the other hand, the two research approaches yielded different results for the other 
two corporate governance variables (ownership concentration and directors’ share 
ownership). While a negative and significant influence of both ownership structures through 
secondary data is found, a strong rejection by the survey respondents on the influence of 
these is documented. This could be interpreted from two perspectives. The strong 
disagreement from respondents could arguably imply that due to the current form of 
corporation in which ownership is diversified from management and to the increased 
emphasis on the board of directors rather than on shareholders, managers perceive 
shareholders as being of no significant influence in implementing policy including disclosure. 
 Alternatively the explanation could lie in how far ‘shareholder activism’ (Reid and 
Toffel, 2009) influences managerial decision making. First, it is understood that, on its own, 
shareholder activism has little chance of success in influencing managerial decisions on 
social and environmental issues unless it is channelled through other means like advocacy 
groups (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Reid and Toffel, 2009). This could be true for climate 
change and GHG emissions disclosures where managers may perceive compliance with 
requirements set by private groups like the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) requirements 
(an NGO grouping of investors promoting transparency and accountability on GHGs) as 
being more important than responding to their own shareholder demands. Consistent with the 
prediction of stakeholder theory, shareholder activism gains salience, power and legitimacy 
through groupings like CDP or CERES which then forces managers to respond rather than 
just responding to their own shareholder demands (Cotter and Najar, 2011). According to 
Mitchell et al. (1997) stakeholder demands are met in accordance with power and legitimacy 
hierarchy. Second, there is mounting evidence that in most cases formal shareholder pressure 
on management through resolutions is often rejected by management due to either 
management refusing to be seen to cede decision-making power or simply dismissing the 
resolutions as being too far from reality (Hoffman, 1996; Sasser et al., 2006). Therefore since 
the survey respondents were people of senior standing within the firms, it is argued that their 
rejection of external influence in the form of ownership could be a manifestation of this 
desire to demonstrate that they maintain discretion over matters of strategic and operational 
importance.            
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 With regards to firm characteristics, the results of both approaches are consistent in 
that they suggest company size is a significant determinant of GHG disclosure while gearing, 
profitability and liquidity are not. The consensus on the influence of company size 
demonstrates that more than anything managers understand that size moderates the extent of 
their discretion in responding to multi-stakeholder demands for GHG information. As argued 
by Darnall et al. (2010) size also determines how other stakeholders view or react to 
managerial action on issues at hand. However the fact that size could be seen to represent 
both the perspective of information asymmetry and social political theories suggests that we 
may not exactly know what it represents (Graham et al., 2005). The evidence from both data 
sources that gearing, profitability and liquidity play no part on GHG disclosures decisions 
follows a consistent pattern of evidence from prior studies that when taken together puts into 
question the validity of these company specific financial variables in environmental or GHG 
disclosure studies. Guidry and Patten (2012) wondered why voluntary disclosure based 
theory models particularly from financial disclosure literature have been used in 
environmental disclosure studies without careful consideration. Their study which reviewed a 
number of environmental disclosure studies failed to find enough evidence supporting that 
company specific financial variables such as profitability and gearing were relevant in 
environmental disclosure research.       
 Though there are no GHG or environmental disclosure studies that specifically 
engaged practitioners regarding the actual determinants of these disclosures, the results can 
also be interpreted in light of other studies that have sought practitioners’ opinions regarding 
important stakeholders on environmental disclosure decisions. It is intimated that if 
practitioners view information asymmetry reduction as a primary reason for disclosure then 
shareholders or investors would be considered highly in their ranking. In this respect, the 
results both agree and contradict prior evidence. Thus, with the exception of Wilmshurst and 
Frost (2000), the majority have found that shareholder/investor concerns rank second when 
practitioners decides on environmental disclosures. For instance, when put to the executives 
of multinationals in Singapore, Perry and Sheng (1999) reported that only 21.4 per cent of 
firms disclosing environmental information agreed that shareholders/investors were important 
compared to 71.4 per cent on government. Similarly, Cormier et al. (2004) through a survey 
found that the public were the highly ranked group seconded by investors/shareholders.  
Recently Dobbs and van Staden (2012) reported that in their survey of New Zealand 
companies, respondents ranked community concerns as of prime importance to their 
232 
 
environmental disclosure decisions than shareholder/investor rights to information. Arguably 
the consistent practitioner ranking of shareholders/investors as being second to other interest 
groups when it comes to environmental disclosures render support to the social political 
theories and suggest that the information asymmetry based theories are of secondary 
importance. This is consistent with the notion that the salient of shareholder demands relating 
to GHG emissions information is not as urgent as that of government, NGOs and public 
(Sprengel and Busch, 2011). 
 
8.7 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presented results and analysis of both secondary and primary data in an attempt 
to answer the research questions relating to the extent and determinants of voluntary GHG 
disclosures. In particular the regression model presented in chapter was subjected to an 
empirical test using data by a sample of FTSE350 over a four year period i.e. 2008-2011. 
Both secondary and primary data were subjected to a series of statistical tests including 
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, OLS modelling and in case of the secondary data, 
panel fixed effects modelling. Robustness of results is checked through running series of 
regressions that includes and excludes certain variable of interest. Interpretation and 
discussion of results is then presented in light of theoretical framework and prior literature.  
The descriptive statistics in particular the mean indicate that the extent of voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information by FTSE350 companies is still low but has steadily 
been increasing since 2008. Thus there has been a noticeable increase in the extent of the 
disclosures in between 2008 and 2011, an indication that of the increased pressure firms are 
being subjected from a diverse range of stakeholders notably government related initiatives 
like the issuance of DEFRA in 2009. In fact, a remarkable increase in the disclosures was 
reported in between 2009 and 2010 compared to between 2010 and 2011.  Evidently there is 
also a tendency towards disclosure of qualitative information as opposed to quantitative 
information.           
 Regarding regression, there was lack of significant relationship between the 
‘traditional’ board characteristics namely board size, proportion of non-executive directors, 
audit committee and the environmental committee and voluntary GHG disclosures. This 
could imply inadequacies of existing board structures to serve the emerging area of GHG 
emission disclosures. Alternatively it could mean that other board structures like 
environmental committee which are meant to champion GHG emission related issues are yet 
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to gain the necessary competencies in this area. However it should be noted that the presence 
of Environmental committee becomes positively significant when regressed against 
quantitative disclosures. Notwithstanding this, the results indicated significant negative 
relationship between ownership concentrations, director ownership and voluntary GHG 
disclosure. This means firms with less ownership concentration and low director ownership 
have potential to disclose more voluntary GHG emission information.   
 In as far as firm characteristics are concerned, size and gearing were statistically 
significant while profitability and liquidity were non-significant. While the outcome on size 
and gearing reflected the theoretical framework and in the case of size, and profitability also 
prior literature, the non-significant of both profitability and liquidity continue to cast doubt 
regarding the suitability financial variables in environmental and GHG disclosure studies. 
Perhaps more insightful is the fact that when put to the preparers of the information, with the 
exception of size, none of the determinants as derived from secondary data were deemed 
influential in the extent of the disclosures. While this may be true in the realm of 
Environmental and GHG disclosures where secondary data has also failed to confirm most of 
the traditional determinants (Guidry and Patten 2012), it also underscores the growing 
concern of many scholars that the voluntary disclosure phenomenon is quite complex in 
reality making it difficult to get a complete picture through inferences from secondary data 
only.            
 When the survey results are triangulated with the OLS regression of the respondents, 
the outcome is mixed. The results indicated that the two research methods suggest that board 
size and proportion of non-executive directors are not significant determinants of GHG 
disclosure. However, the two research methods results differ in that while the quantitative 
approach indicate that ownership concentration and director ownership are significant 
negative determinants of GHG disclosure, our survey results suggest that the two corporate 
governance mechanisms are not significantly related to GHG disclosure. There is, however, 
contradictory results with regard to ownership structure in that secondary data based 
regression confirm them as significant while survey respondents did not support them. The 
contradicting evidence provided by the two research approaches in respect of ownership 
concentration and directors’ share ownership suggests the need for further research in attempt 
to reconcile the differences.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
  
9.0 Introduction 
In recent years, climate change issues have received wider attention from all spheres of life. 
There is a general consensus that human activity is partly responsible for global warming and 
related effects as such there have been calls for action. While governments are still yet to 
provide a coordinated effort in fighting climate change, the private sector has been taking a 
leading role in ensuring accountability of the anthropogenic global warming. This has led to 
various initiatives which have provided guidance on how firms can measure and report their 
GHG emissions. In this respect, the UK government has also been championing efforts to 
reduce the impact of global warming as evidenced by enactment of the Climate change Act 
2008 and subsequent issuance of DEFRA (2009) which laid down measurement and 
reporting guidance on GHG emissions.      
 Against this background, this study was set out to investigate the extent, determinants 
and motivation for GHG emission disclosures by FTSE350 companies in the UK. Thus, the 
first part reviewed evidence of whether companies in the UK are reporting GHG emissions in 
accordance with available guidance on GHG emission measurement and reporting while the 
second part focussed on the different factors which could influence the disclosure of GHG 
information. The third part relating to motivation/determinants for GHG disclosure involved 
primary data collection from senior managers of these firms. Overall the thesis intends to 
make a number of contributions to the reporting disclosure literature and GHG emission 
policy development in the UK. To begin with it provides a detailed account of GHG emission 
reporting pattern by FTSE 350 over a four year period using diverse disclosure avenues like 
annual reports, sustainability reports and websites as opposed to many studies in this areas 
whose focus has been limited to a single year and in many cases using one disclosure media. 
Secondly it documents evidence of which governance and firm characteristics matter when it 
comes to GHG emission reporting. This is important because though GHG emission is 
categorised like environmental reporting, it has its own distinct characteristics that merit its 
own investigation.  More importantly the thesis goes further investigating the question of 
determinants from a primary data point of view. Triangulation of outcomes from both 
secondary data and primary data has been instrumental in assessing the efficacy of existing 
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governance and firm characteristics in explaining the voluntary disclosure phenomenon.
 Therefore in this conclusion chapter, a summary of the results and the context in 
which they fall is presented. The chapter then detail out potential implications/contribution 
and concludes by highlighting the study’s major limitations and suggest avenues for future 
research. 
9.1 Data and Research Methodology 
The study has used both primary and secondary data in answering the set research questions 
namely: (1) what is the extent of GHG emission voluntary disclosures by FTSE350 over four 
years? (2) What could the determinants of such disclosures be? (3) Do practitioners view the 
determinants as being influential in their disclosure decisions?  Secondary data has been used 
to answer questions one and two while primary data has helped analyse the third question. In 
analysing the second question, a research index methodology leading to panel fixed effects 
was developed and used while for the third question a survey questionnaire was used and 
subjected to statistical tests. The disclosure index for the secondary data was developed from 
a multiple GHG reporting frameworks including both the DEFRA (2009) and the GHG 
protocol. The sample for the secondary data consisted of 215 companies drawn from a 
possible sample of 257 firms (which is FTSE350 excluding 93 financial firms). The other 42 
firms were excluded due data unavailability or not being listed throughout the study period. 
For the survey questionnaire the final sample was derived by the number of respondents from 
the 215 companies. 
9.2 Findings and Context 
The descriptive statistics indicate that overall, FTSE350 companies disclose little information 
on GHG emission. Over the four year period the mean disclosure score was 32.5 per cent 
suggesting that more needs to be done to ensure that more GHG information is provided in 
the annual and sustainability reports of the firms.  However there has been noticeable 
increase in the GHG emissions disclosures over the four year period covered by the study. 
While not directly investigated, the significant increase in the disclosures between 2010 and 
2011 could imply the influence brought by the introduction of DEFRA (2009) which came 
into effect in the year 2010. Majorly they disclose qualitative information and governance 
arrangements in place to tackle climate change while detailed quantitative GHG information, 
risks arising from climate change and future estimates information are rare.  
 There is also evidence that the level of disclosure is influenced by corporate 
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governance variables (board size, directors share ownership and ownership concentration) 
and company specific characteristics (size, leverage and industry). The results are also 
consistent with prior studies. For instance, Board size (Peters and Romi, 2012; Cormier et al., 
2011); Non-executive directors (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008); Ownership concentration 
(Matolcsy et al., 2012; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008) and Managerial ownership (Gelb, 2000). 
Evidently there has been lack of significance by traditional governance determinants namely 
board size, non-executive and audit committee while the significance of environmental 
committee was very much dependent on the type of disclosure with qualitative disclosures 
having a significant relationship with environmental committee. Find below a summary of 
the outcome of the main model tested. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
Table 19: Summary of the results of the main model hypothesis 
     
  
Variable     Supported 
Governance characteristics       
Board Size -H1: There is a significant relationship between board size and 
GHG information disclosure  Not supported 
     
  
Non-executive directors - H2: There is a positive relationship between the 
proportion of NEDs on the board and GHG information disclosure Not supported 
     
  
Audit Committee - H3: Firms with large Audit Committee Size will 
disclose more GHG emissions voluntary information Not supported 
     
  
Environmental Committee - H4: Firms with an environmental committee 
will disclose more information on GHG emissions.   Not supported 
     
  
Ownership concentration - H5: There is a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and GHG disclosure, ceteris paribus.  Supported 
     
  
Director ownership - H6: There is a negative relationship between 
directors’ share ownership and GHG information disclosure Supported 
     
  
Firm Characteristics      
Company size - H7: There is a significant positive relationship between 
size and the GHG disclosures Supported 
     
  
Gearing - H8: Highly geared firms are expected to disclose more GHG 
information Not supported 
     
  
Profitability - H9: There is a significant relationship between profitability 
and GHG disclosures Not supported  
     
  
Liquidity - H10: There is a significant positive relationship between 
liquidity and GHG disclosures Not supported 
    
  
 Industry - H11: There is a positive association between Industry sector 
and GHG disclosures Supported 
 
The non-significance of most board characteristics raise questions regarding the 
effectiveness of existing board structures in GHG emission information user needs.  On firm 
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characteristics, size and gearing have a significant relationship with voluntary GHG 
disclosures while profitability and liquidity had no significance.   
 When a list of determinants is put to senior executives of the companies through a 
survey questionnaire to examine whether any of the firm and governance characteristics 
influence the extent of disclosure, firm size and board environmental committee are the only 
determining factors to have received wide support by the respondents while all others were 
firmly rejected. The direct rejection of the characteristics may arguably suggest that 
determinants of financial disclosures are not necessarily the same as those of environmental 
disclosures (Guidry and Patten, 2012).       
 However the results turn out different when the regression output of the respondent 
firms is compared and contrasted to the survey outcome. The results indicated that the two 
research methods suggest that board size and proportion of non-executive directors are not 
significant determinants of GHG disclosure. However, the two research methods results 
differ in that while the quantitative approach indicate that ownership concentration and 
director ownership are significant negative determinants of GHG disclosure, our survey 
results suggest that the two corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to 
GHG disclosure. With regard to firm characteristics, only size was significant using both sets 
of data.            
 The consistent finding by both research approaches that both board size and 
proportion of non-executive directors do not determine the extent of GHG disclosure adds to 
growing empirical evidence that question the adequacy of existing board structures in serving 
wider needs including climate change. Consistent with this view, Wang and Hussainney 
(2013) argued that it is still debatable as to whether certain governance characteristics as 
advocated by UK corporate governance guidance are effective in improving narrative 
reporting in general. The contradicting evidence provided by the two research approaches in 
respect of ownership concentration and directors’ share ownership suggests the need for 
further research in attempt to reconcile the differences. Particularly, what could be useful is 
not just a survey but also interviews so that reasons why such corporate governance variables 
appear not to be influential in determining GHG disclosure can be established. 
9.3 Conclusion 
By using both primary and secondary data from a sample of FTSE350 companies over a four 
year period i.e. 2008-2011, the study has investigated the extent and determinants of 
voluntary GHG emissions reporting. Overall the conclusion is that the extent of disclosure is 
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still low, it has an increasing trend and that both certain governance and firm characteristics 
have a significant role in defining the extent of the disclosures. More importantly through 
time effects the study has highlighted the role that government initiatives can play in 
influencing voluntary initiatives in company operations.     
 One main contribution of the study is first to exclusively look at the voluntary of 
GHG emissions determinants using both secondary and primary data and on a longitudinal 
basis. Many if not all the GHG disclosure studies have only concentrated on one period or 
just one source of data. With this uniqueness the study has been able to raise a number of 
critical questions regarding the efficacy of existing governance structures in addressing the 
question of GHG voluntary disclosures. Similarly the outcome of the primary data which 
rejected most of the financial characteristics has highlighted the need to carefully consider the 
role played by these determinants in GHG or environmental disclosures. Overall it is noted 
that the nature and design of the study enables it to make informed contribution to both 
knowledge and policy debate. 
9.4 Recommendations 
9.4.1 Policy development 
To begin with the current study contributes to policy debate as to what needs to be done to 
ensure firms’ adequate accountability and transparency in the area of climate change and 
GHG emissions. As countries strive to meet their own GHG emission reductions, their 
attention has been paid to role of companies in helping them meet the targets but the question 
that remains unresolved is whether regulatory tools should be used to accomplish this or good 
behaviour should be encouraged through voluntary initiatives. Therefore the study 
contributes to the on-going debate on efficacy of voluntary disclosures over mandatory 
disclosures in particular highlighting whether voluntary disclosures can be relied upon to 
provide adequate information to meet various stakeholder needs. Hess (2005) argued that 
voluntary disclosures often give an appropriate clue as to the extent to which mandatory 
guidelines may enforce compliance. This is especially important given that the UK 
government announced that GHG reporting is mandatory for all FTSE350 with effect from 
September 2013. The results of the panel fixed effects have clearly indicated the effect of 
time in the disclosure decisions with the period between 2009 and 2010 recording more 
increase than any other matched period in the time frame. Coincidentally this also happens to 
be the time when the government had stepped up its efforts in offering guidance regarding 
240 
 
measurement and reporting of GHG emissions. This coupled with the fact that other 
governance and firm characteristics have helped explain the voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emissions suggests that neither alone i.e. pseudo–regulatory guidelines such as DEFRA and 
market forces represented by the various corporate governance and company specific 
characteristics can satisfactorily encourage a firm to disclose information to meet stakeholder 
needs. In other words the results justify a form of intervention if the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is to be improved. This is in line with calls from previous studies (Kolk et al., 
2008; Hrasky 2012).          
 On the same policy implication, the fact that both research approaches failed to 
establish a statistical relationship between two out of the four governance mechanisms 
investigated and GHG disclosures may suggest that authorities responsible for prescribing 
corporate governance mechanisms need to re-examine how such governance mechanisms 
could become more encompassing to serve the needs of wider stakeholders.  
 Besides, the use of both primary and secondary data enhances the credibility and 
richness with which our study can contribute to the policy debate. The study considers this as 
an important debate since most disclosure studies form the basis of regulatory intervention 
hence it is prudent that modelling involved should be grounded in sound theoretical 
framework. By incorporating primary data, the study also stand to make sound contribution 
to policy. One advantage of primary data is that it is able to obtain specific responses to a 
specific question unlike in secondary data where a proxy for say size might represent a 
number of things ranging from political costs, firm risk to environment influence (Graham et 
al., 2005). Thus, evidence abound that the understanding of company specific determinants of 
disclosure is of paramount importance in helping identify and highlight challenges or 
obstacles to the success of future regulatory efforts or policy (Peters and Romi, 2010). As 
May and Sundem (1976) suggest, policy adoption is as a result of the application of a choice 
among several alternatives and often a highly subjective judgemental process which in the 
opinion of Graham et al. (2005) can only have a sound grounding if supported by empirical 
evidence emanating from primary data. Thus the fact that both quantitative and survey results 
confirm the effect of company size suggest that there is merit in that any potential GHG 
disclosure regulation should take into account variations in company size.   
 The important of engaging practitioners in understanding the determinants of GHG 
disclosures in the UK needs no emphasis considering the leading role the UK has taken in the 
fight against climate change. Cormier et al. (2004) suggest that understanding managerial 
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perception can potentially help standard setters to better understand how to effect change in 
such disclosures. It also helps to understand why some information is disclosed by some 
firms and not others. This is especially important in the case of the UK which has taken a 
leading role in GHG management and reporting. For example, the UK Government was the 
first country in the world to pass a long-term legally binding framework to tackle the dangers 
of climate change in form of the Climate Change Act 2008. The Act set a legally binding 
target of at least an 80% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and a reduction in 
emissions of at least 34% by 2020 against a 1990 baseline.  Since then the UK government 
has taken a number of measures including issuing guidance on the way companies should 
report their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (DEFRA, 2009); publishing a review of the 
contribution the reporting of GHGs makes to emissions reductions (DEFRA, 2010) and 
announcement that from 2013 it will become mandatory for listed firms to report their GHGs 
in the annual report to ensure that it remains on course to meet targets set. 
 Particularly the results highlight specific areas that might require regulatory 
intervention to influence firms to be transparent in certain GHG emission information. 
Arnold and Mathews (2002) argued that ‘…the nature and extent of supplementary 
disclosures influences and indicates the direction and scope of future legislation..’  The study 
precisely highlights areas that might need regulation emphasis. For instance quantitative data 
and data relating to climate change risks could be an area of regulatory emphasis. 
Considering that other respondents complained of lack of genuine interest by influential 
investors on GHG information, it is therefore intimated that mandatory reporting will remove 
uncertainty and push firms to invest more in systems that can enable them report more 
quantitative information.   
9.4.2 Voluntary disclosure knowledge 
In terms of the voluntary disclosure phenomenon, the study brings the understanding of GHG 
disclosure determinants on a longitudinal basis. As noted, voluntary disclosure literature is 
dominated by studies that have focussed on a single period (Bartlett and Jones, 1997). Over 
time attempts have been made to conduct studies on a longitudinal basis (see Choi, 1974; 
Firth, 1980; Barret, 1976). Recent studies on longitudinal basis include that of (Gray et al., 
1995a; and Lee, 1994). However these longitudinal studies have not directly investigated the 
question of determinants (Bartlett and Jones, 1997). Therefore, this study which was done on 
a longitudinal basis using a modern form of annual report, covering a number of companies 
in diverse industries while maintaining a particular focus of voluntary disclosure has provided 
242 
 
useful insights to the general literature of disclosures since longitudinal studies tend to 
produce robust results (Oliveira et al., 2006). For instance the results have indicated an 
increasing trend but one where in some years the disclosures are simply a mirror/repetition of 
the prior year.           
 The relevance of longitudinal studies is well documented in literature. Brammer and 
Pavelin (2006) noted that a longitudinal study helps to highlight an evolving pattern of 
disclosure over time and the results of Rajab (2009) on risk disclosures in the UK, though 
done based on random years chosen over time supports this view. Other accounting 
disclosure studies particularly in social and environmental spheres have also displayed a 
pattern of increasing in response to a number of factors specifically regulation and public 
pressure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).        
 By testing primary data the study also makes a general contribution to the existing 
gaps in the disclosure literature. Deducing from the literature reviewed there is obviously a 
gap in literature regarding certain aspects of factors and motivation behind disclosures. In fact 
prior researchers (see Zarb, 2007) have called for more studies exploring the determinants 
and motivation behind disclosures arguing that despite many studies in this area the 
determinants and motives have not been satisfactorily defined (Hackston and Milne, 1996). 
Again Adams (2002) called for more studies testing primary data to reveal the motivation 
behind disclosures arguing that these voluntary disclosure motives or determinants cannot be 
obtained by testing secondary data alone of certain selected variables. Other prior studies like 
that of Gray et al. (2001) and Patten (2002) also argued that results from existing studies on 
disclosures particularly environmental information are inconclusive owing to many 
limitations of the studies and hence called for more studies in this area. Among the 
limitations cited are sample size and lack of industry diversity. The sample which comprised 
nine different industries from FTSE350 is considered diverse enough to give a clear picture 
of the voluntary GHG emission disclosure.        
 Finally, the study also contributes to the understanding of the extent of GHG 
voluntary disclosure practices by UK firms in the context of the requirements of a number of 
GHG disclosure guidance. Although there is growing research on GHG disclosures (e.g., 
Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Peters and Romi, 2012; Rankin et al., 2011; Stanny, 2011) most 
of it is based on GRI (2002). It is therefore intimated that by measuring GHG voluntary 
disclosures based on a number GHG disclosure guidance is more appropriate in that it will 
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show the extent to which UK firms disclose internationally recommended GHG information 
on a voluntary basis.  
9.5 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
One major limitation of the study relates to sample size for both secondary and primary data. 
First, the sample was extracted from FTSE 350 companies after excluding financial 
companies so the sample choice should be considered when drawing conclusions. Future 
research might extend the sample to include the financial companies and some medium and 
small companies since reporting of GHG emissions is expected from all regardless of the 
nature of its operations or size. The sample limitation is more pronounced in the survey 
respondents.  The response rate of 62 companies which though at 28 per cent is considered 
adequate, constrain the extent to which we can generalise the findings. Future studies may 
also enhance their robustness by exploring interactive effects within the main variables of 
interest. This would help bring new insights in the GHG emission literature since from other 
prior disclosure other variables like size have also been found to playing a mediating role in 
the disclosure pattern.  There is also scope for future studies to subdivide the sample and 
review whether disclosure pattern can be different between those in FTSE100 and those 
making up the remaining 250 companies in FTSE350. Such an approach could enrich 
understanding the role of size and scrutiny with regard to GHG emissions of companies 
making the top 100 in FTSE 350. Since mandatory policy is set in such a way to target large 
companies a study incorporating a subdivided sample of FTSE350 may help inform how 
policy can effectively be rolled out to companies beyond the FTSE 350 index.  
 Second, our analysis is restricted to disclosures made in annual reports and 
sustainability reports and no attempt has been made to compare these with what companies 
participating in other disclosure avenues like CDP make. Therefore future studies might 
compare these avenues in order to draw useful lessons. While the exclusion of CDP as an 
avenue was motivated by the desire to overcome many of its shortfalls, it is still 
recommended that such disclosures are considered if a complete picture of disclosure is to be 
established by the FTSE 350.        
 Another limitation relates to the fact that our triangulation made use of cross-sectional 
data, which meant we could not identify the dynamic effects among our determinants of 
GHG disclosure. While this was necessary due to the need to triangulate with the primary 
data, future research needs to track the pattern of disclosure over a period of time. Future 
work that also focuses on in-depth interviews might also bring useful insights as to whether 
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corporate governance mechanisms have any role to play in GHG disclosure. It is also 
possible that the findings of this study might be limited to the UK. Future studies should, 
therefore, investigate whether practitioners in other countries view these corporate 
governance mechanisms as influencing their GHG disclosure decisions. The focus on other 
countries is important in as far as results are concerned. As noted by Kolk (2010); Prado-
Lorenzo et al. (2009), though climate change is a global problem, it affects countries 
differently as such policy guidance tends to reflect the effects experienced by a country and 
this may adversely affect international comparison. Gray et al. (1995a) in a review of 
environmental disclosure literature concluded in similar manner stating that a country of 
origin has a huge influence on disclosures. When researching on Corporate Social 
disclosures, Adams (2002) came to a similar conclusion. Other researchers have also singled 
out country of origin effects as a major limitation of international studies noting that 
voluntary disclosures are very much a reflection of mandatory disclosures which are heavily 
influenced by a country’s legal system (Einhorn, 2005; Zarb, 2007; Holland and Foo, 2003). 
In direct reference to GHGs Peters and Romi (2010) argued that different countries continue 
to develop numerous reporting mechanisms for GHGs hence making firm or country 
comparison difficult. In the circumstances therefore it is recommended that similar studies 
focussing on different countries should be done rather than simply applying lessons learnt 
from this study.          
 The other limitation is the focus on the extent of voluntary disclosure itself. While this 
has unearthed viable information regarding the quantity of the information disclosed it did 
not confirm the quality or credibility of such disclosures. In other words such disclosures may 
not necessarily reflect the state of affairs in the company. It is therefore recommended that 
future studies should focus on the quality and credibility of such disclosures. This is 
important because in some prior studies there is evidence that most companies have been 
disclosing climate change and emission data just for legitimation purposes and not intending 
to demonstrate their true state of affairs (Hrasky, 2012).    
 While the disclosure index is considered broad based in this study compared to prior 
studies, it remains a self-constructed index which is prone to researcher subjectivity. Beattie 
et al. (2004) argued that studies with an already defined index risk overlooking other 
important elements of disclosure if they are not incorporated in the index. Since climate 
change and GHG emission is an evolving area, building on the constructed index in this 
study, future research may also concentrate on established a generally accepted index that 
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may limit subjectivity.          
 Again the study attempted to incorporate a number of governance and firm 
characteristics in its main model but the list of determinants is still not exhaustive. While it is 
not possible to exhaust all variables, future researchers are encouraged to incorporate as many 
variables as possible in a bid to enhance the understanding of the disclosure determinants. 
Alternatively studies may go further investigating the various characteristics of the 
governance determinants used here like environmental committee characteristics or the 
characteristics of the non-executive directors. Other factors like dual listing might also be 
incorporated to assess the impact of different listing jurisdictions on a firm’s GHG emission 
disclosure pattern.         
 Finally, though the study investigated the question of disclosure determinants from a 
longitudinal focus, there is still scope to increase the period with which the phenomenon can 
be studied. Increasing the time frame together with the sample size may significantly improve 
the statistical power or robustness of the results.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
246 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abbott, L., Parker, S, and Peters, G. 2004. Audit committee characteristics and restatements. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 23 (1), 69-87. 
 
Abraham, S., and Cox, P. 2007. Analysing the determinants of narrative risk information in 
UK FTSE 100 annual reports. British Accounting Review 39,227-248. 
 
Abrahamson, E. and Rosenkopf, L., 1997. Social network effects on the extent of innovation 
diffusion: A computer simulation. Organization Science, 8, 289-309. 
 
Aburaya, R.K. 2012. The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Environmental 
Disclosure: UK Evidence. Unpublished Doctoral thesis, Durham University. Available at 
Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3456/. [Accessed 3 May 2013]. 
Adams, C. A., Coutts, A. & Harte, G. 1995. Corporate equal opportunities (non-) disclosure. 
British Accounting Review, 27(20, 87-108. 
Adams, C. A., Hill, W.-Y., & Roberts, C. B. 1998. Corporate social reporting practices in 
Western Europe: Legitimating corporate behaviour? British Accounting Review, 30, 1–21. 
Adams, C. 2002. Internal Organizational Factors Influencing Corporate Social and Ethical 
Reporting: Beyond Current Theorizing. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 
15(2), 223–250. 
Adrem, A. H. 1999. Essays on disclosure practices in Sweden—Causes and effects. Lund: 
Lund University Press 
 
Aerts, W., Cormier, D., & Magnan, M., 2006. Intra-industry imitation in corporate 
environmental reporting: An international perspective. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 25(3), 299-331 
 
Aerts, W. and Cormier, D. 2009. Media legitimacy and corporate environmental 
communication. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34, 1 – 27. 
 
247 
 
Agnolucci, P., 2005. Opportunities and competition in the Non-fossil Obligation. Tyndall 
Centre Working paper series No. 78. Available from 
http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wp78.pdf. [Accessed on 8 January 2012]. 
 
Ahmed Haji, A., 2013. Corporate social responsibility disclosures over time: evidence   
from Malaysia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 28(7), 647-676. 
Ahmed, K., & Courtis, J. K. 1999. Associations between corporate characteristics and 
disclosure levels in annual reports: a meta-analysis. British Accounting Review, 31(1), 35-61. 
Akhtaruddin, M., Hossain, M.A., Hossain, M. and Yao, L. 2009. Corporate Governance and 
Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports of Malaysian Listed Firms. Journal of 
Applied Management Accounting Research, 7(10, 1-19. 
 
Al-Shammari, B., 2007. Determinants of Internet financial reporting by listed companies on 
Kuwait Stock Exchange.  Journal of International Business and Economics,7(1). 
 
Al-Tuwaijri, S. A., Christensen, T.E., and Hughes, K.E., 2004. The relations among 
environmental disclosure, environmental performance, and economic performance: a 
simultaneous equations approach. Accounting, Organizations and Society 29(5-6), 447-471. 
 
Aly, D., Simon, J., and Hussainey, K., 2010. Determinants of corporate internet reporting: 
Evidence from Egypt. Managerial Auditing Journal, 25(2), 182-202. 
Amran, A., Ooi, S.K., Nejati, M., Zulkafli, A.H., & Lim, A.L., 2012. Relationship of firm 
attributes, ownership structure and business network on climate change efforts: evidence 
from Malaysia, International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology, 
DOI:10.1080/13504509.2012.720292. 
 
An, Y., Eggleton, Y., and Davey, H., 2011. Towards a comprehensive theoretical framework 
for voluntary IC disclosure. Journal of intellectual property, 12(11). 
 
Anbumozhi, V., Q. Chotichanathawong, and T. Murugesh. 2011. Information Disclosure 
Strategies for Green Industries. ADBI Working Paper 305. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank 
248 
 
Institute. Available from: http://www.adbi.org/working-
paper/2011/08/22/4678.info.disclosure.strategies.green.industries/. [Accessed on 23 October 
2011]. 
 
Andrew, J. & Cortese, C. 2010. Greenhouse gas reporting and the Carbon Disclosure Project.  
Australasian Accounting Business and Finance journal, 5 (4), 5-18. 
 
Arnold, A. J. & Matthews, D. R. 2002. Corporate financial disclosures in the UK, 1920–50:  
the effects of legislative change and managerial discretion. Accounting and Business  
Research, 32 (1) 3–16. 
 
Armitage, S. and Marston, C., 2007. Corporate disclosure and the cost of capital: the views of 
finance directors. London: ICAEW Centre for Business Performance. 
Ashford, B.E. and Gibbs, B.W. 1990. The double-edge of organizational legitimation. 
Organization Science, 1(2),177-94.  
Ashworth, R., Boyne, G. & Delbridge, R. 2007. Escape from the Iron Cage? Organisational 
change and isomorphic pressures in the public sector‟. Journal of Public Administration and 
Theory, 21, 165-187. 
Aupperle, K. E., Carroll, A. B., & Hatfield, J. D. 1985. An empirical examination of the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability. Academy of 
Management Journal, 28(2), 446-463. 
Baltagi, B. H., (1995). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Wiley, Chichester. 
Bamber, S., Jiang, J., and Wang, I., 2010. What’s My Style? The influence of Top Managers 
on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure. American Accounting Association, 85(4),1131-
1162. 
Band, D., 1992. Corporate governance: why agency theory is not enough. European 
Management Journal, 10(4), 453-459 
Bansal, P. 2005. Evolving sustainability: a longitudinal study of corporate sustainable 
development. Strategic Management Journal, 26, 197–218. 
249 
 
Barako, G., Hancock, P. and Izan, H.Y. 2006. Relationship between corporate governance 
attributes and voluntary disclosures in annual reports: The Kenyan experience.  Financial 
Reporting, Regulation and Governance, 5(1), 1-25. 
Barbu, E., Dumontier, P., Feleaga, N., and Feleaga, L. 2012. Mandatory environmental 
disclosures by companies complying with IAS/IFRS: The case of France, Germany and the 
UK. Available from http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/65/84/09/PDF/Barbu-
Dumontier-Feleaga_WP-CERAG.pdf. [accessed on 9 October 2012]. 
Bartlett, S., and Jones, J.M., 1997. Annual reporting disclosures, 1970-1990 – an 
exemplification. Accounting, Business and Financial History, 7(1), 61-80. 
 
Barrett, M. E. 1976. Financial reporting practices: disclosure and comprehensiveness in an 
international setting. Journal of Accounting Research, 14(1), 10–26. 
 
Barton, S. L., Hill, N. C., & Sundaram, S. 1989. An empirical test of stakeholder theory 
predictions of capital structure. Financial Management, 18(1), 36-44. 
 
Baruch, Y. 1999. Response rates in academic studies – a comparative analysis. Human 
Relations, 52(4), 421-34. 
Beasley, M.S., Carcello, J.V., Hermanson, D.R., and Lapides, P.D., 2000. Fraudulent 
financial reporting: Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms. 
Accounting Horizons, 14, 441-454. 
 
Beattie, V., and Smith, J., 2012.'Evaluating disclosure theory using the views of UK finance 
directors in the intellectual capital context. Accounting and Business Research, iFirst, pp. 1-
24. 
Beattie,V., McInnes, B., and Fearnley, S. 2004. A Methodology for Analysing and 
Evaluating Narratives in Annual Reports: A Comprehensive Descriptive Profile and Metrics 
for Disclosure Quality Attributes. Available from 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/407/1/Beattieaccforum28.pdf. [Accessed on 9 July 2012]. 
250 
 
Battie, V., and Pratt, K., 2002. Business Reporting: Harnessing the Power of the Internet for 
Users, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Edinburgh. 
Bebbington, J., Gray, R., Thompson, I. and Walters, D. 1994. Accountants' attitudes and 
environmentally-sensitive accounting. Accounting and Business Research, 24(94), 109-120. 
Bebbington, J., and Larrinanga-Gonzalez, C., 2008. Carbon Trading: Accounting and 
Reporting issues. European Accounting Review, 17(40),697-717. 
Belkaoui, A. & Karpik, P.G., 1989. Determinants of the Corporate Decision to Disclose 
Social Information.  Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2(1), 36-51. 
Berrone, P. and Gomez-Meijia 2009. Environmental Performance and Executive 
Compensation: An Integrated Agency-Institutional Perspective. Academy of Management 
Journal, 52(1), 103–126. 
Berthelot, S., and Robert, A.M., 2012. Climate change disclosures: An examination of 
Canadian oil and gas firms. Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting. 5(1). 
Bewley K, and Li., Y., 2000. Disclosure of environmental information by Canadian 
manufacturing companies: a voluntary disclosure perspective. Advanced Environ Account 
Management, 1,201–226. 
Bhaskar, R. 1989. Reclaiming reality: a critical introduction to contemporary philosophy, 
London, Verso. 
Blaikie, N., 1993. Approaches to social enquiry, 1
st
 ed, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Bodansky, D., 2010. The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: a post-mortem. American 
Journal of International Law 104 (2), 230–240. 
Bogdan, R. and Taylor, S.J. 1975. Introduction To Qualitative Research Methods: A 
Phenomenological Approach To The Social Sciences, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Boiral, O., 2006. Global Warming: Should Companies adopt a proactive strategy? Long 
Range planning journal. Available from www.lrpjournal.com. [Accessed on 27 February 
2012]. 
251 
 
Bonson, E. & Escobar, T. 2006. Digital reporting in Eastern European: An empirical study. 
International Journal of Accounting Information System 7, 299-318. 
Booth, J., & Deli, D. 1996. Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by 
CEOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 81-104. 
Bosetti, V., Carraro, C., Massetti, E., Sgobbi, A., Tavoni, M., 2009. Optimal energy 
investment and R&D strategies to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. 
Resource and Energy Economics 31, 123–137. 
Bosetti V, and Victor D.G., 2010. Politics and economics of second-best regulation of 
greenhouse gases: the importance of regulatory credibility. FEEM Nota di Lavoro, 2010-029  
Botosan, C. (1997) “Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital” The Accounting Review. 
72 (3), 323-349. 
Bouteligier, S., 2009. Conceptualizing global environmental consultancy firms as actors in 
global environmental governance. Paper presented at the 2009 Amsterdam Conference on the 
Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 2-4 December, Amsterdam. Available 
at: www.earthsystemgovernance.org/ac2009/papers/AC2009-0255.pdf.  Accessed 2 March, 
2012).  
Bowen, F.E. 1999. Does organisational slack stimulate implementation of environmental 
initiatives? Paper presented at the 10
th
 International Association of Business and  Society 
Annual Meeting, Paris. 
Bowen, A., and Ridge, J., 2011. Climate change policy in the United Kingdom. Economics 
working paper series. Centre for Climate change economics and policy, Leeds, UK. 
Bowen, F., & Wittneben, B. 2011. Carbon accounting: negotiating accuracy, consistency and 
certainty across organizational fields. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 24(8), 
1022-1036. 
Bowerman, B.L. and O’Connell, R.T., 1990. Linear Statistical Models: An Applied 
Approach, 2nd. Ed., Duxbury:CA. 
Brammer, S., & Pavelin, S. 2006. Voluntary Environmental Disclosures by Large UK   
Companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(7), 1168-1188. 
252 
 
Brammer, S. & Pavelin, S., 2008. Factors Influencing the Quality of Corporate 
Environmental Disclosure. Business Strategy and the Environment, 17(2), 120- 136. 
 
Brammer, S., Jackson, G., and Matten, D. 2012. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
institutional theory: new perspectives on private governance. Social-Economic Review, 10, 3-
28. 
Bredenkamp, H. and Pattillo, c., 2010. "Financing the Response to Climate Change." 
International Monetary Fund, Staff Position Note SPN10/06, Mar 2010. 
 
Brehm, J.W., and Brehm, S.S., 1981. Psychological Reactance. Wiley: New York. 
 
Brenner, S. N., & Cochran, P. 1991. The stakeholder theory of the firm: Implications for 
business and society theory and research. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Association for Business and Society, Sundance, UT. 
 
Broberg, P., Tagesson, T., and Collin, S., 2009. What explains variation in voluntary 
disclosure? A study of the annual reports of corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange.  Journal of Management and Governance. 14 (4).  
Brown, P.G., 1998: Toward and economics of stewardship: the case of climate. Ecological 
Economics, 26, 11–21. 
Bryman, A. and Cramer, D. 1997. Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS for Windows. 
London, UK: Routledge. 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E. 2003. Business research methods. New York: Oxford University 
Press 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E. 2007. Business Research Methods (2nd Edition), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Buhr, N. 1998. Environmental Performance, Legislation And Annual Report Disclosure: The 
Case Of Acid Rain And Falconbridge. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
11(2), 163-190. 
253 
 
Buhr, N. 2002. A Structuration View on the Initiation of Environmental Reports. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 13(1),17–38. 
Buniamin, S.; Alrazi, B.; Johari, N. & Rahman, N. 2008. An Investigation of the Association 
between Corporate Governance and Environmental Reporting in  Malaysia. Asian Journal 
of Business and Accounting, 1(2), 639-647. 
Burrell, G., and Morgan, G., 1979. Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis, 
London, Heinemann 
Buzby, S. L. 1975. Company size, listed versus unlisted stocks, and the extent of financial 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 13(1), 16–37. 
Bushman, R.M., and Smith, A.J., 2001. Financial accounting information and corporate 
governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32, 237-333. 
 
Cadbury Committee (Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Sir 
Adrian Cadbury, chair), 1992, Report (Gee and Company Ltd, London). 
 
Campbell, D. 2000. Legitimacy theory or managerial reality construction? corporate social 
disclosure in Marks and Spencer Plc corporate reports, 1969-1997. Accounting Forum, 24(1), 
80-100. 
 
Campbell, D, Moore, G and Shrives, P. 2006. Cross-Sectional Effects in Community 
Disclosure. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 19(1), 96-114. 
 
Camfferman, K. & Cooke, T. E. 2002. An analysis of disclosure in the annual reports of  
U.K. and Dutch companies. Journal of International Accounting Research (1), 3-30. 
 
Carbon Disclosure Project. 2007. Available from http://www.trucost.com/published-
research/17/carbon-disclosure-project-report-2007-uk-ftse-350. [accessed on 18 January 
2012]. 
 
Carbon Disclosure Project, 2008. Carbon disclosure project report for FTSE 350: building 
business resilience to inevitable climate change. Available from 
254 
 
https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/65_329_211_Acclimatise_CDP6_FTSE_350_Buildin
g_Business_Resilience_HR%20(2).pdf. [Accessed on 9 February 2012]. 
 
Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011. URL: https://www.cdproject.net/en-
US/WhatWeDo/Pages/overview.aspx.{accessed on 4 July 2012].  
 
Carbon Disclosure Project, 2012. The future of reporting: CDP FTSE 350 Climate Change 
Report. Available from  http://www.lpfa.org.uk/Files/Files/Investment/CDP-FTSE-350-
Climate-Change-Report-2012.pdf. [ Accessed on 6 September 2013]. 
 
Carrington, D. 2010. EU emissions trading scheme on course to make tiny savings, says 
report. The Guardian Newspaper. Available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/sep/10/eu-emissions-trading-savings. 
[Accessed on 9 December 2011]. 
Carbon Trust, 2012a. Climate Change Strategy. Available from 
http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/policy-legislation/Pages/Default.aspx. [Accessed on February 
15, 2012]. 
Carbon Trust 2012b. The EU Emission Trading Scheme. Available from 
http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/policy-legislation/energy-intensive-industries/pages/euets.aspx. 
[Accessed on February 15 2012]. 
Carmines, E.G., & Zeller, R.A. 1991. Reliability and Validity Assessment. London: Sage. 
Carter, S. 2006. The interaction of top management group, stakeholder and situational factors 
on certain corporate reputation management activities. Journal of Management Studies,43, 
1145–1176. 
Carroll, A. B. 1989. Business and society: Ethics and stakeholder management. Cincinnati, 
OH: South-Western. 
CBI, 2011. Consultation on reporting and measuring of GHG emissions by UK 
companies.URL: 
http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/528822/066710BA25ABDD68802578C40050EE10__CBI%20
GHG%20Submission%20July%202011.pdf. [accessed on 30 September 2012]. 
255 
 
Cerf R 1961. Corporate Reporting and Investment Decisions. Berkeley, CA: The University 
of California Press. 
 
Charles H. Cho, C.H., Freedman, M., and Patten, D.M., 2012. Corporate disclosure of 
environmental capital expenditures: A test of alternative theories. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 25(3), 486 – 507. 
Chau, G.K. and Gray, S.J. 2002. Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. The International Journal of Accounting, 37,  247-65. 
Chen, C.J.P. and Jaggi, B. 2000. Association between independent non-executive directors, 
family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 19, 285-310. 
 
Cho, C.H. and Patten, D.M. 2007. The role of environmental disclosures as tools of 
legitimacy: a research note. Accounting, Organizations and Society,  32(7/8), 639-47. 
 
Cho, C. H., Freedman, M., & Patten, D. M. 2012. Corporate disclosure of environmental 
capital expenditures: A test of alternative theories. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 25(3), 486–507 
 
Choi, B.B., Lee, D., and Psaros, J., 2013. An analysis of Australian company carbon emission 
disclosures. Pacific Accounting Review, 25(1), 58-79. 
 
Choi, F.D. 1974. Financial disclosure in relation to a firm’s capital costs. Accounting and 
Business Research, Autumn: 282-292. 
 
Chow, C. W. and Wong-Boren, A. 1987. Voluntary financial disclosure by Mexican 
corporations. The Accounting Review, 62(3), 533–541. 
 
Christopher, T. and Hassan, S. 1996. Determinants of Voluntary Cash Flow Reporting: 
Australian Evidence.  Accounting Research Journal, 19, 113-124. 
 
256 
 
Clarkson, M. B. E. 1991. Defining, evaluating, and managing corporate social performance: 
A stakeholder management model. In J. E. Post (Ed.), Research in corporate social 
performance and policy: 331-358. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
 
Clarkson, M. 1995. A stakeholder framework for analysing and evaluating corporate social 
performance, Academy of Management Review, 92–117. 
 
Clarkson, P.M., Li, Y., Richardson, G.D., and Vasvari, F.P. 2008. Revisiting the relation 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure: An empirical analysis. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(4/5), 303-327. 
 
Clarke, L., J. Edmonds, V. Krey, R. Richels, S. Rose, and M. Tavoni, M, 2009: International 
climate policy architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios, Energy 
Economics 31(Supplement 2): S64-S81. 
 
Climate Change: The UK programme 2006. Available from 
http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/pdf/BRAG_CC_ClimateChangeTheUKProgramme.pdf. [Accessed 
on 8 February 2012]. 
 
Climate Change Act 2008. URL: www.elaw.org/system/files/ukpga_20080027_enpdf . 
[accessed on 5 December 2011]. 
 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board, 2010. Climate Change Reporting Framework – edition 
1.0. Available from http://www.cdsb.net/. (accessed on 6 December 2011)  
Collier, P., Zaman, M., 2000. Convergence in European corporate governance: the audit 
committee concept. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(6),753-68. 
Collis, J., and Hussey, R. 2003. Business Research: a practical guide for undergraduate and 
post-graduate students, 2
nd
 edition, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. 2011. Signaling Theory: A 
Review and Assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 39-67 
257 
 
Converse, J.M., and Presser, S. 1986. Survey Questions: Handcrafting the Standardized 
Questionnaire, Newbury Park CA: Sage.  
Cotter, J., and Najar, M., 2011. Institutional investor influence on global climate change 
disclosure practices. Available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1760633. [Accessed on 7 March 2012]. 
Cooke, T.E. 1989. Disclosure in the corporate annual report of Swedish companies. 
,Accounting and Business Research, 19 (74), 113-124. 
 
Cowen, S.S., Ferreri, L.B. And Parker, L.D. 1987. The Impact of Corporate Characteristics 
on Social Responsibility Disclosure: A Typology and Frequency-Based Analysis. 
Accounting, Organisations and Society, 12(2), 111-122. 
Cormier, D. and Magnan, M. 1999. Corporate environmental disclosure strategies: 
Determinants, cost and benefits”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 14(4), 
429-451. 
Cormier D. & Gordon I.M. 2001. An examination of social and environmental reporting 
strategies. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 14(5), 587-616. 
Cormier, D., Gordon, I. M., & Magnan, M. 2004. Corporate environmental disclosure: 
Contrasting management’s perceptions with reality. Journal of Business Ethics, 49(2), 143–
165.  
Cormier, D., Magnan, M., & Van Velthoven, B. 2005. Environmental disclosure quality in 
large German companies: Economic incentives, public pressures or institutional conditions? 
European Accounting Review, 14(1), 3–39. 
Cormier, D., and Magnan, M., 2007. The revisited contribution of environmental reporting to 
investors’ valuation of a firm’s earnings: An international perspective. Ecological Economics, 
62(3/4), 613-626. 
Cormier, D., Ledoux, M., Magnan, M. and Aerts, W. 2011. Corporate Governance and 
Information Asymmetry between Managers And Investors. Corporate Governance, 10(5), 
574-589. 
258 
 
Crawford, E. & Williams, C. 2010. Should corporate social reporting be voluntary or 
mandatory? Evidence from the banking sector in France and the United States. Corporate 
Governance. Bradford, 10(4), 512-26 
CRC, 2011. CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme. Available from https://www.gov.uk/crc-
energy-efficiency-scheme. [Accessed on 8March 2012]. 
Creswell, J. 1994. Research Design: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, Thousand 
Oaks, CA, Sage. 
Creswell, J. W. 2003. Research design: qualitative and quantitative approaches. Thousand 
Oaks, California Sage Publications, Inc. 
Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Johnson, J.L. and Ellstrand, A.E. 1999. Number of Directors And 
Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 674-686. 
Darnall, N., Henriques, I., and Sadorsky, P., 2010. Adopting proactive environmental 
strategy: The influence of stakeholders and firm size. Journal of management studies, 47, 
pp.1072–1094. 
David P, Bloom M, Hillman AJ. 2007. Investor activism, managerial responsiveness and 
corporate social performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(1), 91– 100. 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22, 20–47. 
Day, R., and Woodward, T., 2009. CSR reporting and the UK financial services sector. 
Journal of Applied Accounting, 10(3). 
Delbeke, Jos (ed.), 2006. EU Environmental Law: The EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Scheme, volume IV of the EU Energy Law series, Leuven Belgium: Claeys & 
Casteels, 2006 
Deegan, C.M. and Carrol, G. 1993. An analysis of the incentives for Australian firms to apply 
for reporting excellence awards. Accounting and Business Research,  23(91), 219-27. 
 
259 
 
Deegan, C. and Gordon, B., 1996. A study of the environmental disclosure practices of 
Australian Corporations. Accounting and Business Research, 26(3), 187-99.  
 
Deegan, C. 2000. Financial Accounting Theory, McGraw Hill Book Company, Sydney. 
 
Deegan, C., 2002. The legitimising effect of social and environmental disclosures – A 
theoretical foundation. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15(3), 282-311. 
Deegan, C., Rankin, M. and Tobin, J., 2002. An examination of the corporate social and 
environmental disclosures of BHP from 1983-1997. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 15(3), 312-43. 
Deegan,C. and Rankin, M.,  1996. Do Australian companies report environmental news 
objectively?: An analysis of environmental disclosures by firms prosecuted successfully by 
the Environmental Protection Authority. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
9(2), 50 – 67. 
Deegan, C. and Samkin, G., 2009. New Zealand Financial Accounting. McGraw-Hill, 
Sydney. 
Deegan, C., and Unerman, G., 2011. Financial Accounting Theory. Second European Edition, 
McGraw- Hill. 
Deephouse, D.L. 1996. Does isomorphism legitimate? Academy of Management Journal, 39, 
1024-1039. 
DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 2002. The UK emissions 
trading scheme. Auction analysis and progress report. October 2002. Online at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/uk/pdf/trading-progress.pdf. 
[Accessed on 3 October 2011]. 
DEFRA, 2006. Appraisal of years 1-4 of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme. Available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090908171815/http:/www.defra.gov.uk/environ
ment/climatechange/trading/uk/pdf/ukets1-4yr-appraisal.pdf. [Accessed on 4 January 2012]. 
260 
 
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2007. Consultation on the 
recommendations of the Climate Change Simplification Project: Climate Change Instruments 
– areas of overlap and options for simplification. 
DEFRA, 2009. Guidance on how to measure and report your greenhouse gas emissions. 
Available from www.defra.gov.uk. [Accessed on 2 October 2010]. 
DEFRA, 2010. Review of the Contribution of Reporting to GHG Emissions Reductions and 
Associated Costs and Benefits. Available from 
http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/imagelibrary/downloadMedia.ashx?MediaDetailsID=18
33. Accessed on March 25, 2012.  
Deloitte, 2007. Accounting for Emission Rights. Available from 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom- 
Australia/Local%20Assets/Documents/Deloitte_Accounting_Emissionright_Feb07.pdf. 
[Accessed on 5 February 2012]. 
Deloitte, 2011. Carbon reporting to date: Seeing the wood for the trees. A survey of Carbon 
Reporting Practices in UK listed companies. Available from https://www.cdproject.net/en-
US/Results/Documents/deloitte-carbon-survey-nov-2010.pdf [Accessed on 27 June 2012].  
 
Deloitte, 2012. Accounting Standards Updates by Jurisdictions. Available from 
http://www.iasplus.com/country/uk.htm. [Accessed on February 29, 2012]. 
 
de Muizon G, and Glachant, M., 2004. The UK climate change levy agreements: combining 
negotiated agreements with tax and emissions trading. In: Baranzini A, Talman P (eds) 
Voluntary approaches in climate policy: an economic assessment of public-private 
partnership. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
 
Denzin, N.K. 1978. 1'he research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
261 
 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. 2003. The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research. in 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds.) Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials, 2
nd
 ed, 
SAGE Publications, Inc., California, pp.1-45. 
 
Depoers, F. 2000. A cost-benefit study of voluntary disclosure: some empirical evidence 
from French listed companies. The European Accounting Review, 9(2), 245-63. 
Dernbach, J.C., 2008. Achieving Early and Substantial Green House Gas reductions under 
the Post Kyoto Agreement. Available from 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1076&context=john_dernbach. 
[Accessed on November 20, 2011].   
DETR, 2000. Climate change: the UK programme. HMSO, Norwich, UK. 
De Vaus, D.A. 2002. Surveys in Social Research, 5th edn., Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
De Villiers, C., Naiker, V., Van Staden, C.J., 2011. The effect of board characteristics on firm 
environmental performance. Journal of Management, 37(6), 1636-1663. 
Diamond, D. W. 1985. Optimal release of information by firms. The Journal of Finance 40 
(September): 1071-1094. 
Dillman, D. 2000. Constructing the questionnaire. Mail and internet surveys. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
DiMaggio, P.J., and Powell, W., 1983. The iron cage revisited- institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147- 60. 
 
DiMaggio, P. J. 1988. Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), 
Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment (pp. 4-21). Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company. 
 
Dixon, R., Milton, K. and Woodhead, A. 2005. An Investigation into the Role, Effectiveness 
and Future of Non-Executive Directors. Journal of General Management, 31(1),1-21. 
 
262 
 
Dragomir, V.D., 2012. The disclosure of industrial greenhouse gas emissions: a critical 
assessment of corporate sustainability reports. Journal of Cleaner Production, 30, 222-237. 
 
Dobbs, S., and Van Staden, C., 2012. Motivation for corporate social and environmental 
reporting: New Zealand Evidence. Paper presented at Macqaurie University. 
http://www.businessandeconomics.mq.edu.au/our_departments/accounting_and_corporate_g
overnance/accounting_finance_research/accg_research_seminars/past_research_seminars/Chr
is_van_Staden/Motivations_for_Corporate_Social_and_Environmenta l_Reporting_-
_Dr_Chris_van_Staden.pdf 
 
Doh, J. P. and Guay, T. R. 2006. Corporate social responsibility, public policy, and NGO 
activism in Europe and the United States: an institutional-stakeholder perspective.. Journal of 
Management Studies, 43, 47–73. 
 
Donaldson, L. 1985. In defence of organisation theory: A reply to the critics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. 1991. Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance 
and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16: 49-64. 
 
Donaldson, L. 2008. Ethics problems and problems with ethics: Toward a pro-management 
theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 78: 299–311. 
 
Doniger, D., 2009, ‘The Copenhagen Accord: a big step forward’, Switchboard, 21 December 
available at http:// 
switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/the_copenhagen_accord_a_big_st.html.  
 
Donnelly, R., and Mulcahy, M., 2008.  Board Structure, Ownership, and Voluntary 
Disclosure in Ireland. Corporate Governance: an international review. 16(5), 416-429. 
 
Donaldson, T. and Preston, L.1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts, 
evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review, 21, 65–91. 
 
263 
 
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. 1994. Towards a unified conception of business ethics: 
Integrative social contracts theory. Academy of Management Review, 19: 252-284. 
 
Dowling, J. and Pfeffer, J., 1975. Organizational legitimacy: social values and organizational 
behaviour. Pacific Sociological Review, 18(1), 122-36. 
 
Dragomir, V. D. 2012. The disclosure of industrial greenhouse gas emissions: a critical 
assessment of corporate sustainability reports. Journal of Cleaner Production, 222-37. 
 
Dunn, P., 2004. The Impact of Insider Power on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Journal  of 
Management, 30(3), 397–412.  
 
Dye, R.A., 1985. Disclosure of Non-proprietary Information. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 23(1), 123-145. 
 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Jackson, P. 2008. Management Research, 3
rd
 ed, Sage 
Publications Ltd, London. 
 
Einhorn, E., 2005. The nature of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 43, 593-621. 
 
Elijido-Ten, E., Kloot, L., and Clarkson, P., 2010. Extending the application of stakeholder 
influence strategies to environmental disclosures : An exploratory study from a developing 
country. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal. 23(10). 
 
Elkington, J. 1999. Triple bottom-line reporting: looking for balance.  Australian CPA 69, 18- 
21.  
Elzahar, H.; Hussainey, K. 2012. Determinants of narrative risk disclosures in UK interim 
reports. The Journal of Risk Finance 13 (2), 133–147. 
Eriksson, P. and Kovalainen, A. 2008. Qualitative Methods in Business Research, 1
st
 ed, 
SAGE Publications Ltd., London. 
264 
 
Eng, L.L. and Mak, Y.T., 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 22(4), 325-345. 
 
Enkvist, P., Naucle´r, T. and Oppenheim, J. 2008. Business strategies for climate change. 
McKinsey Quarterly, 2, 24-33. 
 
Environmental Resources Management, 2010. Company GHG emissions reporting: A study 
on methods and initiatives. A report prepared for the European Union. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pubs/pdf/ERM_GHG_Reporting_final.pdf. Accessed 
February 28 2012. [Accessed on 6 October 2011]. 
 
Evan, W. M., & Freeman, R. E. 1988. A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kant-
ian capitalism. In T. Beauchamp & N. Bowie (Eds.), Ethical theory and business: 75-93. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Ewing, R.,Keith, B., Steve, W.,Jerry, W., Don, C., 2008. Growing Cooler: The Evidence on 
Urban Development and Climate Change, Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute, Smart 
Growth America, Center for Clean Air Policy, and National Center for Smart Growth 
Education and Research. 
 
Falkner R., H. Stephan and J. Vogler. 2010. International climate policy after Copenhagen: 
towards a building blocks approach. Global Policy 1: 252-262. 
 
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. 1983. Separation of ownership and control‘, Journal of Law and 
Economics, June: 301-325. 
Fan, J., and Wong, T. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of 
accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3), 401–25. 
Field, A., 2009. Discovering statistics using SPSS.3
rd
 Edition. Sage publishers, London 
Fields TD, Lys TZ, Vincent L 2001. Empirical research on accounting choice. J Account 
Econ 31,255–307. 
265 
 
Firth, M. 1979. The impact of size, stock market listing, and auditors on voluntary disclosure 
in corporate annual reports, Accounting and Business Research, 273–280. 
 
Firth, M. 1980.Raising Finance and Firms' Corporate Reporting Policies., Abacus, June, 
pp. 100115. 
 
Fisher, C. 2010. Researching and Writing a Dissertation, An Essential Guide For Business 
Students, Pearson Education Limited, Essex.  
 
Florides, G., and Christodoulides, P., 2008. Global warming and carbon dioxide through 
sciences. Review Article. Environmental International. Available from. 
http://pdn.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MiamiImageURL&_cid=271763&_user=1682380
&_pii=S0160412008001232&_check=y&_origin=article&_zone=toolbar&_coverDate=28-
Feb-2009&view=c&originContentFamily=serial&wchp=dGLbVlt-
zSkWA&md5=4bae8926f68b73c2e805d7598dbd68e4/1-s2.0-S0160412008001232-
main.pdf. [Accessed on 7 March 2012]. 
 
Forker, J. R. 1992. Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality. Accounting and Business 
Research 22(86), 111-124. 
 
Forster, P., Ramaswamy, V., Artaxo, P., Berntsen, T., Betts, R., Fahey, D. W., Haywood, J., 
Lean, J., Lowe, D. C., Myhre, G., Nganga, J., Prinn, R., Raga, G., Schulz, M., and Van 
Dorland, R.: Radiative Forcing of Climate Change, in Climate Change 2007: The Physical 
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, 
Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H. L. Miller, pp. 129–234, Cambridge 
Univ. Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 2007. 
 
Forza, C., 2002. Survey research in operations management, International Journal of 
Operations and Production Management, 22 (2), 152-194. 
Freedman, M. and Stagliano, A. J. 1992. European unification, accounting harmonization, 
and social disclosures. The International Journal of Accounting and Education 27 (2), 112-
22. 
266 
 
 
Freedman, M. and Jaggi, B. 2005. Global warming, commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, and 
accounting disclosures by the largest global public firms from polluting industries. The 
International Journal of Accounting, 40(3), 215-32.  
Freeman, R., 1984. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Marshall: Pitman 
Frooman, J., 1999. Stakeholder influence strategies. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 
24 No. 2, pp. 191-205. 
Furrer, B., 2010. Corporate Climate change strategies and their determinants: An analysis of 
banks’ responses to climate change. PhD unpublished Thesis. Available from 
http://www.ine.zhaw.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/engineering/_Institute_und_Zentren/INE/Publ
ikationen/Dissertation_Bettina_Furrer_E-Collection.pdf. Accessed on 20 February 2012. 
Furrer, B., Swoboda, M., & Hoffmann, V. H. 2009. Banking and climate change: 
opportunities and risks.: 51. Zurich: SAM Sustainable Asset Management. 
Galbreath, J., 2010. Corporate Governance Practices that address climate change: an 
exploratory study. Business Strategy and the Environment, 19, 335-350. 
Gelb, D.S., 2000. Managerial ownership and accounting disclosures: an empirical study. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 15, 169-185. 
Ghafran,  C. M, and O'Sullivan N. 2013. The Governance Role of Audit Committees: 
Reviewing a Decade of Evidence. International Journal of Management Reviews, 15, 4, 381-
407. 
Ghauri, P. and Grønhaug, K. 2002. Research methods in business studies: a practical guide. 
2nd ed. Harlow: Prentice Hall. 
Ghazali, N. 2007. Ownership structure and corporate social responsibility disclosure: some 
Malaysian evidence. Journal corporate governance 7 (3), 251-266. 
Gibson, K., & O'Donovan, G. 2007. Corporate Governance and Environmental Reporting: 
An Australian Study. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(5), 944-956. 
Gillan SL, Starks LT. 2007. The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States.  
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(1),55–73. 
267 
 
Gill, J., and Johnson, P. 2002. Research Methods for Managers (3
rd
 edn), London, Sage 
Publications. 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol, 2004. A corporate accounting and reporting standard. Available 
from:  http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/public/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf. [Accessed on 
8 October 2011].  
 
Giner, B. 1997. The influence of company characteristics and accounting regulation on 
information disclosed by Spanish firms. European Accounting Review, 6(1), 45-68. 
 
Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure, 2006. A statement of investor expectations 
for comprehensive corporate disclosure. Available from 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/global_framework.pdf [accessed on 10 
December 2011].  
 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 2006. Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Available from 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3-Sustainability-Reporting-Guidelines.pdf 
[accessed on 10 December 2011].  
 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 2013. What is GRI? Available from 
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-is-GRI/Pages/default.aspx. 
[Accessed on 23 September 2013]. 
 
Gore, A., 2004. The effects of GAAP regulation and bond market interaction on local 
government disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (1), 23-52. 
 
Graham, J.R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. 2005. The Economic Implications of Corporate 
Financial Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(3), 3-73. 
Gray, R., Kouhy, R. and Lavers, S. 1995a. Corporate social and environmental reporting. A 
review of the literature and a longitudinal study of UK disclosure. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 8(2), 47-77. 
268 
 
Gray, R., Kouhy, R., & Lavers, S. 1995b. Methodological themes – construction research 
database of social and environmental reporting by UK companies. Accounting Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 8(2), 78–101 
 
Gray, R.H. and Bebbington, J. 2000. Environmental Accounting, Managerialism and 
Sustainability: Is the Planet Safe in the Hands of Business?’Advances in Environmental 
Accounting and Management, 1: 1–44. 
 
Gray, R., Owen D. and Adams, C. 1996. Accounting and Accountability, Prentice Hall 
Europe, Great Britain. 
 
Gray, R., Javad, M., Power, D.M., and Sinclair, C.D., 2001. Social and Environmental 
Disclosure and Corporate Characteristics: A Research Note and Extension’, Journal of 
Business Finance& Accounting, 28(3/4), 327–56. 
 
Greene WH. 2008. Econometric Analysis 6th edn. Pearson: NJ. 
 
Greve, H.R. 2000. Market niche entry decisions: Competition, learning, and strategy in 
Tokyo banking, 1894-1936. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 816-836. 
 
Griffiths, A., Haigh, N. and Rassias, J. 2007. A framework for understanding institutional 
governance systems and climate change: the case of Australia. European Management 
Journal, 25(6), 415-27. 
 
Griffin, P., Lont, D., and Sun, Y., 2011. The Relevance to Investors of Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Disclosures. Available from  
http://www.asb.unsw.edu.au/schools/accounting/Documents/D.%20Lont%20-
%20The%20Relevance%20to%20Investors%20of%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Emission%20
Disclosures.pdf . [accessed on 12 November 2012]. 
Grubb, M., Vrolijk, C. and Brack, D. 1999. The Kyoto Protocol: A guide and assessment. 
Washington: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
269 
 
Guenter, E., and Stechemesser, K., 2011. Carbon Accounting: A systematic review of 
literature. Available from http://tu-
dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/fakultaet_wirtschaftswissenschaften/bwl/bu/forschung
/download/dateien/Gnther%20%20Stechemesser%20(2011)%20Carbon%20Accounting.pdf. 
[Accessed on February 29, 2012]. 
Guidry, R., and Patten, D., 2012. Voluntary disclosure theory and financial control variables: 
An assessment of recent environmental disclosure research. Accounting Forum, 36, 81-90. 
Gul, F. A. and Leung, S., 2004. Board Leadership, Outside Directors’ Expertise and 
Voluntary Corporate Disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23, 351–379. 
Gupta, J. 2010. A History of International Climate Change Policy. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Climate Change 1, 636–653. 
Guthrie, J., & Parker, L.D. 1989. Corporate social reporting: a rebuttal of legitimacy theory.  
Accounting and Business Research, 19 (76), 343-352. 
Guthrie, J., & Parker, L. D. 1990. Corporate social disclosure practice: a comparative 
international analysis. Advances in Public Interest Accounting, 3,(2), 159-175. 
Hackston, D. and Milne, J.M. 1996. Some determinants of social and environmental 
disclosures in New Zealand companies. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
9(1), 77-108. 
Halme, M., and Huse, M. 1997. The Influence of Corporate Governance, Industry and 
Country Factors on Environmental Reporting. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 13(2), 
137-157 
Haniffa, R. M. & Cooke, T. E. 2002. Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in 
Malaysian corporations, Abacus, 38 (3), 317–349. 
Haniffa, R. M. and T. E. Cooke, T.E., 2005. The Impact of Culture and Governance on 
Corporate Social Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24, 391–430. 
 
Haque, S. and C. Deegan, 2010. An Exploration of Corporate Climate Change-related 
270 
 
Governance Practices and Related Disclosures: Evidence from Australia, Australian 
Accounting Review, 20 (4), 317-333. 
 
Hassan, O.A.G., Romilly, P., Giorgioni, G., & Power, D. 2009. The value relevance 
of disclosure: Evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 44(1), 79-102. 
 
Hassan, O., and Marston, C., 2010. Disclosure Measurement in the Empirical 
Accounting Literature: A Review Article. Woking paper no. 10-18. Brunel University. 
Available from http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/5047/1/1018%5B1%5D.pdf. 
[Accessed on 6 April 2012]. 
 
Hassan, N.T. 2010. Corporate social responsibility disclosure: an examination of framework 
of determinants and consequences. Doctoral thesis, Durham University. 
 
Hatch, M.J. and Cunliffe, A.L. 2006. Organisational Theory, 2
nd
 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
Hausman, D. 1992. Essays on Philosophy and Economic Methodology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Haveman, H. 1993. Follow the leader. Mimetic isomorphism, and entry into new markets. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 593-627. 
 
Hearit, K.M., 1995. Mistakes were made: organizations, apologia, and crises of social 
Legitimacy. Communication Studies,  46(1), 1-17. 
 
Healy, P. M. & Palepu, K. G. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the 
capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 31, 405–440.  
 
271 
 
Heitzman, S.,Wasley, C. and Zimmerman, J., 2010. The joint effects of materiality thresholds 
and voluntary disclosure incentives on firm’s disclosure decisions. Journal of accounting and 
economics, 49 (1–2), 109–132. 
 
Helpburn, C., 2007. Carbon Trading: A Review of the Kyoto Mechanisms. Available from 
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.energy.32.053006.141203?journalCo
de=energy. [Accessed on 5 November 2011]. 
 
Hess, D.: 2008. The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance 
Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue and Development. Business Ethics Quarterly, 18(4), 447–
482. 
Hesse, A 2006, Climate and corporations - Right answers or wrong questions? 
http://www.sd-m.de/files/Hesse_Climate_and_Corporations_CDP.pdf. [Accessed on 26 
November 2011. 
Hill, C.W.L. and Jones T.M. 1992. Stakeholder-agency theory. Journal of Management 
Studies, 29, 131–154. 
 
Hillman, A.J., Keim, G.D., and Luce, R.A., 2001. Board composition and stakeholder 
performance: Do stakeholder directors make a difference? Business and Society,  40(3), 295-
314. 
 
Ho, L. J., & Taylor, M. E. 2007. An empirical analysis of triple bottom-line reporting and  its 
determinants: evidence from the United States and Japan. Journal of  international Financial 
Management and Accounting, 18(2), 123-150. 
 
Ho, S.S.M. and Wong, K.S. 2001.  A study of corporate disclosure practice and effectiveness 
in Hong Kong. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 12(1), 75-
102. 
Hoffman, A.J., 1996. A strategic response to investor activism”, Sloan Management Review, 
37 (2), 51-64. 
272 
 
Hoffman, A.J., 2005. Climate change strategy:  the business logic behind voluntary 
greenhouse gas reductions. California Management Review, 47(3), 21-46. 
Holden, A. 2004. Choosing the Appropriate Methodology:  Understanding Research 
Philosophy. Available from 
http://repository.wit.ie/1466/1/Choosing_the_Appropriate_Methodology_Understanding_Res
earch_Philosophy_(RIKON_Group).pdf.  [Accessed 9 March 2012]. 
Holland, J. 2005. A grounded theory of corporate disclosure. Accounting and Business 
Research, 35(3), 249–267. 
Holland, L. and Foo, Y. B. 2003. Differences in environmental reporting practices in the UK 
and the US: the legal and regulatory context. The British Accounting Review; 35, 1-18 
 
Hopwood, A., 2009. Accounting and the environment. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 34(3/4), 433-9. 
Holthausen, R. and Leftwich, R. 1983. The economic consequences of accounting choice. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5,77-117 
Hossain, M., Tan, L. M., & Adams, M. 1994. Voluntary disclosure in an emerging capital 
market: some empirical evidence from companies listed on the K.L. Stock Exchange. 
International Journal of Accounting, 29, 334–351. 
Hossain, M., Perera, M. and Rhaman, A. 1995. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
of New Zealand companies’, Journal of International Management and Accounting, 6(1), 
69-87. 
 
Holsti, O. R. (1969). Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities. Reading,Mass: 
Addison-Wesle 
 
273 
 
Houghton, J.T. 2004. Global warming. The complete briefing. 3rd edition. Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press, 351pp. 
 
House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2007. Beyond Stern: From the climate 
change programme review to the climate change bill. Available from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmenvaud/460/460.pdf. 
[Accessed on 9 October 2011]. 
House of Commons, 2012. The EU Emission Trading System. Tenth Report. Available from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenergy/1476/1476.pdf. 
[Accessed on 30 June 2013]. 
Hrasky, S., 2012. Carbon footprints and legitimation strategies: symbolism or action? 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal. 25(1), 174-198.  
Huafang, X., and Jianguo, Y., 2007. Ownership structure, board composition and corporate 
voluntary disclosure: Evidence from listed companies in China. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 22(6), 604 – 619. 
Hufbauer, G. And Kim, J., 2010. Reaching a global agreement on climate change: What are 
the obstacles? Asian economic policy review. Available on 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-3131.2010.01144.x/pdf. [accessed on 4 
January 2012]. 
Hussainey, K., Schleicher, T., & Walker, M. 2003. Undertaking large-scale disclosure studies 
when AIMR-FAF ratings are not available: The case of prices leading earnings. Accounting 
and Business Research, 33 (4), 275-294. 
Hussey, J., and Husey, R., 1997. Business Research. A practical Guide for Undergraduate 
and Postgraduate Students, Palgrave: Basingstoke. 
Hybels, R.C., 1995. On legitimacy, legitimation, and organizations: a critical review and 
integrative theoretical model. Academy of Management Journal, pp. 241-5 (special issue). 
Hussein, M. E. 1996. A comparative study of cultural influences on financial reporting in the 
U.S. and The Netherlands. The International Journal of Accounting, 31(1), 95–120 
274 
 
Ibrahim, W.H.W., Ismail, A.G. and Zabaria, W.N.W.M. 2011. Disclosure, risk and 
performance in Islamic banking: A panel data analysis. International Research Journal of 
Finance and Economics, 72, 100-114. 
 
ICAEW, 2009. Turning questions into answers: Environmental issues and annual financial 
reporting. Available from http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Business/TECPLN8045_env_report_aw.pdf. [accessed on 6 
July 2012]. 
 
Ihlen, Ø., 2009. Business and climate change: the climate response of the world’s 30 largest 
corporations. Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture,  3(2), 244-
92. 
 
IPCC, 1990. Climate change: the intergovernmental panel on climate change scientific 
assessment. In: Houghton JT, Jenkins GJ, Ephraums JJ (eds) Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 364 pp 
 
IPCC 1995. Climate change 1995: A report of the intergovernmental panel on climate 
change. Available from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-
assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf. [Accessed on 9 March 2012]. 
 
IPCC, (2001). Climate change 2001: the scientific basis. Available from 
http://www.acrim.com/Reference%20Files/CLIMATECHANGE%202001%20-
%20The%20Scientific%20Basis.pdf. [Accessed on 4 March 2012]. 
 
IPCC, 2007. Climate Change 2007. The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I 
Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
IPCC 2013. Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Climate 
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Summary for Policymakers [Online]. Available: 
www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5-SPM_Approved27Sep2013.pdf 
[Accessed 10/10/13]. 
275 
 
 
IPIECA, 2012. Greenhouse gas emissions reporting: Perspectives on voluntary and regulatory 
regimes. Available from http://www.ipieca.org/publication/greenhouse-gas-emissions-
reporting-perspectives-voluntary-and-regulatory-reporting-mecha. [Accessed on 6 June 
2012].  
Inchausti B. 1997. The influence of company characteristics and accounting regulation on 
information disclosed by Spanish firms. The European Accounting Review 6(1), 45–68. 
Ismail, K. N. I. K., & Chandler, R. 2005. Disclosure in the quarterly reports of Malaysian 
companies. Financial Reporting, Regulation & Governance, 4(1), 1–25. 
 
Jacoby, H.D., Babiker, M.H., Paltsev, S., and Reilly, J.M., 2008. Sharing the Burden of GHG 
Reductions, Joint Program Report Series. 
 
Jager, J., Ferguson, H. L. 1991. Climate change: science, impacts and policy. Proceedings of 
the second world climate conference. Cambridge University Press, New York 
 
Jaggi, B, and Lee P, 2002, Earnings management response to debt covenant violations and 
debt restructuring, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 17, 295-324. 
 
Jenowein, F., Hirigoyen, J., and Probst, D. 2010. Climate change disclosure. Are you ready? 
Implication for real estate. Available from 
http://www.joneslanglasalle.co.uk/Documents/csr/ClimateChangeDisclosure-
AreYouReady.pdf. [Accessed on 9 June 2012].. 
 
Jensen M. C. and Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3,305-360. 
 
Jensen, M. C. and Ruback, R. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50. 
 
276 
 
Jensen, M., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 76, 323–329. 
 
Jensen, M.C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880. 
 
Jensen, M. C. 2001. Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective 
function. Journal of applied corporate finance, 14(3), 8-21. 
 
Jick, T.D. 1979. Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24(4), 602-611. 
 
John, K. and Senbet, L. (1998), ‘‘Corporate governance and board effectiveness’’, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 371-403. 
 
Johnson, R.A., and Greening, D.W., 1999. The effects of corporate governance and 
institutional ownership types on corporate social performance. Academy of management 
journal, 42, 564-576. 
 
Jones, P. D., Wigley, T. M. L., Folland, C. K., Parker, D. E., Angell, J. K., Lebedeff, 
S. & Hansen, J. E. 1988. Evidence for global warming in the past decade, Nature  332, 790. 
 
Jones T. M. 1995. Instrumental stakeholder theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics, 
Academy of Management Review, 20(2), 404-437. 
 
Kalbers, L. P., and Fogarty, T.J., 1993. Audit committee effectiveness: An empirical 
investigation of the contribution of power, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 12, 
24–49. 
 
Kaplan, S.E. and Ruland, R.G., 1991. Positive theory, rationality and accounting regulation. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2(4), 361-74. 
 
277 
 
Kent, p., and Chan, C., 2003. Application of Stakeholder Theory to the Quantity and Quality 
of Australian Voluntary Corporate Environmental Disclosures. Available from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=447901. [Accessed on 4 March 2012]. 
 
Kinnear, T.C. and Taylor, J.R. 1991. Marketing Research, an Applied Approach, 1st 
edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Companies. 
 
Kent, R., Lee, M., 1999. Using the Internet for Market Research: A Study of Private Trading 
on the Internet. Journal of Market Research Society, 41(4), 377 – 342. 
 
Key, S., 1999. Toward a new theory of the firm: a critique of stakeholder theory. 
Management Decision, 37(4), 317-328. 
 
Kiel G, Nicholson G 2003. Board Composition and Corporate Performance: How the 
Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 189–205. 
 
Kiernan, M.,  2008. Climate change and investment risk. Presentation to: The Amsterdam 
Global Conference on Sustainability and Transparency. 
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/C4B276F8-BDAA-4AD1-BBA0- 
CF09016121C3/0/CarbonDisclosureMatthewKiernan.pdf. [Accessed 30 Nov. 2011]. 
 
Knofczynski, G. and Mundfrom, D., 2008. Sample Sizes When Using Multiple Linear 
Regression for Prediction.  Educational and Psychological Measurement 2008 68: 431.  
 
Kock, J., Santalo, J. and Diestre, L., 2012. Corporate governance and the environment: what 
type of governance creates greener companies? Journal of Management Studies, 49, 492–
514. 
Kolk, A. 2010. Social and sustainability dimensions of regionalization and 
(semi)globalization. Multinational Business Review, 18(1), 51-72. 
 
Kolk, A. and Levy, D. 2001. Winds of change: corporate strategy, climate change and oil 
multinationals. European Management Journal, 19(5), 501–509. 
278 
 
 
Kolk, A., and Pinkse, J., 2004. Market strategies for climate change. European  Management 
Journal, 22, 304-314. 
 
Kolk, A., Levy, D., and Pinkse, J. 2008. Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate 
Regime: The Institutionalisation and Commensuration of Carbon Disclosures. European 
Accounting Review. 17(4), 719 – 745.  
 
Kolk, A., and Pinkse, J., 2010. The Integration of Corporate Governance in CorporateSocial 
Responsibility Disclosures. Corporate Social Responsibility and  Environmental 
Management, 17, 15-26. 
Kotter, J., & Heskett, J. 1992. Corporate culture and performance. New York: Free Press. 
Kou, W., & Hussain, S. 2007. Predictive gains to segmental disclosure matrices, geographic 
information and industry sector comparability. The British Accounting Review, 39(3), 183-
195. 
 
KPMG, 2008. International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2008, KPMG, 
Amsterdam. 
 
KPMG  Australia, 2008. Climate Change: Current accounting and tax issues for Australian 
Business leaders. Sydney. 
 
Krauss, S. E. 2005. Research paradigms and meaning making: A primer. The Qualitative 
Report. 10(4):758-770. http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR10-4/krauss.pdf. [Accessed on 4 
March 2012]. 
 
Krippendorff, K. 1980. Content Analysis: An Introduction To Its Methodology, USA: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
 
Krippendorff, K., 2004. Content Analysis, an Introduction to Its Methodology, 2nd Edition. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
279 
 
 
Kumar, P., and Zattoni, A. 2013. Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, and Firm 
Performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(4), 311-313. 
 
Kulovesi, K., 2007. The private sector and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: 
Experiences, Challenges and prospects. Review of the European Community and 
International Environmental Law. 
 
Kumar, R. 1999. Research methodology: a step-by-step guide for beginners. London: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 1997. 
Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, 
Available from: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/background/items/ 
1351.php. [Accessed on 7 October 2011]. 
Laine, M. 2009. Ensuring legitimacy through rhetorical changes? A longitudinal 
interpretation of the environmental disclosures of a leading Finnish chemical company. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 22(7), 1029–1054. 
Lamnek, S. 1993. Qualitative Sozialforschung. Bd. 1. Methodologie. Weinheim: Psychologie 
Verlags Union. 
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of 
corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 31(2), 246-71. 
 
Larrinaga-González, C. and Bebbington, J. 2001. Accounting Change or Institutional 
Appropriation? A Case Study of the Implementation of Environmental Accounting. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 12(3), 269–292. 
 
Larrinaga-González, C., Carrasco-Fenech, F., Caro-González, F. Javier, Correa-Ruiz, C. and 
Páez-Sandubete, J. Maria 2001. The Role of Environmental Accounting in Organisational 
Change: An Exploration of Spanish Companies. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 14(2), 213–239. 
280 
 
 
Lash, J. and Wellington, F. 2007. Competitive advantage on a warming planet. Harvard 
Business Review, 85(3), 95-102. 
Leftwich, R., Watts, R. and Zimmerman, J. 1981. Voluntary corporate disclosure: the case of 
interim reporting. Journal of Accounting Research, 19, 50-77. 
Lee, T.A. 1994. The Changing Form of the Corporate Annual Report. Accounting Historians 
Journal, 215-232. 
Lee, S, Park, Y, and Klassen, R., 2013. Market responses to firms’ voluntary climate change 
information disclosure and carbon communication. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management.  Available from       
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/csr.1321/pdf. [accessed on 20 September 2013]. 
Le Treut, H., Somerville, R., Cubasch, U., Ding, Y., Mauritzen, C., Mokssit, A., Peterson, T. 
And Prather, M. 2007. Historical overview of climate change, in: S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. 
Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor & H. L. Miller (Eds). Climate 
Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Leung, S. and Horwitz, B. 2004. Director ownership and voluntary segment disclosure: Hong 
Kong experience. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 15(3), 
235-260. 
 
Lewis, B., Walls, J., and Dowell, G. 2013. Difference in Degrees: CEO characteristics and 
firm environmental disclosure. Strategic Management Journal, 10.1002/smj. 
 
Li, J., Mangena, M., & Pike, R. 2012. The effect of audit committee characteristics on 
intellectual capital disclosure. The British Accounting Review, 44(2), 98-110. 
 
Lindblom, C.K., 1994. The implication of organizational legitimacy for corporate social 
performance and disclosure. Presented at the Critical Perspectives Conference. 
 
281 
 
Lindzen, R., 1992. Global Warming: The Origin and Nature of the Alleged Scientific 
Consensus. Problems of Sustainable Development. 5(2).  
 
Lindzen, R., 2010. Global Warming: How to approach the science. Available from 
http://gop.science.house.gov/Media/hearings/energy10/nov17/Lindzen.pdf. [Accessed on 8 
March 2012]. 
 
Lipton, M., and J. W. Lorsch. 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. 
Business Lawyer 48 (1), 59-77. 
 
Linsley, P., Shrives, P. 2000. Risk Management and reporting risk in the UK. Journal of Risk, 
3(1), 115-129. 
 
Linsley, P. M., and Shrives, P. J. 2006. Risk reporting: A study of risk disclosures in the 
annual reports of UK companies. British Accounting Review, 38,387-404. 
 
Liu, X., and Anbumozhi, V., 2009. Determinant factors of corporate environmental 
information disclosure: an empirical study of Chinese listed companies. Journal of cleaner 
production, 17(6), 593-600. 
 
Litwin, M.S. 1995. How to Measure Survey Reliability and Validity. London: Sage. 
 
Llena, F., Moneva, J.M., and Hernandez, B., 2007. Environmental disclosures and   
compulsory accounting standards: the case of Spanish annual reports. Business strategy and 
the environment, 16(1), 50–63. 
 
Lorsch, J.W., & MacIver, E. 1989.Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s corporate 
boards. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Lohmann L. 2006. Carbon trading: a critical conversation on climate change, privatisation 
and power. Dev. Dialogue 48(Sept.):32 
Lomborg, B., 2007. Cool It. The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming. 
New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. 
282 
 
 
Lovell, H., Sales de Aguiar, T., Bebbington, J., and Larrinaga-Gonzalez. C., 2010. 
Accounting for Carbon. Available from: http://research-repository.st-
andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/3757/1/ACCA-2010-Accounting-Carbon.pdf. [Accessed 7 
April 2012].   
  
MacKenzie, D. 2009. Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the Politics of 
Carbon Markets. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34 (3–4), 440–55. 
 
Macve, R. and Chen, X. 2010. The equator principles: a success for voluntary codes? 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal,  23(7), 890-919. 
 
Magness, V., 2006. Strategic posture, financial performance, and the environmental 
disclosure: An empirical test of legitimacy theory. Accounting, Auditing, and  Accountability 
Journal, 19(4), 540-563. 
 
Mallin, C., Michelon, G., and Raggi, D. 2013. Monitoring Intensity and Stakeholders’ 
Orientation: How does Governance affect Social and Environmental Disclosure?   Journal of 
Business Ethics, 114, 29-43. 
 
Malone, D., Fries, C. and Jones, T. 1993. An empirical investigation of the extent of 
corporate financial disclosure in the oil and gas industry. Journal of Accounting, Auditing 
and Finance, 8(3), 249-73. 
 
Marston, C. L., & Shrives, P.J. 1991. The use of disclosure indices in accounting research: a 
review article. British Accounting Review, 23 (3, 195-210. 
 
Maslin, M., 2004. Global Warming: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press, USA 
 
Matolcsy, Z., Y. Shan, Y., & Seethamraju, V., 2012. The timing of changes in CEO 
compensation from cash bonus to equity‐based compensation: Determinants and  
performance consequences, Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics,  8,78‐91. 
283 
 
Mangena, M., and Pike, R. 2005. The Effect of Audit Committee Shareholding, Financial 
Expertise and Size on Interim Financial Disclosures. Accounting and Business Research, 35 
(4), 327-349. 
 
Mangena, M. and Tauringana, V. 2007. Corporate compliance with non-mandatory 
statements of best practice: the case of the ASB statement on interim reports. European 
Accounting Review, 16(2), 1-29. 
 
Manne, A. and Richels, R. 2004. US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol: the impact on 
complicance costs and CO2 emissions. Energy Policy, 32(4), 447-454. 
Marcus, A. A. 1993. Business and society: Ethics, government and the world economy. 
Home-wood, IL: Irwin. 
Martin, R.M., 1999. Experimental Economics and empirical testing of discretionary 
disclosure theory. http://www.csupomona.edu/~jis/1999/martin.pdf. [Accessed 5 may 2012]. 
Mason, M. 2008. Transparency for whom? Information disclosure and power in global 
environmental governance. Global Environmental Politics, 8(2), 8-13. 
May, T. 2001. Social Research: Issues, Methods & Process, Buckingham: Open University 
Press 
McColgan P., 2001. Agency theory and corporate governance: a review of the literature from 
a UK perspective. Working paper. Department of Accounting & Finance, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
McGready, M. 2008. Accounting for Carbon.  Accountancy, July: 84–5. 
 
McGregor, P., Swales, J., and Winning M., 2011. A review of the role and remit of the 
committee on climate change. Energy policy. Available from 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.11.007.  
McMurtrie T. 2005. Factors influencing the publication of social performance information: 
An Australian case study. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 
12(3), 129–143. 
284 
 
Meek , G., Roberts, C.B., and Gray, S.J. 1995. Factors influencing voluntary annual report 
disclosures by U.S., U.K. and continental European Multinational corporations. Journal of 
International Business Studies, (Third Quarter Issue), 555-572. 
 
Meyer, J.W., and Rowan, B., 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth 
and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83:340-63. 
 
Michelon, G., and Parbonetti, A., 2012. The effect of corporate governance on sustainability 
disclosure. Journal of Management and Governance, 16, 477-509. 
 
Miller, D. E., & Kunce, J. T. 1973. Prediction and statistical overkill revisited. Measurement 
and Evaluation in Guidance, 6, 157-163. 
 
Milne, M., and Grubnic, S., 2011. Climate change accounting research: Keeping it interesting 
and different. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal. Special Issue. 24(8).  
 
Milne, M.J. and Patten, D. 2002. Securing organizational legitimacy: an experimental 
decision case examining the impact of environmental disclosures. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 15(3), 372-405. 
 
Milne, M.J., & Adler, R.W. 1999. Exploring the reliability of social and environmental 
disclosures content analysis. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 12 (2), 237-256. 
 
Mitchell, J.D., Chia, C.W.L. and Loh, A.S. 1995. Voluntary disclosure of segment 
information: further Australian evidence.  Accounting and Finance, 35(6), 1-13. 
 
Mitchell, V., 1996. Assessing the Reliability and Validity of Questionnaires: an empirical 
example. Journal of Applied Management Studies, 5(2), 199-207. 
 
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R. and Wood, D. J. 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of 
Management Review, 22, 853–86. 
 
285 
 
Miles, S., Hammond, K. and Friedman, A. 2002. Social and Environmental Reporting and 
Ethical Investment, ACCA Research Report No.77 (London: Certified Accountants 
Educational Trust). 
Mobus, J L. 2005. Mandatory Environmental Disclosures in a Legitimacy Theory Context. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 18 (4), 492-517. 
 
Morgan, G. and Smircich, L., 1980. The case for qualitative research, Academy of 
Management Review 5 (4), 491-501. 
 
Morck, R. Vishny, S., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an  empirical 
analysis. Journal of financial economics 20, 293–315. 
 
Mohd Ghazali, N.A. 2007. Ownership structure and corporate social responsibility 
disclosure: some Malaysian evidence. Corporate Governance, 7(3), 251- 265. 
Mohd Ghazali, N.A. and Weetman, P. 2006. Perpetuating traditional influences: voluntary 
disclosure in Malaysia following the economic crisis. Journal of International  Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 15, 226-248.  
Monks R.A.G., and Minow N., 2004. Corporate Governance, 3rd edn. Blackwell: Oxford 
 
Morris, R.D. 1987. Signalling, agency theory and accounting policy choice, Accounting and 
Business Research, 18 (69), 47-56.  
 
Naser, K., Al-Khatib, K. and Karbhari, Y. 2002. Empirical Evidence on the Depth of 
Corporate Information Disclosure in Developing Countries: The Case of Jordan. 
International Journal of Commerce and Management 12 (3/4), 122-155. 
 
National Audit Office, 2007. Review of Climate Change Levy and Climate Change 
Agreements.  Available from http://www.environmental-
auditing.org/Portals/0/AuditFiles/climate_change_Full.pdf. [accessed on 3 January 2012]. 
 
National Audit office, 2006. Climate Change Policy: Options for scrutiny. London, UK. 
 
286 
 
National Audit Office (NAO), 2004. The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: A New way to 
combat Climate Change. Available from http://www.environmental-
auditing.org/Portals/0/AuditFiles/uk271eng04ar_ft_combatclimatchange.pdf. [Accessed on 7 
January 2012]. 
NAO, 2007. The climate change levy and climate change agreements. Technical report, 
National Audit Office, London, UK. 
 
Nauman E & Giel K. 1995. Customer Satisfaction Measurement and Management: Using the 
Voice of the Customer. Cincinnati, Ohio: Thompson Publishing 
 
Ness, K., & Mirza, A. 1991. Corporate social disclosure: A note on a test of agency theory. 
British Accounting Review, 23, 211-217. 
 
Neuendorf, K. A. 2002. The content analysis guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Noe, T. 2002). Institutional Activism and Financial Market Structure. Review of Financial 
Studies, 15, 289-319. 
 
Neu, D., Warsame, H. And Pedwell, K., 1998. Managing Public Impressions: Environmental 
Disclosures in Annual Reports. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 23(3), 265-282. 
 
Nordhaus W., 2007. To tax or not to tax: Alternative approaches to slowing global warming. 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 1(1), 26-44. 
 
Nordhaus, W. D. 2008. A Question of Balance—Weighing the Options on Global Warming 
Policies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Nordhaus, W., 2011. The architecture of climate economics: Designing a global agreement 
on global warming. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Available from 
http://aida.wss.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/documents/BAS_Nordhaus_Jan11.pdf. 
[accessed on 9 March 2012]. 
 
287 
 
Norusis, M. 2004. SPSS 13.0 Statistical Procedures Companion. Upper Saddle-River, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, Inc. 
Ntim, C.G., and Soobaroyen, T. (2013). Black empowerment disclosures by South African 
listed corporations: The influence of ownership and board characteristics. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 116(1): 121-138. 
O’Donovan, G., 2002. Environmental disclosures in the annual report: extending the 
applicability and predictive power of legitimacy theory.  Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 15(3), 344-71. 
O’Dwyer, B. 2002. Managerial Perceptions of Corporate Social Disclosure: An Irish Story. 
Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal, 15(3), 406–36. 
 
O’Dwyer, B., 2003. Conceptions of Corporate Social Responsibility: The Nature of 
Managerial Capture. Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal, 16(4), 523–57. 
 
O'Dwyer, B., Unerman, J.,and Bradley, J. 2005. Perceptions on the emergence and future 
development of corporate social disclosure in Ireland. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 18(1),14-43. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and, Development, (2007). Policies for a Better 
Environment: Progress in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. Paris and 
Washington, D.C. 
 
OECD, 2009. The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation: Policies and Options for Global 
Action Beyond 2012. www.oecd.org/env/cc/econ/beyond2012). [Accessed 9 February 2012]. 
 
OECD, 2010. Transition to a low carbon economy: Public goals and corporate practices. 
Available from  http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/45513642.pdf. [Accessed on 6 
December 2011].  
 
288 
 
OfGEM, 2007. What is Renewables obligation? Available from 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Environment/RenewablObl/Pages/RenewablObl.asp
x. [Accessed on February 20, 2012].  
 
Okereke, C. 2007. An exploration of motivations, drivers and barriers to carbon management: 
The UK FTSE 100. European Management Journal, 25(6), 475-486. 
 
Oliveira, L., Rodrigues, L.L. and Craig, R. 2006. Firm-specific determinants of intangibles 
reporting: evidence from the Portuguese stock market. Journal of Human Resource 
Costing & Accounting, 10(1), 11-33. 
 
 
Owen, D. 2008. Chronicles of Wasted Time? A Personal Reflection on the Current State of 
and Future Prospects for, Social and Environmental Accounting Research. Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal, 21 (2), 240-267. 
 
Owusu-Ansah, S. 1999. The impact of corporate attributes on the extent of mandatory 
disclosure and reporting by listed companies in Zimbabwe. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 33(5), 605–631. 
 
Oyelere, P., Laswad, F. and Fisher, R. 2003. Determinants of internet financial reporting by 
New Zealand companies. Journal of International Management and Accounting, 14(1), 26-
63. 
 
Pachauri, R. K. 2010. Statement of the IPCC Chairman on the establishment of an 
independent committee to review IPCC procedures. IPCC: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press/PA_IPCC_Chairman_Statement_27Feb2010.pdf. [Accessed on 
6 February 2012]. 
 
Parker, L. 2010. Climate Change and the EU Emission Trading Scheme: Looking Beyond 
2020. Congressional Research Service.  Available from 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/137269.pdf. [Accessed on 8 July 2012]. 
 
289 
 
Packard, K., and Reinhardt, F., 2000. What every Executive needs to know about global 
warming. Harvard Business Review, 78(4), 128-135.  
 
Patten, D., 1991. Exposure, Legitimacy and Social Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 10, 297-308. 
 
Patten, D. 1992.  Intra-industry environmental disclosure in response to the Alaskan oil spill: 
A note on legitimacy theory, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15(5), 471–475. 
Patten, D.M., 2002. The relation between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure: a research note”, Accounting, Organisations and Society, 27(8), 471-475. 
Patten, D., & Crampton, W. 2004. Legitimacy and the Internet: An examination of corporate 
web page environmental disclosures. Advances in Environmental Accounting and 
Management, 2, 31-35. 
 
Patton, M.Q. 2002. Qualitative Research And Evaluation Methods (3rd Edition), Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Pearce, D.W., 2005. The UK Climate Change Levy: A study of the political economy. OECD 
Environmental Programme. Available from 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=com/env/epoc/ctpa/cfa(20
04)66/final&doclanguage=en. [Accessed on 2 May 2012]. 
 
Peasnell, K., Pope, P.F., and Young, S. 2005. Board monitoring and earnings management: 
Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 32(7/8), 1311-1346. 
Perry, M., & Sheng, T. T. 1999. An overview of trends related to environmental reporting in 
Singapore. Environmental Management and Health, 10(5), 310–320. 
Peters, G. F. and Romi, A.M., 2010. Carbon emissions accounting and disclosure: An 
international empirical investigation. Working Paper, Indiana University. Available from 
http://comp.uark.edu/~peters/GLOBALCARBON2011.pdf. [Accessed on 8 October 2011]. 
290 
 
Peters, G. F. & Romi, A.M., 2012. The Effect of Corporate Governance on Voluntary Risk 
Disclosures: Evidence from Greenhouse Gas Emission Reporting. Working Paper,  Indiana 
University. URL: http://www.business.utah.edu/sites/default/files/documents/school-of-
accounting/ghg_disclosure_and_corp_gov_20120202.pdf. [Accessed on 23 October 2012]. 
Pfarrer, M., Smith, K., Khanin, D., and  Zhang, X., 2005. Coming forward: Institutional 
influences on voluntary disclosure. Available from:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/mechanisms/pages/Papers/Pfarrer.pdf. [Accessed on 2 June 
2012]. 
Post, C., Rahman, N. and Rubow, E. 2011. Green Governance: Boards Of Directors’ 
Composition And Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility. Business and Society, 
50(1), 189-223. 
Porter, M.E., and Reinhardt, F.L., 2007. A strategic approach to climate. Harvard   
Business Review, 85, 22-26. 
Prado-Lorenzo J.M., Rodriguez-Dominquez, L., Gallego-Alvarez, I.  and Garcia-Sanchez, 
I.M. 2009. Factors influencing the disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions in Companies 
world wide. On-line. Available from  www.emeraldinsight.com/0025-1747.htm. [Accessed 
on October 2, 2011]. 
Prado-Lorenzo J.M., and Garcia-Sanchez, I.M. 2010. The Role of the Board of Directors  in 
Disseminating Relevant Information on Greenhouse Gases. Journal of business  ethics, 97, 
391-424. 
Prencipe, A. 2004. Proprietary costs and determinants of voluntary segment disclosure: 
Evidence from Italian listed companies. European Accounting Review, 13(2), 319–340. 
 
Preston, L. E., & Sapienza, H. J. 1990. Stakeholder management and corporate performance. 
Journal of Behavioral Economics, 19, 361-375. 
 
Prins, G. & Rayner, S. 2007. Time to ditch Kyoto. Commentary. Nature International weekly 
journal of science. Available on  
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v449/n7165/full/449973a.html?amp;cid=1122628622
&ei=JfQfR9joK5j40QH-1IEi.  
291 
 
 
PwC and IETA (PricewaterhouseCoopers and International Emissions Trading Association),  
2007. Trouble-entry Accounting – Revisited (London).  
 
Pwc 2009. Typico plc: Greenhouse Gas Emissions report. Available from 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/carbon-reporting-may-09.pdf. [Accessed on January 4 
2012]. 
 
Raffournier, B. 1995. The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed 
Companies. European Accounting Review [on-line], 4(2), 261-80. 
 
Rajab, B., 2009. Corporate risk disclosure – Its determinants and its impact on a company’s 
cost of equity capital. PhD Thesis, Edinburg Napier University 
Ramaswamy, V., et al., 2001: Radiative forcing of climate change. In: Climate Change 2001: 
The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Houghton, J.T., et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 349– 416 
Rankin, M., Windsor, C., and Wahyum, D., 2011. An investigation of voluntary corporate 
greenhouse gas emissions reporting in a market governance system Australian evidence. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal [On-line], 24(8). 
Rao, K., Tilt, C., and Lester, L., 2012. Corporate governance and environmental reporting: an 
Australian study. Corporate Governance [On-line], 12(2), 143-163. 
Rao, H., & Giorgi, S. 2006. Code breaking: How entrepreneurs exploit cultural logics to 
generate institutional change. Research in Organizational Behaviour, 27(0), 269–304. 
Ratnatunga, J.T. and Balachandran, K.R. 2009.Carbon Business Accounting: The Impact of 
Global Warming on the Cost and Management Accounting Profession. Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance [On-line], 24(2), 333-355. 
 
Ratanatunga, J. 2007. Carbon Cost Accounting: The Impact of Global Warming on the Cost 
Accounting Profession, Journal of applied management accounting research, 5(2), 1-8. 
292 
 
 
Reid, E.M., and Toffel, M.W. 2009. Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate 
Disclosure of Climate Change Strategies. Harvard Business School Technology & Operations 
Mgt. Unit Research Paper No. 09-019. Available at SSRN:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1237982. (accessed on 3 February 2012).  
 
Remenyi, D., Williams, B., Money, A. and Swartz, E. 1998. Doing Research in Business and 
Management: An Introduction to Process and Method, London, Sage. 
 
Reverte, C., 2008. Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Ratings by 
Spanish Listed Firms. Journal of Business Ethics, [on-line], 88, 351-366 
Revkin, A. 2001. Global warming impasse is broken. New York Times, pp. 1A, 8. 
 
Rezai, A., Foley, D., and Taylor, L., 2011. Global warming and economic externalities. 
Economic theory,  Available from 
http://epub.wu.ac.at/3037/1/GlobalWarmingGS101206TexGeneric.pdf. [Accessed on 24 June 
2012]. 
 
Roberts, R.W., 1992. Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure: An 
application of stakeholder theory, Accounting, Organization and Society [On-line], 17, 595–
612. 
 
Roberts, E.S., 1999. In defence of the survey method: An illustration from a study of user 
information satisfaction. Accounting and Finance, 39, 53 – 77. 
Robson, C. 2002. Real World Research 2nd ed, London: Blackwell Publishers Ltd 
Rodrigue, M., Magnan, M., and Cho, C. H. 2013. Is environmental governance substantive or 
symbolic? An empirical investigation.  Journal of Business Ethics [on-line], 114,1331-1335. 
Ross, S.A. 1979. The economics of information and the disclosure regulation debate in 
Edwards, F. (Ed.), Issues in Financial Regulation, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, pp. 177-
202. 
293 
 
Rowley, T., 1998. A Normative Justification for Stakeholder Theory, Business and Society, 
37(1), 105-107. 
Rupley, K.H., Brown, D., and Marshall, R.S., 2012. Governance, media and the quality of 
environmental disclosure. Journal of Accounting Public Policy, 31, 610-640. 
Russell, D., 2011. Towards ecological taxation: The efficacy of emission-related motor 
taxation. Gower Publishing Limited, Surrey, England. 
Sales de Aguiar, T., 2009. Corporate Disclosure of Greenhouse gas emissions – A UK study. 
PhD Thesis, University of St. Andrews 
 
Sampaio, M., Gomes, S., Filho, R., Bruni, A., Filho, J., and Souza, R., 2011. Environmental 
Disclosure of Mining Companies: An Empirical Analysis in the Light of Institutional Theory.  
Available from 
http://www.contabeis.ufba.br/Site/arquivos/Editor/file/Mestrado/Artigos/2011/EHLGDKE_
MEEGE_KG3SA6WU-1.pdf. [Accessed on 5 June 2012]. 
 
Sasser, E.N., Prakash, A., Cashore,B., and Auld, G., 2006. Direct targeting as an NGO 
political strategy: examining private authority regimes in the forestry sector. Business and 
Politics, 8(3), 1-32. 
 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thomhill, A. 2003. Research methods for business students. 
Essex: Pearson Education Limited. 
 
Saunders, M. Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. 2009. Research Methods for Business Students. 5th 
Ed. Harlow: Pearson Education 
 
Schneider, S., Rosencranz, A., Mastrandra M., and Duriseti, K., 2010. Climate change 
science and policy. Book. Island press, Washington DC. 
 
Schipper, K. 1991. Commentary on analysts’ forecast. Accounting Horizons, 5(4), 105–121. 
 
Scott, W. R. 2003. Financial accounting theory (3rd ed.). Toronto: Prentice Hall. 
294 
 
 
Scott, W. R. 1995. Institutions and Organizations, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Scott, W.R. 2001. Institutions and Organizations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Scott, T.W. 1994. Incentives and Disincentives for Financial Disclosure: Voluntary 
Disclosure of Defined Benefit Pension Plan Information by Canadian Firms. The Accounting 
Review 69, 26-43. 
 
Seinfeld, J., 2011. Insights of global warming. Journal of Environmental and Energy 
Engineering. Vol. 57. Available from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/aic.12780/pdf. Accessed on 14 February 2012. 
 
Sen, M., Mukherjee, K., and Pattanayak, J.K. 2011. Corporate environmental disclosure 
practices in India. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 12(2), 139-156. 
 
Sekaran, U. 2003. Research Methods for Business A Skill Building Approach (4th 
Edition), New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Sharma, S. and Henriques, I. 2005. Stakeholder influences on sustainability practices in the 
Canadian forest products industry. Strategic Management Journal, 26, 159–80. 
 
Sherman, W. R. 2009. Making Triple Bottom Line Reporting Comparable: Adoption of the 
GRI G3 Framework. Presented at 2009 Oxford Business & Economics Conference. June 25, 
2009. Oxford, UK.  
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 
LII(2). 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R., 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of 
Political Economy [on-line], 94 (3), 461-88. 
 
295 
 
Sidaway, S & De Lange, P., 2011. Voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report: 
The impact of the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act', in Brad Potter, Paul de 
Lange (ed.) Proceedings of 2011 AFAANZ Conference, Carlton, Australia, 1-35 
 
Silverman, D. 1993. Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and 
Interaction. London: Sage.  
 
Simnett, R., Green, W. & Huggins, A. 2009. GHG emissions standard on its way. Charter. 
80(9), 64-66 
Smith, J.A., Morreale, M. and M.E. Miriani 2008, Climate change disclosure: Moving 
towards a brave new world. Capital Markets Law Journal, 3(4), 469-485.  
Smith and Swierzbinski 2007. Assessing the performance of the UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme. Journal of Environment Resource Economics 37, 131-158. 
Sprengel, D. and Busch, T., 2011. Stakeholder engagement and environmental strategy – the 
case of climate change. Business Strategy and the Environment [On-line], 20(6), 351-64. 
Spence, M. 1973. Job Market Signalling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics [on-line], 87, 
355- 374. 
Spence, M. 2002. Signalling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets. The 
American Economic Review, 92(3), 434-459. 
Spence, C., and Gray, R., 2007. Social and environmental reporting and the business case. 
ACCA Research report No. 98. (London: Certified Accountants Educational Trust). 
Stallworthy, M., 2009. Legislating Against Climate Change: AUK Perspective on a 
Sisyphean Challenge. The Modern Law Review. 
 
Stanny, E., 2011. Voluntary disclosures of emissions by US firms. Working paper, Sonoma 
state University”, Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1454808. 
[Accessed 17 January 2012]. 
 
296 
 
Stanny, E., & Ely, K., 2008. Corporate Environmental Disclosures about the Effects of 
Climate Change. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management,15, 338-
348. 
 
Stern, N., 2006. The Economics of Climate Change – The Stern Review. Available 
via the Internet at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm. 
 
Stern N. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: the Stern Review. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
 
Solomon, A. and Lewis, L. 2002. Incentives and Disincentives for Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure. Business Strategy and the Environment, 11(3), 154–69. 
Solomon J., 2010. Corporate Governance and Accountability. Third edition. Wiley and Sons 
publishers. Sussex, United Kingdom. 
Soobaroyen, T., and Ntim, C. 2013. Social and environmental accounting as symbolic and 
substantive means of legitimation: The case of HIV/AIDS reporting in South Africa. 
Accounting Forum, Special Issue, 37(2), 92-109. 
Sovacool, B., and Brown, M., 2007. Energy and American Society? Springer, New York. 
Stock, J. H., and Watson, M. W. 2003. Introduction to econometrics. Pearson Addison 
Wesley, Boston 
Suchman, M.C., 1995. Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches. Academy 
of Management Journal, 20(3), 571-610.  
 
Suddaby, R. 2010. Challenges for Institutional Theory. Journal of Management Inquiry, 
19(1), 14-20. 
 
Sullivan, R. 2006. Climate change disclosure standards and initiatives: have they added value 
for investors? Insight Investment. Available from: 
http://www.insightinvestment.com/global/documents/riliterature/367922/cc_disclosureinit_re
port.pdf. [Accessed on 30 June 2012]. 
297 
 
 
Sullivan, R. and Gouldson, A. 2012. Does Voluntary Carbon Reporting Meet Investors' 
Needs? Journal of Cleaner Production, 36, 60–67. 
 
Sullivan, R., 2008. Corporate response to climate change: achieving emissions reductions 
through regulation, self-regulation and economic incentives. Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, 
United Kingdom. First edition. 
 
Summerton, P. 2011. Cambridge Econometrics: The UK Emissions Projections. Available 
from http://www.camecon.com/UK/UKEnergy/PressRelease-UKEnergy.aspx. [Accessed on 
4 December 2011]. 
 
Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidell, L.S. 2007. Using Multivariate Statistics, 5th ed., Pearson 
Education, Boston, MA. 
 
Tagesson, Torbjörn, Blank, Veronica, Broberg, Pernilla and Collin, S., 2009. What Explains 
the Extent and Content of Social and Environmental Disclosures on Corporate Websites: A 
Study of Social and Environmental Reporting in Swedish Listed Corporations, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 16, 352-64. 
 
Tanaka, K., O’Neill, B., Rotikyasnkiy, D., Orbesterner, M., and Tol, R., 2009. Evaluating 
Global Warming Potentials with historical temperature. Climatic change, 96, 443-466. 
 
Tang, Q.,and  Luo, L., 2011. Transparency of carbon disclosures: International evidence. 
Research paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885230. [Accessed on 
25 June 2012]. 
 
Tauringana, V., 1997. The impact of listing status and selected company characteristics on 
voluntary disclosures in the United Kingdom. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Napier. 
 
The Carbon Disclosure report, 2010. Carbon Disclosure Project FTSE350 Report. Available 
form https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDP-2010-FTSE350.pdf. [Accessed on 5 
November 2011]. 
298 
 
 
The Climate Change Act 2008. Available on 
www.elaw.org/system/files/ukpga_20080027_enpdf. [Accessed on 6 October 2011]. 
 
The Institute of Business Ethics (IBE), 1994. Benefiting Business & The Environment. 
IBE, London, UK. 
 
The Australian, 2011. Greens call Durban Summit a case of climate failure. Available from 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/climate/greens-call-summit-a-case-of-
climate-change-failure/story-e6frg6xf-1226220321396. [Accessed on 3 December 2011]. 
 
The Economist, 2011. Climate Change: A Deal in Durban. Available from 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/12/climate-change-0 .[Accessed on 28 
December 2011]. 
 
The Economist, 2012. Climate change: The other Greenhouse gases. Available from 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2012/02/climate-change. Accessed on February 21 
2012. 
 
The Australian Academy of Science, 2008. Enhanced Greenhouse Effect: An international 
hot topic. Available from http://www.science.org.au/nova/016/016key.htm. Accessed on 14 
February 2012. 
 
The European Union, 2013. The EU Emission Trading System. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/. [Accessed on 5 September 2013].  
 
The European Union. 2010. EU Emission Trading Scheme. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. [Accessed on 30 October 2011]. 
 
The Renewable UK, 2011. History of NFFO. Available from 
http://www.bwea.com/ref/nffo.html. [Accessed on 30 November 2011]. 
 
299 
 
The UN Association of the UK, 2008. Briefing paper series on climate change: UK Climate 
policy. Available from http://www.una-
uk.org/climate/pdf/UNA%20climate%20UK%20policy.pdf. [Accessed on 29 December 
2011]. 
 
The Combined Code, 2012., The UK corporate governance code. Available from    . 
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx [Accessed on 5 March 2013]. 
 
The Copenhagen Accord, 2009. Available from  
http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/6911.php?priref=6000057
35 [Accessed on 4 December 2011]. 
 
The United Nations, 2011. The Durban Platform. Available from 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations/durban. 
[Accessed on 7 January 2012]. 
 
The UK House Commons, 2012. The road to UNFCCC COP 18 and beyond. Available from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenergy/88/88.pdf. 
[Accessed on 29 September 2012]. 
 
Thomas, A.B.  2004. Research Skills for Management Studies. U.S: Routledge. 
 
Tilling, M.V., and Tilt, C.A., 2010. The edge of legitimacy: Voluntary social and 
environmental reporting in Rothmans’ 1956-1999 annual reports. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability journal. 23(1), 55-81. 
 
Tilt, C. A. 1994. The influence of external pressure groups on corporate social disclosure: 
some empirical evidence. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 7(4), 47 - 72. 
 
Tinker, A.M., Merino, B.D., and Neimark, M.D., 1982. The Normative Origins of Positive 
Theories: Ideology and Accounting Thought. Accounting, Organisations and Society, 7, 167-
200. 
300 
 
 
Tinker, T., Lehman, C. and Neimark, M. 1991. Falling Down the Hole in the Middle of the 
Road: Political Quietism in Corporate Social Reporting. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 4(2), 28–54. 
 
Ullmann, A. 1985.  Data in search of a theory. A critical examination of the relationships 
among social performance, social disclosure and economic performance of US firms, 
Academy of Management Review, 10(3), 540–557. 
 
Unerman, J. 2000. Methodological issues - Reflections on quantification in corporate social 
reporting content analysis. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 13(5), 667 - 681. 
 
Unerman, J. 2003. Enhancing organizational global hegemony with narrative accounting 
disclosures: an early example. Accounting Forum, 27(4), 425-448. 
 
Unerman, J., Guthrie, J. and Striukova, L., 2007. UK Reporting of intellectual capital. 
London: ICAEW Centre for Business Performance. 
 
Unerman, J., 2008. Strategic reputation risk management and corporate social responsibility 
reporting. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal,  21(3), 362-4 
 
UN 2012. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol [Online]. Available: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2012/12/20121217%2011-40%20AM/CN.718.2012.pdf 
[Accessed 11/10/13]. 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992. 31 ILM 849. 
UNFCCC, 2008. Kyoto Protocol: Negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Uzan, H., Szewczyk, S.H. and Varma, R. 2004. Board composition and corporate fraud. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 60(3), 33-43. 
 
Van der Laan, 2009. The Role of Theory in Explaining Motivation for Corporate Social 
Disclosures. The Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, 3(4). 
301 
 
 
van Koten, G., Beisner, E., and Geddes, P., 2009. The economics and policy of global 
warming. Working paper series. University of Victoria, Canada.  
 
Verrecchia, R. E. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, 
179–194 
 
Verma, S. and Dewe, P., 2004. Valuing human resources. ACCA Research Report No. 83. 
London: Certified Accountants Educational Trust. 
 
Wagenhofer, A. 1990. Voluntary Disclosure with a Strategic Opponent. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 12, 341-363. 
 
Walden, W.D. and Stagliano, A.J., 2004. An assessment of the quality of environmental 
disclosure themes. Advances in Environmental Accounting and Management, 2, 137-65  
 
Wallace, R.S.O., Naser, K. and Mora, A. 1994. The relationship between the 
comprehensiveness of corporate annual reports and firm characteristics in Spain. Accounting 
and Business Research, 25(97),  41–53. 
 
Wallace, R. S. O., & Naser, K., 1995. Firm specific determinants of the comprehensiveness 
of mandatory disclosure in the corporate annual reports of firms listed on the stock exchange 
of Hong Kong.  Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 14, 311−368. 
Walden, W., & Schwartz, B., 1997. Environmental disclosures and public policy pressures, 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16, 125–154. 
Walls, J.L., Berrone, P., and Phan, P.H., 2013. Corporate governance and environmental  
performance: is there really a link? Strategic Management journal, 33(8), 885-913. 
Wang, M., and Hussainey, K., 2013. Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by 
corporate governance and their value relevance. Journal of Accounting Public Policy,32,.26-
49.  
302 
 
Warren, M., 2007. US pushes for clear goals on clean air. The Weekend Australian, 
September 4, 29-30.  
Wara, M. 2007. Is the global carbon market working? Nature, 445, 595–596. 
Warfield, T.D.,  Wild, J.J. and  Wild, K.L., 1995. Managerial Ownership, Accounting 
Choices, and Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20,61-91. 
Watson, A., Shrives, P. and Marston, C. 2002. Voluntary disclosure of accounting ratios in 
the UK. The British Accounting Review, 34, 289-313. 
 
Wegener, M., Elayan, F., Felton, S., and Li, J., 2013. Factors influencing corporate 
environmental disclosures. Accounting Perspectives, 12(1), 53-73. 
 
Watts. R.L. & Zimmerman. J.L., 1978. Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of 
Accounting Standards. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 112-134. 
 
Watts, R.L. and Zimmerman, J.L., 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.  
 
Weber, R. P. 1990. Basic content analysis. London: Sage, Publications. 
 
Weber, R. P. 1994. Basic content analysis, in Lewis-Back, M.S (ed), international handbooks 
of quantitative applications in the social sciences. London: Sage Publications. 
 
White, G., Lee, A. and Tower, G. 2007. Drivers of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in 
listed biotechnology companies. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 8(3), 517-37. 
Weiss, C. H. 2000. Which links in which theories shall we evaluate? In Rogers, P. J., Hacsi, 
T. A., Petrosino, A., & Huebner, T. A. (Eds.), Program theory in evaluation: Challenges and 
opportunities. New directions for evaluation. 87 (pp.35–45). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers. 
Welford, R. and Gouldson, A., 1993. Environment Management and Business Strategy, 
Pitman Publishing, London, UK. 
303 
 
 
Weiss, A. 1995. Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 133- 154. 
 
Wellington J., Bathmaker A., Hunt C., McCulloch G., & Sikes P. 2005. Succeeding with your 
doctorate. London:Sage 
 
Weyant, J. P. 2008. A critique of the Stern Review's mitigation cost analyses and integrated 
assessment. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(1), 77-93. 
 
White, G., Lee, A. and Tower, G. 2007. Drivers of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in 
listed biotechnology companies. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 8(3), 517-37 
 
White, G., Lee, A., Yuningsih, Y., Nielsen, C. and Bukh, P.N. 2010. The nature and extent of 
voluntary intellectual capital disclosures by Australian and UK biotechnology companies. 
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 11(4), 519-36. 
 
Whiting, R.H., and Woodcock, 2011. Firm characteristics and intellectual capital disclosure 
by Australian companies.  Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting, 15(2), 102 –
126. 
 
Williamson D, Lynch-Wood G. 2008. Social and environmental reporting in UK company 
law and the issue of legitimacy. Corporate Governance 8(2), 128-140. 
 
Wilmshurst, T. D. and Frost, G.R., 2000. Corporate Environmental Reporting: A Test of 
Legitimacy Theory. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 13(1), 10–26. 
 
Wiseman, J. 1982.An evolution of environmental disclosure made in annual reports. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 7,553-63.  
 
Wittneben, B., and Kiyar, D., 2009. Climate change basics for managers. Management 
Decision.  47.  
 
304 
 
Wolfe, R. A. 1991. The use of content analysis to assess corporate social responsibility. 
Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 12, 281-307. 
 
Wordsworth, A., and Grubb, M., 2001. Quantifying the UK’s incentives for low carbon 
investment. Climate Policy, 3, 77–88 
 
Wordsworth, A. and Grubb, M. 2003. Quantifying the UK’s incentives for low 
carbon investment. in Michaelowa (2003). 
 
World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE), 1994. Environmental Reporting. 
A Manager's Guide. The International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France. 
 
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-221. 
 
Yoshikawa, T. & Phan, P.H. 2003. The performance implications of ownership-driven 
governance reform, European Management Journal, 21(6), 698-706.  
 
Zarb, B.J. 2007. Voluntary Disclosures of Forward-looking Earnings Information and Firm 
Value in the Airline Industry. International Journal of Business Research,  7(6), 1-19. 
 
Zahra, S.A. Neubaum, D.O. and Huse, M. 2000. Entrepreneurship in medium-size 
companies: exploring the effects of ownership and governance systems. Journal of  
Management, 26(5), 947-976. 
 
Zedillo, E., 2007. Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto. Brookings Institution, New 
York. 
 
Zikmund, W.G. 2000. Business Research Methods, (6 ed.) The Dryden Press, Fort 
Worth, Texas. 
 
305 
 
Zucker, L. G. 1987. Institutional theories of organization. Annual review of sociology, 13, 
443-464. 
 
Zucker, L. G. 1977. The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. American Journal 
of Sociology 42,726-43 
 
Zunker, T., 2011. Determinants of the Voluntary Disclosure of Employee Information in 
Annual Reports: An Application of Stakeholder Theory. Unpublished Thesis. Bond 
University. Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
306 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I: Firm GHG disclosure and stakeholder importance 
 
General instructions and information 
This survey questionnaire is for academic purposes only. Therefore, all responses will be 
held in strict confidence. No individual will be identified. 
 
Section A: Background information 
1. Please provide the following information: 
 
 Information relating to yourself: 
i) Name of company …………………………………………………………... 
ii) Job title……………………………………………………………………… 
iii) Gender…………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please circle the appropriate answer relating to you in each of the columns in the table below: 
iv) Your 
age 
(years) 
v) Your length of 
time in job (years) 
vi) Your education 
a. ≤39 
b. 40–49 
c. 50–59 
d. 60+ 
a. <4 
b. 4–9 
c. 10–15 
d. >15 
a. GCSE or equivalent 
b. University degree 
c. MBA 
d. Non-MBA master’s 
e. >Master’s 
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Section B: Determinants of voluntary GHG disclosures 
1. Please indicate the extent of your disagreement or agreement with each of the 
following statements. 
The extent of voluntary GHG disclosures is influenced by;  
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m. Other (please specify)……………………………………………………… 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
Your assistance in providing this information is very much appreciated. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
 
a. Board committee size 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Audit committee size 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Presence and proportion of non-
executive directors on the board 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. presence of an sub-board committee 
on environment 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. separation of the roles of CEO and 
chairman 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Institutional ownership i.e. majority 
of ordinary shares held by 
institutional investors 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Insider ownership i.e. majority of 
ordinary shares held by 
managers/employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. foreign ownership 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Size of your company 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
j. Company gearing i.e. capital 
structure 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
k. Company profitability 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
l. Company liquidity 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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If there are any comments you would like to make regarding this survey, please do so in the 
space provided below: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Ib: Survey questionnaire introductory letter 
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To whom it may concern 
The extent and motivation of Greenhouse Gas disclosures by Listed 
Companies in the United Kingdom  
I am currently conducting a PhD research project on the extent and motivation of Greenhouse 
Gas (GHG) disclosures by listed companies on London Stock Exchange. The main objective 
of this research is to analyse the extent of GHG disclosures and understand the motivation 
behind the disclosures from people either directly or indirectly involved in the preparation of 
the disclosures.  
  
I would be grateful if your company could participate in this survey. Your participation will 
provide invaluable input to the success of this study and further development of knowledge 
and understanding pertaining to the circumstances surrounding GHG information disclosures, 
as well as potentially assisting in policy formulation by government regulatory agencies and 
other interest groups.  
 
All information will be treated as highly CONFIDENTIAL and used for academic purposes 
only. Should you wish to receive a summary of the results of this study please write your 
name and address at the end of the questionnaire. It will be forwarded to you at a later date. 
  
Your cooperation is very much appreciated.  
Sincerely   
(LYTON WESLEY CHITHAMBO)  
PhD Student  
The Business School, Bournemouth University                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Department of Economics, Accounting and Taxation                                                              
89 Holdenhurst Road ; BH8 8EB                                                                                           
Bournemouth                                                                              
lchithambo@bournemouth.ac.uk  
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Appendix 2:DEFRA 2009 Disclosure Requirements 
 Recommended supporting disclosures Notes Section  
1 General company information Company information Company information 
2 State the reporting period covered Reporting period 
3 State the reason for any significant changes in emissions 
since previous year 
Changes in emissions 
4 State the measuring and reporting approach followed Measuring and reporting 
approach 
5 State the approach chosen to identify the operations you 
have collected data from 
Organisational boundary 
6 State the scopes included. Provide a list specifying the 
activity types included in each scope 
Operational scopes 
7 Provide detail of any specific exclusions of emissions from 
scopes 1 and 2 (including estimation of the % this is) 
Operational scopes 
8 Provide a brief explanation for the reason for any 
exclusions from scopes 1 and 2 
Operational scopes 
9 State the calculation approach used, specifically stating for 
each activity the % of activity data estimated 
Operational scopes 
10 State the conversion tools / emission factors you used Operational scopes 
11 Provide a breakdown by country of total GHG emissions Geographical breakdown 
12 Provide detail of any exclusions of countries if a global 
total is reported 
Geographical breakdown 
13 State the base year chosen and approach used to set the 
base year 
Base year 
14 State base year recalculation policy Base year 
15 State appropriate context for any significant emissions Base year 
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changes that trigger base year emissions recalculation 
(acquisitions/divestitures, outsourcing/in sourcing, 
changes in reporting boundaries or calculation 
methodologies, etc.). 
16 State your target, including scopes covered and target 
completion date. Provide a brief overview of progress 
towards target 
Target 
17 State the name of the person(s) responsible for 
achievement of this target and their position in your 
organisation 
Target 
 
18 State the reason for your intensity measurement choice Intensity measurement 
19 State the reason for any significant changes in your 
intensity measurement from the previous year 
Intensity measurement 
20 Provide an outline of any external assurance received and 
a copy of any assurance statement, if applicable 
External Assurance 
Statement 
21 For purchased carbon credits state the reduction in tonnes 
of CO2e per year 
Carbon Offsetting 
22 State the type of carbon credit (Kyoto compliant or non-
Kyoto compliant credit) 
• If carbon credits are Kyoto-compliant, organisations 
should specify which external GHG programme has 
approved them, provide the name of the supplier and a 
hyperlink to the project documentation where possible 
• If carbon credits are non-Kyoto compliant, organisations 
should provide the name of the supplier, a hyperlink to the 
project documentation where possible, details of who 
developed the quantification methodology, how the project 
was validated and verified and how other ‘good quality 
criteria’ were met. 
Carbon Offsetting 
23 For purchased green tariffs state the reduction in tonnes of Green tariffs 
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CO2e per year 
24 State the supplier and the name of the tariff Green tariffs 
25 State the additional carbon saving associated with the tariff 
as a percentage (%) 
Green tariffs 
26 State in MWh the amount of electricity generated from 
owned or controlled sources. State if the owned or 
controlled source is onsite or offsite 
Electricity generation 
27 State if applicable in MWh the amount of own generated 
renewable electricity exported to the grid and if this is 
backed by REGOs within the UK. 
Electricity generation 
28 State the amount of incentive received (e.g. ROCs) if 
applicable 
Electricity generation 
29 State in MWh the amount of heat generated from owned or 
controlled sources. 
State if the owned or controlled source is offsite or onsite 
Heat generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 
 
Appendix 3: GHG Protocol (2004) disclosure requirements 
 Disclosure requirement Type of disclosure  
 a) Description of the company and inventory 
boundary 
 
1 An outline of the organizational boundaries chosen, 
including the chosen consolidation approach  
Recommended information 
2 An outline of the operational boundaries chosen, and if 
scope 3 is included, a list specifying which types of 
activities are covered. 
 
Recommended information  
3 The reporting period covered  Recommended information  
 b) Information on emissions 
 
 
4 Total scope 1 and 2 emissions independent of any GHG 
trades such as sales, purchases, transfers, or banking of 
allowances. 
Recommended information 
5 Emissions data separately for each scope. Recommended information 
6 Emissions data for all six GHGs separately (CO2, CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6) in metric tonnes and in tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent. 
Recommended information  
7 Year chosen as the base year, and an emissions profile 
over time that is consistent with and clarifies the chosen 
policy for making base year emissions recalculations. 
Recommended information  
8 Appropriate context for any significant emissions changes 
that trigger base year emissions recalculation 
(acquisitions/divestitures, outsourcing/insourcing, changes 
in reporting boundaries or calculation methodologies, etc.). 
 
Recommended information 
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9 Emissions data for direct CO2 emissions from biologically 
sequestered carbon (e.g., CO2 from burning 
biomass/biofuels), reported separately from the scopes. 
 
Recommended information 
10 Methodologies used to calculate or measure emissions, 
providing a reference or link to any calculation tools used. 
 
Recommended information 
11 Any specific exclusions of sources, facilities, and / or 
operations. 
Recommended information 
 (a) Information on emissions and performance   
12 Emissions data from relevant scope 3 emissions activities 
for which reliable data can be obtained. 
Optional 
13 Emissions data further subdivided, where this aids 
transparency, by business units/facilities, country, source 
types (stationary combustion, process, fugitive, etc.), and 
activity types (production of electricity, transportation, 
generation of purchased electricity that is sold to end 
users, etc.). 
Optional 
14 Emissions attributable to own generation of electricity, 
heat, or steam that is sold or transferred to another 
organization. 
Optional 
15 Emissions attributable to the generation of electricity, heat 
or steam that is purchased for re-sale to non-end users. 
Optional 
16 A description of performance measured against internal 
and external benchmarks. 
Optional 
17 Emissions of GHGs not covered by the Kyoto Protocol 
(e.g., CFCs, NOx,), reported separately from scopes. 
Optional 
18 Relevant ratio performance indicators (e.g. emissions per 
kilowatt-hour generated, tonne of Material production, or 
sales). 
Optional 
19 An outline of any GHG management/reduction programs Optional 
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or strategies. 
 
20 Information on any contractual provisions addressing 
GHG-related risks and obligations. 
Optional 
21 An outline of any external assurance provided and a copy 
of any verification statement, if applicable, of the reported 
emissions data. 
Optional 
22 Information on the causes of emissions changes that did 
not trigger a base year emissions recalculation (e.g., 
process changes, efficiency improvements, plant closures). 
Optional 
23 GHG emissions data for all years between the base year 
and the reporting year (including details of and reasons for 
recalculations, if appropriate) 
Optional 
24 Information on the quality of the inventory (e.g., 
information on the causes and magnitude of Uncertainties 
in emission estimates) and an outline of policies in place to 
improve inventory quality.  
Optional 
25 Information on any GHG sequestration. Optional 
26 A list of facilities included in the inventory. Optional 
27 A contact person. Optional 
 (b) Information on Offsets  
28 Information on offsets that have been purchased or 
developed outside the inventory boundary, subdivided by 
GHG storage/removals and emissions reduction projects. 
Specify if the offsets are verified/certified and/or approved 
by an external GHG program (e.g., the Clean Development 
Mechanism, Joint Implementation). 
Optional 
29 Information on reductions at sources inside the inventory 
boundary that have been sold/transferred as offsets to a 
Optional 
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third party. Specify if the reduction has been 
verified/certified and/or approved by an external GHG 
program. 
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Appendix 4: Carbon Disclosure Standards Board (2010) 
 Disclosure requirement Notes/Comments  
 Strategic analysis, risk and governance  
1 Strategic analysis - Disclosure about strategic analysis 
shall include a statement about the long-term and short 
term impact climate change actually and potentially has on 
the organization’s strategic objectives. 
 
2 Risks - Disclosure about risks shall include an explanation 
and qualitative assessment of the organization’s exposure 
to current and anticipated (long term and short-term) 
significant risks associated with climate change. 
 
3 Opportunities - Disclosure about opportunities shall 
include an explanation and qualitative assessment of 
current and anticipated (long-term and short term) 
significant opportunities associated with climate change 
 
4 Management actions - Disclosure shall include a 
description of the organization’s long-term and short-term 
strategy or plan to address climate change-related risks, 
opportunities and impacts, including targets to reduce 
GHG emissions and an analysis of performance against 
those targets. 
 
5 Future outlook -  Disclosures shall include information 
about the future outlook, long-term and short term, 
including trends and factors related to climate change that 
are likely to affect management’s view of the 
organization’s strategy or the timescales over which 
achievement of the strategy is typically planned 
 
6 Governance - Disclosures shall describe the governance 
processes and organizational resources that have been 
assigned to the identification, management and governing 
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body oversight of climate change-related issues. 
 Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
 Part 2 GHG emissions (Scope 1 and Scope 2) 
Part 2 GHG emissions should include emissions from 
operationally controlled and/or other 
entities/activities/facilities that: 
 
7 are not consolidated in Part 1; and  
8 must be reported under regulatory requirements by the 
disclosing organization in its capacity as operating licensee 
or in any other capacity (e.g.: tenant); or 
 
 
 Other indirect GHG emissions (Scope 3) 
 
Scope 3 GHG emissions 
are not required by CDSB 
(2010) but where Scope 3 
emissions expose the 
reporting organization to 
risks, opportunity or 
financial impacts, the 
effect should be disclosed 
under the Strategic 
Analysis, Risk and 
Governance. 
 
 Once the reporting categories/boundaries are determined, 
an entity shall disclose the following: 
 
9 Gross absolute Part 1 and Part 2 GHG emissions shall be 
calculated by reference to one or more recognized GHG 
emissions reporting schemes and disclosed in CO2 
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equivalent metric tones 
10 Normalized GHG emissions shall be disclosed for the 
organization i.e. Normalized GHG emissions = Absolute 
GHG emissions /output (physical or economic 
 
11 GHG emissions results shall be accompanied by 
contextual disclosures that include: 
a. the name or names of the recognized GHG emissions 
reporting scheme(s) used to calculate GHG emissions; 
 b. the quantification methodology used for calculating 
GHG emissions. 
 c. key assumptions made in the preparation of disclosures; 
d. emission factors and/or the source of emission factors 
used to calculate GHG emissions from activity data; 
e. the global warming potentials (GWP) used and their 
source; 
f.  in support of Scope 2 (indirect) GHG emissions results, 
disclose details (in KWh, MWh  or GWh) of the purchased 
electricity the organization has consumed; 
g. a description of the main effects of uncertainty in the 
calculation of GHG emissions e.g.: data gaps, 
assumptions, extrapolations, metering/measurement 
inaccuracies etc.; 
h. a statement on whether and to what extent GHG 
emissions results have been                verified or 
assured in house or by an independent third party; 
 i. confirmation or otherwise that Scope 1 and 2 GHG 
emissions results relate to activities and sources within the 
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organizational boundaries. 
 
12 Movements in GHG emissions results over time shall be 
disclosed and explained. 
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Appendix 5: GHG Disclosure Score Index 
  GHG Disclosure Score Index 
  Disclosure item Score 
      
  Qualitative Disclosures   
1 Institutional background 1 
2 Period covered by the report 1 
3 Statement on company position on climate change and related responsibilities 1 
4 Corporate governance on climate change 1 
5 Climate change opportunities and company strategies 1 
6 Climate change impact on business operations including supply chains 1 
7 Identification of regulatory risks as a result of climate change 1 
8 Identification of all other risks as a result of climate change 1 
9 Actions/measures taken to reduce/mitigate climate change impact 1 
10 Adaptation strategies to climate change effects 1 
      
11 Regulated Schemes to which a firm belongs 1 
12 Reporting Guidelines used in GHG reporting 1 
13 An assurance statement on disclosed information 1 
14 Contact or responsible person for GHG reporting 1 
      
15 Organisation boundary and consolidation approach 1 
16 Base Year 1 
17 Explanation for a change in base year 1 
18 GHGs covered including those not required by Kyoto protocol 1 
19 Sources and sinks used/excluded 1 
20 Conversion factors used/methodology used to measure or calculate emissions 1 
21 Explanation for any changes to methodology or conversion factors previously used 1 
22 A list of facilities included in the inventory for GHG emissions 1 
23 
Information on the quality of the inventory e.g. causes and magnitude of uncertainties 
in estimates 1 
24 Information on any GHG sequestration 1 
25 Disclosure of the supplier and the name of the purchased green tariff 1 
      
26 
Explanations for changes in performance of total GHG emissions in Co2 metric 
tonnes 1 
27 Explanation of any country excluded if global total is reported 1 
      
28 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 1 emissions 1 
29 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions from scope 1 1 
30 Explanation for the reason of any exclusion from scope 1 1 
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31 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 2 emissions 1 
32 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions from scope 2 1 
33 Explanation for the reason of any exclusion from scope 2 1 
      
34 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 3 emissions 1 
      
      
  Quantitative Disclosures   
35 Total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 1 
36 Comparative data of Total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 1 
37 Future estimates of total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 1 
38 GHG emission by business unit/type/country 1 
39 GHG removals quantified in tonnes of Co2e 1 
      
40 Scope 1 emissions 1 
41 Comparative data on scope 1 emissions 1 
42 Future  estimates of scope 1 emissions 1 
      
43 Scope 2 emissions  1 
44 Comparative data on scope 2 emissions 1 
45 Future  estimates of scope 2 emissions 1 
      
46 Scope 3 emissions 1 
47 Comparative data on scope 3 emissions 1 
48 Future estimates of scope 3 emissions 1 
      
49 Emission of direct Co2 reported separately from scopes 1 
50 Emission not covered by Kyoto and reported separately from scopes 1 
51 
Emission attributable to own generation of electricity/heat/steam sold or transferred to 
another orgn 1 
52 
Emission attributable to own generation of electricity/heat/steam purchased for resale 
to end users 1 
53 For purchased green tariff state the reduction in tonnes of Co2e per year 1 
54 Additional carbon saving associated with the tariff as a percentage 1 
      
55 Quantitative data estimates of the regulatory risks as a result of climate change 1 
56 Quantitative data estimates of all other risks as a result of climate change 1 
      
57 
GHG emission performance measurement against internal and external benchmarks 
including ratios 1 
58 GHG emission targets set and achieved 1 
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59 GHG emission offsets information 1 
60 Comparative information on targets set and achieved 1 
      
  Maximum Disclosure Score 60 
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Appendix 6: List of companies used in the sample 
  List of FTSE350 Companies making up the study sample     
  Company Sector Industry  
1 BAE Systems Aerospace and Defence Industrials 
2 Chemring Group Aerospace and Defence Industrials 
3 Cobham Aerospace and Defence Industrials 
4 Meggitt Aerospace and Defence Industrials 
5 Qinetiq Group Aerospace and Defence Industrials 
6 Rolls-Royce Holdings Aerospace and Defence Industrials 
7 Senior Aerospace and Defence Industrials 
8 Ultra Electronics Holdings Aerospace and Defence Industrials 
  
   
  
9 GKN Automobiles and Parts Consumer Goods 
  
   
  
10 Barr (A.G.) Beverages Consumer Goods 
11 Britvic Beverages Consumer Goods 
12 Diageo Beverages Consumer Goods 
13 SABMiller Beverages Consumer Goods 
  
   
  
14 Croda International Chemicals Basic Materials 
15 Elementis Chemicals Basic Materials 
16 Johnson Matthey Chemicals Basic Materials 
17 Victrex Chemicals Basic Materials 
18 Yule Catto & Co. Chemicals Basic Materials 
  
   
  
19 Balfour Beatty Construction and Materials Industrials 
20 Galliford Try Construction and Materials Industrials 
21 Kier Group Construction and Materials Industrials 
  
   
  
22 Drax Group Electricity Utilities   
  
   
  
23 Domino Printing Sciences Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industrials 
24 Halma Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industrials 
25 Morgan Crucible Co. Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industrials 
26 Oxford Intruments Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industrials 
27 Renishaw Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industrials 
28 Spectris Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industrials 
  
   
  
29 BT Group Fixed Line Telecommunication Telecommunications 
30 Colt Group SA Fixed Line Telecommunication Telecommunications 
31 KCOM Group Fixed Line Telecommunication Telecommunications 
32 TalkTalk Telecom Group Fixed Line Telecommunication Telecommunications 
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33 Booker Group Food and Drug Retailers Consumer Services 
34 Greggs Food and Drug Retailers Consumer Services 
35 Morrisons Food and Drug Retailers Consumer Services 
36 Ocado Group Food and Drug Retailers Consumer Services 
37 Sainsbury Food and Drug Retailers Consumer Services 
38 Tesco Food and Drug Retailers Consumer Services 
  
   
  
39 Associated British Foods Food Producers Consumer Goods 
40 Cranswick Food Producers Consumer Goods 
41 Dairy Crest Group Food Producers Consumer Goods 
42 Devro Food Producers Consumer Goods 
43 Premier Foods Food Producers Consumer Goods 
44 Tate & Lyle Food Producers Consumer Goods 
45 Unilever Food Producers Consumer Goods 
  
   
  
46 Mondi Forestry and Paper Basic Materials 
  
   
  
47 Centrica Gas, Water and Multiutilities Utilities   
48 International Power Gas, Water and Multiutilities Utilities   
49 National Grid Gas, Water and Multiutilities Utilities   
50 Northambrian Water Group Gas, Water and Multiutilities Utilities   
51 Pennon Group Gas, Water and Multiutilities Utilities   
52 Severn Trent Gas, Water and Multiutilities Utilities   
53 United Utilities Group Gas, Water and Multiutilities Utilities   
  
   
  
54 Cookson Group General Industrials Industrials 
55 RPC Group General Industrials Industrials 
56 Rexam General Industrials Industrials 
57 Smith (DS) General Industrials Industrials 
58 Smiths Group General Industrials Industrials 
  
   
  
59 Brown Group General Retailers Consumer Services 
60 Carpetright General Retailers Consumer Services 
61 Debenhams General Retailers Consumer Services 
62 Dignity General Retailers Consumer Services 
63 Dixons Retail General Retailers Consumer Services 
64 Dunelm Group General Retailers Consumer Services 
65 Halfords Group General Retailers Consumer Services 
66 Home Retail Group General Retailers Consumer Services 
67 Inchcape General Retailers Consumer Services 
68 JD Sports Fashion General Retailers Consumer Services 
69 Kesa Electricals General Retailers Consumer Services 
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70 Kingfisher General Retailers Consumer Services 
71 Marks & Spencer General Retailers Consumer Services 
72 Mothercare General Retailers Consumer Services 
73 Next General Retailers Consumer Services 
74 Sports Direct General Retailers Consumer Services 
75 WH Smith General Retailers Consumer Services 
  
   
  
76 Smith & Nephew Health Care Equipment and Services Health Care 
  
   
  
77 Barratt Developments Household Goods Consumer Goods 
78 Bellway Household Goods Consumer Goods 
79 Berkeley Group Holdings Household Goods Consumer Goods 
80 Bovi Homes Group Household Goods Consumer Goods 
81 Persimmon Household Goods Consumer Goods 
82 Reckitt Benckiser Household Goods Consumer Goods 
83 Redrow Household Goods Consumer Goods 
84 Taylor Wimpey Household Goods Consumer Goods 
  
   
  
85 Bodycote Industrial Engineering Industrials 
86 Fenner Industrial Engineering Industrials 
87 IMI Industrial Engineering Industrials 
88 Melrose Industrial Engineering Industrials 
89 Rotork Industrial Engineering Industrials 
90 Spirax-Sarco Engineering Industrial Engineering Industrials 
91 Weir Industrial Engineering Industrials 
  
   
  
92 Ferrexpo Industrial Metals Basic Materials 
  
   
  
93 BBA Aviation Industrial Transportation Industrials 
94 Stobart Group Industrial Transportation Industrials 
  
   
  
95 Aegis Group Media Consumer Services 
96 
British Sky Broadcasting 
Group Media Consumer Services 
97 Daily Mail & General Trust Media Consumer Services 
98 
Euromoney Institutional 
Investors Media Consumer Services 
99 ITE Group Media Consumer Services 
100 ITV Media Consumer Services 
101 Informa Media Consumer Services 
102 Pearson Media Consumer Services 
103 Reed Elsevier Media Consumer Services 
104 Rightmove Media Consumer Services 
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105 UBM Media Consumer Services 
106 WPP Media Consumer Services 
  
   
  
107 Allied Gold Mining Mining Basic Materials 
108 Anglo American Mining Basic Materials 
109 Antofagasta Mining Basic Materials 
110 BHP Billiton Mining Basic Materials 
111 Centamin Egypt Mining Basic Materials 
112 Eurasian Natural Resources Mining Basic Materials 
113 Fresnillo Mining Basic Materials 
114 Gem Diamonds Mining Basic Materials 
115 Hochschild Mining Mining Basic Materials 
116 Kazakhmys Mining Basic Materials 
117 Kenmare Resources Mining Basic Materials 
118 Lonmin Mining Basic Materials 
119 New World Resources Mining Basic Materials 
120 Petropavlovsk Mining Basic Materials 
121 Randgold Resources Mining Basic Materials 
122 Rio Tinto Mining Basic Materials 
123 Talvivaara Mining Company Mining Basic Materials 
124 Vedanta Resources Mining Basic Materials 
125 Xstrata Mining Basic Materials 
  
   
  
126 Inmarsat Mobile Telecommunications Telecommunications 
127 Vodafone Group Mobile Telecommunications Telecommunications 
  
   
  
128 Afren Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
129 BG Group Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
130 BP Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
131 Carn Energy Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
132 Exillon Energy Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
133 Heritage Oil Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
134 Premier Oil Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
135 Royal Dutch Shell A Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
136 Salamander Energy Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
137 Soco International Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
138 Tollow Oil Oil and Gas producers Oil and Gas 
  
   
  
139 Hunting  
Oil Equipment, Services and 
Distribution Oil and Gas 
140 Kentz Corporation 
Oil Equipment, Services and 
Distribution Oil and Gas 
141 Lamprell 
Oil Equipment, Services and 
Distribution Oil and Gas 
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142 Petrofac 
Oil Equipment, Services and 
Distribution Oil and Gas 
143 Wood Group (John) 
Oil Equipment, Services and 
Distribution Oil and Gas 
144 Amec 
Oil Equipment, Services and 
Distribution Oil and Gas 
  
   
  
145 Burberry Group Personal Goods Consumer Goods 
146 PZ Cussons Personal Goods Consumer Goods 
  
   
  
147 AstraZeneca Pharmaceticals and Biotechnology Health Care 
148 BTG Pharmaceticals and Biotechnology Health Care 
149 Genus Pharmaceticals and Biotechnology Health Care 
150 GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceticals and Biotechnology Health Care 
151 Hikma Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceticals and Biotechnology Health Care 
152 Shire Pharmaceticals and Biotechnology Health Care 
  
   
  
153 Aveva Group Software and Computer Services Technology 
154 Computacenter Software and Computer Services Technology 
155 Fidessa Group Software and Computer Services Technology 
156 Invensys Software and Computer Services Technology 
157 Logica Software and Computer Services Technology 
158 Microfocus International Software and Computer Services Technology 
159 SDL Software and Computer Services Technology 
160 Sage Group Software and Computer Services Technology 
161 Telecity Group Software and Computer Services Technology 
  
   
  
162 Aggreko Support Services Industrials 
163 Ashtead Group Support Services Industrials 
164 Atkins (WS) Support Services Industrials 
165 Babcock International Group Support Services Industrials 
166 Berendsen Support Services Industrials 
167 Bunzl Support Services Industrials 
168 Capita Group Support Services Industrials 
169 Carillion Support Services Industrials 
170 De la Rue Support Services Industrials 
171 Electrocomponents Support Services Industrials 
172 Experian Support Services Industrials 
173 Filtrona Support Services Industrials 
174 G4S Support Services Industrials 
175 Hays Support Services Industrials 
176 Homeserve Support Services Industrials 
177 Interserve Support Services Industrials 
178 Intertek Group Support Services Industrials 
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179 MITIE Group Support Services Industrials 
180 Michael Page International Support Services Industrials 
181 Northgate Support Services Industrials 
182 Premier Farnell Support Services Industrials 
183 RPS Support Services Industrials 
184 Regus Support Services Industrials 
185 Rentokil Initial Support Services Industrials 
186 SIG Support Services Industrials 
187 Sthree Support Services Industrials 
188 Serco Group Support Services Industrials 
189 Shanks Group Support Services Industrials 
190 Travis Perkins Support Services Industrials 
  
   
  
191 ARM Holdings 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment Technology 
192 
Imagination Technologies 
Group 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment Technology 
193 Laird 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment Technology 
194 Pace 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment Technology 
195 Spirent Communication 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment Technology 
  
   
  
196 British American Tobacco Tobacco Consumer Goods 
197 Imperial Tobacco Group Tobacco Consumer Goods 
  
   
  
198 Carnival Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
199 Compass Group Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
200 Easyjet Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
201 FirstGroup Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
202 Go-Ahead Group Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
203 Greene King Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
204 
InterContinental Hotels 
Group Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
205 Ladbrokes Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
206 Marstons Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
207 
Millennium & Copthorne 
Hotels Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
208 National Express Group Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
209 Restaurant Group Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
210 Stagecoach Group Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
211 TUI Travel Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
212 Thomas Cook Group Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
213 Wetherspoon (JD) Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
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214 Whitbread Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
215 William Hill Travel and Leisure Consumer Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
